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Abstract
My key question is whether the collective right to self-determination justifies a right on the
part of liberal democracies to exclude outsiders from entering and settling within their
territorial jurisdiction, from accessing citizenship or from participating in the formulation
of their ‘internal’ decisions or policies. I approach the research through critically analysing
six different accounts of the practice and value of democratic self-determination, which
can be categorised as: liberal nationalist, identity liberal, liberal communitarian,
multicultural/republican, cosmopolitan/discourse theory and agonistic.
I argue that although democracy does not and cannot logically call for the extension of
participatory membership to all those affected or coerced by the decisions of a state, self-
determination is compatible with porous boundaries demarcating social membership and
citizenship. The position I advance recognises the importance of clearly demarcated
jurisdictional boundaries for facilitating democratic self-determination, but holds that the
existence of those borders, and the value and practice of self-determination, which they
protect, are compatible with open access to social membership and citizenship. In contrast
to what has become a prevalent line of thinking with regard to the politics of membership
in liberal-democracies, I argue that the value of free movement championed by liberalism
is compatible with the value of self-determination championed by democrats. If valid, the
upshot of my argument is that liberal-democrats should support the right to self-
determination as non-interference for distinct political communities, but not the self-
determination of their social membership and citizenship policies.
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Chapter 1
Introduction
It is an accepted maxim of international law,
that every sovereign nation has the power, as
inherent in sovereignty, and essential to self-
preservation, to forbid the entrance of foreigners
within its dominions, or to admit them only in
such cases and upon such conditions as it may
see fit to prescribe.
American Supreme Court, Nishimura Ekkiu v
United States (1892)
1.1 Framing the problem; Three Modes of Democratic Exclusion
To what extent - if at all - does the principle of self-determination
justify or entail a right on the part of liberal democracies to control
admission to membership?1 The majority of the canonical texts in
liberal political theory do not tackle this particular problem; in fact it
has not generally been seen as a problem at all. Until relatively
recently, most liberal theorists have simply assumed the model of a
bounded and territorially exclusive society for their thought
experiments concerning justice.2 For example, in Political Liberalism,
John Rawls famously postulates the existence of a:
1 I follow Abizadeh (2009) when he writes: “A state is liberal insofar
as it respects the rights and interests of the human beings on whom it
imposes its might. It is democratic insofar as it ultimately attributes
sovereignty to the people, not to itself”.
2 Cole (2000), p60; pp. 194-195. Notable exceptions to this trend
within the liberal canon include Kant (1795) and Sidgwick (1897).
The first important post-Theory of Justice treatment on the issue of
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(…) democratic society … as a complete and
closed social system. It is complete in that it is
self-sufficient and has a place for all the main
purposes of human life. It is also closed … in
that entry into it is only by birth and exit from it
is only by death.3
In theorising about the principles of justice that should determine the
basic structure of society, Rawls assumes for the purposes of his
enterprise that there is no immigration or emigration, and only limited
(if any) economic, social and cultural interaction with other
communities. By framing the question of justice within the context of
a bounded and closed society, Rawls is able to avoid addressing the
question of how and according to what normative principles the
membership boundaries of a liberal democracy should be determined.4
Loren Lomasky notes that the assumption of the legitimacy of
territorially bounded nation-states is a trend we see throughout the
history of liberal thought:
(…) the rule among liberal theorists is to take
states in whatever form and variety they come
down to us as the relevant objects for molding in
accord with precepts of justice. From Hobbes
and Lock through to Rawls, the social contract
is assumed to establish, and to operate within,
fixed national boundaries. What lends
legitimacy to those borders is less diligently
examined.5
immigration from a liberal perspective is in Ackerman (1980).
3 Rawls (1993), p41.
4 Kymlicka (2001a), p252.
5 Lomasky (2001), p56.
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However, within the last thirty years a growing number of theorists in
the liberal-democratic tradition have begun to focus their attention on
the boundaries of political communities and on normative issues
relating to the way in which states regulate admission to their
territory, access to citizenship and rights to participate in their
‘internal’ deliberations and decision making procedures. These
theorists call into question the conventional assumption that the
boundaries of territory, citizenship and democratic participation as
defined by the nation-state can be taken for granted as historical
contingencies, leaving theorists to focus on more important issues
concerning justice and equality internal to particular political
communities. Instead, they consider normative questions of how
territorial and membership boundaries are set and negotiated to be of
equal importance, if not in an important sense prior to, the question of
what justice requires in terms of the duties we owe to our co-
members. It could be argued against the Rawlsian approach that we
cannot establish what distributive justice requires within a liberal
democracy until we know whether, to what extent and in what ways a
liberal democracy has the right to regulate access on the part of
outsiders to the goods which are held within its territory, including the
good of membership.
It is often said that the question of the normative basis for practices of
inclusion and exclusion brings into relief a tension between two of the
core commitments of liberal-democracies.6 On the one hand, they are
committed to recognising the equal moral worth and freedom of all
individuals. Joseph Carens observes that it is a “basic presupposition”
of all liberal political theories that “we should treat all human beings,
not just members of our own society, as free and equal moral
6 Abizadeh (2008); Benhabib (2005); Joppke (2005); Whelan (1983);
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persons”.7 Recognising the equal moral worth and freedom of all
individuals would seem to render all practices of membership control
morally suspect; and at the very least as standing in need of a
justification directed towards those who are excluded which is
consistent with viewing them as inherently free and equal. Liberals are
committed to ensuring the maximum sphere of personal liberty
compatible with the maximum liberty of all. This would seem to
translate into a presumption in favour of unrestricted individual
freedom of movement.8 From a liberal egalitarian perspective, Carens
explains that the value of freedom of movement - both intranationally
and internationally - lies in: a) facilitating personal autonomy, b)
reducing inequality of opportunity based on arbitrary facts or
characteristics (e.g. birth place and nationality), and c) combating
actual inequalities in wealth, resources and opportunities. These last
two considerations also reflect social justice concerns that
membership controls perpetuate global inequality - a charge that I will
discuss in more detail in section 1.4:
Freedom of movement is closely connected to
each of these three concerns. First, the right to
go where you want to go is itself an important
freedom. It is precisely this freedom, and all this
freedom makes possible, that is taken away by
imprisonment. Second, freedom of movement is
essential for equality of opportunity. You have
to be able to move to where the opportunities
are in order to take advantage of them. Third,
freedom of movement would contribute to a
Whelan (1988a); Taylor (2005).
7 Carens (1995), p256. Implicit in my acceptance of this statement is a
rejection of ‘realism’ in IR theory, which holds that the only moral
duty of states is towards their own citizens. On realism in this context,
see Donnelly (2000).
8 Carens (1992), p25. See also Cole (2000); Dummett (2002);
Kymlicka (2001a).
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reduction of political, social and economic
inequalities.9
Democratic theorists have also found reason to challenge the
boundaries of nation-states, but in terms of the way in which they
restrict the scope of democratic participation, rather than the free
movement of individuals. In the face of political issues of global scale
such as the environment, terrorism, the drugs trade, health concerns
like AIDS, migration and international trade and finance, many
theorists argue that the division of democratic constituencies into
territorially bounded jurisdictions defined by nation-states with rights
to self-determination and mutual non-interference is an anachronism
which perpetuates injustice and domination.10 Instead, it is said that
the issues that transcend the borders between nation-states should be
deliberated over in democratic fora which also either transcend or are
situated at a level above national boundaries.
However, liberal-democrats are also committed to the importance of
collective self-determination through popular sovereignty. If we value
collective self-determination and popular sovereignty then it seems
that we must permit political communities to have some degree of
control over the conditions and criteria for entrance to and
membership within their community, as well access to a sphere of
democratic decision-making free from the input of territorial
9 Carens (1992), p26.
10 Archibugi (1998); Archibugi (2004); Benhabib (2004a); Fraser
(2008); Goodin (2007); Gould (2009); Held (1995); Marchetti (2005);
Marchetti (2008); Moore (2006); Tinnevelt and Geenens (2008);
Young (2000a); Young (2004); Young (2005a); Young (2007).
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outsiders. The inclusion of outsiders, whether through admission to
residency status, admission to citizenship or through being awarded a
democratic voice, is likely to have some kind of impact on the
political, socio-cultural and economic conditions in the host country,
and it would seem that these are the sorts of domestic conditions over
which citizens should be entitled to have some kind of democratic
control. As Whelan argues:
(T)he operation of democratic institutions
should amount to “self-determination”, or
control by the people over matters that affect
their common interests. The admission of new
members into the democratic group … would
appear to be such a matter, one that could not
only affect various private interests of the
current members, but that could also, in the
aggregate, affect the quality of their public life
and the character of their community.11
So the question of membership is an area where these dual normative
commitments - to universal freedom and equality on the one hand, and
to democratic self-determination on the other - potentially collide.
Why should the liberal commitment to freedom and equality apply
only to the citizens of particular states? Why not consider those
principles as applying equally to all individuals, regardless of their
nationality, citizenship status or territorial location? And if we do
want to extend the liberal commitment to freedom and equality to all
individuals, regardless of their nationality, citizenship status or
territorial location, what does this entail for the right of political
communities to regulate the terms for the admission of outsiders to
membership? For Seyla Benhabib, the always-present tension between
the universal, cosmopolitan grounding of political rights in shared
humanity and the particular instances of those rights when they are
11 Whelan (1988a), pp. 28-29.
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embedded within differentiated political communities represents “the
paradox of democratic legitimacy”.12 She articulates this tension in the
following terms:
Sovereignty entails the right of a people to
control its borders as well as define the
procedures for admitting “aliens” into its
territory and society; yet in a liberal-democratic
polity, such sovereignty claims must always be
constrained by human rights, which individuals
are entitled to, not by virtue of being citizens or
members of a polity, but insofar as they are
simply human beings (…)13
In this thesis I situate the issue of political membership within the
perspective of liberal-democratic theory, asking what the practice of
self-determination implies for the regulation of movement across
territorial borders, for the rules and procedures for accessing
citizenship and for the distribution of rights to democratic
participation. For my purposes, ‘exclusion’ as a political phenomenon
refers to the manifold ways in which individuals are “prevented from
initiating and participating in democratic negotiation”.14 Does the
collective right to self-determination justify or in some sense entail a
right on the part of liberal democracies to exclude outsiders from
entering and settling within their territorial jurisdiction, from
accessing citizenship or from participating in the formulation of their
‘internal’ decisions or policies? We can characterise these three forms
of exclusion as: exclusion from social membership15 (i.e. exclusion
from entering and settling in the territory of a political community as a
resident alien), exclusion from citizenship (i.e. exclusion from formal
12 Benhabib (2004a), p43.
13 Benhabib (1999), p711. See also Sidgwick (1897), p295.
14 Williams and Macedo (2005), p17.
15 Carens (2009) uses the term ‘social membership’ in this way.
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membership in the polity) and exclusion from participatory
membership (i.e. exclusion from participation in deliberations and
decisions undertaken by political communities of which one is neither
a social member nor a citizen, but whose decisions and policies
nonetheless affect one’s interests). Participatory membership
describes the normative goal endorsed by transnational and global
democrats of re-situating rights to democratic participation in
transnational or supra-national deliberative fora which transcend or
supersede the divisions between nation-states.16 These three forms of
exclusion are not intended to exhaust the ways in which individuals
may find themselves less than equally represented in relation to other
members of a political community, but they provide a framework for
the normative investigation to follow.
The distinction between social membership and citizenship indicates
the fact that entering and settling in the territory of a political
community does not entail full membership in the sense of the
complete basket of social, civil and political rights.17 Resident aliens
are individuals who are social members in my use of the term;
tourists, foreign students and other kinds of temporary visitors are not
relevant to my project. Social membership means being legally
admitted to the territory and granted residency status. I use the term
‘social member’ to indicate the fact that once settled, these individuals
typically make a commitment and contribution to their country of
residence through living, working, developing relationships in civil
and political society, and so forth.18 Territorial admission is often
16 Transnational democratic interaction is democratic deliberation
carried out between nation-states. Global or supra-national democratic
interaction is democratic deliberation carried out at levels above the
nation-state.
17 Carens (1992), p29.
18 Carens (2009).
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contingent upon the possession of certain economic skills and
resources - including financial independence - as evidence of the
contribution that prospective migrants will make to their host society
and to provide reassurance that they will not become a drain on social
and economic resources. So highly skilled individuals like doctors,
engineers or academics usually have greater freedom of international
movement than poor, unskilled labourers. Access to social
membership and citizenship is also commonly awarded more readily
to individuals who have a historic or cultural connection to the
destination country. For example, in the early 1960s the UK
Conservative government actively encouraged immigration from
Commonwealth countries.19 Israel’s ‘Law of Return’ enacted in 1950
grants Jews and those of Jewish ancestry the right to residency and
citizenship in Israel. Immigration and membership policy is thus used
to consolidate Israel’s goal of establishing a secure state in the Middle
East and to ensure inter-generational cultural and religious continuity.
Liberal states universally award social members some set of key civil
and political rights and benefits; rights to due process, for example,
and to private property. But they reserve some rights, benefits and
burdens for citizens alone; typically (but not universally) the right to
vote and the right to hold office in high-tier positions in government,
immunity against deportation and often eligibility for certain social
benefits and healthcare provisions. For example, the 1996 Welfare
Reform Act in the United States made access to provisions like food
stamps conditional upon citizenship status. Furthermore, acquiring
citizenship serves an important symbolic function in so far as it
confers the status of a full member of the civil and political
community. All liberal democracies grant citizenship to some
19 Hardill, Graham & Kofman (eds) (2001), p68.
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individuals at birth; either through birth to parents who are citizens
(jus sanguinis) or birth within the territory (jus soli). Resident aliens
can acquire citizenship through naturalisation. Liberal states vary in
the different conditions and criteria that have to be satisfied to
naturalise, but they typically require a certain period of residency,
language skills, lack of criminal record, and some degree of civic
competence and knowledge of the political institutions and history of
the host country.
In addition to being part of a comparatively neglected field of inquiry
in liberal political theory, the question I address in this thesis is of
considerable relevance to the contemporary scene of global politics.
As the process of economic, environmental, industrial and
technological globalisation gains speed, the significance of the
boundaries of political communities – in both a territorial and a
jurisdictional sense –in structuring the life-options of individuals is
likely to increase. For this reason, it is incumbent upon political
theorists and analysts to subject those boundaries to normative and
empirical analysis. Those theorists who have called into question the
normative basis of membership controls have most commonly been
answered by appeals to the value of collective self-determination.
1.2 The Value of Collective Self-Determination
The ideal of collective self-determination refers to the value and
practice of a group of individuals jointly establishing the conditions of
their shared political, economic and cultural life. It is respected in
international law: Article 1, section 2 of the UN Charter states that a
key goal for the UN is “To develop friendly relations among nations
21
based on respect for the principle of equal rights and self-
determination of peoples”.20 Self-determination became a prevalent
concept in international relations in the nineteenth century with the
rise of claims to independent statehood on the part of European
nationalities. During this period, the relevant unit to which rights of
self-determination were ascribed was conceived in ethnic terms. The
terms of the Paris Peace Accord in 1919 sought to ensure a lasting
peace in Europe by awarding self-determination rights and
independent statehood to ethnic groups that had previously been
subsumed under the Russian, Ottoman, Austro-Hungarian and
German empires.21 The ideal of self-determination continued to play
an important role in the twentieth century in the context of the
struggles for independence of colonised groups. However, after the
Second World War, self-determination came to be understood in
primarily multi-ethnic and non-nationalist terms. It is generally
understood today in international law that self-determination does not
entail the political independence of an ethnically or nationally
homogenous group, but rather the political claim of the “right of the
majority within an accepted political unit to exercise power”.22 Still,
the ethnic conception has retained its relevance in the late twentieth
and twenty-first centuries for indigenous groups looking to secede
from central authorities in order to remedy historic injustice and/or
present day social, political and economic marginalisation, to preserve
their distinct culture and way of life and to establish their claims to
territorial integrity, jurisdictional authority and political autonomy.23
20 UN Charter (1945), Article 1, Section 2.
21 Moore (1998), p136.
22 Higgins (1963), pp. 103-105; quoted in Moore (1998), p136.
23 Dahbour (2001).
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There seem to be compelling reasons why political communities
should have rights to self-determination. For David Miller, an
appropriate analogy that spells out the value of collective self-
determination is that of individual autonomy. In the same way that
individuals are entitled to a sphere of decision-making over which
they should be sovereign in order to enable them to pursue their self-
defined goals, so too are groups.24 The most appropriate self-
determining political community, for Miller, is a national group:
(…) self-determination for groups is valuable in
much the same way as self-determination for
individuals. Just as individual people want to be
able to shape their circumstances to suit their
aims and ambitions, so groups want to be able to
decide how to organize their internal affairs and
to dispose of their resources.25
Margalit and Raz provide a similar account of the value served by
national self-determination:
The idea of national self-government ... speaks
of groups determining the character of their
social and economic environment, their
fortunes, the course of their development, and
the fortunes of their members by their own
actions, i.e, by the action of those groups, in as
much as these are matters which are properly
within the realm of political action.26
However, not all theorists who affirm the importance of the self-
determination of distinct groups affirm the value of nationalism or
24 I follow Moore (2001, p170) in understanding a ‘collective right’ to
refer to a “right that must be exercised in common with others”.
25 Miller (2000), p164.
26 Margalit and Raz (1990), p440.
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national identity. There is disagreement amongst theorists over the
appropriate unit to which rights to self-determination should be
ascribed. Iris Young, for example, rejects the idea that special moral
obligations and rights to self-determination follow from shared
nationality:
(…) the concept of self-determination I wish to
defend detaches the concept of a people from
nationalism, that is, from the claim that being a
people entails rights to a distinct, contiguous and
bounded territory over which the group has
exclusive jurisdiction (…)27
Nevertheless, she still reserves an important role in her theory of
justice for the self-determination of distinct communities of ‘peoples’,
and on similar grounds to Miller and Margalit and Raz, i.e. from the
value of individual autonomy and well-being:
(…) to the extent that the well-being of
individuals partly depends on the flourishing of
the meanings and practices that serve as sources
of their selves, then those people should have
the means collectively to decide how to
maintain and promote their flourishing as
people.28
Theorists often unpack further the value of self-determination in terms
of allowing room for the development of diverse forms of political
organisation and/or cultural ways of life. The relevant and deliberately
alarming contrast often drawn is that of a world state without borders
that would eradicate the differentiated jurisdictions within which
associations of individuals collectively deliberate over, decide upon
27 Young (2000a), p255.
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and develop different political, economic, social and cultural systems
of governance and collective organisation in accordance with their
self-defined needs and interests. This is what Michael Walzer has in
mind when he argues that membership controls are necessary for
particular associations to be “communities of character”29 with their
own distinct way of life; for example, with their own health care
programmes, taxation priorities or systems of cultural rights.
Preventing the autonomous self-determination of political
communities would in turn undermine the autonomy of individual
citizens, because they would no longer be able to regard their state and
its coercive laws as the political framework through which they
express their particular preferences and pursue their particular goals.
In order to see coercive state actions as consistent with their freedom
and autonomy, citizens must be able to regard the state as acting out
their democratically self-defined interests. The link between self-
determination and personal autonomy is explained by Arash Abizadeh
in this way when he writes that:
The democratic principle of self-determination
might follow from the ideal of personal
autonomy in either of two ways: either because
democratic political institutions are
instrumentally necessary for the protection of
personal autonomy from coercive encroachment
or because being able to see oneself as the
author of the laws to which one is subject is
inherently necessary for a justification of
coercion consistent with autonomy.30
It is often thought that the right to collective self-determination
implies a corresponding right to non-interference from external states,
28 Ibid, p256.
29 Walzer (1983), p62. See also Whelan (1988a), p34.
30 Abizadeh (2008), p42.
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agencies, organisations or individuals. For example, the United
Nations’ Declaration on the Inadmissibility of Intervention in the
Domestic Affairs of States and the Protection of Their Independence
and Sovereignty claims that “Every State has an inalienable right to
choose its political, economic, social and cultural systems, without
interference in any form by another State”.31 In this vein, Miller
endorses a vision of the international order in which “nation-states are
self-determining, but respect the self-determination of others through
obligations of non-interference and in some cases of aid”.32 Self-
determination as non-interference is closely linked to the principle of
national sovereignty. Ideally, sovereign political entities possess full
authority to regulate political affairs within a particular bounded
territory, and this authority is taken to be exclusive in the sense that it
denies the right of outsiders or external states, agencies, organisations
or individuals to have any kind of input or participation in those
‘internal’ affairs.33
1.3 Self-determination and Inclusion/Exclusion
My key question in this thesis is whether the sphere of self-determined
decision-making for liberal democracies should encompass the
demarcation and distribution of any of the three forms of membership
introduced above. Many authors argue that self-determination is
conceptually and/or normatively inseparable from acts of exclusion.
Though it appears in various different theoretical formulations, the
basic claim here is that the right of a political community to control
admission to membership is a necessary and/or normatively legitimate
31 A/RES/20/2131 (1965).
32 Miller (1995), p107.
33 Cole (2000) p18.
26
function of its right to democratic self-determination. Democracy, it is
often said, inherently calls for bounded jurisdictions that distinguish
members from non-members. What is interesting to note as a
preliminary point is that the exclusion claim is advanced from authors
who otherwise have very different theoretical orientations. For
example, Raffaele Marchetti states that:
(…) the very idea of a self-defining group
implies exclusivity, i.e. the existence of public
characteristics effectively delimiting the
boundaries of a community. Every such society
needs to assume a selective criterion in order to
self-define its jurisdictional constituency, thus
simultaneously keeping out non-members. The
demarcation of group identity entails drawing a
line between those who are in and those who are
out, between those individuals who are
recognised as equal and those who are treated
unequally.34
Jurgen Habermas also argues that democratic self-determination
entails the existence of political communities differentiated by
jurisdictional boundaries:
Any political community that wants to
understand itself as a democracy must at least
distinguish between members and non-
members. The self-referential concept of
collective self-determination demarcates a
logical space for democratically united citizens
who are members of a political community.35
The idea that democratic self-determination is a ‘self-referential’
concept seems to encapsulate the thought that it is for the existing
34 Marchetti (2005), p487.
35 Habermas (2001), p107.
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members to decide upon and shape the sphere of membership
according to their self-determined goals and interests. The existing
‘self’ that is self-determining can only be demarcated by the existing
‘self’. Perhaps most famously, Walzer argues that exclusion is
inherent in the very meaning of self-determination, since the whole
point of self-determination is to preserve the distinctiveness of
political communities, which would be threatened if they did not have
a unilateral right to impose membership controls: “Admission and
exclusion are at the core of communal independence. They suggest the
deepest meaning of self-determination.”36
Walzer’s often-cited claim speaks to a point that is not only echoed by
a number of other theorists but (as we will see in the following
section) also reflected in international relations and in the status of
national sovereignty. His claim supposes that there is something about
membership decisions which means that they hold a particular
significance for the practice of collective self-determination, which, in
turn, means that it is of particular importance that citizens should
exercise unilateral control over those decisions. A number of theorists
suggest with Walzer that if political communities cannot exercise
unilateral control over membership policy then they fail to qualify as
fully self-determining associations. Frederick Whelan, for example,
argues that:
(…) if power over this matter lay elsewhere than
in the hands of the members, if the matter …
were permanently removed from the agenda, the
democracy that existed would be seriously
attenuated; it would not amount to self-
determination.37
36 Walzer (1983), p62.
37 Whelan (1988a), pp. 28-29.
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Similarly, Jonathan Seglow argues that one of the main reasons for
rejecting a policy of open borders is because:
(…) it would remove a peculiarly significant
aspect of citizens’ right to control their future:
their very freedom to determine who becomes a
member (even a citizen) and who does not. I
suggest that the freedom to determine
membership of the very polity which has
freedom to determine its own affairs is of
special symbolic importance.38
Peter Meilander accounts for the source of the ‘peculiar significance’
of membership decisions by arguing that the question of membership
raises the issue of the identity of the political community that the
members wish to either preserve or develop:
By determining or changing the very
composition of a people, questions of
membership go to the heart of its basic character
or identity …. Immigration triggers …. deep
responses because it forces a people to address
the question, Who are we and who do we want
to be?39
From the quotations just cited, we can see that the arguments for
membership controls from self-determination typically appeal to a set
of premises concerning the normative, political and conceptual
relationships between collective and/or national identity, culture,
democracy, popular sovereignty and territorial rights. The ways in
which theorists either tie these premises together to justify exclusion,
38 Seglow (2006b), p236.
39 Meilander (2001), p83.
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or try to pick them apart to encourage more inclusive politics, will be
discussed in detail in the chapters that follow.
From the perspective of those theorists who are concerned to promote
more inclusive forms of democratic politics, a key part of the problem
with defending the boundaries around political communities is that the
‘internal’ deliberations and decisions of states - including their
deliberations and decisions over their border controls and membership
policies - can and often do affect those who are disenfranchised.40
Seglow articulates this problem when he writes:
One of the freedoms that free and equal citizens
ought to have is the freedom to decide on
matters of common concern with their fellow
citizens. The moral problem is when this
collective freedom impacts upon the interests of
those excluded from the ambit of decision-
making (…)41
Many theorists consider it normatively significant that the processes
through which states define and carry out their self-determined goals
often have effects that transcend the borders between states, and so
they argue that many ‘internal’ decisions - including decisions over
membership - should not be the exclusive preserve of territorially
bounded citizens to deliberate over and decide upon. This group of
theorists - which can be broadly characterised as transnational or
global democrats - typically argue that the participatory membership
boundaries of political communities should be set by and
(re)negotiated according to some version of the ‘all-affected’
principle. This argument is internal to democratic theory, and its basic
40 Abizadeh (2008), p46.
41 Seglow (2005), p324.
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formulation is that all those individuals who are affected by a decision
of a government should have a right to participate in the making of
that decision.42 Put simply, it makes the normative claim that the value
of democratic institutions is that they enable those who are affected by
the decisions of political communities and the activities of states to
have a say in how coercive power is distributed and exercised, and it
marries this to the empirical observation that the affects of political
decisions often transcend the borders of political communities, which
leads to the conclusion that democratic politics should not be confined
within those communities but should be carried out either
transnationally or globally. Participatory membership should therefore
be re-situated in transnational or global deliberative bodies and not
confined within territorially bounded, sovereign political
communities. As we will see in Chapter 4, Iris Young argues that
obligations of justice stem from causal connections and
interdependencies. In so far as those relationships transcend the
borders of sovereign nation-states, there should in her view be greater
global regulation of the activities of political communities as well as
access for individuals to transnational and global democratic fora: “If
the scope of democratic political institutions should correspond to the
scope of obligations of justice, then ... there ought to be more global
institutional capacity to govern relations and interactions among the
world’s peoples”.43
Proponents of the all-affected principle commonly cite ecological
policy as an example of a sphere of decision making that can have a
profound impact on the interests of those who, by virtue of their status
as non-members, are barred from participating in those decisions. The
French policy of nuclear testing in its colonial territories in the South
42 Dahl (1970), p64.
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Pacific in 1996 was a legitimate act of self-determination in so far as it
was a decision undertaken by a democratically mandated government
to pursue a particular goal related to national self-defence within its
territorial jurisdiction. Yet the French government was never required
to consult or take into account the views of the people who lived in
the surrounding area and whose lives and environment were likely to
be (and were) profoundly and negatively affected by the testing, since
they were not part of the French demos.44 The French citizens who
were able to decide on the matter bore none of the negative effects,
and presumably benefited in terms of greater national security and
scientific advancement.45 If valid, the all-affected principle supplies
the normative criterion that explains why the South-Pacific Islanders
have a claim to participatory membership that they hold against the
French government, despite not being recognised as French citizens.
More generally, it is clear that border controls and the demarcation of
social membership and citizenship can have a significant impact on
the interests of those located abroad who - by virtue of their territorial
location and citizenship status - have no say in the making of those
decisions. As Benhabib points out, one of the paradoxes of democracy
and political membership is that:
(…) a shared feature of all norms of
membership, including but not only norms of
citizenship, is that those who are affected by the
consequences of these norms and, in the first
place, by criteria of exclusion, per definitionem,
cannot be party to their articulation.46
43 Young (2000a), p9.
44 This example is used in Karlsonn (2006), p18. See also Shachar
(2007), pp. 264-265, & Archibugi (2004), p444.
45 Archibugi (2004), p444.
46 Benhabib (2004a), p15.
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This perspective on democratic inclusion provides a normative
alternative to the idea that membership control is a power that is either
inherently and/or justifiably implied by the right of collective self-
determination. It states that one good reason on democratic grounds
that the existing citizens of a political community should not be
entitled to exercise unilateral control over membership policy is
because those decisions also affect outsiders. Implicit in this view is a
rejection of the idea that democracy inherently presupposes a
territorially bounded and exclusive demos.
It seems then that self-determination has normatively troubling
implications for practices of inclusion and exclusion. Membership
controls are (according to many theorists) necessary for and/or
justified by the valuable practice of collective self-determination, yet
self-determining communities often enact decisions which result in
political consequences that call into question the just character of the
boundaries separating members from non-members.
However, not all theorists agree that democratic self-determination
necessarily implies acts of exclusion or unilateral control over
membership. Iris Young, for example, develops an understanding of
self-determination as non-domination, and she argues that this
alternative conception shows us that self-determination can and
should proceed without acts of exclusion. Benhabib also attempts to
reconcile inclusive membership procedures with the practice of
democratic self-determination. She argues that although the logic of
democratic representation and legitimation calls for the existence of
borders separating different jurisdictions, there are processes available
within democratic fora - what she calls ‘democratic iterations’ and
‘jurisgenerative politics’ - that can serve to progressively widen the
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circle of inclusion to encompass previously excluded or marginalised
individuals.47 Both Young and Benhabib believe that combining the
all-affected principle with a federalist institutional design for the
organisation and interaction of distinct political communities is the
key to reconciling properly inclusive membership policies with the
value and practice of democratic self-determination. The agonistic
conception of democracy as political action taken in concert with
strangers also suggests an alternative to culturally, nationally or
economically exclusive membership policies.
This rather stark contrast between those authors who regard
membership controls as either justified by or inherent in the very
meaning of self-determination, and those authors who argue for more
fluid, porous or issue-responsive membership boundaries because
collectively self-determined decisions often have normatively relevant
implications for the interests of individuals regardless of their
nationality, citizenship-status or territorial location, provides the broad
framework for this thesis. I approach the research through critically
analysing six different accounts of the practice and value of
democratic self-determination, which can be categorised as: liberal
nationalist, identity liberal, liberal communitarian,
multicultural/republican, cosmopolitan/discourse theory and
agonistic. Each of these approaches puts forward a particular
interpretation of the value of democratic freedom in relation to the
rights of individuals, and each results in a different set of
recommendations as to the correct principles and procedures that
should govern membership practices.
47 Ibid.
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In the following section I provide a definition of some of the key
conceptual terms that I will employ throughout the thesis. I then
discuss the way in which the ‘peculiar significance’ of membership
controls relates to national sovereignty in real world politics. Finally, I
set some parameters for my project by briefly outlining what will not
be taken into consideration. In the final section of this chapter, I
outline the shape of the thesis, its key arguments and conclusion.
1.4 National Sovereignty and Political Membership
The state is a political apparatus with jurisdiction over a bounded
territory. Nations are communities which are said to share a culture in
the sense of a language, history and other common traits such as
shared values, beliefs or a ‘national consciousness’ (i.e. a belief that
all the members of the nation share something in common that
distinguishes them as a group). Marchetti notes that:
While the term ‘state’ represents a legal concept
describing a social group that occupies a defined
territory and is organized under common
political institutions and effective government,
‘nation’ depicts a social group that shares a
common ideology, common institutions and
customs, and a sense of homogeneity. In this
sense, a nation can be seen then as a community
of sentiment or an ‘imagined community’.48
‘Democracy’, however, is challenging to define, because it is itself a
contested and normative concept. To describe a regime, organisation,
policy or decision as being ‘democratic’ is to judge it to be legitimate
in some sense. Those who - like Walzer - define democracy as being a
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form of government where all who are subject to the law (i.e. bound
by it in the legal sense) should also be able to regard themselves as the
authors of those laws find themselves in disagreement with others -
such as Young49 - who define democracy as being a form of
government where all those who are affected by the law should be the
authors of those laws. Other theorists - like Nancy Fraser50 and
Abizadeh51 - narrow down the definition further by specifying that, in
a democracy, those who are coerced by the law should be the authors
of those laws. So there is no normatively neutral or theory-innocent
way of defining democracy. It will become clear in this thesis that
follow that I favour the normative arguments supporting the first,
Walzerian understanding, but in order not to beg the question as far as
possible, I will limit myself here to defining self-determination as
being democratic if it proceeds according to the practice of popular
sovereignty. Popular sovereignty refers to the idea that the people that
constitute a particular demos (whether that demos be defined by those
who are subjected to, affected or coerced by the law, or by some other
criterion) legitimate the exercise of political power through being
awarded a voice in the construction of the laws under which they are
governed.52 Its value stems partly from its protection of a sphere of
political freedom and autonomy that we would lack under, say, a
theocracy, monarchy or absolutist regime. That freedom arises from
the fact that, in Charles Taylor’s words, “we are ruling ourselves in
common, and not being ruled by some agency which need take no
account of us.”53 Democracy is rule by the people. The normative
difficulty consists in specifying who should constitute ‘the people’.
48 Marchetti (2005), p493.
49 Young (2000a).
50 Fraser (2008).
51 Abizadeh (2008).
52 Benhabib (2007), p449.
53 Taylor (2004), p189.
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In contemporary international politics this normative question is side-
stepped, as the right to control admission to membership is generally
seen as an important manifestation of national sovereignty and
collective self-determination. As Sarah Collinson notes, “The
admission of aliens has historically been viewed as inherent in the
very nature of sovereignty.”54 States tend to regard membership
policies as a means of furthering or facilitating their political,
economic, social and cultural goals. As I noted above, specific groups
of immigrants are often actively recruited in order to meet demands
from the labour market, to provide certain skills and services or to
facilitate the cultural goals of the nation.55 Naturally, such policies are
equally exclusive of those lacking the specific qualifications, cultural
traits or skills which are required. For example, the immigration
policy of Quebec favors French speakers and actively encourages
migration from French-speaking North African countries. Immigration
and membership policy is thus used to consolidate Quebec’s goal to
preserve a distinct Francophile cultural identity independent of
anglophone Canada. Other countries focus less on cultural integration
and more on the economic attributes and potential contribution of
prospective migrants. For example, the UK has recently followed
Australia in introducing a selective points-based immigration system
in order to meet specific needs in the domestic labour market and to
reassure citizens that immigration will not have a detrimental impact
on “jobs, public services and their way of life”.56 The key message of
the 2006 Home Office document outlining the new system is that
54 Collinson (1993), p3. It is, however, important to note that the
current forms of bureaucratic membership regulation enacted by
sovereign states are a comparatively recent phenomenon, dating from
the end of the nineteenth century with the United States’ Chinese
Exclusion Act in 1882; Cole (2000), p30. See also Chapter 7, section
7.3 of this thesis.
55 Sager (2008), p70.
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citizens will be able to exercise unilateral control over immigration
according to their self-defined needs and goals:
(…) this new points-based system will allow
employers and those in educational institutions
to take ownership of migration to this country.
They, rather than just the Home Office alone,
will be able to vet who comes into the UK
according to the skills and talents of individuals
they feel they need to enhance their sector.57
Nation-states today are embedded in complex networks of
international agreements and treaties, and they are increasingly (if
only nominally) bound by forms of international legislation, such as
the framework of universal human rights issued by the UN or the
regulations on ecological policy agreed to under the terms of the
Kyoto Protocol58. In the sphere of membership, however, they still
possess the virtually unconstrained sovereignty which they lack with
regard to - say - their environmental policies. It is interesting to note
with Roger Brubacker that the idea of the ‘peculiar significance’ of
membership decisions, which I referred to above, is reflected in EU
policy, where “citizenship is a last bastion of sovereignty; states
continue to enjoy a freedom in this regard that they increasingly lack
in others”.59 Although the right to freedom of movement for EU-15
citizens is enshrined in the EU constitution, there has been little effort
made to harmonise the procedures through which migrants can access
citizenship.60 As we will see in Chapter 5, Benhabib is particularly
animated by the fact that whilst the Universal Declaration of Human
Rights recognises a human right to exit a state, it imposes no
56 Home Office (2006), p1.
57 Home Office (2006), Foreword.
58 Cole (2000), p21.
59 Brubacker (1992), p180.
60 Gunes-Ayata (2008), p4.
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reciprocal obligation on any other state to grant entrance to outsiders.
So in the terms laid out in what is arguably the most significant legal
attempt to constrain national sovereignty according to a bill of
universal human rights, states remain the final arbiters over
admittance to social membership and citizenship.61
What does contemporary political theory have to say on these
matters? Before I proceed to outline the shape of this thesis I want to
make some caveats concerning the scope of my project. Firstly, some
of the most pressing normative issues relating to immigration,
citizenship and borders arise because of the vast disparities in wealth,
resources, employment opportunities, political stability and just
political institutions between nation-states. This normative landscape
is complicated further by the acts of colonialism, slavery, empire and
conquest which constitute the historical background for present day
international inequalities and the particular demarcation of nation-
states. It is beyond the scope of this thesis to investigate in any
comprehensive sense the normative implications of global inequality
and its historical background for issues relating to self-determination
and political membership.62 The focus of this thesis is on evaluating
whether the right to self-determination grounds a right on the part of
liberal democracies to control admission to membership. The debate
on global inequality and global justice - although importantly related -
is orthogonal to the debate on democracy and political membership,
because the primary normative concern in the former would seem to
be inequality, rather than exclusion from membership. In other words,
considerations of global inequality may pertain first and foremost to
arguments for the international redistribution of wealth and resources
61 Benhabib (2004b), p130.
62 For detailed treatments of these issues, see the collection of essays
in Barry and Goodin (eds) (1992).
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rather than for opening up borders or for developing forms of
democratic inclusion and participation above and beyond the nation-
state.63 At the same time, no lengthy normative analysis of democracy
and membership can avoid taking considerations of global inequality
into account, because some of the most compelling arguments against
democratic exclusion follow from the role that membership
boundaries play in perpetuating global inequality. The current system
of border restrictions around nation-states help to perpetuate a global
context in which some individuals enjoy enormous wealth and
opportunity whilst others, by comparison, are condemned to live a life
of abject poverty. Yet place or circumstances of birth - the criteria on
which liberal states universally award citizenship automatically to a
certain class of individuals - would appear to be paradigmatic
examples of the kinds of arbitrary facts that liberals (and liberal
egalitarians in particular) strongly believe should not determine a
person’s fundamental life opportunities.64 I will limit my discussion of
these issues to the relevant arguments in the work of the authors on
which I focus; they will come to the fore primarily in Chapter 3, when
I discuss Miller’s account of national responsibility.
Secondly, I will not be addressing issues concerning the secession of
groups from wider political communities. The focus of this thesis is
not on claims for self-determination, i.e. the conditions under which a
group aspiring to sovereign statehood should be recognised as such
under international law. Whilst secession disputes do encompass
63 See, for example, the discussions of the relationship between global
inequality and border controls in Barry (1992) & Bader (1997). This is
a claim I discuss at some length in Chapter 3, section 3.8.
64Hence, Carens’ (1995, p230) oft-cited description of birthright
citizenship as being “the modern equivalent of feudal privilege - an
inherited status that greatly enhances one’s life chances”. For a further
critique of birthright citizenship from a liberal egalitarian perspective,
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pressing - and often bloody and intractable - issues relating to self-
determination and political membership, my interest concerns political
communities that already have a recognised right to self-
determination.65
Lastly, it is important to bear in mind that there are many different
categories of migrants because people re-locate for many different
reasons. As I stated above, temporary visitors such as students or
holiday makers are not the focus of my discussions of admission to
social membership and citizenship. Refugees and asylum seekers raise
a distinct set of normative issues in relation to political membership
and I will not be including them in this project. So I assume that the
migrants being considered for social membership and citizenship are
not fleeing war, religious or political persecution, or other threats to
their immediate personal safety or human rights. I will also not be
addressing the issue of illegal immigration nor family re-unification
policy. The former requires separate normative analysis because it
raises issues which are only tangentially related to legal immigration. I
will take it as given that the latter issue is uncontroversial; other things
being equal (e.g. national security would not be at threat) families and
spouses should and often do have an immediate right to re-locate in
order to live together.66
see Shachar (2003); Shachar (2007) & Shachar (2009).
65 See, for example, the discussion of the relationship between claims
to secession, self-determination and political membership in Dahbour
(2005) & Moore (1998).
66 For example, Home Office (2002, p99) explains that “In June 1997,
this Government abolished the ‘primary purpose’ rule which
prevented foreign spouses coming to the United Kingdom where it
was judged that the primary purpose of the marriage was admission to
this country. We held it to be unfair and arbitrary as it caught not just
bogus marriages, but also genuine arranged marriages where the
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The type of migrant I will be occupied with in this thesis when
discussing admission to social membership and citizenship is
motivated to re-locate primarily by a desire to improve their economic
well-being.67 Economic migrants are individuals who seek to better
their life options (primarily through a higher income, better
employment opportunities and a higher standard of living) by settling
on a long term basis in a foreign country.68 No hard and fast definition
of ‘long term basis’ is available, so I will simply assume that they
seek permanent residency status potentially leading to citizenship, and
aim to live out their lives for the foreseeable future in their new
country
1.5 The Shape of the Thesis
The key question motivating my research is whether and to what
extent the regulation of the three forms of political membership
mentioned above should fall under the remit of a liberal democracy’s
right to self-determination. Philip Cole summarises the normative
framework for this kind of investigation as follows:
If we believe that the moral equality of persons
can act as the basis of a framework of
international justice and human rights, then we
do believe there are limits to self-determination;
parties intended to live together permanently in the UK”.
67 Considerations of social, linguistic and cultural climate may of
course also be relevant to their choice of destination state, as well as
the existence of historical ties; Seglow (2006a), p2.
68 The vast majority of migrants fit into this category; Seglow (2005,
p318) points out that in 2002, only 15 million of the world’s 185
million migrants were refugees. My typology of migration types
follows that of Seglow (2006a), p2.
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some matters can rightly be held to lie beyond
the scope of the democratic powers of any body
of people … it could be argued that one of the
most important matters that should lie outside
the scope of the self-determining power of an
association is its membership.69
Cole does, however, concede that “it may not be impossible to make
out a liberal argument for this kind of power”.70 My aim in this thesis
is to make progress in the direction that Cole gestures towards here -
towards an assessment of the normative validity of arguments for the
right of a liberal democracy to control its sphere of membership as a
function of its right to self-determination.
The following chapters will illustrate how different conceptions of
self-determination result in very different prescriptions concerning
both the porosity and regulation of the membership boundaries of
political communities.71 The way in which theorists view
immigration, access to citizenship and the legitimate scope of
participatory rights is shaped in part by their understanding of what
sorts of conditions are seen as required for, justified by and/or
necessary for self-determination to proceed. It follows from this that
in so far as a particular account of democratic self-determination can
be criticised as incoherent, contradictory, empirically inadequate or
politically undesirable, we will also be armed with an objection to the
particular criteria for boundary setting that are said to follow from that
account. This is one of the main strategies I will employ in critically
analysing the six different accounts of self-determination that I will be
discussing in the chapters that follow.
69 Cole (2000), pp. 185-186.
70 Ibid, p185.
71 Meilander (2000, p171), makes a similar claim.
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I will argue to the conclusion that although democracy does not and
cannot logically call for the extension of participatory membership to
all those affected or coerced by the decisions of a state, self-
determination is compatible with porous boundaries demarcating
social membership and citizenship. I use the term ‘porous’ to highlight
the fact that I do not necessarily endorse the wholesale opening of all
boundaries and borders; there may well be defensible reasons for why
liberal democracies should exercise powers of membership control.
But this thesis draws attention to problems with attempting to justify
territorial exclusion and exclusion from citizenship from the value of
self-determination. The position I advance recognises the importance
of clearly demarcated jurisdictional boundaries for facilitating
democratic self-determination, but holds that the existence of those
borders, and the value and practice of self-determination, which they
protect, are compatible with open access to social membership and
citizenship.
I begin in Chapter 2 by focusing on a group of authors who put
forward a justification for exclusion from social membership and
citizenship grounded on a nationalist account of self-determination.
The main focus of the chapter is on the liberal nationalist account put
forward by Yael Tamir and the identity liberal account put forward
Andrew Tebble. The kernel of both these positions is that national
majorities have a right to protect their cultural identity and shared
values from being eroded through the presence in society of
individuals who do not endorse or participate in the identity or values
in question. They argue that the shared identity and values of the host
community should provide the criteria for inclusion and exclusion,
since these shared features are of crucial importance to the practice of
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national self-determination and to the autonomy of individual citizens.
The chapter begins by discussing how the relationship between
allegedly shared national identity and democracy has recently come to
play an increasingly prominent role in justifications for exclusion
from social membership and citizenship in a number of liberal
democratic states. This trend is most notable in the move towards
‘thickening’ naturalisation criteria by requiring the applicant to
illustrate their commitment to the liberal values that are said to be
shared by the members of the host community. In my response, I
argue against the view that there are in fact a set of values, traits or
characteristics which are shared within any national community and
which can thus constitute the basis for justified acts of exclusion, and I
also put forward reasons for rejecting the ideal of democracy which
this view implies.
In this chapter I also discuss briefly Will Kymlicka’s position on
immigration restrictions for reasons of protecting ‘societal cultures’. I
argue that - as least as far as economically advanced, politically stable
and prosperous liberal democracies are concerned - his position on the
value of societal culture supports internal measures designed to ensure
socio-political integration, rather than restrictions at the border.
In Chapter 3 I look at another set of nationalist justifications for
exclusion from social membership put forward by the liberal-
communitarians Michael Walzer and David Miller. Walzer puts
forward one of the most robust set of arguments for both an inherent
and normatively legitimate connection between self-determination and
the right of a community to determine its own membership
boundaries. He argues that exclusion is part of the very meaning of
self-determination, and that depriving communities of their right to set
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restrictive membership criteria would also deprive them of their
capacity to govern themselves in accordance with their shared
understandings and historic character. As such, Walzer argues that the
terms of admission to social membership should be set unilaterally by
the existing members, in the same way that the current members of
clubs are entitled to decide upon the admission of new members. In
this chapter I distinguish two different strands of argument in the case
that Walzer puts forward for the right of communities to exclude
outsiders from social membership; a communitarian and a democratic
argument. I give reasons for rejecting both. The communitarian
argument for closure from the value of diversity is belied by the
evidence of regional diversity within federalist forms of political
organisation like the United States. The argument for closure that
appeals directly to the value of democracy and popular sovereignty
succumbs to a logical paradox; which is that democracy cannot in
itself tell us who constitutes the demos with subsequent legitimate
powers to exclude.
David Miller’s account of the territorial rights of nation-states and the
way in which they ground their right to self-determination and control
over membership avoids some of the problems I discuss in relation to
Tamir, Tebble and Walzer. However, his position faces difficulties of
its own. I begin my critique by pointing out some problems with
Miller’s justification for territorial rights on the basis of historical
occupancy and cultural transformation; I argue that boundary disputes
often arise precisely because of controversy concerning legitimate
historical ownership. I then argue against Miller’s link between
territorial rights and exclusion on the grounds of equality. I explain
how Miller might respond to this objection by appealing to his
account of national responsibility, and I go on to give four arguments
for rejecting it. Lastly, I discuss the claim that concerns about global
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inequality are more relevant to the issue of the just distribution of
wealth and resources rather than border controls or citizenship policy,
and that nation-states can therefore ‘purchase’ the right to exclude by
fulfilling their global redistributive obligations. Whilst I give some
reasons for being sympathetic towards the claim that, in combating
global inequality, redistributive efforts should take priority over
campaigning for opening up borders, I nevertheless advance four
arguments for doubting that the right to exclude can in fact be
purchased in this way. The liberal nationalist, identity liberal and
liberal communitarian accounts of self-determination discussed in the
first two chapters face serious difficulties in justifying the exclusion of
outsiders from social membership or citizenship.
Walzer also maintains that excluding resident aliens from citizenship
is unacceptable on liberal-democratic grounds. What this means is that
subjection to the law should provide the key criterion for access to
citizenship (and therefore implicit in this argument is a rejection of the
principle of inclusion to participatory membership on the basis of
affectedness).72 This is an argument I endorse, and the reasons
become clear in my discussion of participatory membership in
Chapters 4 and 5, when I address the post-nationalist accounts of self-
determination and global democracy put forward by Iris Young and
Seyla Benhabib respectively.
Sovereignty, in Walzer and Miller’s view, implies a principle of self-
determination as non-interference. In Young’s view, this account of
self-determination is normatively problematic and leads to
unjustifiable exclusions and domination. She argues instead for a
72 Excluding temporary visitors. See the discussion in Chapter 4,
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principle of self-determination as non-domination combined with a
federalist structure of inter-linked and overlapping democratic
jurisdictions, and she claims that this shows how inclusion in self-
determining political communities need not necessarily imply
exclusion. This understanding of self-determination is designed to
show that neither the external regulation of the membership policies
of particular communities by global authorities nor the democratic
participation of territorial outsiders need necessarily compromise the
right of a community to self-determination. Contra liberal nationalists
and liberal communitarians, Young argues that obligations of justice
between agents spring from social, political and economic connections
which are not confined within the borders of sovereign states. In
contrast to Walzer’s argument for subjection to the law as the mode of
demarcating a constituency, Young argues that participatory
membership should be defined according to the set of individuals
whose interests are affected by the decision or policy under
consideration. I give a number of arguments for rejecting this position
on participatory membership and for maintaining the subject-to-the-
law principle for demarcating citizenship. This discussion suggests,
with Walzer and Miller, that democratic citizenship should remain
territorially bounded and that liberal democracies can legitimately
exclude outsiders from participatory membership. My argument here
supports a distinction between democratic constituencies and moral
constituencies; whilst subjection to the law should in my view be used
to demarcate the former, normative criteria like affectedness or
coercion may still be valid for demarcating the latter. Unlike social
membership and citizenship, which I argue in Chapters 2 and 3 can be
open to outsiders without compromising democratic self-
determination, in this chapter I argue that the self-determination rights
section 4.4.
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of political communities could be undermined if they lack the power
to exclude outsiders from participatory membership.
In Chapter 5 I move on to discuss critically the
cosmopolitan/discourse theory approach to membership put forward
by Seyla Benhabib. According to Benhabib, developments in
globalisation, increased migration and the fraying of nation-state
sovereignty have resulted in the need for new approaches to political
membership that do not rest on nationality or ethno-cultural
identification. This much is consistent with my arguments against
exclusion from social membership and citizenship in Chapters 2 and
3. However, for Benhabib as for Young, affectedness should be used
as the criterion of demarcating participatory membership, i.e. as the
criterion that should be used as a jurisdictional rule. The first part of
this chapter continues to develop my critique of the attempt to use
affectedness as a guide to drawing the boundaries of a democratic
community. I then discuss and reject two possible responses to my
objections that could be brought out of Benhabib’s work.
I go on to suggest that the practice of ‘enlarged mentality’ (which
Benhabib argues should constitute the sine qua non of contemporary
citizenship practice) risks excluding the perspective of marginalised
and/or relatively powerless individuals in society. As such, it may in
fact work to silence the perspective of immigrants, even if they are
formally included in the demos. In the second part of the chapter I
consider Benhabib’s position on citizenship. Benhabib argues that
there is a human right to membership and that this places a moral limit
on the power of a community to define its own membership
boundaries. At the same time, she considers it unobjectionable that the
right to collective self-determination grounds a right on the part of the
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host community to set the criteria and conditions to be satisfied for
access to citizenship, within certain moral constraints. I argue that this
position on naturalisation is difficult to reconcile with her
commitment to finding solutions to moral and political problems that
are reciprocally acceptable to all parties concerned, and which
embody the discourse theory norms of universal respect and
egalitarian reciprocity.
In the final chapter, I argue that agonistic democratic theory offers a
potentially useful way of thinking through the relationship between
self-determination and political membership in light of the preceding
discussions. The features of agonistic democratic theory which I
discuss and endorse feed into a conception of democratic self-
determination which avoids many of the problematic implications for
the distribution and demarcation of political membership which I
identity with the five other accounts being looked at in this thesis.
Whilst agonistic theory avoids the objectionably exclusionary
implications of liberal nationalism, identity liberalism and liberal
communitarianism, it also resists the kind of exclusions that I argue
follow from Benhabib’s position on the transparency between subjects
in moral reasoning and communication. I focus on the work of
Chantal Mouffe and Bonnie Honig. Whilst I am critical of Mouffe’s
claim that her model of agonistic democracy will be more open and
inclusive towards excluded individuals than rationalist or deliberative
democratic models, and whilst I also resist her argument that
democracy necessarily entails the exclusion of outsiders from social
membership and citizenship, I believe that her account of divided
subjectivity gestures towards a re-conceptualisation of democratic
self-determination as political action taken in concert with strangers.
This conceptual shift in turn encourages the opening of jurisdictional
boundaries for greater freedom of international movement and ease of
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access to social membership and citizenship; which my arguments in
Chapters 2 and 3 suggest are normatively attractive goals. I develop
this idea further through an analysis of Honig’s recent work on the
symbolic politics of foreigness, which bolsters my argument for
porous borders demarcating social membership and citizenship by
providing evidence of the ways in which the legitimacy of democratic
regimes are often re-invigorated by the territorial admission and
naturalisation of foreigners.
If open borders were to jeopardise the stability of a political
association through the inclusion of those who would destroy liberal-
democracy, or if free movement would threaten to create the
domination of one group over another, then there may be a justifiable
right to exclude. But I argue that these kinds of exclusions are not
cases of collective self-determination as such, but rather self-defence
or self-preservation.73 My overall conclusion is that whilst self-
determination does call for a collective right to non-interference - i.e.
the exclusion of outsiders from participatory membership (contra
Young and Benhabib) - it need not and should not encompass the right
to exclude outsiders from social membership (contra Tamir, Walzer
and Miller), and it in fact mandates inclusion to citizenship for all
those who are subject to the laws of their state of residence. There
may be compelling real-world reasons which justify the exclusion of
outsiders from the territory of another country or from citizenship
status; for example, reasons of administrative stability or public
order.74 But I suggest that appeals to collective self-determination
should not be among those reasons.
73 See Chapter 2, nt. 100 & Chapter 3, nt. 99.
74 See Carens (1992) pp. 28-31; the collection of essays in Gibney (ed)
(1988) & in Barry and Goodin (eds) (1992).
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In the concluding chapter of this thesis, I reflect on the policy
implications of my theoretical analysis by discussing two recent
documents outlining UK policy on citizenship and immigration: the
2002 White Paper ‘Secure Borders, Safe Haven’75 (which I also refer
to briefly in the introduction to Chapter 2), and the 2006 Home Office
document ‘A Points-Based System: Making Migration Work For
Britain’.76
75 Home Office (2002).
76 Home Office (2006).
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Chapter 2
Liberal Nationalism, Identity Liberalism and Political
Membership
2.1 Introduction
In this chapter, I discuss a liberal nationalist and an identity liberal
position on self-determination and political membership, which both
support culturally protectionist social membership and citizenship
policies. According to the viewpoints under consideration here, the
appropriate unit for political self-determination is a group of citizens
bound together by a common culture, which is articulated through the
idea of a national background. The collective right to self-
determination follows from what is said to be the importance of
shared culture to the members of the national group. In so far as their
common cultural background and national identity facilitates
important goals relating to collective self-determination and
individual autonomy, there follows in turn a justification for the right
of the community to exclude those outsiders who are deemed unable
or unwilling to endorse and/or participate in the central tenets of that
shared cultural identity. The focus of this chapter is on arguments for
the right of liberal democracies to control admission to social
membership and citizenship; arguments for the exclusion of outsiders
from participatory membership are at most orthogonal to this debate,
and will be addressed in detail in Chapters 3, 4 and 5.
‘Culture’ in both the liberal nationalist and identity liberal positions is
formulated in non-conservative terms, i.e. it is open to change from
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outside influences, it is understood as internally heterogenous and it is
seen as largely constructed through subjective identification; all of
which means that membership in the national group is not necessarily
closed permanently to outsiders.1 This is what in part distinguishes
liberal nationalism from conservative or illiberal nationalisms.2
Nevertheless, according to the liberal nationalist and identity liberal
accounts considered in this chapter, admission to social membership
and/or citizenship in the liberal-democratic nation-state still requires
evidence of some degree of cultural assimilation on the part of
prospective members, and is contingent on the approval of the
established members.
Broadly speaking, the German government has pursued this kind of
approach to citizenship since the 1980s, by offering membership to
foreigners on the condition of their assimilation into the German
culture, in particular by learning the German language and by
identifying with German values and cultural characteristics.3 Recent
trends in the immigration and naturalisation policies of a number of
other liberal nation-states are also predicated on, or at least seem to
confirm a connection between, the importance of shared national
identity - and in particular shared values and normative beliefs - and
the acquisition or denial of membership. Although both the
theoretical and public political discourse of liberal states have within
the last few decades undergone a substantive ‘cultural turn’,
embracing special rights, exemptions and dispensations on cultural,
1 Barbieri (1998), p89.
2 Kymlicka (2001a), p259.
3 In 1999, Germany’s Alien Law was changed to allow for the
transmission of citizenship from resident aliens to their children,
through the adoption of the principle of jus soli. This is said to reflect
a move away from the previously ethno-nationalist conception of
German citizenship. See Anil (2005) & Benhabib (2004b), p156.
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religious or other identity-based grounds, numerous liberal states –
including Britain, the Netherlands and Australia - have recently taken
a distinctly assimilative approach to their immigration and citizenship
policies.4 There is an increasing drive in these states to make the
inclusion of immigrants (in terms of their access to both social
membership and citizenship) conditional upon their endorsement of
the shared values, norms and political principles of their host nation,
which are said to be characteristic of the national cultural identity,
and which are in turn said to be crucial for the self-determination of
the national community.
In Britain, the decision to move ‘beyond multiculturalism’ was
announced in the government’s 2002 White Paper ‘Secure Borders,
Safe Haven’.5 Whilst not wholly abandoning the multicultural
strategy of accommodating differences through institutional means of
representation for minority groups and accommodation for the
expression of minority cultural and religious practices and beliefs in
the public sphere, the paper stresses the importance for social
cohesion of ensuring that immigrants are loyal to the British national
identity and values. According to the White Paper, the fundamental
tenets of that identity are “that we respect human rights and freedoms,
uphold democratic values, observe laws faithfully and fulfill our
duties and obligations”.6 In a similar vein, a senior official in the
Australian government has recently argued for de-naturalising
resident immigrants if they display resistance to core liberal values
like individual liberty and democracy.7 In 2006, Nicholas Sarkozy
4 This turn is discussed in Joppke, (2004); Joppke (2005) & Tebble
(2006).
5 Home Office (2002). I discuss this document in greater detail in
Chapter 7, section 7.2.
6 Ibid, p34; Joppke (2005), p56.
7 Garnaut (2006); cited in Tebble (2006), p474.
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(who was at the time the French Interior Minister) claimed that
immigrant families should be deported if they failed to respect equal
rights for women or to learn French.8 In the same year, the Dutch
government issued a DVD to prospective citizens showing images of
same-sex couples embracing in public and scenes of topless bathing,
in order to highlight the kinds of values which migrants need to
embrace in order to qualify for full membership.9
As these examples indicate, there has been a movement in Western
liberal states in recent years to ‘thicken’ the criteria for admission to
citizenship by making naturalisation conditional upon an affirmation
of the dominant national values of the host society. There are at least
two different but interrelated concerns motivating this requirement:
either the preservation of a national identity and culture as a way of
maintaining unity and ensuing socio-political integration amongst the
members of the political community, or a concern with preventing the
democratic political system from being dissolved or compromised.10
The first is a claim about the value of national cultural identity and
self-determination, which we will encounter in the liberal nationalist
position of Yael Tamir, and the second is a claim about the conditions
required for sustaining democratic institutions and procedures, which
we will encounter in the identity liberal position put forward by Adam
Tebble and Dominique Schnapper. My aim in this chapter is to
evaluate whether either of these claims can provide a defensible
normative link between the ideal of self-determination and the
practice of membership controls in liberal democracies.
8 http://www.interieur.gouv.fr; cited in Tebble (2006), p474.
9 Smith (2006); cited in Tebble (2006), p474.
10 Rubio-Marin (2000), p63.
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I begin my critical analysis in the following section by outlining the
cultural account of national identity and self-determination put
forward by Yael Tamir. Tamir attempts to create a synthesis of the
core features that are of value in liberalism and nationalism, “drawing
from liberalism a commitment to personal autonomy and individual
rights, and from nationalism an appreciation of the importance of
membership in human communities in general, and in national
communities in particular”.11 Does Tamir’s cultural account of
national self-determination ground a case for justified acts of
exclusion? I begin my discussion of Tamir’s work in the following
section by outlining the core features of her account of self-
determination, paying particular attention to the way in which she
distinguishes cultural from political rights and national self-
determination from individual self-rule. In drawing attention to this
distinction, I will introduce the difference between cultural and
democratic self-determination; a difference that will be discussed
further in relation to Walzer’s work in the following chapter. In
section 2.3, I go on to discuss the way in which Tamir employs
national self-determination as a mode of demarcating social
membership and citizenship, i.e. the way in which the right of the host
community to national self-determination functions to justify the
membership boundaries of political communities. As we will see,
Tamir believes that the different value commitments and normative
beliefs of prospective migrants can constitute the grounds for their
exclusion, because in her view permitting unacculturated immigrants
to enter the association and become social members and/or citizens
could threaten to dissolve the shared cultural conditions required for
national self-determination.
11 Tamir (1993), p35.
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In section 2.4, I evaluate critically Tamir’s position on the
relationship between national self-determination and membership
controls. I begin by arguing that it seems empirically false to suppose
that national groups have a distinct shared set of values or beliefs
which set them apart from other groups, and which require protection
through immigration restrictions. The internal normative diversity
within national groups seems to undermine the case for restrictive
membership policies from the value of self-determination; if the
existing internal diversity does not threaten national self-
determination, then why should the differences that immigrants may
bring compromise the self-determination of the host community?
Following on from this objection, I go on to discuss what seems to be
a tension between Tamir’s own understanding of national identity and
her defence of immigration restrictions.Whilst national identity, for
Tamir, exists primarily through national consciousness and is
essentially a matter of subjective identification, the exclusion of
outsiders on the grounds of their value commitments would seem to
depend on the identification of objectively shared features of the host
community as well as objectively identifiable features of would-be
migrants. Whilst Tamir does state that national communities cannot
exist through subjective identification alone and that there must also
be a ‘sufficient’ number of objectively identifiable features, we will
see that she does not in fact count values or normative commitments
as necessarily being amongst those objectively identifiable, shared
features; she claims that the unity of national communities is not
threatened by internal normative diversity. This makes her defence of
immigration restrictions, in order to protect the right to national self-
determination, problematic.
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I then go on to argue that there is a general tension in Tamir’s account
between individualism and nationalism, and that she errs too far
towards privileging group rights over individual rights in the domain
of immigration and membership policy. I argue that the monocultural,
corporate conclusion she reaches in the case of immigration stands in
tension with the multicultural, individualist premises with which she
approaches the topic of nationalism.
Lastly, I question whether immigration controls are either appropriate
or necessary for national self-determination in Tamir’s sense, firstly
by highlighting the option of voluntary segregation and group-based
clustering in civil society, and secondly by citing examples that Tamir
herself provides of national groups that seem to preserve successfully
their cultural distinctiveness despite not being demarcated by either a
geographical or political border. What my analysis suggests is that the
tension between national self-determination and freedom of
movement seems exaggerated within the terms of Tamir’s position.
She does not show convincingly that national self-determination
should encompass the right to exclude outsiders on cultural or value-
based grounds, because it is questionable that relinquishing this
unilateral right to exclude will jeopardise her ideal of national self-
determination.
In this initial discussion I limit my arguments primarily to the issue of
whether the value commitments and beliefs of migrants can be used
legitimately as the grounds for their exclusion from liberal
democracies. National identities are also said to encompass
characteristics such as a shared language, common participation in
political institutions and a sense of collective history. As we will see,
whilst Tamir does at points acknowledge a distinction between
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national identity and shared values, she seems to run these two
together when she argues that prospective migrants must be
committed to the values underlying the national identity of the
community which they seek to join, given the threat they might
otherwise pose to the right to national self-determination on the part
of existing members. Will Kymlicka draws a firmer and more
consistent distinction between national identity and shared values, and
in section 2.5 I outline briefly and discuss critically this distinction in
his work and its implications for membership controls. I argue that
Kymlicka’s position on the importance of protecting ‘societal
cultures’ does not support a unilateral right on the part of the existing
citizens of liberal states to control membership, but instead points to
the need for: a) internal integration policies designed to encourage
language education and naturalisation, and b) limitations on the pace
of immigration, so as not to overwhelm the social services required to
provide these measures to aid integration.
In the final section of this chapter I consider the identity liberal
position on immigration restrictions. The viewpoint here is that
immigration might threaten to corrode the democratic system from
within, if sufficient measures are not taken to ensure that prospective
migrants and prospective citizens are loyal to liberal democratic
values. The first argument I put forward in my response is that
undemocratic or illiberal activities carried out by immigrants should
be dealt with within the internal criminal law process rather than
through enforcing border controls or by scrutinising the views and
beliefs of prospective migrants, because liberal states should be
committed to applying the same principles and procedures to migrants
that are applied to birthright citizens. I then put forward a more
political critique of assimilative immigration and naturalisation
policy, suggesting that it risks creating separatism and political
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instability, which are two of the potential political outcomes of high
levels of immigration that identity liberals are particularly concerned
to combat. The final objection I make concerns the kinds of critical
practices that the identity liberal position would seem to encourage. I
argue that the identity liberal approach to citizenship sustains the idea
that only immigrant communities perpetuate non-liberal or illiberal
views and activities, and that this is: a) an unfair and unrealistic
representation of both immigrant and host communities, and b) one
which overlooks the importance of context in formulating defensible
evaluations of socio-cultural practices. A more nuanced and
contextually sensitive approach to national identity would be one that
emphasises that the members of liberal national groups also commit
practices and follow norms which may be problematic from a liberal
perspective. I articulate this more nuanced approach through the idea
of reciprocal critique. My analysis suggests that neither liberal
nationalism nor identity liberalism can readily accommodate the need
for and critical disposition required by reciprocal critique, which
provides a further objection to both positions.
2.2 National Self-Determination
The aim of Tamir’s project is to illustrate how the core values of the
liberal tradition - “respect for personal autonomy, reflection, and
choice”12 - and the core values of nationalism - “belonging, loyalty,
and solidarity”13 - are not mutually exclusive but can in fact
accommodate and reinforce each other. The idea of liberal
nationalism corresponds to what Tamir believes are the two ‘most
important’ features of identity for modern individuals: “the need to
12 Ibid, p6.
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live one’s life from the inside and the need to be rooted”.14 According
to Tamir, membership of a national group is an “important and
constitutive element of personal identity”,15 and it is the importance
of national membership to individual identity, autonomy and personal
prosperity that grounds a right to national self-determination. Tamir’s
marriage of liberalism and nationalism is informed by a particular
view of the self and of the conditions required for the exercise of
choice and personal autonomy. The good life, in her view, requires
the communal, cultural context that a relatively stable and prosperous
national identity provides. As such, the right to national self-
determination is a function of the individual’s right to autonomy and
personal self-determination. She argues that in order for individuals to
attain self-determination, i.e. the ability to live an autonomous life
and to exercise personal choice, they require the familiarity of a
cultural context provided by their national identity, which in turn
entails that their national identity must find expression in the public
sphere:
(…) by nature, individuals are members of
particular human communities. Outside such
communities they cannot develop a language
and a culture, or set themselves aims. Their
lives become meaningless; there is no substance
to their reflection, no set of norms and values in
light of which they can make choices and
become the free, autonomous persons that
liberals assume them to be. Being situated,
adhering to a particular tradition, and being
intimate with a particular language, could
therefore be seen as preconditions of personal
autonomy (…)16
13 Ibid.
14 Ibid, p30.
15 Ibid, p35.
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For Tamir, the state represents a particular political apparatus with the
power to command obedience and loyalty from the citizen-body,
whereas nations are communities whose members share ties of
culture, solidarity and subjective identification.17 What is particularly
important to Tamir’s account is the distinction between subjective and
objective accounts of national identity. According to Tamir, nation-
building projects attempt to isolate a set of objective features which
validate the existence of the nation in the eyes of the international
community. However, all such attempts have, historically, failed,
suggesting that no ‘scientific’ definition of the nation is available:
“(…) all attempts to single out a particular set of objective features -
be it a common history, collective destiny, language, religion,
territory, climate, race, ethnicity - as necessary and sufficient for the
definition of a nation have ended in failure”.18 In other words, in
Tamir’s view nations have no core existence outside of the fact of a
national consciousness. Following Benedict Anderson’s definition of
nations as “imaginary communities”,19 Tamir maintains that a
subjective national consciousness is the only necessary factor for a
group to constitute a nation: “the nation exists only when its members
consciously conceive themselves as distinct from members of other
groups”.20 However, she does not consider a purely subjective
account sufficient in and of itself to establish the existence of a
nation. To qualify as a nation a group must exhibit not only ‘self-
awareness’ but also a “sufficient number of shared, objective
characteristics - such as language, history, or territory”.21 According
to Tamir, culture is what provides those features that enable the co-
16 Ibid, p7.
17 Ibid, pp. 58-69.
18 Ibid, p65.
19 Anderson (1983), p6.
20 Tamir (1993), p8.
21 Ibid, p66.
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members of a nation to identify one another.22 The value of culture is
expressed in individualist terms: “When (individuals) are able to
identify with their own culture in the political framework, when the
political institutions reflect familiar traditions, historical
interpretations, and norms of behavior, individuals come to perceive
themselves as the creators, or at least the carriers, of a valuable set of
beliefs”.23
The key features of a national identity, according to Tamir, are shared
“patterns of behavior, language, norms, myths and symbols that
enable mutual recognition”.24 For Tamir, the term ‘nation’ thus
encompasses an almost unlimited range of different kinds of ethnic,
religious and linguistic communities. The nation is understood as a
cultural community, and the right to national self-determination is
derived from the right of the existing members to protect, preserve
and develop their culture in a public sphere. As such, self-
determination is more than just a right on the part of individuals to
participate in democratic governance - which is what Tamir calls a
‘political’ account of self-determination. National self-determination
is instead a right to cultural preservation:
The right to national self-determination …
stakes a cultural rather than a political claim,
namely, it is the right to preserve the existence
of a nation as a distinct cultural entity. The right
differs from the right of individuals to govern
their lives and to participate in a free and
democratic process … the right to national self-
determination is first and foremost a cultural
claim (…)25
22 Ibid, p68.
23 Ibid, p72.
24 Ibid, p68.
25 Ibid, pp. 57-58.
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Tamir’s cultural understanding of national identity feeds into a
distinction between a right to self-determination and a right to self-
rule. Self-determination, on Tamir’s account, concerns the right of
national groups to maintain their distinct existence and to organise
their affairs in keeping with their particular historic way of life;
encompassing, as we have seen, their particular norms, myths,
symbols and language.26 Self-rule, in contrast, describes individual
democratic rights, i.e the right of individuals “to participate in the
governing of their lives”.27 It is the role, relevance and political status
of culture, then, that distinguishes self-determination from self-rule in
Tamir’s scheme. Self-rule is in principle satisfied regardless of
whether the outcome of political decisions reflect the particular
culture or interests of those individuals to whom the right of self-rule
is ascribed: “At the conclusion of a fair process, individuals may find
themselves in a minority position, unable to influence, let alone
imprint the political sphere with their culture, preferences and norms
of behavior, yet they could hardly claim that their right to self-rule
has been violated”.28 The realisation of the right to self-determination,
on the other hand, requires a certain political outcome - namely, the
successful expression of the national culture in the public sphere:
(…) the right to national self-determination is
not only measured by the ability to participate
in determining the cultural nature of the social
and political system one belongs to, but also by
the results of this process. National self-
determination is said to be attained only when
certain features, unique to the nation, find
expression in the public sphere.29
26 Ibid, p69.
27 Ibid.
28 Ibid, p70.
29 Ibid.
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As such, Tamir’s understanding of national self-determination is not
primarily about the availability of equal rights or civil liberties, nor is
it primarily concerned with the democratic participation of citizens,
but rather with the status and recognition of the national culture in the
public sphere. It is “the right of individuals to express their national
identity, to protect, preserve, and cultivate the existence of their
nation as a distinct entity”.30
Since self-determination is not equivalent to self-rule in Tamir’s
scheme, it follows that the right to national self-determination is not
necessarily equivalent to a right to a sovereign state, only a public
sphere that reflects the national identity of the majority of the
members in a particular territory: “although it cannot be ensured that
every nation will have its own state, all nations are entitled to a public
sphere in which they constitute the majority”.31 The right to national
self-determination, in Tamir’s view, can in principle be satisfied by a
number of different political arrangements, such as “federative and
confederative arrangements, local autonomies, or the establishment of
national institutions”.32 Tamir’s liberal nationalism does not therefore
constitute a justification for a system of sovereign nation-states with
mutually exclusive rights to non-interference.33
Tamir argues that the scope of rights to self-rule and self-
determination should be determined functionally, i.e. “that the scope
30 Ibid, p72.
31 Ibid, p150.
32 Ibid, p9.
33 Ibid, p151, p165.
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should correspond to their purpose”.34 The right to national self-
determination, as we have seen, is designed to ensure the expression
and preservation of national culture in the public sphere, and for
Tamir this is best achieved in a “small, relatively closed and
homogenous framework”.35 The principle of self-rule, on the other
hand, is designed to ensure that individuals are able to participate in
the formulation of the rules and decisions that are likely to have an
impact on their interests. This may well require the existence of
transnational or supra-national deliberative fora and regional
organisations. Tamir suggests that the need for transnational political
procedures and organisations is particularly apparent in the case of
ecological, economic and military policy.36 The realisation of national
self-determination is best facilitated through a system of small,
autonomous national communities nestled within a wider regional,
federal or consociational framework, with a division of authority
between the different levels:
(…) only by replacing the aspiration of an
independent state for each nation with more
modest solutions such as local autonomies,
federative or confederative arrangements, could
all nations come to enjoy an equal scheme of
national rights. Ensuing the ability of all nations
to implement their right to national self-
determination would then lead to a world in
which traditional nation-states wither away,
surrendering their power to make economic,
strategic, and ecological decisions to regional
organisations and their power to structure
cultural policies to local national
communities.37
34 Ibid, p150.
35 Ibid, p151.
36 Ibid, pp. 150-151.
37 Ibid, p151. As Cole (2000, p113) notes, it is an interesting
implication of this passage that Tamir does not consider ‘economic,
strategic, and ecological’ decisions to fall under the remit of a
national community’s right to self-determination. Other liberal
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In Chapter 4, we will see that Iris Young defends a similar federal
arrangement for accommodating the right of distinct groups to self-
determination without entailing national sovereignty, at least in terms
of the ‘Westphalian’ non-interference model38. However, in Young’s
view the collective right to self-determination should not encompass
the right to territorial exclusion. So the question I want to address is:
should migration and the terms and rules for admission to social
membership and citizenship in liberal democracies fall under the right
to national self-determination in Tamir’s sense; i.e. should migration
and membership procedures be regulated by national cultural groups
as a function of their right to self-determination? It is useful at this
point to recall the idea posed by Philip Cole that I discussed in the
introductory chapter to this thesis, that:
(…) some matters can rightly be held to lie
beyond the scope of the democratic powers of
any body of people …. it could be argued that
one of the most important matters that should
lie outside the scope of the self-determining
power of an association is its membership.39
Tamir disagrees, stating that:
(…) liberal democratic principles dictate that, if
a majority of its citizens so wishes, a national
entity is justified in retaining its national
theorists of nationalism - David Miller for example - consider
economic and ecological policies to be importantly related to the
ability of a nation to pursue its cultural goals. See Miller (2007), pp.
73-74.
38 The term ‘Westphalian’ refers to the Treaty of Westphalia in 1648,
which established many of the key features of the current
international state system; Fraser (2005), p11. See Chapter 4, section
4.2 of this thesis.
39 Cole (2000), pp. 185-186.
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character. On these grounds a national entity
might be seen as entitled to restrict immigration
in order to preserve the existence of a viable
majority.40
The question is, why should the desire on the part of national
majorities to preserve their national character take precedence over
the desire on the part of prospective migrants to enter the territory and
become a member? Tamir’s response, as we will see in the following
section, appeals to the value of cultural identity.
At this stage, it will be useful to outline a three-part distinction that
will help to categorise the different concepts of culture at work in the
accounts of self-determination that I discuss in this chapter, and in
later chapters. For simplicity, I will refer to these concepts as: A, B
and C.
Concept A states that the successful functioning of liberal
democracies requires citizens to accept only a very ‘thin’ political
culture. On this account, what needs to be shared amongst the
members of a liberal state is a public commitment to a set of abstract
liberal rights, and a willingness to participate in liberal political
institutions. Self-determination and social cohesion, on this account,
do not necessarily require or express a shared ethnic, linguistic,
religious or cultural background. Whatever ‘thick’ cultural
commitments may be shared by the national majority can be
separated from the public political culture. Therefore, according to
concept A, liberal states can accommodate the fact that citizens may
adhere to a multitude of ‘thicker’ sub-cultures, so long as they
40 Tamir (1993), p160.
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participate in the overarching public political culture. Local and
particularistic cultural commitments can sit alongside the public
political culture; integration and naturalisation does not require that
the former be qualified or re-interpreted in any substantive sense, so
long as they are compatible with the latter. Appeals to linguistic,
historical or ethnic criteria as the basis for membership are therefore
illegitimate.
We can understand Tamir’s project as a reaction against the kind of
neutral liberalism described by concept A. Her position accepts the
key premise of Concept B, which is that political procedures and
principles cannot, in fact, be divorced neatly from the particular
historical background and cultural practices of distinct national
communities. On this account, ‘thin’ concepts of social cohesion
based only on a commitment to fundamental rights and a willingness
to participate in shared institutions occlude the fact that all political
regimes and principles inevitably reflect a particular historical, ethnic
and cultural background. The abstract overarching rights and
principles described by concept A will always interpreted according
to the ethnic and cultural values and historical experiences of the
majority national group when they are situated in concrete political
contexts. Therefore, the clarity of the distinction between culture and
political culture, which concept A turns upon, is called into question.
However, whilst citizens are required to participate in and respect the
outcome of liberal democratic procedures, they are free to challenge
and re-interpret the particularistic norms that are inevitably embodied
in those procedures. No particular instantiation of cultural norms
requires protection, and new citizens can engage with existing
citizens in re-iterating the meaning of those norms, and the meaning
of membership more generally. I will argue in the following section
that Tamir equivocates between endorsing this position on culture,
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and wanting to introduce ‘thicker’, more substantive cultural
commitments as the pre-requisite for national self-determination, of
the type described by concept C.
Concept C holds that the cohesion and self-determination of liberal
democracies require a ‘thick’, pre-political national culture,
encompassing not only a commitment to fundamental rights and
principles, and not only representative of a particular history and
culture, but also embodying a commitment to a particular way of life.
The self-determination of political communities, on this account, rests
upon the fact that citizens actively endorse and participate in a shared
national culture and historical way of life; a commitment that extends
beyond their participation in the public political realm. Liberal
citizens do not simply participate in liberal procedures, nor do they
simply move within a political world that is marked indelibly by
history, ethnicity and culture. They are also advocates of a particular
liberal way of life. Self-determination, on this account, both
presupposes and expresses the thick affective bond that is supplied by
a shared national culture. Liberal citizenship is therefore conditional
upon endorsing liberal rights and principles as they are instantiated in
this particular community at this particular moment in history. To
challenge the particular concrete instantiation of liberal rights in a
particular community amounts to a revocation of membership status.
2.3 Liberal Nationalism and Political Membership
According to Tamir, if liberal democracies were purely voluntary
associations, grounded only on individual consent, then membership
would likewise be purely voluntary. Liberal democracies would be
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under an obligation to welcome as members anyone who voluntarily
consented to their particular rules and regulations and who willingly
identified with the community. In other words, freedom of movement
would fall under the remit of an individual’s right to exercise self-
rule:
If liberal states are seen as based on a covenant
between free individuals who have contracted
among themselves to create a political
framework meant to defend their rights and
interests, it would seem reasonable to assume
that membership will be granted to all those
who actively consent to share in this covenant.
Preference would then be given to those who
are most committed to the agreed upon
principles and ends, and who are best qualified
to further the aims of the association. A liberal
state resting on these assumptions would grant
citizenship only to informed adults who actively
request it, thereby expressing their willingness
and consent.41
However, she notes that although this ideal of membership-through-
voluntary-consent fits with the principled notion that liberal
communities are voluntary associations, it is belied by the practice of
attributing membership through birthright. Tamir argues that the
dominant practice of awarding citizenship automatically through
birthright in liberal democracies can only be explained with reference
to the ‘hidden’ importance those associations attribute to national
identity. The vast majority of individuals acquire their citizenship-
status through the accident of the circumstances of their birth. All
liberal democracies attribute citizenship primarily - though not
exclusively - through jus soli or jus sanguinis (or some combination
of the two). The former principle bestows citizenship on all those
41 Ibid, p125.
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children born within the territory of the state, whilst the latter
principle bestows citizenship on all those children born to citizen-
parents. According to Tamir, the prevalence of these practices can
only be explained by reference to the “national values hidden in the
liberal agenda”.42 In other words, liberal associations purport to be
grounded on voluntary consent, when in actual fact they more closely
resemble “ongoing and relatively closed communities whose
members share a common fate”.43 In Tamir’s view, this is because
they are in fact communities that are based on the value of shared
national culture, and their membership policies are (rightfully in her
view) predicated on the importance of preserving that culture: “the
terms of membership set by the liberal state thus reinforce the view of
the state as a distinct historical community rather than a voluntary
association”.44 What this means is that if the existing citizens do not
wish to extend membership to outsiders on the grounds of the
importance of preserving their shared cultural identity, then it is
irrelevant whether or not the outsider wishes to join the association.
The desire on the part of prospective migrants to - say - better their
life prospects, seek out a higher income or pursue employment
opportunities by immigrating is trumped by the desire on the part of
the existing members to bar them from entering, if they regard such
exclusion as necessary to protect and preserve their distinct national
culture. Quoting Walzer, she writes:
Assuming that individuals have a right to
preserve the uniqueness of their communal life,
it would make sense to place some restrictions
on membership and claim that we, who already
belong, should do the choosing “in accordance
with our own understanding of what
membership means in our community and of
42 Ibid, p117.
43 Ibid.
44 Ibid, p124.
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what sort of a community we want to have.45
Tamir recognises that there is a tension between her understanding of
national self-determination and liberalism’s commitment to universal
individual rights when we look at the issue of immigration restrictions
and border controls, and she maintains that the “gap between the ideal
of free immigration and the ideal of national self-determination”46
cannot be bridged:
Liberal nationalism is committed to the liberal
ideal of freedom of movement as well as to the
right of national communities to preserve their
distinctiveness. But attempts to accommodate
both these ideals within a consociational setup
are extremely problematic, as free immigration
might threaten the national character of each
segment.47
Tamir states that “Since liberalism cannot provide a theory of
demarcation, it has adopted for this purpose the national ideal of self-
determination”.48 What I understand her to mean by this statement is
that liberalism cannot in and of itself justify the drawing of any
boundaries between members and non-members; liberal theory’s
universal commitment to individual freedom and equality mandates
open borders and unfettered freedom of movement. Thus, it is
national self-determination that provides the relevant justification of
and criteria for drawing exclusionary boundaries between members
and non-members. Tamir therefore confirms the presence in her
discussion of membership of the apparent tension at the heart of
45 Ibid, p127, quoting Walzer (1983), p23.
46 Ibid, p159.
47 Ibid, p158.
48 Ibid, p121.
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liberal-democratic communities discussed in the introductory chapter;
namely, between the value of collective self-determination and the
value of individual freedom and equality.
Given her cultural understanding of national self-determination, it is
unsurprising that Tamir explicitly endorses cultural assimilation as a
condition of acquiring membership: “Prospective citizens must be
able and willing to be members of this particular historical
community, its past, its future, its forms of life and institutions”.49
Since, for Tamir, the unity of liberal nations rests not only on a
consensus over certain values essential to its functioning “but also on
a distinct cultural foundation”,50 she argues that nations have a right
to impose restrictions on membership in order to preserve their
cultural homogeneity: “a state that views itself as a community is
justified in offering citizenship only to those committed to respect its
communal values, collective history, and shared aspirations for a
prosperous future”.51 In addition to a willingness to share in the
national culture and identity of the host community and to respect its
communal values, Tamir stipulates “general civic competence”52 as a
legitimate criterion for exclusion, by which she means “the readiness
and the ability to communicate, argue and discuss matters with fellow
citizens, and to form judgements on the basis of this dialogue”.53
To summarise briefly: we have seen that Tamir advances a liberal
individualist account of the value of national identity. For Tamir,
individual autonomy and rational choice rests on the existence of a
49 Ibid, p129.
50 Ibid, p163.
51 Ibid, p129.
52 Ibid.
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cultural framework that makes the options available to us
intelligible.54 The exclusion of prospective migrants unwilling or
unable to endorse the national culture of the host community -
including, as we have seen, its shared values and normative
commitments - is therefore justified as a way of protecting the interest
in national self-determination - and in turn the autonomy of - the
individual members of that culture. This account provides one
possible way of justifying in normative terms the kinds of culturally
assimilative immigration and naturalisation policies that have recently
become more prevalent in a number of liberal-democracies. In the
following section, I develop a critical analysis of Tamir’s position on
immigration which leads to the conclusion that the tension she
outlines between open access to social membership and/or citizenship
and national self-determination may not be as intractable as she
suggests.
2.4 Objections to Tamir’s Cultural Exclusions
The first objection I want to raise is that Tamir’s defence of
membership controls from the importance of shared identity to
national self-determination seems to rest on a conception of national
identities that denies implausibly their internal heterogeneity. The
idea that national cultural groups are unanimously united in their
normative commitments, values, beliefs, patterns of behaviour or
aspirations, or that they have a unique shared character that we can
single out and identify, lacks empirical credibility. To return to one of
the concrete examples mentioned in the introduction to this chapter,
the British National Party is composed of members of a liberal
national group, and yet on any plausible account they cannot be said
53 Ibid.
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to uphold the core liberal values of the British national culture as
characterised in the White Paper ‘Secure Borders, Safe Haven’. Nor,
it seems, would Dutch Catholics be able to assent in good faith to the
kinds of values motivating the scenes of public display of
homosexuality featured in the DVD shown to prospective citizens in
Holland.55 As Andrew Vincent argues in his critique of Tamir:
The problem here is how we recognize the
national identity and culture of Britain, Canada,
Australia, Germany, America or Israel? Is there
a central public culture or distinctive set of
values acknowledged by all the citizens? Taking
Britain alone, there are so many cross-cutting
differences of class, age, ethnicity, belief-
systems and gender that such a judgement
seems simply frivolous.56
Arash Abizadeh makes the stronger, seemingly ontological claim that
cultures are necessarily characterised by internal diversity:
Any attempt to specify the boundaries of a
“shared” culture faces the insurmountable
problem that further difference can always be
found within the boundaries that were supposed
to mark off difference, such that any cultural
“entity” so specified will inevitably appear to
the analyst to be a hybrid.57
What this suggests is that any attempt to isolate the core shared
values, beliefs or characteristics of a given nation is likely to be
characterised by interminable disagreement amongst the members of
that nation concerning what those values, beliefs or characteristics
54 Ibid, p84
55 The example of Dutch Catholics is taken from Fekete (2006), p4.
56 Vincent (1997), p291. See also Parekh (1999), pp. 311-313.
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are. The internal diversity within national groups undermines in turn
the claim that they are entitled to restrict immigration to preserve their
unique culture and distinctiveness. Since national cultures are not it
seems repositories for sets of values or characteristics both specific to
and shared amongst all the members of the group, a right to national
self-determination cannot in and of itself ground a right to exclude on
the basis of the values or characteristics held by the prospective
migrant. More broadly, we can say that if there is no stable boundary
demarcating the identity of a national group then the case for an
immigration policy designed to police that boundary becomes far less
defensible.58
The second criticism I want to make follows on from the first, but is
concerned less with empirical and ontological claims regarding the
composition of national cultural groups than with the internal
structure of Tamir’s argument. There is a tension running throughout
Liberal Nationalism between, on the one hand, recognising along
with critics like Vincent and Abizadeh that national cultures are
characterised by internal diversity and, on the other hand, defending
membership practices designed to preserve one particular
interpretation of the core values and beliefs of a national culture. For
example, Tamir cites the US during the McCarthy years as an
example of a community in which membership is predicated on
shared values: “When membership is based on an overlapping
consensus of shared values, then those outside the consensus can be
marginalised, and their membership questioned to the point of turning
them into outcasts, as was the fate of communists in the United
States”.59 However, this example is not the rule for Tamir. She goes
57 Abizadeh (2002), p502.
58 Bader (1995), p218.
59 Tamir (1993), p90.
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on to state that “(…) in a society where social cohesion is based on
national, cultural, and historical criteria, holding nonconformist views
does not necessarily lead to excommunication”.60 So we can see that
Tamir does not think that communities united through “national,
cultural and historical criteria” are necessarily united by a consensus
on shared values or beliefs. This is a distinction we will encounter
again in the following section, in the work of Will Kymlicka. But this
distinction between national communities on the one hand and
communities united by shared values or beliefs on the other seems to
contradict her claim that national communities are justified in
withholding membership status to outsiders using the shared values or
beliefs of the existing members as the criteria of exclusion. It seems
inconsistent to maintain that national self-determination justifies the
exclusion of outsiders on the grounds of their value commitments,
since we are told that national groups cannot necessarily be identified
with any particular set of shared values, norms or beliefs.
In response to this objection, it could be argued that whilst there are
no values, beliefs or other properties or characteristics that are shared
by all the members of a national culture, there are some values or
beliefs which are not held by any of the members of the culture, and it
is the possession of those sorts of values or beliefs on the part of
prospective migrants or prospective citizens that can justifiably
constitute the grounds for their exclusion as a function of the right of
the members of the host community to national self-determination. So
the claim would be that whilst there are no values that must
necessarily be held in order to identify with and be accepted as a
member, there are certain values that are still wholly incompatible
with membership in this particular community. For example, when
60 Ibid.
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the Dutch government issued a DVD showing same-sex couples
embracing one another in public to prospective citizens, we could
suppose that the idea behind this was not that the prospective citizen
must necessarily approve of or value homosexuality, or even value a
public sphere in which displays of homosexual attraction are
tolerated, but that they must at the very least not desire the existence
of a public sphere where expressions of homosexual attraction are
legislated against. This would be a requirement of compatibility in
value commitments and the interpretation of social practices that is
weaker and demands less congruence amongst citizens than the
requirement of unanimous consensus. Following Abizadeh,
compatibility here could mean that “each actor’s interpretation of a
particular practice, and the individual actor’s corresponding actions,
be such that they can persist in the face of the actions of other
individuals, who may or may not share the same interpretations”.61
Could Tamir rescue her case for restrictive immigration policies by
retreating to this weaker understanding of congruence, and argue that
exclusion is justified in cases where the values of prospective
migrants are incompatible with the values of the host community?
The problem with this response is that it does not comport well with
Tamir’s endorsement of what she calls ‘pluralistic nationalism’. She
writes that “Contrary to widespread perceptions, national
communities might, in some respects, be more open and pluralistic
than communities in which social bonds rely on a set of shared
values”.62 In fact, she goes further than this, and argues that “The
national bond is not broken even in cases of extreme normative
disagreements. Since the roots of unity in national communities are
outside the normative sphere, they can accommodate normative
61 Abizadeh (2002), p500.
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diversity, and in this sense be more pluralistic than groups held
together by shared values”.63 This quotation implies that Tamir
cannot in consistency make the riposte considered above. It would
seem reasonable to describe incompatible value commitments as
“extreme normative disagreements”, and Tamir tells us that national
communities are able to accommodate such disagreements without
the “national bond” being broken. Presumably, then, the presence of
extreme normative disagreements or incompatibility in value
commitments or beliefs amongst the members of the national
community need not threaten the exercise of the right to national self-
determination. In which case, extreme normative disagreements
cannot it seems constitute the link between the right to national self-
determination and the justifiable exclusion of outsiders. Tamir would
seem to be unable to justify any normative considerations being
employed as criteria for exclusion as a function of the right to
national self-determination, since she claims that the roots of unity in
national communities do not have anything to do with unity in
normative commitments.
I now want to make a broader criticism concerning Tamir’s
subjectivist understanding of national culture and its relation to her
defence of immigration restrictions. According to Philip Cole,
Tamir’s liberal nationalism strives to present national culture as
having “historical depth and authenticity” so as to conceal “the way in
which it is undergoing constant reinvention, relying on fictions and
forgettings, the way in which it is the product of manipulation and
exclusion”.64 But in actual fact, she is frank about the artificiality and
contingency of national culture. She recognises that - given the
62 Tamir (1993), p90.
63 Ibid (italics added).
64 Cole (2000), p112.
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primacy of subjective, mutual recognition in her account of national
identities - it is perfectly coherent to suppose that national identities
can change or wither away depending on the nature of the feelings
shared by the members, thus belying the thought that national cultures
necessarily possess historical depth: “(…) feelings can of course
change and bring about the destruction of nations or result in the
emergence of new ones. Nations exist only as long as their members
share a feeling of communal membership (…)”.65 Tamir also
recognises that national identities rest on falsely homogenising the
host community, and that this does involve fictions, forgettings,
manipulation and exclusion: “Drawing the boundaries of a nation
involves a conscious and deliberate effort to lessen the importance of
objective differences within the group while reinforcing the group’s
uniqueness vis-à-vis outsiders”.66 She concedes that there is no such
thing as a pristine or wholly homogenous cultural group: “the illusion
that we can rely on the notion of a national character in order to set
the borders of national groups, is essential to the understanding of
modern nationality”.67 Again, we are told that national groups rely
primarily on subjective identification rather than objectively shared
properties:
Modern nations are too large to allow all their
members to encounter each other personally.
Recognition of fellow members, the drawing of
boundaries between members and nonmembers,
thus becomes a product of human imagination,
contingent on the belief that there are
similarities among members.68
There is, however, an unacknowledged tension here between Tamir’s
65 Tamir (1993), p66.
66 Ibid.
67 Ibid, p67.
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recognition, on the one hand, of the fluidity, contingency and
artificiality of national cultures and their internal diversity, and, on
the other hand, the rigid restrictions on membership that she believes
may be justified on the grounds of protecting and preserving the
shared values and identity contained within national cultures. If
cultures are in a process of constant change and if they are
characterised by such internal diversity and so many objective
differences amongst the members that it requires a “conscious and
deliberate effort” to lessen those differences in order to preserve a
feeling of national unity, then it seems disingenuous to suggest that
the differences that immigrants might bring to the national
composition could seriously threaten the ability of the host
community to exercise its right to national self-determination.69 If
national cultures are characterised by internal diversity amongst the
existing members, and if this internal diversity does not compromise
the ability of the existing individual members to enjoy their right to
national self-determination, then it does not seem valid to suppose
that the introduction of further diversity through immigration will
necessarily threaten the exercise of national self-determination.70
A further problem with Tamir’s approach is that she proceeds from
individualist, multicultural premises to support a corporate,
monocultural conclusion, and the conclusion seems to stand in
68 Ibid, p68.
69 Seglow (2005, p. 321-322) puts forward a similar criticism in
relation to Walzer’s defense of immigration restrictions on the
grounds of preserving cultural distinctiveness.
70 There may, however, be a need to limit the pace of immigration, so
as not to overwhelm the receiving country. However, this does not
amount to a general justification to control membership on the
grounds of self-determination. This is a point I discuss further, in
relation to Kymlicka’s position on immigration and societal culture,
in the following section.
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tension with the premises in a way that undermines her argument for
membership controls. Most liberal democracies today are
multicultural in the descriptive sense of being characterised by the co-
existence of numerous cultural groups. Within the terms of Tamir’s
individualist premises, this is presumably something to be celebrated
because of the greater number of cultural options it makes available to
individuals, thereby increasing their capacity to exercise their
autonomy through free choice (hence, the individualist, multicultural
premises). This presumption seems borne out by the following
statement: ‘‘It is important to note that individuals will be unable to
exercise their right to make cultural choices unless they live in a
culturally plural environment”.71 Indeed, she goes as far as to state
that even the preservation of nonliberal cultures can be justified on
individualist terms: “many individuals find the feelings of closeness,
solidarity, and assurance offered by authoritarian cultures very
attractive. Hence, support for the plurality of cultures is not
synonymous with an attempt to eradicate all nonliberal cultural
options”.72 Yet to argue that immigration should be restricted in order
to preserve a national culture is to place greater importance on the
preservation of one group identity than on the interest that individuals
may have in the increased number of cultural options brought about
by immigration. Tamir may be correct that a rich cultural background
is an important pre-requisite for exercising free choice and for leading
an autonomous life, but this falls short of establishing that individuals
require the cultural context provided by any particular national
identity.73 It seems quite plausible to suppose that, for some
individuals, a cultural context that was the hybrid product of cultural
inter-mingling through immigration may serve to provide them with a
71 Tamir (1993), p30.
72 Ibid, p31.
73 Cole (2000, p112) makes a similar point, referring to Patten (1999),
p6.
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greater opportunity to act freely and autonomously. Likewise, a
context in which an individual was exposed to many different cultures
could provide them with more options to choose from, thus increasing
their capacity for autonomy74 - and as we can see from the quotation
above, this is a point Tamir herself concedes. But since most liberal
democratic states today are multicultural in the descriptive sense, to
argue for cultural preservation through immigration restrictions in
fact means that only one cultural group in any given state -
presumably, the one with the greatest numbers, political power, and
economic resources - gets to stamp its identity on the public sphere.
Hence she reaches a corporate, monocultural conclusion that seems to
stand in tension with the premises of her overall argument. Tamir
recognises the problem of minorities within regions dominated by an
alien national culture, and she is frank about the inevitable costs they
face in terms of political and social marginalisation:
Membership in this (liberal national) entity will
be more accessible to certain individuals,
capable of identifying with the political entity
as their own, than to others. Consequently, even
if governing institutions respect a wide range of
rights and liberties and distribute goods and
official positions fairly, members of minority
groups will unavoidably feel alienated to some
extent. Alienation rather than a deprivation of
rights is to be acknowledged as the main
problem affecting members of national
minorities.75
It seems that liberal nationalism is inherently characterised by a tense
balancing act between the two core sets of values that it attempts to
marry. The more it emphasises the value to the individual of national
identity, the less value it can invest in nationalism tout court, whilst
74 Wilcox (2004), p568.
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the more value it invests in nationalism tout court, the less value it
can invest in individualism. In my view Tamir fails to balance these
commitments in a persuasive manner. There is a general tension in
her account between valuing individual freedom and self-rule, on the
one hand, and valuing communal identity and national self-
determination, on the other. This tension is particularly apparent in
her reflections on migration and membership - a point she concedes,
as we saw in the previous section, when she acknowledges a
contradiction in her position between valuing national self-
determination and valuing freedom of movement. Tamir writes that:
“… individuals are the best judges of what cultural environment is
most suited to their needs: If in their exercise of cultural choices
individuals do not try to hinder others from exercising theirs, there are
no grounds for preventing them from pursuing their life-plans as they
see fit”.76 If we start from the perspective of the prospective migrant
rather than from the perspective of the members of the host
community, and if we apply the previous quoted statement to the
question of immigration and national self-determination, we have the
claim that individuals should be permitted to migrate to whatever
cultural environment they so choose, as long as in doing so they do
not compromise the ability of the existing members to belong to a
self-determining national culture, thereby hindering the ability of the
existing members to exercise cultural choices. The arguments I have
presented above suggest that Tamir has not shown convincingly that
the value commitments and beliefs that migrants bring should be
considered a valid reason for their exclusion on the grounds of
national self-determination. Indeed, if Tamir were to take seriously
her claim that “individuals are the best judges of what cultural
environment is most suited to their needs” then she would presumably
be led away from endorsing political, national-level restrictions on
75 Tamir (1993), p163.
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migration in order to preserve cultural distinctiveness towards simply
relying on the cultural preferences of individuals to lead to informal,
voluntary segregation and group-based clustering at a more local
level.77
Following on from this last point, we can ask Tamir why restricting
immigration is necessary to preserve cultural distinctiveness at all.
Her claim that immigration controls are justified in order to preserve
national cultures seems to be contradicted by the examples she herself
provides of national groups that preserve their unique culture despite
not being demarcated by geographical and/or political borders:
Cultural uniqueness is preserved in Quebec, in
Belgium, and in many other places, without an
actual geographical border. Scattered peoples
like the Jews or the Armenians, and immigrant
groups such as Hispanics in Southern
California, Cubans in Miami, Algerians in
France, and Pakistanis in England, and religious
sects like the Mormons in Utah, the Amish in
Pennsylvania, or the Ultra-Orthodox Jewish
community in Jerusalem, also manage to
preserve their identities without tangible
boundaries.78
She goes on to state that the boundaries between different national
communities are commonly ‘invisible’ and are enforced not through
political measures but through erecting “ideological, religious,
linguistic, and mainly psychological barriers between members and
76 Ibid, p31.
77 Chang (2007) discusses the option of voluntary segregation in
relation to Walzer’s position on membership.
78 Tamir (1993), p166.
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nonmembers”.79 But if that is the case, then it seems puzzling that
Tamir is prepared to endorse the idea that national cultures are
entitled to political measures like immigration restrictions to preserve
their uniqueness, since the whole thrust of what she is saying here
seems to be that political measures like immigration restrictions are
not strictly necessary for national self-determination. Given the
evidence of national groups who do not require immigration
restrictions to preserve their uniqueness, and given the option and
likelihood of local, voluntary cultural segregation and clustering, it
would seem as if the tension that Tamir outlines between national
self-determination and freedom of movement is at the very least
exaggerated within the terms of her own theory. The examples she
provides above and the arguments I have put forward in this section
seem to mitigate the concern that relinquishing the right of
communities to exclude outsiders through immigration restrictions
will compromise the ability of the existing members to belong to a
self-determining national community.
In the objections put forward in this section I hope to have cast doubt
on the idea that Tamir’s understanding of national self-determination
grounds a right to exclude outsiders on the basis of their value
commitments and beliefs. But what of other allegedly core, objective
features of national identity, such as a shared language, or common
participation in shared political and social institutions? In the
following section I outline briefly and discuss critically Will
Kymlicka’s argument for restricting immigration in order to protect
these features of national identity - which are encompassed under the
term ‘societal culture’.
79 Ibid.
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2.5 Kymlicka on Societal Culture and Immigration
Kymlicka draws a distinction between shared values and cultural
identity - a distinction that we have encountered in relation to Tamir,
but which, as I have argued above, she seems to run together when
she defends immigration restrictions to protect the shared national
identity of the host community. Kymlicka writes that: “Social unity
cannot be based on shared beliefs … What matters is not shared
values, but a shared identity … What holds Americans together,
despite their disagreements over the nature of the good life, is the fact
that they share an identity as Americans”.80 What needs to be shared
amongst citizens and protected through immigration restrictions, for
Kymlicka, is not a set of shared values but a societal culture, which
encompasses “a common language and social institutions, rather than
common religious beliefs, family customs or personal lifestyles”81
and which is “territorially-concentrated”.82 As with Tamir, the value
of cultural membership for Kymlicka consists in enabling individuals
to make autonomous choices amongst a range of intelligible options.
He argues that people’s life options are culturally embedded, so that
the dissolution of their cultural structure could prevent an individual
from pursuing a meaningful and autonomous life.83
Is the self-determination argument for exclusion any more defensible
when we make explicit in this way a distinction between shared
values and societal cultural identity, and stress that it is the latter that
immigration restrictions are designed to protect? Kymlicka argues
80 Kymlicka (1996), p131. Miller (2007, p224) puts forward a similar
claim.
81 Kymlicka (2001c), p18.
82 Kymlicka (2001b), p75.
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that without the right to exclude outsiders from social membership,
liberal nation-states could be faced by an influx of immigrants who
are so culturally different that - regardless of their values or beliefs -
their presence could prove socially disruptive and could compromise
the integrity of the societal culture of the existing members. He writes
that “Open borders would … make it more likely that people’s own
national community would be overrun by settlers from other cultures,
and that they would be unable to ensure their survival as a distinct
national culture”.84 The idea then is that their control over social
membership helps to preserve the shared language and common
participation in the social and political institutions that underly the
societal culture, and therefore the autonomy of the existing members
of the political community.
However, it seems to me that Kymlicka’s arguments for the
importance of societal culture to autonomy do not in themselves
support a general right of existing citizens to control membership, if
we are thinking about economically advanced, politically stable and
comparatively prosperous liberal states, as opposed to numerically,
economically and politically vulnerable national minorities. So long
as there are internal measures available to ensure the preservation of
“a shared language which is used in a wide range of societal
institutions, in both public and private life”,85 it seems that border
restrictions are unnecessary for the preservation of societal culture;
something akin to culturally protectionist overkill. Kymlicka himself
has shown convincingly that the uniquely high levels of immigration
into Canada and the United States (the highest and second highest per
83 Kymlicka (1995), p83.
84 Kymlicka (2001b), p215.
85 Kymlicka (2001c), p18.
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capita rates of immigration in the world)86 are compatible with
comparatively successful societal integration and cohesion because of
the way in which migrants are treated once they are territorially
present. In Kymlicka’s own analysis, the socio-political integration of
resident migrants is achieved mainly because “public policies support
large-scale immigration, provide newcomers with the rights needed to
participate in the larger society, and endorse a more “multicultural”
conception of citizenship that seeks to accommodate rather than
suppress immigrant ethnic identities”.87 In the Canadian case,
Kymlicka highlights the importance of “publicly funded language
training classes … as well as citizenship promotion campaigns”.88
Encouraging the naturalisation of resident migrants is a particularly
significant factor in facilitating their societal integration:
When immigrants gain the psychological and
legal security that comes with citizenship, they
are more likely to put down roots, to contribute
to local community initiatives, to care about
how well their children are integrating, to invest
in the linguistic skills and social capital needed
to prosper, and more generally to develop
stronger feelings of Canadian identity and
loyalty.89
This evidence leads Kymlicka to the conclusion that “(…) properly
managed - immigration can be a benefit and a resource to the country
rather than a threat to it”.90 But then this in turn supports the
conclusion that what really matters for the preservation of societal
culture and for socio-political integration in the face of high levels of
immigration is not so much the right to exclude immigrants at the
86 Abizadeh (2006), p4.
87 Kymlicka and Banting (2006), p281.
88 Kymlicka (2004), p197.
89 Ibid, p199.
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border.91 Instead, this evidence points to the need for the proper
internal management of and response to immigrant communities once
they are here, in particular through providing language training and
encouraging naturalisation.92 Therefore, as far as membership
controls go, I think that Kymlicka’s argument concerning the
importance of societal culture supports at most limiting the pace of
immigration, so as not to overwhelm the internal social services
required to provide these sorts of measures that help integration; they
do not it seems support a unilateral right to shape membership on the
part of existing members.93
But this conclusion may be too quick. Is it really the case that we can
successfully encourage immigrants to integrate, naturalise and to
participate in liberal-democratic institutions without first ensuring that
they are loyal to some recognisable interpretation of liberal-
democratic values? In other words, how persuasive is Kymlicka’s
claim that participation in a shared liberal democratic political culture
and identity need not be preceded by and grounded upon an
endorsement of liberal democratic values or beliefs? In the following
section, I discuss critically the identity liberal position on
immigration, which claims that in the absence of measures being
taken to ensure that immigrants are loyal to the common values and
beliefs which are said to underlie liberal-democratic institutions prior
to their acquisition of citizenship, those institutions are at risk of
being dissolved ‘from the inside’. The concern to be addressed here is
90 Kymlicka and Banting (2006), p281.
91 Abizadeh (2006), p4.
92 The British Islamic advocacy group FAIR has argued that whilst
the majority of asylum seekers and migrants coming to Britain are
keen to undergo language training, there is insufficient governmental
funding, resulting in a lack of course places available in educational
institutions. FAIR (2002), p2.
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that following Kymlicka’s advice and providing “newcomers with the
rights needed to participate in the larger society” whilst endorsing a
“multicultural” conception of citizenship without first making sure
that those newcomers are loyal to liberal democratic values could
result in them using those rights to corrupt or destroy liberal
democracy itself. Having outlined this position, I argue that it too has
difficulty in sustaining a normative link between collective self-
determination and control over social membership and citizenship.
2.6 Identity Liberalism and Democratic Exclusion
The aspect of identity liberalism I am interested in exploring here
concerns its emphasis on the importance of protecting democracy,
rather than preserving the distinctiveness of national cultures as an
end in itself. Although the political measures they endorse in response
to immigration are the same as Tamir - namely, the exclusion of
outsiders using the shared values and cultural identity of the host
community as the relevant criteria - identity liberals are more
concerned with protecting what Tamir characterises as the right of the
existing members to exercise self-rule rather than collective rights to
national self-determination. In contrast to Tamir’s acceptance of the
value to individuals of nonliberal forms of life, identity liberalism
privileges the liberal way of life above all others and regards
nonliberal cultures as a threat to hard-won advances in terms of the
protection of personal autonomy and individual rights.
According to Adam Tebble, identity liberalism denotes a “perspective
93 Sager (2008), pp. 75-76.
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that employs a progressive identity-based normative discourse
typically considered to be the preserve of the multicultural left to
defend a right-wing politics of assimilation”.94 What Tebble identifies
as distinctive about this position is that it supports demands for the
assimilation of immigrants into the dominant national culture and for
tighter immigration controls not through conventional right-wing
discourses of racial or ethnic purity or cultural superiority, but by
appropriating the normative logic and ethical premises of
multiculturalism itself. The kernel of the identity liberal’s position is
that national majorities have a right to protect their culture and
political values from being eroded through the presence in society of
groups who do not endorse the national values in question. If, as
multiculturalists like Charles Taylor95 and Bhikhu Parekh96 maintain,
our cultural identity is a significant source of our well-being, self-
esteem or our capacity for autonomy, it follows that the liberal
national culture should be protected from being swamped by those
who reject its underlying values. Such a right comes into play in cases
where non-liberal groups develop the degree of political voice and
organisation within their host society for them to represent a genuine
threat to the preservation of the values which support the socio-
political institutions of the national majority. This right, according to
Tebble, justifies the emphasis which is increasingly being placed on
the need for immigrants to accept and endorse the public values of
their host nation as a condition of their naturalisation. What makes
this a recognisably liberal view is that the protection of the national
culture is linked to the stability and permanence of liberal democratic
institutions and the space for pluralism that they provide:
Identity liberals contend that the state must not
94 Tebble (2006), p463.
95 Taylor (1992).
96 Parekh (2006).
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only pursue assimilationism internally but must
adopt policies of exclusion and, in extremis,
repatriation with respect to communities whose
values are deemed incompatible with those of
the liberal national culture (…) In order to
combat the destruction of cultural
permissiveness, identity liberals thus concede
that cultural selection with regard to
immigration and assimilation are both necessary
and desirable (…)97
Here, the question to be addressed is whether abandoning the
requirement of assimilation to a set of shared cultural values as a
condition of membership will result in the erosion or corruption of the
democratic system from within. This is still a question concerning the
relationship between self-determination and political membership,
because it is a question of whether relinquishing the right of
communities to exclude outsiders on the grounds of their value
commitments will result in compromising the right of the existing
members to be a part of a stable democratic system. If a convincing
case can be made for a positive answer to this question, then
assimilation, de-naturalisation, deportation or exclusion at the border
may be justified in order to prevent the disintegration of the liberal
democratic culture which is required for the existing members to
exercise their right to collective self-determination. Rubio-Marin
describes the sort of concern expressed by identity liberals when she
writes:
(…) the objection would be that letting every
kind of resident have a political voice would
endanger a democratic system by allowing
political power to be used to corrupt the very
democratic structure from inside … ensuring
that immigrants will remain loyal to the
fundamental values … of the state are among
97 Tebble (2006), p481.
96
the reasonable functions that many states expect
immigration and naturalisation laws to serve.98
A comprehensive answer to this kind of question in any particular
case would have to take account of numerous contextual and
empirical considerations - such as the size of the host community in
relation to the number of prospective migrants, and the economic and
employment situation in the receiving country. It is possible to
imagine a situation in which immigration restrictions could be
justified on the grounds of the absorptive capacity of the host
community. If a small, economically vibrant and liberal state A was
surrounded by larger, impoverished, illiberal states, and if opening up
the borders of state A was likely to lead to a massive and
unmanageable influx of outsiders with no commitment to any
defensible interpretation of the values of liberty and equality, then it
is conceivable that the argument from democratic values could justify
a restrictive and/or assimilative immigration policy.99 To consider a
different (and admittedly rather unlikely) kind of case, if a
prospective migrant openly declared his intention to work for the
destruction of the liberal democratic system of the host community, it
would seem perverse to maintain that the host community was under
any obligation to permit them to enter. This argument cannot however
ground a general right to control membership on the part of existing
members, only a right to exclude those individuals who actually
declare their intention to destroy liberal democracy from within.100
98 Rubio-Marin (2000), p65.
99 Carens (1992), pp. 28-29.
100 Abizadeh (2006), p4. Meilander (2001, p90) characterises the
exclusion of hostile outsiders as an act of ‘political self-preservation’,
which suggests that self-determination is not the key principle at
stake in justifying such acts of membership control. So even if liberal-
democracies do have a right to exclude outsiders in these sorts of
cases, this is congruent with my overall argument in this thesis that
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Leaving aside limiting cases such as these, I want to investigate the
normative claim that restrictive immigration criteria can be seen as a
justifiable measure to mitigate the risk that unchecked free movement
might pose to the integrity of the democratic system of the host
community.
Alongside Tebble, Dominique Schnapper also stresses the importance
to democracy of a shared cultural basis, including a set of shared
values. Democracy is liable to flounder, she maintains, in the absence
of “national solidarity … founded on a common political project,
stemming from a common political culture”.101 On her account, the
health and stability of liberal democracy requires a firm foundation
for motivating individuals to integrate and to engage in non-strategic
political activity, i.e. political activity not motivated purely by self-
interest on the part of individuals or groups. This, in turn, rests
importantly on the existence of shared values, norms, practices, goals
and beliefs:
The process of internal integration implies …
that the common goals of the collective
enterprise be defined and accepted, that
individuals share a certain number of common
practices and beliefs (…) In the case of the
nation, it is a matter of political goals, practices
and beliefs.102
For Schnapper, then, the existence of nationally shared characteristics
is what motivates the citizenry to act beyond the domain of strategic
self-determination does not ground a right to exclude outsiders from
social membership or citizenship. See also Sager (2008), pp. 73-74,
and Chapter 3, nt. 99 of this thesis.
101 Schnapper (1994), p. 40; quoted in Abizadeh (2002), p499.
102 Ibid.
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action and is what ensures their integration. If, as she maintains, the
health and stability of democracy rests on the existence of common
collective goals, beliefs, norms and values, we have a plausible prima
facie case for ensuring that membership in the polity is extended only
to those who are prepared to endorse those collective attributes, i.e.
for assimilative immigration and naturalisation criteria. As Rubio-
Marin observes:
Scrutinizing and testing those who cannot be
assumed to have acquired the attachments,
abilities and knowledge that make the system
work … might be justified as a preventative
measure against the erosion of democracy.
Ensuring that immigrants who are to join the
body politic are fully loyal to the system …
could precisely be seen as this kind of
preventative measure.103
It has been argued that it is simply empirically false to claim that
democracy and political stability necessarily require cultural
homogeneity, given the evidence we have of enduring and relatively
stable multicultural democratic states like Britain and the United
States.104 But we should note that the claim being considered here is
that a shared political culture is an important pre-requisite for the
stability and preservation of a liberal democratic system. Political
culture encompasses adherence to political principles and procedures,
rather than national cultural features like a shared language, religion
or sense of collective history. This is where the identity liberal
position may be relevant to the argument for restrictive immigration
and citizenship policies, because its core claim is that, contra
Kymlicka, multiculturalism and permissive immigration policies can
result in incompatible political cultures co-existing under one national
103 Rubio-Marin (2000), p71.
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roof. These mixtures can then prove corrosive of the democratic
system. Tebble cites a number of recent examples of politically
disruptive activities undertaken by Islamic groups that seem to
support the idea that scrutinising the loyalty of prospective migrants
to democratic values to ascertain their commitment to the liberal-
democratic political culture should be a valid condition of their
inclusion:
(…) in the UK during the 2005 general election
campaign … religious fundamentalists took
over the election press conference of a national
body representing the Muslim community,
claiming that voting was sinful. A day later a
pro-Iraq War Labour candidate was forced to
abandon canvassing in her constituency after
she was verbally abused by a gang of Muslim
males and had her car pelted with eggs and its
tires slashed. On the same day in the same
constituency, even the press conference of an
anti-war Respect Party candidate was invaded
by a mob that attacked the attendees and
threatened the candidate with death threats,
claiming that voting was un-Islamic.105
Whilst it is of course true that these are examples of acts committed
by Muslims that are disruptive of the democratic process, it seems to
me that characterising these as problems of immigration or of
citizenship rather than as problems of criminality begs the question at
hand, in a way that enables Tebble to reach a conclusion regarding
membership controls to which he is not necessarily entitled on liberal
grounds.106 Given that liberals are typically opposed to drawing
104 Wilcox (2004), pp. 568-569.
105 Tebble (2006), p473.
106 The Muslim advocacy group FAIR disputes the drawing of any
connection between the civil disturbances in Britain in the summer of
2002 and notions of loyalty, belonging, immigration and citizenship
policy, by pointing out that the majority of individuals involved in the
100
distinctions amongst individuals on the basis of their ascriptive
characteristics, surely the politically and normatively relevant features
of the acts described by Tebble are that they are against the law and
are undemocratic, not that they are illegal and undemocratic acts
committed by Muslims? These examples therefore seem to me to lend
support not to tighter immigration restrictions or thicker naturalisation
criteria, but instead support for the state claiming a “monopoly of
legitimate force for itself”.107 Since liberal states are perfectly able to
enforce the law against citizens who act illegally and who act to
seriously disrupt the democratic process, and since liberal states are
also nominally committed to universal equality, we must ask why it
should not take the same approach to resident immigrants and
naturalised citizens as it takes towards birthright citizens and deal
with any offences the former commit through the internal criminal
law process, rather than through enforcing preemptive, restrictive
border and citizenship controls? Rubio-Marin supports this focus on
internal measures in place of exclusionary membership controls when
she argues that “the fact that some immigrants may hold
undemocratic or illiberal views does not leave them in a position
essentially different from that of rebellious or dissenting citizens”.108
From a liberal perspective, what I think is particularly objectionable
about Tebble’s presentation of the issue of undemocratic activities
carried out by Muslims immigrants is the idea that their conduct
might constitute valid grounds for their ‘repatriation’. Liberal states
unrest were British-born citizens. Contra Tebble, they emphasise
economic exclusion and a lack of equal rights and opportunities,
rather than ethnic segregation, as the key factors in dissolving social
cohesion and encouraging civil unrest in the UK. FAIR (2002), pp. 2-
3.
107 Weber et al (2008), p156.
108 Rubio-Marin, (2000), p71.
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do not deport citizens who have acquired their membership through
birthright, regardless of any criminal or undemocratic acts they might
go on to commit or beliefs they might go on to express. We should
question then why immigrants who have acquired their membership
status through naturalisation should be vulnerable to this threat within
a political society committed to universal equality.109 Indeed, it seems
difficult on liberal grounds to justify applying to any procedures or
policies towards resident migrants if those procedures and policies are
not seen as applicable to the existing members of the host community,
precisely because doing so involves compromising the liberal
commitment to the universal equality of all individuals.110 So I concur
with Rubio-Marin when she states that: “As a general principle, one
could say that whatever the requirements found to be compelling for
the survival of a democratic society, they should apply equally to all
its members”.111
A second, more political problem with the assimilative approach to
naturalisation is that it seems to preclude the possibility that newly
established citizens could contribute to shaping or changing the
existing political structure within their host society by articulating
their perspective on a particular issue. If access to citizenship is
dependent upon affirming a set of national values, this suggests that
all the important work of constructing, defending and implementing
109 Walzer (1983, pp. 56-61) argues that the threat of deportation
which hangs over resident aliens runs contrary to the normative logic
of democracy. In the following chapter I discuss Walzer’s
understanding of democratic inclusion according to ethical
territoriality and the subject-to-the-law principle of demarcation. See
also Cole (2000), pp. 142-143.
110 For similar claims, see Cole (2000), and Wilcox (2004), pp. 580-
581.
111 Rubio-Marin (2000), p72. Seglow (2009, p791) defends a similar
claim when discussing what he calls a ‘symettry principle’.
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those values has already been done prior to the arrival of new
immigrants. As Iris Young points out, “assimilation always implies
coming into the game after it is already begun, after the rules and
standards have already been set, and having to prove oneself
according to those rules and standards”.112 As such, newly established
citizens are in a position of acquiescence in a present system rather
than one of active political engagement to formulate new ones.
Moreover, given that the condition of their naturalisation will have
been to display loyalty to the core values underlying the national
culture, those immigrants who do go on to challenge the existing
arrangements in their host nation are liable to be portrayed as
treasonous and/or politically disruptive. The upshot of this is that if
immigrant groups do not feel that they have a genuine opportunity to
contest and change existing arrangements in their host nation then any
subsequent feelings of frustration they might have with the present
state of politics are less likely to be channeled through public,
political and democratic means. Those grievances are instead more
likely to be articulated in private associations. Chantal Mouffe, whose
work I discuss in detail in Chapter 6, argues that if deep-seated
differences of opinion are not allowed to be aired within a democratic
forum it is likely that they will instead be pressed into the service of
conservative and anti-democratic movements.113 Rather than
combating political separatism and destabilisation, the assimilative
approach to naturalisation and immigration favoured by identity
liberalism may encourage just that state of affairs.
A further, related problem with the identity liberal and liberal
nationalist position is that it risks suppressing the need for immanent
criticism within the liberal nation state. If the national culture is
112 Young (1990), p103.
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associated in a straightforward way with a set of liberal democratic
values, then the practices, norms and attitudes of the native citizenry
are unlikely to come under the same degree of critical scrutiny as
practices maintained by sections of immigrant communities. In other
words, if the national culture is painted in homogenous terms as
upholding a core set of liberal democratic values, then it may become
harder to criticise those who belong to the national culture for not
embodying those values in their activities or opinions. Conversely, it
may become easier to associate the practices of immigrant
communities in a straightforward way with oppression or social
injustice. This is because, on the identity liberal position, the
behaviour or norms of the non-immigrant population is taken as the
standard against which the behaviour or norms of potential citizens
are evaluated. I think that Young has something similar to this in
mind when she points out that “the goal of assimilation holds up to
people a demand that they ‘fit’, be like the mainstream, in behavior,
values, and goals”.114
In this way, the identity liberal position sustains an over-simplified
picture of the relationship between freedom and national identity
which fails to do justice to the contextual and multi-dimensional
nature of emancipatory and oppressive practices. Practices that are
common within a national group expressly committed to autonomy
and emancipation are not obviously autonomous or emancipatory for
that reason alone. Joseph Carens points out that “one could make a
plausible case that French haute couture, by constructing female
identity in terms of a woman’s ability to dress in ways that are
attractive to men, has contributed more to the subordination of
113 Mouffe (2000a), p104.
114 Young (1990), p317.
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women … than the hijab ever did”.115 Carens’ assertion here is
bolstered by the evidence that the veil has in fact served liberating
and politically empowering ends for women within certain historical
and political contexts. For example, Leila Ahmed argues that for
professionally ambitious Muslim women in contemporary Egypt
wearing the veil serves a politically empowering function in that it
aids their transition from their rural backgrounds “to emerge socially
into a sexually integrated world”.116 What this implies is that a
judgment about the emancipatory or oppressive nature of a given
practice or norm should take account of the surrounding social,
political, historical and cultural circumstances and should not simply
proceed by way of comparison to the practices which occur in liberal
national groups. A key problem with the identity liberal position, in
my view, is that it undermines the need for this kind of contextual
approach by perpetuating the idea that there is a homogenous body of
core liberal values shared and endorsed by all citizens of the nation
state. I think that Bonnie Honig has a similar point in mind when she
writes in her criticism of Susan Okin’s approach to multiculturalism
and female rights that:
Her faith that Western liberal regimes are
furthest along a progressive trajectory of
unfolding liberal equality prevents her from
engaging in a more selective and comparative
analysis of particular practices, powers, and
contexts that could well enlighten us about
ourselves and heighten our critical awareness of
some of the limits as well as the benefits of
liberal ways of life.117
This is not to suggest that the host community is never justified in
115 Carens (2000), p159.
116 Ahmed (1992), pp. 223-224; quoted in Honig (2001a), p64.
117 Honig (1997); in critique of Okin (1999).
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passing judgment on the practices maintained by certain sections of
immigrant communities. The point is rather that our critical eye
should be equally attuned to potentially problematic practices or
norms within our own community. We can call this a principle of
reciprocal critique: charges or criticisms leveled at minority groups
should, in the interest of evenhandedness and in awareness of the
internal differences within national groups, be accompanied by an
interrogation of potentially problematic practices or norms within the
host country which bear relevance to the same sphere. In a discussion
of Iris Young’s work, Penny Enslin puts forward a similar suggestion
when she argues that:
(…) denouncing dowry murder has to be
accompanied by ongoing attention to the
incidence of murder of American women by
men with guns. Western women’s acceptance of
images of beauty that lead them to undergo
cosmetic surgery should accompany calling
attention to genital surgeries.118
The principle of reciprocal critique also implies that liberal criticism
should not be disproportionately focused on any one particular
community. So, for example, criticism of homophobic or patriarchal
practices or norms within certain sections of Islamic communities
should be accompanied by attention to similar norms or practices
maintained within certain sections of, say, Judeo-Christian and Afro-
Caribbean communities. If this principle is defensible, it suggests that
one important way in which the differences of immigrants could
function as a resource within the democratic process is in providing
occasion to re-examine practices or norms commonly held within the
host nation that may be problematic from a liberal perspective.
Fulfilling that potential, however, would require that receiving states
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demonstrate: a) a degree of fallibilism about the unanimous
endorsement and full realisation in practice of liberal values amongst
the citizenry, and b) a willingness to address the cultural and political
differences of immigrants within the democratic process, rather than
attempting to filter them out as a condition of their inclusion. Neither
of these conditions can be reconciled straightforwardly with Tebble’s
identity liberal nor Tamir’s liberal nationalist position on immigration
and citizenship.
Would an immigration policy that was more permissive towards the
cultural and political differences of immigrants risk undermining the
social bases of trust, solidarity or fellow-feeling which may be either
necessary or instrumental in sustaining democratic structures of
governance? In essence this is an empirical matter and so not open to
theoretical validation. However, as we will see in Chapters 4 and 6
respectively, republican/multicultural theorists (represented by
Young) and agonistic democrats (represented by Mouffe and Honig)
suggest that there are modes of belonging to a polity that do not
necessarily require cohesion in the thick sense of a shared national
identity or set of values. Young, for example, argues that participation
in the activity of democratic politics alone provides sufficient bonds
of solidarity to sustain the functioning of the liberal democratic
polity:
(…) workable democratic politics requires of
citizens some sense of being together with one
another in order to sustain the commitment that
seeking solutions to conflict under
circumstances of difference and inequality
requires ... Political co-operation requires a less
substantial unity than shared understandings or
118 Enslin (2006), p65.
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a common good (….)119
For Honig, democratic self-determination is not about the
consolidation or expression of communally shared identity, nor is it
primarily to do with the erection of frontiers between insiders and
outsiders. Instead, she argues that:
(…) democracy is always about living with
strangers under a law that is therefore alien
(because it is the mongrel product of political
action - often gone awry - taken with and
among strangers). Even at its very best, or
especially so, democracy is about being
mobilized into action periodically with and on
behalf of people who are surely opaque to us
and often unknown to us.120
What Honig suggests here is that the ideal of popular sovereignty is
illusory or at best a regulative fiction that could never be realised. In
her view, democracies can never fulfill the ideal of matching policies
to a shared collective will of the people simply because there is no
shared collective will to which such policies could correspond. Given
Tamir’s acknowledgement of the artificiality, contingency and
heterogeneity of national identities, she would seem to be committed
to a similar view. But if this is the case, then, as I argued in section
2.4, the tension between national self-determination and freedom of
movement that informs her endorsement of restrictive social
membership and citizenship policies seems less intractable than she
suggests.
119 Young (2000a), p110.
120 Honig (2001a), p39.
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2.7 Conclusion
I began this chapter by noting that a number of liberal democracies
have in recent years taken a more assimilative approach to their
immigration and citizenship policies. Liberal nationalism and identity
liberalism are two theoretical orientations that may help to justify in
normative terms these kinds of restrictive membership controls. For
Tamir, the unilateral right to determine the policy of border control
and the criteria for membership is a function of the right of the
existing members to national self-determination, which is in turn an
important pre-condition for their exercise of free choice and
autonomy.
In section 2.4 I questioned the normative link that Tamir tries to
establish between national self-determination and control over
membership. If, as I argued, the evidence is that national groups are
characterised by internal diversity in the beliefs, norms and
characteristics held by the members, then the case for an immigration
policy designed to protect the shared identity of the host national
community appears to be misguided. I then went on to argue that
there is a general tension within Tamir’s position itself between
recognising the diversity within national communities and the
contingency and artificiality of national identities whilst at the same
time arguing for restrictive membership policies in order to preserve
national homogeneity. I then argued that there is a tension in Tamir’s
position between the individualist and multicultural premises she
adopts and the corporatist, monocultural conclusion that she reaches
in the case of immigration restrictions. I suggested that if Tamir were
to take seriously her commitment to individual autonomy, as well as
her claim that individuals are the best judges of what cultural
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environment is suited to their needs, then she would back away from
endorsing formal immigration restrictions at the national level. Lastly,
I argued that, faced with the evidence of national groups which
preserve their unique culture despite not being demarcated by
geographical borders, it seems difficult for Tamir to defend
immigration restrictions on the grounds of national self-
determination.
In section 2.5 I discussed Kymlicka’s argument for restricting
immigration on the grounds of protecting ‘societal cultures’. I argued
in my response that Kymlicka’s own analysis of immigration
integration in Canada and the United States suggests that the proper
internal management of immigrants can be sufficient to ensure their
socio-political integration, and therefore border restrictions do not
seem strictly necessary for the preservation of societal cultures. At
most, Kymlicka’s argument supports restrictions on the pace of
immigration, not a general right to control membership on the
grounds of self-determination.
In section 2.6 I discussed an opposing viewpoint, put forward from
the perspective of identity liberalism. Identity liberals are concerned
that the democratic system may be corroded from within if sufficient
measures are not taken to ensure that immigrants are loyal to liberal-
democratic values. In my response, I argued that undemocratic or
illiberal activities carried out by immigrant groups should be dealt
with through the internal criminal law process rather than through
enforcing border controls or exclusionary citizenship policies. This is
the approach taken towards native-born citizens, and a society
committed to universal equality should be prepared to apply the same
standards to immigrants that are applied to native citizens. I then
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argued that assimilative naturalisation and immigration criteria
threaten to create political instability and separatism, so that the
identity liberal approach may turn out to be self-defeating. Lastly, I
argued that identity liberalism perpetuates the idea that only
immigrants hold views or carry out practices which are problematic
from a liberal perspective, and that this fails to do justice to the
internal diversity within national groups, and undermines the need for
reciprocal critique.
In the following chapter, I address the arguments from self-
determination for control over social membership put forward by
Michael Walzer and David Miller. We have seen in this chapter that
Tamir’s account of national self-determination is concerned primarily
with the status and representation of shared culture in the public
political sphere, rather than the democratic participation of citizens.
Likewise, although Tebble and Schnapper want to protect liberal
democracy, they do so primarily via endorsing measures designed to
protect the national culture of the host society. Walzer and Miller, on
the other hand, stress to a far greater degree the role of democratic
legitimacy in drawing a normative link between self-determination
and control over membership (although their arguments also
incorporate importantly a concern with the protection of national
identities). Does their focus on democratic considerations overcome
the problems identified in this chapter with justifying control over
membership purely on the basis of cultural self-determination? This
question will partly form the focus for the following chapter.
Alongside his arguments for the exclusion of outsiders from social
membership, Walzer also maintains that resident migrants have a
right to citizenship which is grounded on the ‘subject-to-the-law’
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principle of democratic inclusion. If my critique in section 2.7 is
valid, this may provide a favourable alternative to the exclusive
citizenship policies endorsed by identity liberals.
113
Chapter 3
Michael Walzer and David Miller on Political Community,
Territoriality and Membership
3.1 Introduction
Michael Walzer’s chapter on membership in his Spheres of Justice1
represents one of the seminal treatments in contemporary political
philosophy on the relationship between political membership and
democratic self-determination. Though written in 1983, his reflections
in Spheres on the right of sovereign nation-states to control
membership continues to influence many of the themes and
arguments in the current critical dialogue in political theory on
immigration, membership and the ethics of political community.2 In
that text, Walzer puts forward a robust defence of the right of nation-
states to choose to exclude outsiders from social membership as a
function of their right to self-determination. As we saw in the
introductory chapter, he goes so far as to claim that the right to
exclude is inherent in the very meaning of self-determination, so that
if citizens cannot exercise unilateral control over social membership
then they fail to belong to a fully self-determining nation-state. David
Miller has also recently provided a defence of immigration
restrictions based on the values of and relationships between the
territorial rights of nation-states, democratic self-determination and
national responsibility.
1 Walzer (1983).
2 See, for example, the discussions of Walzer’s position in Barbieri
(1998); Bader (1995); Benhabib (2004); Cole (2000); Meilander
(2001), & Seglow (2005).
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There is an important cultural element to the accounts of national self-
determination put forward by both theorists, and this cultural
dimension contributes to their defence of membership controls. Miller
states that “the general justification for immigration restrictions
involves an appeal to national self-determination and in particular a
people’s right to shape its own cultural development”.3 He holds that
a morally defensible position on the relationship between immigration
and self-determination will be one that aims to achieve an acceptable
balance between “the interests that immigrants have in entering the
country that they want to live in and the interests that national
communities have in maintaining control over their own composition
and character”.4 From Walzer’s liberal-communitarian perspective,
political communities operate on the basis of a shared understanding
of the meaning, purpose and correct ordering of social goods amongst
their members. They are culturally distinct entities with a right to
preserve their unique character in keeping with the shared sentiments,
values and traditions of the existing members, and this is achieved
partly through imposing restrictions on social membership. For both
Miller and Walzer, decisions about membership are seen as a core
feature of national self-determination because they impact directly
upon the shared culture, distinct character and collective goals of
receiving countries. In their view, without the ability to shape
membership through immigration controls and through the exclusion
of the voices of outsiders, the citizens of nation-states would be
deprived of a key feature of their collective freedom; namely, the
freedom to determine the shared cultural, political and economic
conditions within which democratic self-rule proceeds. I shall argue
in this chapter that neither theorist establishes a convincing case for
3 Miller (2007), p228.
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thinking that social membership controls are a justifiable feature of
collective self-determination.
Whilst Walzer supports the right of political communities to exclude
outsiders from territorial admission, he regards the acquisition of
citizenship for resident migrants as a right that follows from the logic
of democratic principles. Admission to citizenship lies outside of the
scope of the self-determining powers of a political community to
grant or withhold as they so choose. His position on membership has
therefore been described as ‘hard-outside/soft-inside’.5 He thinks that
the distribution of social membership is a unilateral communal right
(subject to some important constraints, outlined in section 3.3 below),
whereas access to citizenship is a right that individuals hold against
their state of residence. “Immigration,” he writes, “is both a matter of
political choice and moral constraint. Naturalization, by contrast, is
entirely constrained: every new immigrant, every refugee taken in,
every resident and worker must be offered the opportunities of
citizenship”.6
I begin my discussion in the following section by giving an account
of Walzer’s understanding of political community and national
sovereignty. In section 3.3 I outline his position on naturalisation and
the democratic right to citizenship for all settled residents. I discuss
how Walzer appeals to the subject-to-the-law principle of democratic
inclusion and ethical territoriality in substantiating his position on
citizenship, and I give an account of the normative logic behind it. As
we will see, it provides an important alternative to the culturally
4 Ibid, p230.
5 Bosniak (2007), p396.
6 Walzer (1983), p62.
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exclusive citizenship policies endorsed by Tamir, Tebble and
Schnapper.
In section 3.4 I move on to discuss the ‘hard-outside’ aspect of his
position, and I argue that we can discern two distinct arguments or
themes in Walzer’s justification for the right to exclude outsiders
from social membership. The first is grounded - as with Tamir’s
account - on the value of tradition and the preservation of distinct
cultures, whilst the second is based on the value of popular
sovereignty and democratic self-determination.7 The first argument
defends state sovereignty over territorial admissions in order to
preserve the distinctiveness of the traditions and cultures on which
political communities are said to be established. Having outlined this
argument, I raise the objection that preserving the diversity of
political communities does not seem to necessarily require closure in
the form of state-level immigration restrictions given the evidence of
regional diversity across the United States and across the signatory
states of the EU.
In section 3.5 I move on to discuss Walzer’s second main argument
for excluding outsiders from social membership, which is democratic
in character and defends state sovereignty over admissions in order to
respect the integrity of the process of democratic will-formation. The
democratic argument avoids the problems with culturally protectionist
policies of membership control, which I have raised in the previous
chapter, and which I develop further in section 3.4. However, I argue
7 Laegaard (2007, pp. 293-294) also discusses this distinction between
cultural and democratic self-determination. She takes her cue from
Seglow (2005)pp. 319-324.
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that it results in an infinite regress of constitutive decisions - what is
known as the ‘boundary problem’ in democratic theory.
In section 3.5 I go on to look at Miller’s recent arguments for the
exclusive territorial rights of nation-states and for collective national
responsibility.8 Miller’s argument for territorial rights from historic
occupancy and the cultural transformation of the land avoids the
logical paradox described by the boundary problem because it does
not appeal directly to democratic criteria to demarcate the political
unit that has a right to self-determination and, subsequently,
legitimate powers of exclusion. Miller also avoids the problems with
the purely cultural account of rights to national self-determination put
forward by Tamir (and Walzer in his more communitarian and less
democratic moments), since he does not appeal to a shared culture in
any thick sense or shared normative commitments in order to
demarcate and justify the exclusionary boundaries of political
communities.
However, his position generates difficulties of its own. The first
problem I discuss, with the attempt to demarcate political boundaries
and territorial rights by reference to historic occupancy and land
transformation, is that often disputes over boundaries arise precisely
because of controversy surrounding claims to historic entitlement. A
further objection to Miller’s account is that it is vulnerable to liberal
egalitarian critiques of distributive inequality and the arbitrary
distribution of economic resources and social goods in general across
the globe. However, Miller is armed with an important response to
this objection, which appeals to collective national responsibility.
8 Miller (2007).
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Having discussed this response, I then put forward four arguments for
disputing the closeness of the ‘fit’ between the actions of democratic
states and the collective will of the members of nations, which in turn
challenge Miller’s defence of national responsibility. This discussion
suggests that Miller’s argument from collective national responsibility
fails to show that self-determination trumps egalitarian considerations
in favour of greater ease of access to social membership leading to
citizenship.
However, Walzer, Miller, Tamir, as well as a number of other
theorists, all argue that global inequality is more relevant to
arguments for the international redistribution of wealth and resources
than for greater ease of access for impoverished outsiders to social
membership and citizenship in wealthier countries. In the final section
of this chapter, I address the argument that holds that the right of self-
determining states to decide to exclude outsiders is justified in so far
as those states combine their domestic policy of (at least partially)
closed borders with foreign policies designed to ensure that those who
are excluded are not denied sufficient rights, options and resources in
their home country. A pre-requisite for the moral legitimacy of
democratic exclusion, according to this argument, is that prosperous
nation-states have met their obligations of justice or of aid to those
who are denied entrance, through such measures as the provision of
resources, the re-distribution of wealth or through humanitarian or
military intervention. Miller complements this position when he
argues that so long as individuals have adequate options within their
own countries, they do not have a general right to freedom of
international movement that outweighs the right that nation-states
have to territorial closure as a function of their right to self-
determination. I discuss the way in which the idea of ‘purchasing’ the
right to exclude by compensating those who are excluded is one
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possible way of providing a positive answer to the following question
posed by Philip Cole: “(…) can we draw a boundary that constitutes
insiders and outsiders in a way that embodies the principles of equal
respect and concern for humanity as such - not only insiders - that
many regard as the central commitments of liberal theory?”9
I suggest that this line of argument does have merit in so far as
economic redistribution is arguably a more effective strategy for
combating global inequality than (just) opening up borders. So
Walzer, Miller et al may be correct in thinking that social justice
concerns about global inequality are more relevant to the question of
the just international distribution of wealth and resources than an
account of just membership practices. Nevertheless, I put forward
four arguments for thinking that redistributive efforts do not justify
the exclusion of outsiders from social membership. Firstly, the
purchase argument is difficult to reconcile with the account of moral
contextualism that Walzer and Miller employ to justify in part their
positions on the exclusive dimension of national self-determination,
in the first place. Following on from this, I argue that even if we
reject moral contextualism, it will be virtually impossible to justify
the exclusion of an outsider on the grounds that they have been
compensated because of the difficulties in valuing the goods and
opportunities being denied, in comparison to the goods and
opportunities available in their home country. A third difficulty with
justifying exclusion via compensation is that often it is not merely a
lack of goods, wealth or resources that are the primary causes of
poverty and migration pressure but corrupt governments and senior
officials. Simply redistributing wealth in these cases is liable to
9 Cole (2000), p60.
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benefit only ruling elites and is unlikely to ‘trickle down’ to the
world’s poorest. Lastly, even if all of these problems were overcome,
the likelihood is that it would still take many years for redistributive
efforts to make a real difference to global inequality. This means that
if the compensation argument is used to justify democratic closure,
those individuals who are excluded in the interim period are not
counted in the moral register. So if compensation or redistributive
efforts are combined with and used to justify closed borders, Cole’s
charge mentioned above will not have been met convincingly.
3.2 Walzer on Political Community and National Sovereignty
In the introductory chapter, I noted that the majority of the major texts
in liberal political theory focus on the question of justice within
bounded communities, and thus avoid addressing the question of how
and according to what sorts of constraints membership is acquired,
regulated or withheld. In contrast, Walzer argues that the question of
the distribution of membership is prior to all other questions of
distributive justice.10 What is of particular significance about shared
membership for Walzer is that it provides the political framework for
many of the most significant and far-reaching obligations of
distributive justice that we are required by the state and by morality to
assume. Whom we deem as members and whom we deem as
outsiders to our community “structures all our other distributive
choices, from whom we require obedience and collect taxes, to whom
we allocate goods and services”.11 On this account, membership
10 Walzer (1983), p31. Cole (2000, p60) & Bader (1995, p213) also
point out that Walzer (1983) represents a notable exception to the
traditional silence in liberal political theory on the subject of
membership controls.
11 Walzer (1983), p31.
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represents a commitment to exchanging and sharing goods with like-
minded individuals; the members of a political community are those
people who are “committed to dividing, exchanging and sharing
social goods, first of all among themselves”.12 Since shared
membership structures all the subsequent distributive decisions that
are made within a political community, we can see why Walzer
maintains that the question of membership must be addressed before
we can turn to other questions of distributive justice.
The relevant unit of analysis for Walzer’s reflections on membership
is the nation-state, understood as a political apparatus with sovereign
authority over a bounded territory through which a historic
community decides upon and acts out its self-determined goals.
Unlike Tamir, who rejects the idea that successful national self-
determination necessarily entails independent statehood, Walzer is a
staunch internationalist in the sense that he supports - ideally
speaking - the formation of an independent state for each independent
nation.13 For Walzer, the political community that expresses its will
through a sovereign state represents a world of shared meanings,
understandings and practices. In his scheme, the nation-state thus
represents the political expression of the shared culture and distinctive
way of life of the members of a political community.
Walzer’s globe is composed of comparatively self-enclosed nation-
states and the guiding principle of international relations, in his view,
should be to respect the territorial sovereignty of those states (perhaps
most importantly with regard to their membership and immigration
policies). His argument for national sovereignty and the non-
12 Ibid.
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interference rights of states is partly due to his brand of moral
contextualism. In his earlier work Just and Unjust Wars14 Walzer
maintains that, very often, foreigners will be insufficiently attuned to
the particular history, culture and society of other political
communities to be able to judge whether there is a ‘fit’ between state
policy and the common political life of its citizens: “they don’t know
enough about its history, and they have no direct experience, and can
form no concrete judgments of the conflicts and harmonies, the
historical choices and cultural affinities, the loyalties and resentments,
that underlie it”.15 For Walzer, there are no universal standards of
morality or of justice. Moral standards and judgements are local and
contextual; they are specific to the shared understandings of the
members of particular communities.16 If, as Walzer maintains, one
must be an existing member of a political community in order to be
able to pass coherent and defensible judgments concerning its
policies, practices and values, then any attempt to regulate or pass
judgement on the admissions policies of nation-states by external
individuals, organisations, states or agencies is bound to represent a
distorted and unjustified imposition of alien norms and principles.
When defending national sovereignty and self-determination as non-
interference, Walzer draws an analogy with individual autonomy. Just
as liberal states regard individuals as entitled to a sphere of decision-
making free from external interference, so too should nation-states be
left to determine their own communal destiny (short of limiting cases
such as regimes that engage in genocide or other flagrant abuses of
human rights):
13 Walzer (1987), p229.
14 Walzer (1977).
15 Walzer (1980), p212.
16 Walzer (1983).
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When we describe individual rights, we are
assigning to individuals a certain authority to
shape their own lives, and we are denying that
officials, even well meaning officials, are
authorised to interfere. The description of
communal rights makes a similar assertion and
a similar denial. In the individual case, we fix a
certain area for personal choice; in the
communal case, we fix a certain area for
political choice. Unless these areas are clearly
marked out and protected, both sorts of choices
are likely to become problematic.17
If political communities have a collective existence through the
presence of a “shared history, communal sentiment (and) accepted
conventions”,18 then their political life should proceed without
interference or participation from outsiders. For Walzer,
compromising the sovereignty of nation-states by sanctioning the
external interference or the regulation of their affairs by (for example)
a transnational or supra-national body would be to dissolve the space
within which communal self-determination takes place: “communal
life and liberty requires the existence of “relatively self-enclosed
arenas of political development””.19 So in Walzer’s view, the value of
and the preconditions for the exercise of collective self-determination
preclude the external regulation of immigration policy or the
democratic participation of outsiders in the ‘internal’ affairs of
political communities. It is for the members to decide unilaterally
upon their economic, social and political goals, including whom to
admit and whom to exclude, subject to some important qualifications.
I will discuss these qualifications in the following section, having first
17 Walzer (1980), p224.
18 Ibid, p228
19 Ibid; quoting Beitz (1979), pp. 422-423.
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outlined Walzer’s position on citizenship and naturalisation; the ‘soft-
inside’ aspect of his theory of membership.
3.3 Walzer on Naturalisation
Walzer’s account of the right to citizenship for all settled residents
provides a normatively attractive alternative to the culturally
exclusive citizenship policies endorsed by Tamir and Tebble. In
contrast to the liberal nationalist and identity liberal positions which
were discussed and criticised in the previous chapter, Walzer argues
for a strictly territorial account of the moral basis for distributing
citizenship: “the state owes something to its inhabitants simply,
without reference to their collective or national identity”.20 He
maintains that whilst the citizenry of a particular state are entitled to
bar outsiders from becoming social members as a function of their
collective right to self-determination, this discretion does not extend
to naturalisation. The host community has no right to decide to
exclude permanently any resident from acquiring the political and
social rights that are required for them to participate in the process of
collective self-determination: “second admissions (naturalisation)
depend on first admissions (immigration) and are subject only to
certain constraints of time and qualification, never to the ultimate
constraint of closure”.21 He argues that since all those who reside on a
permanent basis within the territorial jurisdiction of a state are subject
to its authority, they must have an equal say in the decisions
undertaken and the policies pursued by that state: “the processes of
self-determination through which a democratic state shapes its
internal life must be open, and equally open, to all those men and
20 Walzer (1983), p43.
21 Ibid, pp 60-61.
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women who live within its territory, work in the local economy and
are subject to local law”.22 What this means in practice is that if the
host community does decide to permit outsiders to enter the territory -
say, for example, if they decide to offer financial incentives to attract
guest-workers or other categories of economic migrants - then, once
they have become settled residents, those migrants cannot be confined
to a position of permanent alienage or other forms of second-class
citizenship but must instead be set on a quick path to formal
membership in the polity through naturalisation. Walzer supports this
position on naturalisation on the grounds that granting social
membership to outsiders but denying them citizenship constitutes a
form of political tyranny, since it creates a sub-class of residents who
are ruled by the existing citizens; the state then becomes “like a
family with live-in servants”.23
Another way of expressing this point is to say that guest-worker
programs create a democratic legitimacy gap, since - ideally speaking
in Walzer’s view - legitimacy in democratic procedures and policies
calls for the consent and equal participation of the governed, which is
precisely what is lacking in cases where residents are denied access to
citizenship. In keeping with his moral contextualism discussed in the
previous section, Walzer puts forward an immanent criticism of this
kind of scenario, in that his objections appeal to the self-
understanding of democratic communities. He argues that the logic of
democracy calls for all those who are subject to the law to have an
equal say in its formulation. In so far as liberal-democratic
communities deny political rights to a particular sub-set of residents
who are nevertheless subject to the law, those communities fail to
honour the ethical principles from which their mode of governance
22 Ibid, p60.
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derives its normative legitimacy. Walzer thus employs the ‘subject-to-
the-law’ principle as his chief mode of demarcating citizenship
boundaries: “Men and women are either subject to the state’s
authority, or they are not; and if they are subject, they must be given a
say, and ultimately an equal say, in what that authority does”.24
Linda Bosniak has argued that Walzer is only able to justify his
combination of inclusion to citizenship within the territory with
exclusion from social membership at the border by regarding the
inside and the outside of the territorial boundaries of nation-states as
distinct normative spheres and by applying different principles and
practices to them: “ (…) in (Walzer’s) view, border and interior are
distinct regulatory and social domains whose governing logics are
entirely separate. His approach relies on a conception of border and
interior as divided jurisdictions, with different normative practices
applying to each”.25 This seems mistaken to me, since the same
principle - self-determination - is what justifies the territorial
exclusion of outsiders whilst also calling for the inclusion to
citizenship of social members. The reason that Walzer argues that
outsiders can be excluded justifiably from social membership is
because those inside the territory of a political community have a
right to self-determination. Likewise, the reason he argues that those
who are inside the territory must have citizenship rights is again
because the existing members have a right to self-determination. In
her discussion of Benhabib’s The Rights of Others26, Rainer Baubock
asks: “is (self-determination) a principle that enables democratic
polities to determine their own boundaries? Or does it only entail a
23 Ibid, p53.
24 Ibid, p61.
25 Bosniak (2007), p395.
26 Benhabib (2004a).
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claim of equal citizenship within already predetermined
boundaries?”.27 If my interpretation is correct, then in Walzer’s view
self-determination performs both roles. The value of self-
determination performs a double-movement in Walzer’s theory of
membership, in the sense that the same value that underlies the claim
in justice for the inclusion to citizenship of those situated within the
territory also underlies the justification for the exclusion of those
situated outside the territory.
Walzer’s position on citizenship embodies a principle of ethical
territoriality.28 For Walzer, the physical fact of being present within
the territorial jurisdiction of a particular state is what supplies the
criterion for allocating political rights (though of course in Walzer’s
view residency depends on the prior criterion of being allowed into
the territory by the existing members). This territorial conception of
citizenship rights treats residency status within the territorial
jurisdiction of the nation-state as sufficient grounds for attributing full
membership status. Ethical territoriality aims, ideally, for inclusivity
and equality. The preservation of differential, gradient or status-based
levels of inclusion and membership (for example, denizenship,
second-class or permanent alien status) is rejected in favour of
universal franchise for all those subject to the laws of the nation-state
in which they reside. It purports, therefore, to counter the democratic
legitimacy gap that occurs when the structure of membership
attribution results in a permanent sub-class of residents who live,
work and base their lives within a nation-state but are systematically
prevented from having a political voice in determining the conditions
of their residency. Since all those who reside within the territorial
jurisdiction of a state are subject to the power and authority of the
27 Baubock (2007), p11.
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government and are therefore legally bound by its decisions, all
should be equally entitled to the full basket of rights in order to both
protect them from abuses at the hands of that government and to
enable them to have a say in the construction of the rules by which
the monopoly of legitimate power and authority in their society will
be exercised. Ethical territoriality speaks to the liberal democratic
intuition that there is something morally suspect in systematically
preserving a class of long-term political outsiders within the
boundaries of the national community.29 For example, the
introduction of territorial rights by the United States Supreme Court
in the late 19thC was seen as a blow struck in the name of equality
against the exclusion and subordination of Chinese immigrants:
“(rights) are not confined to the protection of citizens … These
provisions are universal in their application to all persons within the
territorial jurisdiction”.30 Ethical territoriality is embodied in US law,
as all individuals who are territorially present - regardless of their
legal status - are awarded a set of constitutional, common law and
statutory rights. Likewise, the legislation and rights outlined in the
Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms applies to “every human
being who is physically present in Canada and by virtue of such
presence amenable to Canadian law”.31
Ethical territoriality and the subject-to-the-law mode of demarcating
citizenship have the important prima facie advantage of granting
28 Bosniak (2007); Bosniak (2008).
29 Bosniak (2007), p393.
30 Yick Wo vs. Hopkins, 118 U.S. 356, 369 (1886), quoted in Bosniak
(2007), p393.
31 Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms; quoted in Bosniak
(2008), p3. This is not to say that there are no differences in the rights
awarded to residents and those awarded to citizens. See Chapter 1,
section 1.1 of this thesis.
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individuals a stable and equal body of democratic rights in a stable
and determinate democratic community. As Baubock argues:
Liberal democracy presupposes stable territorial
boundaries for defining who is entitled to be a
member in a self-governing political
community. Democratic government involves a
dual structure where legislation represents
citizens as members of a political community,
but where laws are valid for everybody within a
territory.32
In the following two chapters, we will encounter two opposing views.
Proponents of the ‘all-affected’ and ‘all-coerced’ principles of
democratic inclusion argue that democratic legitimacy in fact calls for
participatory membership to be extended to territorial outsiders who
are either affected or coerced by the decisions and actions undertaken
by political communities. This may require temporary,
deterritorialised and issue-responsive demoi to be formulated and
dissolved depending on the particular decisions at stake. I endorse
Walzer’s territorialist position on citizenship and a corresponding
rejection of extending participatory membership to affected or
coerced outsiders. The reasons will become clear when I address
directly the all-affected and all-coerced principles of democratic
inclusion in the following two chapters. In particular, I will argue that
the clarity and stability of the territorialist position, as noted by
Baubock, helps it to avoid some of the key difficulties with using
affectedness or coercion as principles of democratic inclusion.
In addition to placing the right to naturalisation for permanent
residents outside of the scope of the self-determining powers of
32 Baubock (2004), p25. See also Baubock (1994), p178.
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political communities, there are a number of other important
constraints that Walzer sets to the right of communal discretion in
formulating membership and admissions policies. His position on the
right of political communities to closure falls short of establishing
that political communities have both liberty and licence to formulate
any criteria for entrance they deem fit. He states that “one can argue
about particular admissions standards by appealing, for example, to
the condition and character of the host country and to the shared
understandings of those who are already members”.33 So, in keeping
with his moral contextualism, Walzer thinks that admissions policies
should be constrained by the shared values and self-understanding of
the existing members.
We can see from the following quotation that, for Walzer, the process
of self-determination through which a community shapes itself must
also honour certain constraints to do with their history and the actual
internal ethnic, racial, cultural, and religious make-up of the current
society. This is a function of his more general claim that all territorial
insiders must count equally and be represented equally:
The claim of American advocates of restricted
immigration (in 1920, say), that they were
defending a homogenous white and Protestant
country, can plausibly be called unjust as well
as inaccurate: as if non-white and non-
Protestant citizens were invisible men and
women, who didn’t have to be counted in the
national census! Earlier Americans, seeking the
benefits of economic and geographic expansion,
had created a pluralist society; and the moral
realities of that society ought to have guided the
legislators of the 1920s.34
33 Walzer (1983), p40.
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The collective right to shape admissions policies is also qualified by
the principle of ‘mutual aid’ for necessitous strangers. Those whose
life prospects would be significantly worsened or their human rights
put in jeopardy if they were not permitted to leave their country of
origin have a claim (but not a right) to be admitted into wealthier or
more politically stable countries. However, the force of this claim is
‘uncertain’, according to Walzer, because it has to be weighed against
the shared understandings of membership maintained within
destination communities. Walzer believes that nation-states have a
special obligation to take in refugees of the same ethnicity as the
national group: “Greeks driven from Turkey, Turks from Greece,
after the wars and revolutions of the early twentieth century, had to be
taken in by the states that bore their collective names”.35 In cases like
these, Walzer claims, the analogy of states to families seems both
helpful and accurate: “(states) don’t only preside over a piece of
territory and a random collection of inhabitants; they are also the
political expression of a common life and (most often) of a national
“family” that is never entirely enclosed within their legal
boundaries”.36 In Chapter 6, we will see that this is directly contrary
to Bonnie Honig’s understanding of democracy as being at its most
vital when it consists in co-ordinated political activity taken in
conjunction with and of behalf of individuals who are often unknown
and/or opaque to us.37
34 Ibid.
35 Ibid, p42.
36 Ibid.
37 Honig (2001a), p39. Miller (2007, pp. 227-228) rejects the ‘family’
model because it seems contrary to the principle that liberal states
should be ethnically and culturally neutral.
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For Walzer, the democratic right to citizenship makes control over
territorial admissions a particularly significant feature of self-
determination. Given that all those who are admitted as residents have
a subsequent right to citizenship, territorial admissions threaten to
impact upon the shared collective life of the existing citizens by
changing the composition of formal membership. In the following
section, I discuss critically Walzer’s two-pronged defence of the right
of political communities to control admission to social membership. I
argue that neither his communitarian nor his democratic account
sustain unproblematically a normative link between self-
determination and control over membership.38
3.4 Cultural Distinctiveness and Exclusion
Take the following quotation from Walzer’s article ‘The Moral
Standing of States’, where he defends the sovereignty of states as
derivative of “the rights of contemporary men and women to live as
members of a historic community and to express their inherited
culture through political forms worked out among themselves”.39 I
think we can discern the basic outline of the two strands of his
argument for control over social membership in this sentence; I will
address the democratic theme in the following section. The
communitarian argument comes out in the reference to a “historic
community” and “inherited culture”, suggesting the normative value
of cultural conservation, respect for tradition and the preservation of
shared meanings. The proposition here seems to be something like
this: national sovereignty derives its legitimacy from the fact that the
38 This distinction is drawn and discussed in Seglow (2005); Seglow
(2006a) & Laegaard (2007)
39 Walzer (1980), p211.
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state exists to preserve the rights of the members of a political
community to live in a certain way and within a certain kind of
tradition or culture that has been handed down to them by their
ancestors. Therefore, states have a responsibility to take the measures
necessary to preserve the distinctive character of the public culture of
the political community they preside over, which may entail
restricting immigration or closing borders altogether. This theme is
borne out by statements such as the following:
Admission and exclusion are at the core of
communal independence. They suggest the
deepest meaning of self-determination. Without
them, there could not be communities of
character, historically stable, ongoing
associations of men and women with some
special commitment to one another and some
special sense of their common life.40
So, as with Tamir’s liberal nationalism, Walzer’s communitarian
defence of immigration restrictions appeals to the idea that unchecked
freedom of movement could undermine the cultural distinctiveness of
political communities. “The distinctiveness of cultures and groups”,
he writes, “depends upon closure and, without it, cannot be conceived
as a stable feature of human life. If this distinctiveness is a value, as
most people … seem to believe, then closure must be permitted
somewhere”.41 In Walzer’s view, without the unilateral right to
exclude outsiders the members of political communities would be
deprived of their right to belong to a self-determining association,
since freedom of movement would threaten to dissolve their shared
identity and culture: “the restraint of entry serves to defend the liberty
and welfare, the politics and culture of a group of people committed
40 Walzer (1983), p62.
41 Ibid, p39.
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to one another and to their common life”.42 Walzer thinks that the
drive to exclude from our common life those who are different from
us, and to thus preserve a socio-political setting where we co-exist
and share goods and resources with like-minded and culturally similar
individuals, is a stable feature of human nature. This is borne out by
his claim that, absent state-level restrictions on immigration,
individuals would inevitably seek to impose closure at more local
levels. In other words, if states did not have rigid border controls then
neighborhoods would erect their own barriers against outsiders in
order to “defend their local politics and culture against strangers”.43 In
Walzer’s memorable formulation, he states that “To tear down the
walls of the state is not ... to create a world without walls, but rather
to create a thousand petty fortresses”.44
Even if we grant Walzer all of the above, however, we can still
question why the current number and size of national “fortresses” is
preferable from a normative point of view to a “thousand petty
fortresses”, i.e. neighbourhoods or local communities with a distinct
character, which are bonded together solely through people’s will
rather than through formal political boundaries. Why are restrictions
on movement less problematic at the national level than at the local,
residential level?45 Walzer gives two answers. Firstly, he claims that
local mobility is more important for individual choice than
international mobility,46 and secondly, that the “politics and the
culture of a modern democracy probably requires the kind of
largeness, and also the kind of boundedness, that states provide”.47
42 Ibid.
43 Ibid, p38.
44 Ibid, p39.
45 Chang (2007), p31.
46 Walzer (1983), p39.
47 Ibid.
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The first argument concerning the greater importance of local over
international mobility for individual choice presumes that there are
sufficient social, economic and political goods accessible within one’s
locality to negate the need for international migration, and the very
fact of migration pressure from poorer to wealthier countries makes it
clear that this is not the case for a great number of individuals.48
Walzer’s second argument seems to beg the question at hand, which
is that democratic self-determination rests on the kind of impenetrable
“boundedness” that large nation-states provide.49 Democracy may
well rest on boundedness, but the need for a boundary demarcating a
constituency tells us nothing about how porous that boundary should
be.50
Walzer would claim in response that opening up national boundaries
would result in the dissolution of the distinctiveness and cohesiveness
of national groups. He bolsters this claim further by attempting to
forge a normative connection between cultural homogeneity,
immigration restrictions and democracy by arguing that freedom of
movement feeds authoritarian regimes. According to Walzer, these
sorts of regimes “thrive in the absence of communal cohesion”.51
However, I noted in the previous chapter that Tamir provides a
number of examples of cases where the cultural distinctiveness and
cohesion of cultures and groups - and, therefore in Walzer’s terms,
safeguards against authoritarian government - is preserved in the
absence of formal, exclusive territorial boundaries: “ (…) the Jews or
the Armenians, and immigrant groups such as Hispanics in Southern
California, Cubans in Miami, Algerians in France, and Pakistanis in
48 Chang (2007), pp. 12-13.
49 Ibid, p34.
50 Abizadeh (2008), p43.
51 Walzer (1983), p34.
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England … manage to preserve their identities without tangible
boundaries”.52
In response to these examples, Walzer might reply that whilst these
sorts of groups do not have tangible territorial boundaries, they still
have rigid membership boundaries; one cannot of course become
Cuban by stating a desire to do so, nor by moving into a
predominantly Cuban neighborhood. Likewise, there are rigid criteria
for becoming a member of the Jewish religion.53 So even in the
examples above, “closure” is still taking place “somewhere”, but not
at a territorial border. However, we can push this objection further by
taking into account examples of diversity amongst political
communities being preserved in the absence of any membership
restrictions, whether territorial, ethnic or ascriptive. Walzer’s broader
claim that immigration restrictions at the level of the nation-state are
justified to protect the distinctiveness of political communities is
belied by the evidence of regional diversity across the United States.54
Clearly, there are significant differences in the character and general
socio-political culture of the different states. Simply put, the state of
New York is not the same as the state of Alabama. Federal states are
distinct political communities with their own elected officials,
taxation priorities, legislation, and so on. Yet they cannot impose any
formal restrictions on the freedom of movement of US nationals. This
regional diversity is therefore primarily a result of the voluntary
preferences of individuals. Broadly speaking, those who wish to live
in a comparatively liberal political and cultural environment tend to
either stay in or re-locate to the East of the United States. Those who
prefer a more culturally and politically conservative environment tend
52 Tamir (1993), p166.
53 Cole (2000), p74.
54 Carens (1995), pp. 245-246; Abizadeh (2008), pp. 3-4.
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to stay in or re-locate to certain Southern states or ‘Red’ states. In
turn, the residents of those states elect state officials with whom they
can identify and whose political agenda they (more or less) endorse,
which in turn contributes to the distinctive character of the regional
political community. Why is voluntary segregation and clustering in
this way not sufficient from Walzer’s point of view to meet whatever
needs individuals may have for living in distinctive communities?
Why insist on restrictions on immigration at the level of the nation-
state?55
At this point, Walzer might respond that the regional diversity across
the United States is only preserved in the absence of internal
restrictions on freedom of movement because those states are
sheltered by the restrictions on movement into the nation (similarly,
he might add that the distinctiveness of the Jewish people is
maintained without a territorial border because of the existence of
restrictions on entry to the religion). It could be argued that the only
way in which associational diversity can be determined at a local
level purely by people’s preferences is if the state is able to shape the
wider sphere of social membership by controlling entry at the level of
the border. But then this argument is in turn belied by the evidence of
national diversity within the EU. Signatory nation-states have very
little control over the admission of individuals from other signatory
states, and yet France still has a distinctive socio-political culture in
comparison to, say, the United Kingdom. Walzer might then push the
argument back another stage, by claiming that national diversity is
preserved amongst signatory states because they are sheltered by the
still wider restrictions on entry that apply to individuals from outside
the EU. But the core point here is that it is not the case that the UK
55 Chang (2007).
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fails to achieve cultural self-determination (in Walzer’s
understanding) because its sovereignty over social membership
controls is constrained. Preserving the diversity of political
communities does not it seems require the state-level border controls
that Walzer defends.
The only large-scale migratory movements within the EU have
occurred in response to large disparities in wealth and employment
opportunities across signatory states; as was seen, for example, in the
case of the recent influx of Polish migrants into the UK. This in turn
suggests that what immigration restrictions primarily function to
preserve is not the cultural distinctiveness of different political
communities, but rather their economic privileges and employment
opportunities.56 It would seem then that what the defender of
immigration restrictions from the value of self-determination needs is
an independent argument for why the members of nation-states have a
right to exclusive preserve over their economic advantages and
resources. As we will see in section 3.6, David Miller has supplied
arguments to that effect on the basis of legitimate territorial control
and collective national responsibility.
3.5 Democratic Self-Determination and the Boundary Problem
I now want to discuss the second theme in Walzer’s case for
communal closure. In the quotation cited at the start of the previous
section, when Walzer refers to the process of citizens expressing their
56 Seglow (2005, pp. 322-323) points out that “.. most migrants do not
move in pursuit of Millian, ‘experiments in living’, but simply in
order to improve their economic welfare”.
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“inherited culture through political forms worked out among
themselves”, the emphasis shifts from the preservation of cultures and
traditions to their possible revision or re-interpretation through the
participation of individuals in the democratic process. Here the stress
seems to be laid upon preserving a space for democratic participation;
change over conservation. In this voice, I think what Walzer wants to
do is not freeze cultural traditions nor try to invoke the idea of a
cohesive community necessarily united in voice, values and purposes,
but rather respect the integrity of the process of democratic self-
determination. In his discussion of sovereignty in Just and Unjust
Wars, one of his main claims in support of a principle of sovereignty
as non-interference is that he is prepared to defend politics against
“the traditional philosophical dislike for politics”57 displayed by some
of his critics, which is revealed by their desire “to press international
society toward a kind of reiterated singularity – the same government
or roughly the same sort of government for every political
community”.58 Walzer maintains that international society should
respect the internal political processes of other societies because
people have a right to be governed by a state of their own in
accordance with the shared understandings amongst the members
concerning the nature and purposes of their association. Ideally, this
process will be carried out democratically, but its results should be
respected regardless (short of limiting cases like genocidal regimes):
My own preference for democracy doesn’t
extend to a belief that this preference should be
uniformly enforced on every political
community. Democracy has to be reached
through a political process that, in its nature,
can also produce different results. Whenever
these results threaten life and liberty, some kind
of intervention is necessary, but the don’t
57 Walzer (1980), p228.
58 Ibid, p216.
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always do that, and when they don’t the
different political formations that emerge must
be given room to develop (and change).59
Although this discussion occurs in the context of an argument
concerning military non-intervention, it helps to flesh out Walzer’s
argument for respecting the outcome of processes of collective self-
determination. In contrast to the communitarian argument discussed
in the previous section, the proposition here seems to run something
like this: if we value the political participation of citizens, then we
have to be prepared to listen to their collective voice. For democratic
states, internal legitimacy is bound up with the idea that the people
have an equal say in their political life. Since the character of their
society is something that the members of the demos will presumably
want to have some kind of control over, and since admissions and
membership procedures can, in certain conditions, have an impact for
better or worse on the character or identity of their society, we should
be prepared to give citizens a say in how those procedures are carried
out: “as citizens of such a country, we have to decide: whom should
we admit? Ought we to have open admissions? Can we choose among
applicants? What are the appropriate criteria for distributing
membership?”60
Walzer states that when evaluating a particular naturalisation or
immigration policy, the members of a political community need to
ask themselves whether that policy actually represents their shared
understanding of the good of membership and how it should be
distributed. This introduces a dynamic, deliberative element to
Walzer’s account of national identity. National identities are not
59 Walzer (2000), p8 (italics added).
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necessarily set in stone, and the existing members are not under an
obligation to preserve them over time in their current form (unless, of
course, they assume such an obligation). Instead, the identity of the
political community and the subsequent terms of membership are
proper objects for discussion and debate amongst the citizenry: “ (…)
the distribution of membership in American society, and in any
ongoing society, is a matter of political decision …. What kind of
community do the citizens want to create? With what other men and
women do they want to share and exchange social goods?”61 This is
the relevant sense in which states are like private clubs, Walzer
argues, since membership in clubs is something that is decided upon
by the existing members in accordance with the kind of purposes they
want the club to serve and the sorts of individuals they want to share
in their collective enterprise. Outsiders may wish to join the club, and
they may be able to give better or worse reasons as to why they
should be admitted, but they have no right to join and thus cannot
freely choose to enter and acquire membership. Analogously,
immigrants are free to apply for membership in any state they wish,
but they have no right of entry that states are under an obligation to
recognise, and the authority of the existing members to choose to
accept or reject them is authoritative and final.62
The core problem I want to raise here though is that Walzer cannot
specify - in terms that are consistent with the elementary principles of
democratic legitimacy that, as we have seen, he himself appeals to -
why this group of individuals is entitled to constitute itself as a
bounded demos that has a subsequent right to exercise powers of
exclusion. As Arash Abizadeh argues, Walzer’s direct appeal to self-
60 See also Whelan (1988a), pp. 28-29.
61 Walzer (1983), p 40.
62 Ibid, p41.
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determination to ground the right of a community to exclude outsiders
“begs the question of who the relevant collective ‘self’ rightly is”.63
This is the ‘boundary problem’ in democratic theory that has been
discussed at length by Frederick Whelan.64 The key problem with
purely democratic accounts of the collective right to self-
determination is that “ … (Democracy) cannot be brought to bear on
the logically prior matter of the constitution of the group itself, the
existence of which it presupposes”.65 Walzer states bluntly that the
original members of the demos are simply those individuals who
voluntarily recognised one another as members and thus formed a
political association: “Initially, at least, the sphere of membership is
given: the men and women who determine what membership means,
and who shape the admissions policies of the political community, are
simply the men and women who are already there”.66 Walzer’s
account of boundary-constitution thus invokes the idea of a set of
‘founding fathers’ who brought a political community into being
simply through an act of volition and mutual recognition, and who
subsequently have a legitimate right to set the terms and conditions
for future membership as a function of their right to democratic self-
determination: “only the founders choose themselves (or one
another); all other members have been chosen by those who were
members before them”.67
But the matter of the initial constitution of a democratic community is
not as straightforward as this. Walzer’s appeal to ‘founding fathers’
assumes what the self-determination argument is supposed to
demonstrate; that there is a group of individuals with legitimate
63 Abizadeh (2008), p49.
64 Whelan (1983).
65 Ibid, p40; quoted in Abizadeh (2008), p46.
66 Walzer (1983), p43.
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democratic authority to demarcate a jurisdictional unit and shape the
subsequent sphere of membership through practices of exclusion. The
original founders cannot, as Walzer seems to suggest, have
democratic authority to choose one another as members, because that
kind of authority can only come from being a member of the demos;
but the demos is brought into existence after the founders have chosen
one another. This paradox seems to recur for every subsequent
membership decision that is made by reference to democratic criteria,
because each subsequent membership decision raises the issue of the
constitution of a new demos. As Ayelet Shachar notes, the democratic
self-determination argument for membership controls “presupposes
precisely what is at issue here: namely, the existence of an already
legitimately defined political community whose members can then
justly determine to whom to distribute membership entitlements in
the future”.68
We have seen that Walzer argues that the question of the terms and
conditions for membership must be settled before all other questions
of distributive justice. But according to the objection being
considered here, there is in a fact a more elementary question, or
rather infinite series of questions, concerning the constitution of the
group that then decides upon the terms and conditions for
membership. Any attempt to answer boundary disputes or
membership decisions by reference to democratic criteria results in an
infinite logical regress, because before we can answer the question of
the constitution of the demos, we have to know who is entitled to
decide upon the constitution of the demos, but before we can answer
that question we need to know who is entitled to decide upon who is
entitled to decide upon the constitution of the demos, and so forth ad
67 Ibid, p41.
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infinitum. As Baubock observes, “The question of how to demarcate a
constituency that will then decide about its own borders produces a
vexing self-determination paradox that has been stated succinctly by
Ivor Jennings …. Letting the people decide “was in fact ridiculous
because the people cannot decide until someone decides who are the
people”.69 Similarly, Robert Goodin observes that “Logically,
constituting the demos - in the very first instance, at least - cannot
itself be a product of ordinary democratic decision making … The
initial membership of the demos, at least, must itself be constituted
according to some principle independent of any decision of the demos
(…)”.70 The boundary problem leads Carol Gould to suggest that
democratic self-determination cannot in and of itself be appealed to
directly to demarcate legitimately the sphere of membership: “ (…)
issues of membership in a demos (or citizenship), as well as more
general questions of who has rights to participate in collective
decision making, require an appeal to concepts beyond those of self-
determination or self-rule per se”.71
There are two responses that Walzer could make here. Firstly, he
could bypass democratic arguments for self-determination, and fall
back on the idea of protecting the shared culture and identity of the
host community, and appeal to this as the justification for a right to
closure. But this would bring us back to the objections in section 3.2
above. Walzer’s second possible response to the boundary problem
could be to appeal to the subject-to-the-law principle of demarcation.
According to this response, the scope of the demos is defined simply
by those who are subject to the laws of the state in question. But this
68 Shachar (2009), p139.
69 Baubock (2004), p21; quoting Jennings (1956), p56.
70 Goodin (2007), p43.
71 Gould (2004), pp. 174-175.
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does not bring the logical regress described by the boundary problem
to a halt, because it simply presupposes the existence of a bounded
territorial unit, and tells us nothing about why the laws of that unit are
legitimate expressions of the democratic will of that particular demos.
As Johann Karlsonn points out, “the subject-to-the-law principle
offers no real solution to the boundary problem, since it merely
presumes that there is already a state in place to maintain the laws and
do the subjecting”.72 In the remainder of this chapter, I discuss
critically David Miller’s recent work on immigration, which attempts
to supply a normative argument for the territorial rights of states that
does not appeal directly to democratic criteria, and so may be more
successful than Walzer in justifying practices of membership control.
3.6 Miller on the Territorial Rights of Nation-States
In contrast to Tamir’s non-statist account of national self-
determination, Miller regards the state as the best vehicle for national
self-determination, claiming that “it is valuable for the boundaries of
political units (paradigmatically, states) to coincide with national
boundaries”.73 National identity, for Miller, describes a language, a
common set of political practices and principles, a general belief
amongst the members that they share something in common that sets
them apart from the members of other nations, and a shared aspiration
for collective self-determination.74 Miller argues that nations have a
public culture, which consists in “a set of ideas about the character of
the community which … helps to fix responsibilities”.75 Elsewhere,
72 Karlsonn (2006), p24.
73 Miller (1995), p82.
74 Miller (2007), pp. 118-120.
75 Miller (1995), p68.
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he describes public culture as “a set of understandings about how a
group of people is to conduct its life together”.76 In Miller’s view,
nations are ethical communities, which means that we owe more
extensive obligations of justice to fellow-nationals than to human
beings as such.77
Unlike Tamir, Kymlicka, Tebble and Walzer (in his more
communitarian moments), Miller has in the past denied that
considerations of protecting national identities should be of particular
importance to debates on immigration restrictions. Drawing a
distinction between the existence of a national identity and the
preservation of national identity in any particular form, Miller argues
that immigrants cannot be justifiably excluded simply on the grounds
that they may bring about changes to the dominant national culture:
“Why should immigrants pose a threat to national identity once it is
recognized that that identity is always in flux?”78 Contra liberal
nationalists, identity liberals and liberal communitarians like Walzer,
national groups “need not … select as new members only those who
already share the existing national identity”.79
Despite his resistance in the past to identity and culture based
arguments for exclusion, Miller is critical of arguments for opening
up borders on the grounds of either egalitarian justice or from the
value of freedom of movement. He claims that neither sort of
normative consideration sustains the conclusion that control over
membership should be removed from the self-determining powers of
76 Ibid, p26.
77 Miller (1995); Miller (2007).
78 Miller (1995), p128.
79 Ibid, p129.
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liberal-democracies. I will discuss his response to the egalitarian
critique of closed borders in the following section, when I look at his
account of national responsibility. In this section I focus on his
arguments against open access to social membership from the value
of freedom of movement, and on his account of the territorial rights of
nation-states.
Miller denies that there is a human right to unlimited freedom of
movement, so on his account the right to self-determination on the
part of liberal-democracies trumps the interest that prospective
migrants may have in being able to freely enter their country of
choice. If his argument for this conclusion is successful, it suggests
that respecting universal liberal rights and commitments may be
compatible with defending a right to communal closure on the part of
nation-states as a function of their right to self-determination. If
Miller is correct in arguing that the liberal commitment to the value of
freedom of movement can be constrained in scope without being
wholly compromised, then we may not be faced by an inherent and
necessary tension between liberalism and the value of free movement
on the one hand and democracy and the license of citizens to
determine the boundaries of membership on the other.
Miller’s account begins with a discussion of the normative basis for
the right of states to wield authority over a determinate and bounded
territory. He claims that this question is in an important sense prior to
the question of the legitimacy of immigration restrictions:
How can states justify their claim to decide who
resides on a particular part of the earth’s surface
and who does not, particularly in view of the
somewhat murky historical processes by which
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state boundaries have usually been established?
People might have a right to migrate simply on
the grounds that states have no right to exclude
them from their territory.80
Miller’s argument for the territorial rights of nation-states appeals to
the interplay between historic occupancy and the mutually
transformative impact of national cultures on the territory of the land
they occupy. When the members of a national group reside on an area
of land, over time they inevitably shape the territory according to
elements of their shared culture, and in turn the character and
conditions of the land inevitably shapes the shared culture of the
national group. Materially, the group adds value to the territory by
building roads, bridges, irrigation systems and so forth. Symbolically,
the territory will be the site of events of particular cultural and
historic significance for the group, such as battles, burials or events of
religious importance. The group’s culture is in turn shaped by the
character of the territory. For example, Native American hunting
practices can be seen as the result of their adaptation to the physical
realities of their land. There is inevitably a mutually transformative
interaction between the culture of the national group and the land that
they occupy, and in Miller’s view it is this interaction that accounts
for the special significance that the land holds for the members of the
national group and that lays the foundation for the right of the group
to claim and exercise territorial control:
The culture must adapt to the territory if the
people are to prosper: it matters whether the
climate is hot or cold, the land suitable for
hunting or agriculture, whether the territory is
landlocked or open to the sea, and so forth. But
equally the territory will in nearly every case be
shaped over time according to the cultural
80 Miller (2007), p202.
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priorities of the people, as fields are marked out
and cultivated; irrigation systems are created;
villages, towns, and cities are built; and so forth
... It has become the people’s home, in the sense
that they have adapted their way of life to the
physical constraints of the territory and then
transformed it to a greater or lesser extent in
pursuit of their common goals.81
By denying territorial rights to a national group, we deprive them of
the material and symbolic value that the territory holds for the
members of that group. The value of the interaction between the
group’s culture and the land is embodied exclusively in the territory in
the sense that it can only be enjoyed on that particular piece of land.82
An obvious example of this is the special symbolic significance that
the Temple of Jerusalem holds for many members of Israel, and the
poverty in that group’s view of suggestions to the effect that the value
of worshiping in other places could be of comparable significance.
However, this argument in itself falls short of establishing that states
are morally justified in excluding prospective migrants from entering
the territory. Miller departs from the Walzerian democratic account of
the relationship between collective self-determination and
membership when he denies the validity of the ‘club’ model as an
accurate or useful analogy for the membership procedures of political
associations. A state cannot, in Miller’s view, simply hold “that it is
entirely at liberty to choose who comes in and who does not”.83 It
does not have this kind of unaccountable unilateral discretion, firstly,
because the consequences for an individual of being excluded from a
state are potentially much graver than the consequences of being
81 Ibid, p218.
82 Ibid.
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excluded from a club in civil society, and secondly because excluded
immigrants are not free to simply start up their own political
association, unlike the case of individuals who are excluded from
private clubs, who, in principle, have the freedom to set up a club of
their own. Miller thinks that his account of the justification for
territorial control from historic ownership and cultural impact is
sufficient to establish that states have a right to exclude. Establishing
that they ought to do so in any particular case - that they are morally
justified in doing so - requires further argument.84 This further step
requires states to offer a justification for exclusion that takes into
account the potentially significant needs and interests that may be
served by the prospective migrant’s entry into the political
community - such as increased wages, better employment
opportunities or a wider and more satisfying range of social, political
or cultural options - and to show why the exercise of exclusive
territorial rights trumps those interests in such a way that justifies
their exclusion.85
It is at this juncture in his argument that Miller appeals to the value of
collective self-determination. Self-determination provides the bridge
in Miller’s account between the legitimate possession of territorial
rights and the justification for exercising those rights in such a way as
to exclude prospective migrants. Miller puts forward what is
essentially a consequentialist account of the value of self-
determination.86 That is, self-determination is presented as being
valuable because it protects the political community’s collective goals
regarding - for example - its “education system … health care system,
83 Miller (2007), p223.
84 Angeli (2007), p12.
85 Miller (2007), p221.
86 Angeli (2008), p10.
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and … other social services”.87 The idea is that the best way to
respect the importance to individuals of participating in a self-
determining political association and exercising autonomous choices
amongst different social, cultural and political options is to award the
members of that association the unilateral right to control
membership, in so far as unchecked immigration may threaten to
undermine the pursuit of the goals that they have collectively decided
upon, by altering the demographic composition of the community:
An adequate explanation (for the exclusion of a
prospective migrant) will be one that links
immigration policy to the general goals of the
society in question. These goals will reflect
existing national values and will ideally be set
through a continuing process of democratic
debate. Immigration on any significant scale
will invariably have an impact on these goals ...
It will, for example, change the age profile of
the country … the mix of skills available in the
workforce, the demands made on the education
system, the health care system, and the other
social services … All of these are legitimate
concerns of public policy, and depending on the
priorities set by each political community, they
may count either for or against admitting
particular groups of immigrants.88
For Miller, the territorial rights of states are derived from the
collective history as well as the present-day values and interests of the
members of their nations. The right to territorial control then grounds
the subsequent right to control the sphere of social membership,
because unchecked immigration may jeopardise the pursuit of the
goals collectively decided upon by the citizens by altering the internal
composition of the demos. So Miller’s argument avoids the regress of
87 Miller (2007), p229.
88 Ibid, pp. 222-223.
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constitutive decisions that was discussed in relation to Walzer’s
position, because it does not appeal directly to democratic
considerations to justify the initial territorial authority of a particular
self-determining demos. This is not to deny the importance of
democracy to Miller’s account of self-determination and exclusion.
What I am drawing attention to is that the juncture in Miller’s
argument where he appeals to democratic considerations enables him
to avoid the regress of constitutive decisions described by the
boundary problem, because the question of the boundaries of the
demos has already been answered by appeal to the argument
concerning the territorial rights that follow from historic occupancy
and cultural transformation.
Unlike Tamir’s cultural account of national self-determination, at this
point it is no objection to Miller’s position that the members of a
national community may have heterogenous values and political
preferences that lead to divergent views on the goals that they wish
their state to pursue. All his position turns on is the idea that the
members share a common interest in those goals being set through
properly inclusive democratic procedures. Accepting that interest also
entails accepting that any given individual is liable to find him or
herself in the minority on certain issues, and in the majority on other
issues, including immigration and citizenship policy:
(…) although different individuals and groups
are likely to disagree about the priorities that
their political community should pursue, they
have a common interest in being able to set
those goals through democratic debate, and this
of course entails being willing to accept
majority decisions reached through proper
procedures.89
89 Ibid, p224.
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We might agree with all of this and yet still contend that self-
determination does not ground a right to control immigration. That is,
we could grant Miller the argument, concerning territorial rights and
self-determination, but still maintain that the issue of social
membership should not be encompassed under those territorial rights.
A straightforward liberal egalitarian argument to this effect would be
to suggest that, whilst a group does have a right to decide collectively
upon the goals they wish to pursue on a determinate area of land, in
the interests of equality of opportunity and the value of freedom of
movement, they have no right to exclude outsiders from wishing to
enter the territory, contribute to those goals and thus reap the material
and symbolic rewards, since the boundaries around political
communities are arbitrary from a moral point of view.90 The next
stage in Miller’s argument is to establish that in principle the
territorial rights of national groups trump the interests that individuals
may have in migrating, so that the symbolic and material values that
the territory holds for the group not only justify their right to
territorial control, but also to exclude outsiders from entering. This
requires an argument to the conclusion that the interest that
prospective migrants have in being free to enter the country of their
choice is in principle of insufficient normative weight to ground a
right to unlimited freedom of movement and to thus trump the right of
states to control membership.
Miller’s core objection to unlimited freedom of international
movement is that if individuals have options in their home country
that are adequate to secure their basic interests and welfare, then their
90 Carens (1995).
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need to migrate is not sufficiently compelling to put other states under
an obligation to permit them to enter.91 According to Miller, the right
to immigrate should be understood as “a derivative right, justified
only as a means to protect other rights such as the right to
subsistence”.92 He observes that freedom of movement is valuable
only in so far as it enables the individual to pursue other valuable
ends: for example, to pursue a new career, to find a marriage partner,
or to benefit financially from tax exemptions. These are the sorts of
considerations that are relevant to the question of the scope of the
right to freedom of movement; that is, the area over which an
individual should be able to range freely in pursuit of valuable ends.
Miller notes that in practice liberal states regard a consequentialist
approach to the scope of the right to freedom of movement as
unproblematic when considering movement within bounded
communities. States put into place restrictions on people’s internal
freedom of movement in order to protect all manner of different
socially valuable projects, institutions and rules. We cannot, for
example, move freely into other people’s private property, traffic
regulations prevent us from driving wherever we may please, the
police regulate our movement up and down streets, and so on.93 “The
point here”, Miller explains, “is that liberal societies in general offer
their members sufficient freedom of movement to protect the interests
that the human right to free movement is intended to protect”.94
Seen from this perspective, Miller suggests that unlimited freedom of
international movement starts to look like an expensive preference. In
other words, a good that individuals may strongly desire, but not a
91 Miller (2007), pp. 204-209.
92 Ibid, p202.
93 Ibid, p56.
94 Ibid, p206.
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good that is necessarily of such significance to their basic needs and
human rights that it imposes either a positive duty on others (and
other states) to act to secure it, or a negative duty not to interfere with
its exercise: “ (…) although people certainly have an interest in being
able to migrate internationally, they do not have a basic need of the
kind that would be required to ground a human right. It is more like
my interest in having an Aston Martin than my need for access to
some means of physical mobility”.95 Another way of putting the point
would be to say that there exists a qualified right to freedom of
international movement and access to membership which is a
remedial right in that “its existence depends on the fact that the
person’s vital interests cannot be secured in the country where she
currently resides”.96
In the following section, I evaluate the force of Miller’s arguments for
membership controls. Firstly, I note the way in which Miller’s
defence of territorial rights seems able to account for the claims of
indigenous groups to have independent statehood and to close their
borders in cases where they are in danger of being ‘swamped’ by
outsiders. Whilst Miller’s argument for membership controls based on
territorial rights does have some advantages over the culture,
political-diversity and democratic justifications for exclusion put
forward by Tamir, Tebble and Walzer, his position generates
difficulties of its own. Firstly, disputes over claims to territorial
control often revolve around which group has the legitimate rights
based on historic occupancy, and in such cases Miller’s account may
beg the issue at hand. I then discuss an equality objection, which is
that Miller’s position on territorial rights and exclusion from social
membership seems to restrict arbitrarily the life options of individuals
95 Ibid, p207.
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according to their respective lines of cultural descent. Miller’s
account of national responsibility is designed to overcome this sort of
objection, but having outlined his position I raise four arguments
against the idea that the borders of wealthy nation-states can be closed
justifiably on such grounds.
3.7 National Responsibility and Global Inequality
One advantage of linking historic occupancy and cultural
transformation to territorial rights and self-determination is that it
provides a plausible account of the normative force of the claims of
indigenous groups to have territorial rights over a particular area of
land. As Margaret Moore explains, “ (…) it is because a particular
group has been in place for a long time - or since time immemorial -
that they have come to care about the land; their myths and behavior
patterns are bound up with the land, its seasons, its topography, and
so on; and through this, they have greater claim to it than any other
group”.97 As a corollary of this, Miller’s argument seems to provide a
convincing account of what is morally wrong with coercive state
interference in the territorial control of minority national groups, such
as the Chinese state’s policy of ‘swamping’ Tibet with large numbers
of Chinese settlers and thus politically dispossessing native
Tibetans.98 We seem to have here a clear case for the moral
legitimacy of recognising the Tibetan right to self-determination,
including the right to close their borders to outsiders who seek to
exercise political domination, in order to preserve their control over
territory that holds a special historic, symbolic, cultural and material
96 Ibid, p206.
97 Moore (2001), p191.
98 I have borrowed the example of Tibet from Sager (2008), p74.
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value for native Tibetans.99 It should be noted that Miller’s political
and state-centred understanding of national self-determination seems
to account for the harm being committed and the political measures
needed to rectify it in the case of Tibet, more comprehensively than
Tamir’s cultural, non-statist understanding. It seems evident that what
Tibetans require in order to be self-determining in the face of
aggressive Chinese expansion is political control over a determinate
area of land and independent statehood, and not just the ability to
practice their culture and religion in a public sphere.
It is interesting to note that some cosmopolitan critics of nationalist
accounts of self-determination and political membership endorse the
legitimacy of membership controls in the case of politically and
numerically vulnerable minority groups. Abizadeh, for example,
when considering the most plausible arguments commonly put
forward for the right to communal closure, concludes that “if the
point of borders is to protect an entrenched minority from being
overrun by foreigners who would end up dominating the polity and
fundamentally transforming its character, then it is conceivable that
… democratic legitimacy would require at least some unilateral
discretion in closing borders”.100 In keeping with this general line of
argument, Michael Dummett considers the minority-culture situation
to give rise to one of only two morally valid justifications for
exclusion. Immigration restrictions are defensible in cases where “a
relatively small population, with a distinct but vulnerable culture, is in
99 Moore (2001), pp. 192-193. I follow Sager (2008, p73-74) in
characterising the justification for membership control in cases like
Tibet as based primarily on self-preservation or self-defence, against
the aggression of outsiders. So my defence of independent statehood
and membership controls for native Tibetans is compatible with my
overall objection to arguments for membership control from the value
and practice of self-determination. See also Meilander (2001), p90,
and Chapter 2, nt. 100 of this thesis.
100 Abizadeh, (2008), p53.
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danger of being submerged by the entry of a large number of people
with a more robust culture”.101 So even authors who argue for a
strong presumption in favour of open borders recognise that freedom
of movement can become a shield for the dominance of numerically,
politically or economically vulnerable minority groups, and that in
such cases it may be overridden justifiably.
However, although Miller seems to provides a convincing account of
the normative geography of cases like Tibet, his defence of territorial
rights generates difficulties of its own. One possible objection to
Miller’s attempt to ground territorial rights on historic occupancy and
cultural transformation is that often, boundary disputes arise precisely
because of disputes over historic entitlement, given the complexity of
patterns of historic migration. In other words, controversy over
historic occupancy and cultural entitlement can often be the issues
that give rise to boundary disputes, and so occupancy and cultural
entitlement cannot always be invoked to solve them. For example,
Moore points out that we can understand the conflict over territorial
jurisdiction in Northern Ireland as being:
(…) settler-native in origin, and implicit in that
conception is the view that the Gaelic-speaking
Irish people are indigenous (native) to Ireland,
and that the Ulster Protestants, who form a
majority in the north-east part of the island, are
‘settler’ people who dispossessed the native
Irish and oppressed them.102
In cases like these, Miller’s argument for territorial rights on the basis
of historic occupancy and cultural transformation would seem to beg
101 Dummett (2004), p119. See also Baubock (2009), p14.
102 Moore (2001), p187.
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precisely what is at issue - namely, which group has a right to occupy
and transform the territory grounded on historic ownership and
attachment to the land - and so cannot be the basis for establishing the
proper jurisdictional boundaries of the right to self-determination that
the disputing groups possess. Depending on where we start from in
history (and whose account of history we accept as valid), different
groups may have legitimate territorial rights according to Miller’s
position, and it may be difficult to justify the thought that the chosen
starting point is non-arbitrary.103 Miller recognises that the patterns of
migration, colonialism, aggressive expansion, occupancy and
secession that constitute the historic background for today’s particular
demarcation of nation-states and their jurisdictions muddy the waters
as far as the legitimacy of claims to historic ownership are concerned.
But his argument for territorial rights on the basis of occupancy does
not make a straightforward appeal to the authenticity of claims to
original occupation. Instead, he claims that “ (…) occupancy and use
of land over a long period eventually (trumps) the territorial claims of
the original possessors”.104
I now want to put forward an objection from the value of equality and
distributive justice. We can imagine an indigenous nomadic national
group A that requires a vast area of land in order to live according to
its historic and cultural traditions. The nomadic culture, on Miller’s
account, has developed because the group has over time adapted itself
and added value to the territory it finds itself living upon. Imagine
then another national group B nearby whose territory cannot support
the group’s members in the way they would wish. Say, for the sake of
argument, that their territory has become overpopulated or that the
fertility of the land is rapidly deteriorating. We can add to this
103 Moore (1998), p145.
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example the observation that natural resources - minerals, precious
stones, oil, and so on - are distributed across the globe arbitrarily, and
that nation-state A has been far more fortunate in the amount of
resources they posses in their territory in relation to nation-state B.105
Also assume for the sake of argument that the members of B cannot
be described justifiably as refugees, and that they meet Miller’s
threshold for a decent life, which is an aspect of his position I will
return to below. Still it would seem counter to liberal principles of
equality of opportunity to maintain that the members of this second
group have no claim to be admitted into the territory of the first group
purely on the grounds that the first group requires exclusive access to
this particular piece of vast, uninhabited and bountiful land in order to
practice their traditional nomadic culture and way of life. It seems
counter to liberal principles that the life prospects of the current
members of the two groups should be so heavily determined by the
arbitrary fact of their lines of cultural descent and the actions of their
ancestors.106 If valid, what this objection suggests is that Miller’s
argument concerning territorial rights can at most establish that
national groups have a just claim to preserve in perpetuity their access
to areas of historic and cultural significance to them. In itself, it falls
short of establishing that they have a right, that liberals should
recognise, grounded on historic occupancy and cultural
transformation, to exclude outsiders from entering their territory
(notwithstanding limiting cases like Tibet).
Iris Young defends this kind of non-exclusive access arrangement as
a way of recognising the legitimate aspiration of groups to attain self-
104 Miller (2007), p220.
105 Beitz (1979); Carens (1995); Pogge (2002); Young (2000a), pp.
246-247.
106 Moore (1998), p144.
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determination without thereby entailing the territorial exclusions and
rights to non-interference implied by nationalist conceptions of group
identity and self-determination:
(…) in principle the implementation of self-
governance institutions often should recognize
the importance of land, resources, and place
without assuming that self-determination
requires exclusive control over a large and
contiguous bounded territory.107
The option that Young defends for accommodating the importance of
particular areas of land or sites of historic and/or cultural importance
for a group without entailing exclusive territorial control is to situate
those groups within “interlocking federal arrangements”.108 Young’s
views on federalism, self-determination and the politics of
membership will be discussed in detail in the following chapter. At
this stage I want to note that Young’s idea of accommodating the
right to self-determination of political communities within a shared
jurisdictional context suggests a further criticism of Miller’s argument
for exclusive territorial control based on cultural/historic significance.
The problem here (a difficulty which Young’s federal vision is
designed partly to be responsive to) is that Miller’s argument seems to
have difficulty in accounting for situations where a particular area or
site is of special cultural or historic significance to two or more
groups. In the case of the city of Jerusalem, for example, do
Palestinians or Israelis have a right to exclusive control over that site
and the surrounding territory?109 To appeal to cultural or historic
significance to settle this matter would seem to beg the question at
hand since both groups are able to claim legitimately that Jerusalem is
107 Young (2000a), p261.
108 Ibid, p261.
109 Ibid, p262. See also Moore (2001), pp. 196-198.
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of particular symbolic and religious significance to them. It seems
that in the context of these sorts of conflicting but legitimate group
claims, Miller’s account cannot tell us which group has the legitimate
right to exercise territorial control and powers of democratic
exclusion. Young’s position, which will be discussed further in the
following chapter, is that a system of shared federal jurisdiction is the
most practical and normatively defensible response to cases like
these.
Leaving aside the problem of how Miller would account for
conflicting group claims to a single site of historic or cultural
significance, I want to return to the equality objection. This brings us
to Miller’s views on national responsibility. What Miller would
presumably want to say in response to the hypothetical example given
above and the objection from equality that it supports is that the
current economic, cultural and social situation of groups A and B -
i.e. the circumstances that have led to migratory pressure for the
members of group B - are not due to factors that are purely arbitrary
from a moral point of view, in so far as there are circumstances in
which it makes sense to attribute collective responsibility to national
groups, and in so far as those circumstances apply to the background
conditions informing the example. The proper attribution of collective
outcome responsibility removes any just obligation on the part of
other groups to offer forms of assistance beyond humanitarian aid.
Most importantly for my purposes here, it removes any obligation
from principles of egalitarian justice to open up borders to the
members of poorer countries. Other national groups do not bear
remedial responsibility i.e. a responsibility to alleviate the burdens
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facing other groups.110 Consider, Miller asks us, the situation of the
following kind of ‘like-minded’ national group:
Their members subscribe to a common public
culture, despite individual differences in belief
and value, and they participate in mutually
beneficial practices whose shape they have a
chance to influence. The more strongly these
conditions obtain, the more appropriate it is to
hold nations responsible for their political
actions, and the consequences that flow from
these.111
In Miller’s view, the members of democratic nation-states with a
shared underlying public culture can properly be held responsible in
the outcome sense for the actions and the consequences of the
decisions of their state because states - ideally speaking - are “agents
of the people they are supposed to serve”.112 Naturally, the wider the
democratic legitimacy gap in a given society the less sense it makes
to attribute collective outcome responsibility for their state’s actions
to the members of the nation. The members of a national group under
colonial rule, for example, can hardly be said to be collectively
responsible for the actions and decisions of the foreign empire ruling
them. However, the closer the nation-state approximates the ideals of
110 In Miller’s use of these terms, ‘outcome responsibility’ refers to
the proper attribution of moral blame due to causal responsibility. If it
is my fault that x occurred and that I should bear the consequences of
x, then I have outcome responsibility in the relevant sense. If a child
is drowning in a lake because I pushed him in, then I have outcome
responsibility. ‘Remedial responsibility’ is a form of responsibility
that ignores causality and blame and focuses solely on future-oriented
capacities; so I have responsibility in the remedial sense to save a
child from drowning because I have the capacity to do so without
incurring serious harm. Whether I am causally responsible for the
child being in the lake in the first place is irrelevant to attributions of
remedial responsibility in this case. Miller (2007), Chapter 4.
111 Ibid, p136.
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democratic accountability, transparency, and legitimacy, the more
sense it makes in Miller’s view to regard states as the political
apparatus through which nations - i.e. the people who constitute the
demos - act out their collectively agreed upon decisions and pursue
their collective goals, in keeping with the common sentiments and
shared public culture of the individual members, and thus the more
sense it makes to attribute responsibility for the state’s actions and
their consequences to the individual members of the nation: “the
policies pursued by the state can reasonably be seen as policies for
whose effects the citizen body as a whole is collectively responsible,
given that they have authorized the government to act on their behalf
in a free election”.113
The link that Miller forges between democratic self-determination
and collective national responsibility is the theoretical move that leads
him to propose a two-level account of global justice. Unlike
proponents of global egalitarianism, Miller advocates splitting the
responsibility for social justice between nation-states and the
international community. It is the responsibility of states to ensure
social justice amongst their citizens, whilst the international
community is charged with creating the global conditions which will
enable states to meet their internal responsibilities.114 Miller rejects
the idea that global justice implies global egalitarianism - i.e.
equalising freedoms, opportunities and resources across all nation-
states - on the grounds that the members of different political
communities will have different ways of ranking and evaluating
benefits and burdens: “people in different communities will want to
112 Ibid, p111.
113 Ibid, p128.
114 The characterisation of Miller’s position as ‘two-level’ is in Levy
(2008b), pp. 485-486.
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have these advantages distributed in different ways. In particular, they
will attach different relative weights to different components of the
bundle”.115
Even if it were possible to establish an objective baseline for equality
of opportunity across political communities, in Miller’s view justice
would not dictate that opportunities should be equalised globally
because it will often make sense to attribute responsibility for
inequalities between and within different political communities to the
choices and cultural preferences of the members of national groups.116
Respecting the processes of self-determination internal to “culturally
distinct communities each enjoying some degree of autonomy”117
thus weighs heavily against equality of opportunity or open borders as
an ideal of global justice. Whilst all individuals are entitled in justice
to a minimum set of goods and resources, beyond that baseline the
members of nations can properly be said to be collectively
responsible for both the benefits and the burdens that their chosen
policies result in. Miller takes this argument further by arguing that
the current members of a nation-state can be held collectively
responsible for the benefits and burdens generated by the actions of
past members, so that even when seen from a historic perspective the
current predicament that the members find themselves in bears no
weight in favour of global redistributive justice, substantive equality
of opportunity or open borders.118 For Miller, the contextual nature of
values and goods combined with the appropriate attribution of
national responsibility means that immigrants from poor countries do
115 Miller (2004), p125.
116 Miller (2004); Miller (2007), Chapter 5. Benhabib (2004, Chapter
3) also objects to global egalitarianism on the grounds that it would
compromise collective self-determination.
117 Miller (2004), p125.
118 Miller (2007), Chapter 6.
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not have a claim to be admitted to wealthier nations on the basis of
egalitarian distributive justice.
My aim now is not to try to establish against Miller that global
equality is a condition of global justice. That would require an
extended discussion which is beyond the scope of this thesis. Instead,
my aim is the more limited one of showing that considerations of
global inequality count more in favour of greater ease of access for
individuals from poorer states to social membership leading to
citizenship in wealthier states, than is suggested by his account of
national responsibility and democratic self-determination.
The fist objection I want to make concerns the closeness of the ‘fit’
between the actions of states and the collective will of the members of
the nations that they encompass. Even purportedly democratic states
often act autonomously and in ways that pay no heed to the voice of
their electorate.119 Moreover, even when the members of the demos
are given the opportunity to voice their collective will, states are often
free to simply ignore them and pursue policies directly contrary to
those that the majority wills. A well-known recent example of this
was the British invasion of Iraq. Evidence shows that a majority of
UK citizens were opposed to the war, and in February 2003 hundreds
of thousands gathered in London to protest the invasion.120 Yet the
British state ignored their collective will. In this case, it seems
perverse to hold the members of the British nation collectively
responsible for the actions of the British state purely because Britain
has a nominally liberal democratic government. This example applies
119 Levy (2008b), p488.
120 Angus Reid Global Monitor (2006), April; http://www.angus-
reid.com/polls/view/11447
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to the debate over global inequality and freedom of movement in so
far as it highlights the general problem of ascertaining that the will of
nation A has ‘passed through’ to the actions of its state in such a way
as to attribute collective outcome responsibility to the members of
nation A (rather than to their state), and to thus remove remedial
responsibility from other nations in the form of opening up borders,
should the members of A feel pressure to migrate due to their
domestic circumstances.
The second reason to chip away at the connection Miller wants to
forge between states and nations in order to derive an account of
collective national responsibility concerns the role and political and
economic power of non-state actors in the international arena.
Miller’s view of global politics in the account he gives of national
responsibility for the outcome of processes of self-determination is
blinkered in that it seems to take into account only inter-state and
intra-state relationships. Yet the political, economic, and social
conditions of nation-states are often heavily influenced by the actions
of NGOs, global financial organisations such as the IMF and the
World Bank, and unaccountable multinational corporate entities that
operate independently of the democratic will of the members of
nations. Given that these organisations are not democratically
organised, and given that they can and do exercise a significant
amount of political and economic leverage over nation-states that may
be impeccably democratic themselves, it seems that the members of
nations cannot be held solely collectively responsible for the
conditions in their countries. In the following chapter, we will see that
proponents of the ‘all-coerced’ principle of democratic inclusion call
for transparency and democratic accountability in the structure of
these organisations.
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What is particularly damaging for Miller’s position is the fact that the
nation-states that are most vulnerable to economic exploitation by
both external state and non-state actors are those that are least
equipped to mount effective democratic opposition. As Jacob Levy
points out, “democracy has been especially rare among poor
countries, making the attribution of poverty-maintaining policies to
the nations particularly problematic”.121 Sune Laegaard makes a
similar point when she argues that global poverty is not primarily a
result of the collective choices of democratically organised peoples.
Instead, it is “more often the result of bad (undemocratic) governance,
elite driven political conflict and exploitation, unfair international
trade and the like”.122 This castes doubt on the argument that
collective national responsibility trumps considerations of equality
that weigh in favour of open migration. If it is primarily states,
competing political elites, and/or non-state actors like international
corporations that are responsible in the outcome sense for the
domestic conditions in a given country, including employment
opportunities, relative wealth and so on, then it seems that the idea of
collective outcome responsibility does not make a real difference to
egalitarian considerations in favour of opening up borders to the
members of nations, since these individuals are not members of the
units to which collective outcome responsibility for domestic
conditions should properly be ascribed.
In addition to the argument for collective national responsibility from
democratic self-determination, Miller also claims that the cultural
disposition or collective frame of mind of a nation constitutes
sufficient grounds to attribute collective responsibility to nation-
121 Levy (2008b), pp. 489.
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states.123 So if the members of nation A are culturally predisposed to
pursue spendthrift polices through the state, and if the members of
nation B are culturally predisposed to pursue generous social welfare
policies through the state, the members of each nation can be held
legitimately collectively responsible for their relative wealth at the
later time T. This removes any obligation on the part of the members
of A to assist the members of B beyond what is necessary to ensure
their basic minimum welfare; in particular, it removes any obligation
to allow the members of B to seek a better life by migrating to A.
The problem with this argument is that it is a matter of considerable
historic, social and political contingency which cultural norms,
choices or predispositions will be conducive to economic success and
stability at any given moment in history. This means that the charge
of arbitrariness, that I earlier leveled at the way in which Miller’s
account of exclusionary territorial rights seemed to perpetuate global
inequality, might stick. As Levy points out:
(…) there seem to be real accidents of luck and
timing concerning which habits and norms are
conducive to wealth, and when. Rapid
population growth may deplete resources and
create poverty at some moments and at some
levels of population density. At others, it creates
economies of scale, generates a working-age
population able to take advantage of productive
capital that needs sufficient labour (…)124
Following on from this point, attributions of outcome responsibility
usually turn on a sufficient degree of epistemic awareness on the part
122 Laegaard (2007), p290.
123 Miller (2004); Miller (2007), Chapter 6.
124 Levy (2000b), p489.
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of the relevant agent. Naturally, there is considerable room for debate
concerning how much awareness is sufficient to attribute what degree
of responsibility. But intuitively, it seems that the greater the degree
of complexity involved in being able to predict the outcome of a
decision or dominant cultural norm, the less sense it makes to hold
those making the decisions or acting in accordance with those norms
responsible for the outcome. Miller himself holds that, in the case of
individual responsibility, “we hold people responsible for the
consequences of their actions that a reasonable person could have
foreseen (…)”.125 But as Levy’s point above indicates, the degree of
complexity and the number of contingent factors involved in the
historic and contemporary political and social issues that determine
the respective levels of wealth and economic stability across states
would seem to entail that this epistemic condition is impossible to
satisfy in a way that would sanction attributing collective outcome
responsibility for those levels to nations.
The final argument that Miller makes against opening up borders to
social membership in order to combat global inequality, is that it
would undermine national self-determination. Miller holds that
without the unilateral right to close their borders, national self-
determination would be “hollowed out” because the unrestricted entry
of strangers with different preferences might threaten to compromise
the capacity of nations to carry out their self-defined goals and
collective projects:
(…) we might permit nations to continue
making autonomous decisions in areas such as
resource conservation and population control,
but then require them to provide free access to
anyone who wants to join ... It is easy to see,
125 Miller (2007) p116.
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however, that this would also undermine self-
determination … For decisions about admission
to citizenship are inseparable from other
decisions about the kind of society one wants to
build. Some nations setting out on a path of
rapid economic growth may welcome all-
comers … Other nations with demanding
environmental objectives may pursue policies
aimed at reducing population growth … An
unlimited right to free movement would pre-
empt policy choices of this kind, and ... hollow
out the idea of national self-determination.126
But as Leif Wenar points out, this characterisation has an unreal ‘all-
or-nothing’ character.127 I think that national self-determination
would only be undermined by open borders in the fundamental sense
suggested to by Miller if there was: a) unanimous agreement amongst
the citizenry concerning the policies they wanted their state to pursue;
b) unanimous agreement amongst the set of migrants choosing to
relocate concerning the policies they wanted their destination state to
pursue; c) if the policies favoured by the existing citizenry and those
favoured by the migrants were mutually contradictory, and d) the
migrants outnumbered the original citizens. So if all the current
members agreed on a certain ecological policy, for example, and if
the free entrance of outsiders meant that that policy was impossible to
fulfill because it would result in the entrance of a group of migrants
not only unanimously united in their support for an ecological goal
contradictory to the (universally agreed upon) policy preference of the
existing members but also numerous enough to form a majority, then
every single pre-migration member would find that their self-defined
political interests in the domain of ecological policy - and, therefore,
to an extent their political autonomy - had been compromised. In this
126 Ibid, pp. 73-74.
127 Wenar (2008), p408. Wenar does not however substantiate this
claim with the argument I advance here.
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extreme scenario, we might want to say that the pre-migration
community was no longer self-determining in the domain of
ecological policy.
However, the more realistic picture is of a group of citizens internally
divided over the policies it wants the state to pursue and a group of
migrants similarly divided in their preferences for state policy. We
have seen above that Miller accept this; “ (…) different individuals
and groups are likely to disagree about the priorities that their
political community should pursue (…)”.128 He claims that his
argument in defence of membership controls from democratic self-
determination does not “assume a homogenous national culture in
which all participants share the same goals”.129 It only assumes that
they have a common interest in their state’s policies being set through
an inclusive democratic process. But - notwithstanding the extreme
scenario outlined above - the unimpeded entry of outsiders is only
realistically going to alter the balance of the net priorities in the
society, rather than render the pre-migration preferences of the
political community completely and permanently null and void as far
as state policy is concerned. Granted, in an exceptional case opening
up borders may result in what was once a minority preference in the
pre-migration community for a certain ecological policy (for
example) becoming a majority preference. Some of the native citizens
may find that the result of free migration was that their preferred
ecological policy becomes state policy, or perhaps gains regional
influence. Equally, though, free migration might result in a situation
where the majority come to be persuaded of a different viewpoint on
a given policy because of the presence within the demos of the new
members and the arguments they put forward. This could even, in
128 Miller (2007), p224.
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principle, result in a policy being adopted that is more just, more
efficient, more attentive of the needs of the disadvantaged, etc, than
the policy that was pursued in the pre-migration days. Why should all
this not simply reflect the on-going process of democratic self-
determination, rather than be understood to undermine or “hollow
out” self-determination? In direct contrast to Tamir’s ‘outcome’
oriented account, for Miller self-determination requires only a
democratic process in which members can express their preferences
and have those preferences taken into account by their state. He states
explicitly that it does not require the satisfaction of any particular
preferences.130 Even if free migration meant that my preference,
which was in the majority in the pre-migration period, came to be in
the minority, I am still a member of a self-determining nation-state in
Miller’s sense, because finding oneself in the minority on some issues
and in the majority on others is part and parcel of the process of
democratic self-determination as he understands it, and because my
concerns and interests are still going to be taken into account by the
state when it comes time to deliberate over issues in the democratic
process. Miller acknowledges all this: “ (…) I may disagree with the
current language policy of my state, but it is to my advantage
nonetheless that the policy is the subject of a democratic process that
takes my concerns into account, and that on other occasions will
generate policies that I favor”.131 Unless we support a normative goal
whereby democratic self-determination implies permanent majorities
(and it is clear from the previous quotation that this is not Miller’s
view), I don’t see that the alteration that free migration might make to
the current set of democratically defined (but internally disagreed
upon) goals is sufficient reason in itself for excluding outsiders.
129 Ibid.
130 Ibid.
131 Ibid.
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If the objections put forward in this section have force, they suggest
that Miller’s arguments from collective national responsibility and
democratic self-determination do not outweigh egalitarian
considerations in favour of greater ease of access for outsiders to
social membership leading to citizenship. However, even if Miller’s
account of collective national responsibility fails to fully assuage
liberal egalitarian concerns about global inequality, might it be the
case that the real problem is the inequality, rather than the exclusive
membership policies of wealthy nation-states?132 In other words, why
should we assume that egalitarian considerations of distributive
inequality and the arbitrary distribution of wealth and resources are
relevant first and foremost to the question of membership? If it were
possible to rectify global inequality by means other than opening up
borders, might that be sufficient to not only meet the objections raised
above but also to justify including control over social membership
amongst the self-determining powers of liberal-democracies? In the
following section, I discuss the idea of ‘purchasing’ the right to
exclude through redistributing wealth and resources and by taking
measures to ensure that democracy and human rights are secure
across all nation-states.133 Note that if my arguments against Miller’s
account of national responsibility have force, they suggest that
wealthy states may have obligations in distributive justice that are
more extensive than merely ensuring a basic minimum of welfare for
all. What those obligations may consist of is, again, beyond the scope
of this thesis. But I think the arguments of the following section need
only turn on the point that those obligations are more extensive than
Miller thinks.
132 Carens (1992), pp. 34-35.
133 I have borrowed the description of ‘purchasing’ the right to
exclude from Bertram (unpublished manuscript), p3.
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3.8 The Purchase Argument for Democratic Closure
The ‘purchase argument’ is common to a number of liberal nationalist
and communitarian theorists, and it is present in one form or another
in the work of Tamir, Walzer and Miller. The basic thought is that if
restrictions on immigration do not have a sufficiently negative impact
on the interests of those who are denied entrance because they have
sufficient options and secure political and human rights in the state in
which they currently reside, then exclusive acts of democratic self-
determination need not necessarily stand in contrast with the liberal
commitment to universal freedom, equality and human rights.
Prosperous states have to compensate those who are liable to be
harmed through being excluded by redistributing wealth and
resources to poorer states and by taking steps in general to ensure that
human rights and democracy are well established across the globe.
They can then close their borders, secure in the knowledge that they
have met their obligations to those who have been kept out.
Walzer puts forward a version of this argument in the context of his
discussion of mutual aid and the extent of the obligations of wealthy
nations to immigrants from poorer areas. He maintains that a “(…)
community might well decide to cut off immigration ... if it were
willing to export (some of) its superfluous wealth”.134 Although Miller
rejects global egalitarianism, he does regard shared humanity as
sufficient to generate an obligation to ensure that the basic human
rights of all individuals are respected, so that closing borders must be
accompanied by efforts to ensure that the exclusion of prospective
migrants does not cause or perpetuate severe harm. This may require
134 Walzer (1983), p48.
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redistributive efforts, humanitarian aid or foreign political
intervention and activity. For Miller, the offer of refuge is a last resort
when all other alternatives have been exhausted:
(…) a state that claims legitimate authority over
a territory must also take reasonable steps to
protect the human rights of those whose
position is worsened by the boundaries it
defends - which might mean, in special
circumstances where there is no alternative,
allowing them to come in (in other
circumstances the state might, for instance,
offer them protection in the place where they
now reside). In other words, it cannot, ethically
speaking, defend its boundaries and do nothing
else in a world where human rights are in many
places insecure.135
It seems that the ‘purchase’ argument is an inherent corollory of
liberal nationalism on the subject of membership controls. However,
in contrast to Walzer and Miller, a number of authors claim that the
redistributive efforts that would be required to fulfill the conditions
set by the terms of the purchase argument (and to therefore justify
democratic exclusion) are more extensive than merely ensuring a
basic level of welfare for all, and they express their argument not in
terms of humanitarian aid but within the language of equality and
distributive justice. For example, Will Kymlicka claims that “if states
do meet their obligations of international justice, then it is permissible
for them to regulate admissions so as (sic) preserve a distinct national
community”.136 Similarly, Kok-Chor Tan argues that “border
restrictions on the part of well-off countries can be justly maintained
only in a context of a global arrangement (of distributive justice) that
135 Miller (2007), p221.
136 Kymlicka (2001a), p271; quoted in Seglow (2005), p238.
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those kept out can reasonably accept as reasonable”.137 Rainer
Baubock agrees when she argues that “(…) closing borders to the less
fortunate ones … can be justified on grounds of democratic self-
determination only if democratic states also take credible efforts to
fight global distributive injustice”.138 Lastly, Tamir follows this trend
when she states that:
Restricting immigration in order to retain the
national character of a certain territory, is only
justified if all nations have an equal chance of
establishing a national entity ... Liberal
nationalism thus implies that it is justified for a
nation to seek homogeneity by restricting
immigration only if it has fulfilled its global
obligation to assure equality among all
nations.139
Democratic theorists, too, have found reason to endorse a variant of
the ‘purchase argument’. Goodin, for example, argues that
compensating those excluded from a decision-making procedure who
have a genuine claim to have their voice heard is a ‘third-best’
alternative to either a wholly inclusive franchise (i.e. a global demos)
or a global demos sub-divided into federal jurisdictions: “the price of
not enfranchising everyone we ideally should is that we would have
to pay them off for any harms we inflict upon them and accede to
their demands for fair recompense for any benefits we derive from the
wrongfully disenfranchised”.140
137 Tan (2004), p176; quoted in Seglow (2005), p328.
138 Baubock (2007), p401.
139 Tamir (1992), p161.
140 Goodin (2007), p68. See also Steiner (2001).
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What this argument supplies is one possible way of responding to
Cole’s position that all strategies of membership control are
fundamentally illiberal because they fail to apply the same liberal
principles and procedures to both insiders and outsiders. He argues
that “the exclusion of outsiders necessary to establish free and equal
citizenship for insiders will, in practice, make the free and equal
citizenship for all an impossibility”.141 If valid, the ‘purchase’
argument (at least the stronger version that appeals to distributive
justice) implies that Cole sets up a false dichotomy here. It draws
attention to the fact that the exclusion of outsiders necessary to
establish free and equal citizenship for insiders will, in practice, make
free and equal citizenship for all in one particular political
community impossible. Outsiders who are excluded are not
necessarily deprived of free and equal citizenship and some measure
of equal opportunity and economic welfare in some community, and
the idea is that if states combine their policies of exclusion with
efforts to ensure this then they can in fact implement policies of
membership control that are consistent with viewing both insiders and
outsiders as inherently free and equal. Whelan suggests this point
when he argues that democratic particularism can be combined with
the universal liberal commitment to freedom and equality by
proposing that:
(…) statism, democracy and community are
themselves universal principles: no one should
be stateless, everyone can and should enjoy
democratic citizenship and community
membership, somewhere … one’s own
participation in the life of a group need not
preclude, and ought not to be pursued at the
expense of, other people’s doing the same.142
141 Cole (2000), p11.
142 Whelan (1988a) p34.
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Similarly, Tan argues that a consistent liberal nationalist regards self-
determination as a universal right and must therefore be committed to
its realisation for all individuals: “as long as one is genuinely
committed to the principle of national self-determination as a
universal ideal, one must also, to be consistent, be committed to
bringing about the preconditions that make self-determination
possible”.143 She goes on to argue that this would require a radical
egalitarian redistribution of wealth and resources across the globe,
because “one important precondition (for self-determination) is that
of economic equality between nations”.144
In terms of efficiency in combating global inequality, there are some
practical advantages to redistributing wealth and resources rather than
(just) opening up borders. Firstly, in order to be able to migrate in the
first place, a would-be migrant needs sufficient financial resources to
allow them to leave their country of origin. As such, those who would
need to migrate for reasons of extreme poverty are in fact unlikely to
be in a position to take advantage of a policy of open borders. The
policy becomes self-defeating in that instance. As Castles and Miller
point out: “ (…) it is rarely the poorest people from the least-
developed countries who move to the richest countries; more
frequently the migrants are people of intermediate social status from
areas which are undergoing economic and social change”.145
Moreover, if open borders resulted in only comparatively privileged,
wealthy and/or skilled individuals from developing nations migrating,
143 Miller (2007, p74, nt. 22) agrees that “an ethically acceptable form
of nationalism must treat self-determination as a universal value”.
144 Tan (2004), p123.
145 Castles and Miller (1998), p21; quoted in Cole (2000), p29. See
also Miller (2007), p203 and Seglow (2006a), p6.
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then free movement could potentially worsen the economic
conditions in poor countries and exacerbate global inequality.
Secondly, opening up borders places the burden of improving their
situation solely on the shoulders of would-be migrants.146 They are the
people who have to leave their country of origin and construct a new
life for themselves in a potentially strange cultural, social and
political environment. The difficulty of doing so, especially under
conditions of poverty, racial or political persecution or social
marginalisation, for example, should not be underestimated. Carens -
one of the most prominent advocates of open borders - recognises
that:
(…) most human beings do not love to move.
They normally feel attached to their native land
and to the particular language, culture and
community in which they grew up and in which
they feel at home. They seek to move only
when life is very difficult where they are.147
When discussing the significance of the right to exit a state in
comparison to the importance of the right to entry, he states that the
former carries greater moral weight because of the importance to
individuals of their connections to their locality and place of
residence: “All of the ties that one creates in the course of living in a
place mean that one normally (though not always) has a much more
vital interest in being able to stay where one is than in being able to
get in somewhere new”.148 This leads Carens to the suggestion that
combating global inequality through economic redistribution should
146 Seglow (2006a), p4.
147 Carens (1995), p250.
148Carens (1992), p29.
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take priority over campaigning for greater porosity in borders. He also
observes that:
In struggling against injustice, it is a bad
strategy to make the admission of new
immigrants to rich countries a priority, because
restrictions are a symptom, not a cause, of the
real problems, because immigration can never
be a solution for more than a relatively small
number … and because this focus on people
who want to move … may perpetuate neo-
colonial assumptions about the superiority of
the First World.149
Carens himself has recognised four strong reasons in favour of
redistributing wealth and resources from wealthier to poorer countries
instead of simply opening up borders then sitting back to see who
decides, or is able, to come.150 So there are good reasons why social
justice concerns about global inequality may be more relevant to
arguments for the global redistribution of wealth and resources than
the redistribution of membership; primarily because opening up
borders is, arguably, a comparatively inefficient way of combating the
grossest forms of global poverty and injustice.151
However, for my purposes, the key question is: once wealth and
resources are being redistributed in the preferred way (whatever that
may be), do nation-states then have a right to close their borders? Can
the right to exclude be ‘purchased’ in this way? I want to raise four
arguments against this conclusion. For the reasons given above,
149 Ibid, p35.
150 This is not to suggest that opening up borders and redistributing
wealth are contradictory or mutually incompatible goals; Carens
(1992), p35.
151 Seglow (2005), pp. 326-328; Seglow (2006a), p9.
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greater porosity in national borders would not obviate the whole topic
of the redistributive obligations of wealthy nations. But I now want to
argue against the view that the fulfillment of their redistributive
obligations entitles states to a right to exclude outsiders from social
membership.
Firstly, the account of the ethics of community and moral
contextualism that is put forward in similar versions by Tamir,
Walzer and Miller seems to imply that they lack the epistemic
resources to implement with any kind of confidence the global aid or
benefit policies that the ‘purchase’ argument would require if it were
to overcome the case from egalitarian justice for opening up borders.
We have seen that both Walzer and Miller strongly dispute the
coherence of attempts to establish an objective baseline for equality in
goods and harms across all communities. Walzer thinks that outsiders
are insufficiently attuned to the internal ways of ranking different
goods and harms within other communities to be able to evaluate their
policies correctly: “they don’t know enough about its history, and
they have no direct experience, and can form no concrete judgments
of the conflicts and harmonies, the historical choices and cultural
affinities, the loyalties and resentments, that underlie it”.152 Likewise,
we have seen that Miller argues against global egalitarianism on the
grounds that different communities have different ways of assessing
benefits and burdens. But this moral contextualism also seems to
imply that outsiders cannot know how to redistribute wealth and
resources in a way that would be sufficient to offset the harms caused
and the inequalities perpetuated by their prevention of migration,
because the accurate weighing of harms and benefits is something
that is culturally contextual. Walzer and Miller seem to deny the
152 Walzer (1980), p212.
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availability of the cross-communal vantage point from which valid
judgements concerning effective foreign aid would need to be made
from for the purchase argument to succeed in justifying democratic
exclusion.153
Following on from this point, even if we reject moral contextualism
there is still a vast space for theorists and policy makers to disagree
over how to implement foreign aid or redistributive policies in such a
way that would be sufficient to offset whatever harm might be caused
to prospective migrants by their exclusion from other countries.
Christopher Bertram describes the virtually insurmountable
difficulties in calculating whether any given individual is sufficiently
compensated to justify their exclusion from another country when he
points out that:
The valuation of the denied opportunity will be
nearly impossible because of the enormous
indeterminacy about the nature of what is being
valued. If a person is denied access to a country
wealthier than their own, we should need to
know the value of their opportunities back
home and the value of the opportunities back
home (sic) in order to reach a net figure and the
value of the opportunity denied will depend on
whether we assess it against the background of
what this person might expect if they were
allowed in (and everything else held constant)
or whether we ask what their opportunities
might have been under an open borders policy
where all those similarly situated would also
have a right of immigration.154
153 It is important at this point to bear in mind that I hope to have
shown in the previous section that there are serious difficulties with
Miller’s argument from national responsibility that wealthy nations
will have fulfilled their global obligations by merely bringing all
individuals up to a basic minimum level of welfare.
154 Bertram (unpublished manuscript), p12. Notice, with the objection
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The defender of the purchase argument needs to have a robust
account of equality and global justice that enables them to
demonstrate that these values can be realised through redistributive
means. But the core point here is that the relationship between
equality, global justice and practices of membership control is far
more conceptually and normatively ambiguous than the purchase
argument allows for. Therefore, the conclusion that Miller et al draw
is by no means as straightforward as they would have us believe.
A third reason for doubting that border controls can be justified via
redistributive means is that lack of money or resources in their
country of origin may not be the key factor that leads an individual to
seek out a better life elsewhere. They may be fleeing a corrupt
government or a system of tribal law which they find culturally
suffocating or politically archaic. Simply providing foreign aid,
wealth or resources in these cases could mean that ruling elites get
wealthier and more powerful whilst the poor and dissatisfied in
society continue to suffer. According to Giles Bolton, this has been
the general fate of foreign aid programs to African states in the post-
colonial era.155 To really follow through the logic of the purchase
argument in a way that would be sufficient to override individual
preferences to migrate, it would seem that prosperous nation-states
that wanted to close their borders would have to involve themselves
in innumerable armed conflicts or other kinds of foreign intervention
to impose liberal democracy and the rule of law across the globe. This
would involve precisely the kind of ‘overriding’ of local meanings,
values, political practices and national sovereignty that Walzer is
explicitly opposed to, and which I think Miller would also be uneasy
with given his deference to contextualist accounts of goods and
previous to this one, that Walzer and Miller’s moral contextualism
implies that it would be impossible to perform the kind of valuation
described by Bertram.
155 Bolton (2007).
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values and the sanctity of national sovereignty and self-determination
as non-interference.
Lastly, even if the epistemic and political problems raised above were
overcome, so that the necessary global redistributive principles were
justified beyond reasonable disagreement and put into place and
corrupt governments had been ousted and the rule of law established
across all nation-states, global disparities in wealth and resources
would still be prevalent for many years to come. Seglow observes that
“Trade barriers can be lowered, aid increased, skills and expertise
exported, and it will still be some time to come before pressure to
migrate from the poor world to the rich would significantly
reduce”.156 The purchase argument for democratic closure seems to
‘sign off’ from the moral register the huge number of individuals who
would still face greatly reduced equality of opportunity and economic
welfare in the interim period before the ‘purchasing’ or the
‘compensating’ had begun to make a substantive difference to global
inequality and to ‘trickle down’ to the world’s poorest. The advantage
of opening borders, by contrast, is that it provides individuals with the
option (notwithstanding the difficulties noted above in terms of
personal, financial and emotional cost, etc) of migrating to a
prosperous country, and therefore may help to rectify the substantive
inequality suffered by any given prospective migrant and his or her
family, perhaps in the course of one or two generations. As Seglow
notes, “Until poorer states’ economic and welfare infrastructures are
substantially improved, migration from poorer states provides
migrants and their families with resources of a quality not available in
their own state, and their remittances assist a wider community back
156 Seglow (2006a), p9.
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home”.157 In my view, the previous four objections suggest that the
‘purchase’ argument does not defeat considerations from social
justice for greater ease of access to social membership leading to
citizenship.
3.9 Conclusion
In this chapter I have argued that neither Walzer nor Miller have
shown convincingly that liberal democracies should have a right to
control the admission of outsiders to social membership as a function
of their right to self-determination. Walzer puts forward a
communitarian and a democratic defence of territorial exclusion, and
I have offered objections to both. As for the former argument, the
distinctiveness of the federal states in the US and the member states
of the EU attests to the fact that the diversity of political communities
can be preserved in the absence of formal restrictions on movement
and membership. As for the latter, the idea that membership controls
can be justified purely by appeal to democratic self-determination
invites the question: ‘by what democratic authority does this group of
individuals assert control over membership?’, which results in a
logical regress of constitutive decisions.
David Miller’s defence of membership controls from the value of
self-determination avoids this logical paradox because he supports the
self-determination of political communities not directly from
democratic considerations but from the legitimacy of the territorial
rights of nation-states. Nevertheless, I have highlighted some
157 Ibid. As Carens (1992, p35) states, “we have to consider the moral
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difficulties with his position. Firstly, it seems unable to give clear
guidance in settling controversial jurisdictional disputes such as the
case of Northern Ireland, because the legitimacy of the jurisdictional
claims of either Protestants or Catholics according to Miller’s analysis
seem to depend on where we start from in history. I then put forward
a criticism from the perspective of liberal egalitarianism. Miller’s
account of national responsibility is designed to counter those who
argue for freedom of international movement from the value of
equality. However, I have raised four objections against Miller,
which, taken together, lead to the conclusion that considerations of
global inequality in favour of free movement cannot be deflated
easily by the idea of national responsibility.
In the final section of this chapter I discussed the claim that global
inequality is more pertinent to the question of the just distribution of
wealth and resources rather than of free movement or the acquisition
of citizenship. The ‘purchase’ argument for democratic closure builds
on this insight, and holds that the exclusion of outsiders on grounds of
self-determination is justifiable in so far as those who are excluded
have sufficient rights, resources and opportunities in their home
country. Where such rights, resources and opportunities are lacking,
wealthier nation-states that wish to close their borders must
compensate those migrants who are liable to be harmed through being
excluded, be it through the provision of foreign aid, redistributive
efforts or military intervention. I have advanced four arguments
against the idea that the right to exclude can be purchased in this way.
claims of those we encounter here and now”.
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We have seen that Walzer also defends a right to citizenship for those
migrants who are permitted residency status by their host community.
In section 3.3 I discussed the way in which Walzer appeals to ethical
territoriality and the subject-to-the-law principle of democratic
inclusion in supporting this position on citizenship, and I have given
an account of the democratic and egalitarian normative logic behind
it. In the following chapter I outline and discuss critically an opposing
viewpoint put forward in the later work of Iris Young. In place of an
exclusively territorial conception of citizenship rights, Young argues
that formal democratic inclusion should be defined according to the
set of individuals whose interests are affected by a decision or policy.
In this chapter and the previous one, I have raised difficulties with
attempts to justify the exclusion of outsiders from social membership
and citizenship on the grounds of self-determination. Should we
follow Young and attempt to push democratic inclusion even further,
by opening up the jurisdictional boundaries around political
communities to allow not only for the free movement and
resettlement of individuals, but also for the representation and
participation of affected outsiders? This question is the main focus for
the following chapter.
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Chapter 4
Self-Determination Without Exclusion?
4.1 Introduction
We have seen in the previous two chapters that Tamir, Walzer and
Miller believe that national political communities fall short of
achieving genuine self-determination if they are denied the right to
implement and enforce membership controls unilaterally. In response, I
have advanced arguments to the conclusion that neither democratic nor
cultural self-determination justifies the exclusion of outsiders from
social membership for the reasons that these authors give. They
embrace the exclusionary implications of nationalism precisely
because they regard membership controls as a justifiable feature of
collective self-determination; and justice as only having coherent
application within the context of shared citizenship and nationality.
Moreover, Walzer and Miller both explicitly defend a principle of
national sovereignty that implies self-determination as
non-interference; which is to say that in their view democratic
self-determination calls for a sphere of decision-making that is
exclusive of the voices of non-members. Implicit in this view is a
rejection of the idea that participatory membership should be extended
to outsiders, regardless of whether their rights or interests may be
affected by the ‘internal’ decisions and policies of other nation-states.
This much is clear from Walzer’s argument that it is those who are
subject to laws, that should have an equal say in their making. We have
also seen that David Miller endorses a vision of the international order
in which “nation-states are self-determining, but respect the
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self-determination of others through obligations of non-interference
and in some cases of aid”.1
Iris Marion Young’s later work provides an important alternative to
these nationalist accounts of self-determination. Throughout her career,
Young often sought to illustrate how challenging the conventional
meaning and use of political concepts - such as ‘impartiality’,
‘neutrality’, and ‘the common good’ - could be used to further
emancipatory ends. The critical analyses of these terms in her earlier
work was designed to show how their conventional usage worked to
subordinate difference and to reinforce the dominance of the social and
political perspective of privileged and powerful groups.2 In her later
work, Young turned to issues of self-determination and sovereignty
and performed a similar critical exercise, in order to reveal what she
saw as arbitrary and morally unjustifiable inequalities, harms and
exclusions embodied in the familiar use and application of those
concepts.
In Young’s view, the current system of nation-states and the dominant
principle of sovereignty as non-interference is responsible for the
related ideas that self-determination is an inherently and justifiably
exclusive enterprise at the territorial border and that political
communities should be free to order their internal affairs without
external regulation, interference or participations from outsiders:
(…) the nation-state system enacts exclusions
that are sometimes grave in their consequences
yet widely accepted as legitimate. States claim
the right to exclude non-citizens who wish to live
1 Miller (1995), p107.
2 Young (1990); Young (1995); Young (1997a).
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within their borders. They also claim a right
against interference from other states or
international bodies concerning the actions and
policies they take within their borders.3
Young’s goal was to develop an alternative “normative and
social-theoretical account”4 of self-determination that “preserves a
space for the positive valence of the distinctness of peoples without
endorsing the exclusions typical of nationalism”.5 Her vision of
‘diverse democratic federalism’6 is designed to show that, contra
Tamir, Walzer, and Miller, group differences and collective
self-determination can and should co-exist with open borders and
radically inclusive democratic politics. Borders demarcating distinct
self-determining political communities still exist in Young’s ideal
vision of global society, but in her view those borders should not
prevent the free movement of peoples, nor should they demarcate
impermeable jurisdictions for democratic participation. Young’s later
work can therefore be understood as a reaction to the cultural,
nationalist and democratic accounts of self-determination-as-exclusion
and as non-interference that I have discussed in the previous two
chapters.
Young’s attempt to re-conceptualise self-determination in a way that
meets the justifiable need for the political autonomy of distinct groups
without entailing the atomistic form of independence entailed by
self-determination as non-interference, hinges on her marriage of the
republican ideal of non-domination with a federalist structure of
overlapping democratic jurisdictions. Her core institutional proposal is
3 Young (2000a), p236.
4 Ibid, p252.
5 Ibid.
6 Young (2007), pp. 32-38.
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that “we need to envision a more federated system of global
governance with both stronger global regulation than currently exists
and more regional and cultural autonomy”.7 One important element of
Young’s project is to replace the “substantial” ontology of group
differences characteristic of nationalism with an account of individual
and collective identity that is based on the idea of “relational
autonomy”.8 Another important move that Young makes is to replace
the ideal of ethical territoriality and the subject-to-the-law principle of
democratic inclusion that we have encountered in Walzer’s work with
an approach, to drawing participatory membership boundaries, that
appeals to affected interests. Relationships of justice and rights to
participatory membership, on this view, stem not exclusively from
co-nationality, shared citizenship, cultural affinity or subjection to the
law but from social, economic and political connections. In so far as
these connections transcend the borders of political communities, there
should be transnational, supranational or global democratic institutions
in place to enable individuals to press their claims and defend their
interests in the context of a shared decision-making structure, where all
have an equal opportunity to influence the outcome of deliberation.
This way of distributing participatory membership is designed to
puncture the exclusivity of the Westphalian nation-state and to usher in
a post-sovereignty and global form of democratic deliberation. Young
claims that by making these conceptual, normative and institutional
shifts, we can divorce the idea of self-determination from its
nationalistic and exclusionary implications, which will not only serve
the interest that groups have in being recognised as distinct and
autonomous political entities, but of justice and non-domination for all
self-determining peoples in general.
7 Ibid, p26.
8 Young (2000a), p258.
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In the previous two chapters I have raised a number of objections
against arguments from national self-determination for the exclusion of
outsiders from social membership and citizenship. Young agrees that
the jurisdictional boundaries around political communities should be
open in terms of allowing the free movement and re-settlement of
people, and that this is compatible with collective self-determination.
But she also claims that those boundaries should be open to revision
according to the all-affected principle, partly in order to prevent the
domination of one political community over another: “autonomous
governance units should be institutionalized as open, in both a
territorial and a jurisdictional sense”9. The main focus for the critical
discussion in this chapter will be Young’s arguments for extending
participatory membership to affected outsiders, which is a key aspect
of her ideal of self-determination as non-domination. I will be arguing
against this position. Alongside a number of other difficulties, there are
good reasons to think that collective self-determination does call for a
determinate, clearly demarcated and stable demos, which could be
dissolved by a thoroughgoing commitment to the all-affected principle
of democratic inclusion.
The chapter is divided into four sections. In section 4.2, I outline the
key elements of Young’s approach to self-determination and political
membership, paying particular attention to her accounts of relational
autonomy and non-domination. Although Young avoids some of the
shortcomings of nationalist, communitarian and democratic arguments
for territorial exclusion from the value of self-determination, I have a
number of reservations about the way she uses affectedness as a mode
of demarcating a demos. I discuss these reservations in section 4.3. I
begin by arguing that the principle of democratic inclusion according to
affected interests is an unhelpful jurisdictional rule because it seems to
9 Ibid, p268.
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result in an infinite regress of constitutive decisions. Following on from
this objection, I argue that affectedness can only be applied to decide
the appropriate constitution of the demos for any given decision
through the use of substantive normative judgement on the part of an
external organisation, agency or individual(s). I go on to argue that, for
this reason, Young’s earlier critique of the ideals of impartiality and
neutrality and her general reflections on the risk of the powerful and
privileged oppressing and dominating the weaker and less powerful
should have given her reason to hesitate before endorsing affectedness
as a jurisdictional rule. The upshot of this discussion is that the earlier
Young seems to paint the later Young into a corner. In her vision of the
global order, endorsing special representation for the numerically
smaller and politically vulnerable units of self-determining peoples,
seems instrumental in insulating them against the threat of oppression
and domination at the hands of more numerous and powerful units.
However, such measures seem to take her back to the principle of
self-determination as non-interference that she wanted to move beyond
by recommending self-determination as non-domination in the first
place.
The problems that I highlight with affectedness as a jurisdictional rule
lead me to re-consider in section 4.4 the merits of the
subject-to-the-law principle of democratic inclusion. I will argue that
its clarity, determinacy and stability help it to overcome some of the
problems I identify with the all-affected principle. I go on to defend the
principle against the charge that it extends membership to transients
and temporary visitors, and so is an unhelpful and indeterminate
boundary rule. A more pressing objection, however, is that it seems at
first glance unable to account for Young’s important insights regarding
the spill-over effects of the self-determining activities of political
communities. In order to meet this objection, I discuss the possible
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advantages of formulating subjection as a criterion of democratic
inclusion in a more expansive sense, to encompass not just subjection
to formal law but to governance structures. On this more expansive
account, subjection to coercive power generates a right to participatory
membership. However, whilst this ‘all-coerced’ principle has some
advantages over the all-subjected principle, in particular by addressing
directly the coercive activities of non-statist international organisations
and by calling for transparency and democratic accountability in their
structures, it seems to fall foul of the same problem concerning the
burden of substantive normative judgement that I note with the
all-affected principle.
To move beyond this impasse, I put forward a way of combining the
all-subjected principle with the all-affected and all-coerced principles,
in a manner that is designed to reap the benefits of the clarity and
determinacy of the former without overlooking the normative insights
captured by the latter two. I propose that the all-subjected principle can
be deployed to indicate which political community has to be negotiated
with in cases where their actions may impact negatively on the rights of
outsiders or subject them to coercion, whilst affectedness and coercion
suggest two possible norms that can be deployed in the course of those
negotiations. What this proposal turns on is the thought that the criteria
from which we derive transnational or global obligations of justice can
and should be separated from the criteria used to demarcate a
democratic constituency. Proponents of the all-affected and all-coerced
principles confound the two, which is to say that they believe that the
scope of obligations of justice should correspond to the scope of
democratic political institutions. In so doing, they run into logical
paradoxes and problems of authorisation. I support further my position
on subjection to the law as a jurisdictional rule by pointing out that it
does not entail that there could or should be no transnational or global
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regulation of the ‘internal’ affairs of political communities, nor does it
preclude transnational and supranational democratic activity. However,
I end the chapter by noting that the normative validity of my proposal is
put into question by the fact of initial imbalances in power, wealth and
resources between political communities.
4.2 Sovereignty, Non-Interference and Non-Domination
The ‘Westphalian’ understanding of sovereignty describes the right of
states to wield “central and final authority over all the legal and
political matters within a determinate and strictly bounded territory”.10
This understanding of sovereignty includes a principle of
non-interference: “for a state to have final authority implies that no
other state and no other transnational body has the authority to interfere
with the actions and policies of that sovereign state”.11 On this view, the
right of nation-states to decide unilaterally upon their internal political
affairs is a fundamental expression of their status as autonomous
political entities in the international political system. Sovereignty
understood as non-interference implies that states have full power and
authority to rule on affairs within their bounded territory, including the
terms and conditions for the admission of foreigners and their legal
status once they have entered the territory. States are morally justified
in pursuing an immigration policy which is designed to further their
own interests and are free to rule exclusively over the ways in which
outsiders can gain access to membership. We saw in the introductory
chapter that in practice this is generally accepted at the level of
international relations. Canadian immigration policy, for example,
explicitly states that its membership policies are “designed and
administered in such a way as to promote the domestic and
10 Young (2007), p26.
11 Ibid, p27.
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international interests of Canada”.12 This view also encapsulates the
thought that borders are morally significant because they define the
boundaries within which both principles of justice and rights to
democratic participation are to apply. Those outside the territory have
no claim in justice to access the territory and capitalise on the resources
within the jurisdiction of other states or to participate in their internal
decision-making procedures. Although Young concedes that the
Westphalian ideal of sovereignty as non-interference may not and may
never have actually existed in practice - given the density of economic
and political interconnections between nation-states throughout history
- she claims that it still carries weight as a normative ideal for many
theorists and political leaders, and so still constitutes a valid unit of
analysis and critique.13
Following F.H. Hinsley,14 we can identify an ‘internal’ and an
‘external’ aspect of this understanding of sovereignty. The former
provides an answer to the problem of locating and understanding the
nature of legitimate political authority within a political community,
whilst the latter provides an answer to the question of how external
relations between different political communities should be regulated.
Internal sovereignty describes a central, final and absolute source of
political authority over a strictly delineated territory and over a strictly
delineated population. External sovereignty, on the other hand,
describes a relationship of independence between different sovereign
nations. Inter-state relations are to be governed by the mutual
recognition of the internal sovereignty of other nations. It has been
argued that the conceptual coherence of internal sovereignty rests on
the presence of this external, reciprocal recognition between states.
12 Canadian Immigration Act (1985), section 3 (h).
13 Young (2007), p27.
14 Hinsley (1986).
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Anthony Giddens, for example, claims that sovereignty “only has
meaning in the context of a reflexively regulated system larger than any
one state”.15
Young argues that the concept of autonomy underlying the ideal of
sovereignty and self-determination as non-interference is predicated on
an ontologically and normatively inadequate understanding of freedom
and identity. Non-interference presumes that individuals and groups
are free and autonomous when they operate within a domain of activity
which is independent of the influence or input of others. The only
obligations or relationships that occur between autonomous actors are
those into which they enter voluntarily. Absent such voluntary
relationships, a self-determining actor should be “left alone to conduct
his or her affairs over his or her own independent sphere”.16
Young’s key objection to the ideal of self-determination as
non-interference stems from the fact of causal relations in the form of
social, economic and political connections between insiders and
outsiders. Since the actions of those within territorially bounded states
can and do affect the rights and interests of those outside, and
vice-versa, she argues that we need to think of democracy and justice as
being applicable not just within the cultural and institutional structure
of an autonomous sovereign nation-state and between co-members of a
political community, but both transnationally and globally.17 This view
stands in direct contrast to the nationalist accounts of
self-determination and of obligations of justice put forward by Walzer
and Miller. We have seen that these theorists support the view that in
15 Giddens (1987), p281.
16 Young (2007), p46.
17 Young (2000b), p247.
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order to achieve genuine self-determination political communities
require rights to non-interference in the sense of being free to
collectively decide upon and pursue their political, cultural and
economic goals without input, interference or regulation from outside
individuals, agencies or organisations (perhaps most importantly in the
domain of their membership and admissions procedures). Moreover,
they hold that shared nationality constitutes the framework for
obligations of justice. Young argues that the ideal of non-interference
underlying this concept of self-determination is normatively
problematic and potentially a cause of injustice and domination. Since
the causal relationships, interdependencies and interactions between
the insiders and outsiders of a political community generate benefits
and burdens, in Young’s view those actors are implicated in a
relationship of justice:
Wherever people act within a set of institutions
that connect them to one another by commerce,
communication, or the consequences of policies,
such that systematic interdependencies generate
benefits and burdens that would not exist without
those institutional relationships, then the people
within that set of interdependent institutions
stand in relations of justice.18
Young sought to develop an alternative understanding of
self-determination that could accommodate the need for the external
regulation of interdependent political communities and co-deliberation
between the citizens of different political communities over issues that
jointly impact upon their respective interests without thereby
compromising their status as autonomous, self-determining political
entities. Young argues that if we replace sovereignty and
self-determination as non-interference with an alternative account
18 Young (2000a), p242.
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focussed on relational autonomy and non-domination, then it is
possible to understand how groups united around a distinctive social
perspective can be constrained in their activities (including their
discretion over border regulations and citizenship acquisition)19
without losing either their distinct character or their capacity for
self-determination. Her core proposal is usefully summarised as
follows:
I propose that a principle of self-determination
for peoples should be interpreted along the lines
of relational autonomy or non-domination, rather
than simply as independence or non-interference
(…) Because a people stands in interdependent
relations with others ... a people cannot ignore
the claims and interests of those others when the
former’s actions potentially affect the latter. In
so far as outsiders are affected by the activities of
self-determining people, those others have a
legitimate claim to have their interests and needs
taken into account even though they are outside
the government jurisdiction. Conversely,
outsiders should recognise that when they
themselves affect a people, the latter can
legitimately claim that they should have their
interests taken into account in so far as they may
be adversely affected.20
Although they disagree on the relationship between self-determination,
group identity and political membership, both Young and Tamir want
to detach the idea of self-determination from the idea of a nation-state,
and in so doing to dispute the nationalist ideal of one state for every
nation, i.e. “the claim that being a people entails rights to a distinct,
contiguous, and bounded territory over which the group has exclusive
jurisdiction and with which others may not interfere”.21 Young
19 Ibid, p267.
20 Ibid, p259.
21 Ibid, p255.
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encourages a view of collective self-determination not in terms of
mutually exclusive nation-states with rights to non-interference but in
terms of a structure of small federal units characterised by a political
relationship of “relational-autonomy”, with access to global
democratic fora and regulations. “Federalism”, she explains, “is the
general name for governance arrangements between self-governing
entities in which they participate together in … cooperative
regulation”.22 Relational-autonomy describes a political relationship
between subjects as well as federal units in which each subject and unit
is able to “pursue their own ends in the context of relationships in
which others may do the same”.23 Relational autonomy means that
relationships between actors should be arranged to maximise the ability
of all to achieve their goals.24 In Young’s vision of “diverse decentred
democratic federalism”,25 this means that power is taken away from
nation-states and is dispensed ‘upwards’, to global regulatory bodies,
and ‘downwards’, to local federal units. The regional locales will have
access to global authorities in order to limit the power of other units of
self-determining peoples to dominate them: “I imagine a global system
of regulatory regimes to which locales, regions and states relate in a
nested, federated system’.26
Relational autonomy is intended to replace the “atomized”27 form of
autonomy which in Young’s view informs the ideal of
self-determination as non-interference. As we have seen, on this latter
view individual and collective freedom consist in a sphere of activity
22 Young (2007), p67.
23 Ibid, p47.
24 Ibid.
25 Ibid, pp. 32-38.
26 Ibid, p34.
27 Young (2000a), p258; Young (2007), p33.
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free from all outside interference.28 Relational-autonomy, by contrast,
is designed to capture the importance of both individual and collective
choice and autonomy whilst also accommodating the normative
significance of the fact that individuals and groups are embedded in a
complex series of largely unchosen relationships, “by virtue of kinship,
history, proximity, or the unintended consequences of actions”.29
Relational autonomy and self-determination as non-domination for
groups implies only a prima facie right to non-interference. Insofar as
the activities of a group and the interconnected relationships they find
themselves in have the potential to affect others outside the group,
those outsiders have a right to make claims and to pursue collectively
some kind of settlement or agreement on the issue at hand.30
The ontology of group identity that accompanies Young’s concept of
relational autonomy stands in contrast to the picture of national identity
underlying Tamir and Walzer’s defence of immigration restrictions.31
According to Young’s view, groups do not possess a coherent, unified
or pristine identity, or a shared culture or character that warrants
protection through membership controls. Instead, Young argues that
groups develop and shift their identity in response to the range of
structural relationships that they find themselves in:
(…) groups should be understood not as entirely
other, but as overlapping, as constituted in
relation to one another and thus as shifting their
28 Young (2007), p45.
29 Young (2004) p184.
30 Young (2007), p51.
31 Young (2000a, p252) endorses what she regards as Tamir's
'non-essentialist' account of national identity. However, she does not
pursue the critique I developed in Chapter 2, section 2.4, which
challenged the consistency between Tamir's non-essentialist and
pluralistic account of national identity and her defence of membership
controls on the grounds of self-determination.
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attributes and needs in accordance with what
relations are salient.32
The liberal nationalist and identity liberal claim that there is a shared
national culture, the protection of which legitimises the exclusion of
those outsiders deemed unable or unwilling to endorse its central tenets,
is a clear example of the demand for homogeneity that Young criticises.
Her claim that “a rigid conceptualization of group differentiation both
denies the similarities that many group members have with those not
considered in the group, and denies the many shadings and
differentiations within the group”33 obviously applies as much to the
politics of national majority groups as it does to minority groups.
Young charges nationalists with erroneously defining group identity -
and therefore political membership - in essentialist and exclusionary
terms, and she argues that this not only denies the internal
heterogeneity of groups but also insulates political communities from
recognising their obligations in justice to outsiders. This is not to say
that Young refuses to recognise any group-based differences.
According to her conception of relational autonomy, “group
differentiation”34 should be thought of “as a matter of degree” rather
than as an “either/or conception”.35 In other words, although the
members of groups are likely to feel some affinity with one another due
to a shared social perspective, the nature and the degree of that affinity
will change in response to the circumstances facing the individual
members of the group and the particular structural relationships they
find themselves in:
On this view, social difference may be stronger
or weaker, and it may be more or less salient,
32 Young (1993), pp. 123-124.
33 Young (2000a), p89.
34 Ibid.
35 Ibid, p253.
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depending on the point of view of comparison …
Those I affirm as like me in one respect are
different in others, and I may perceive
similarities with those whom I affirm as
distinct.36
Given this relational picture of collective identity, Young
acknowledges that it is not self-evident whether a group of individuals
warrant rights to self-determination.37 However, she recognises that
vagueness at an ontological level about group boundaries makes no
difference to the fact that in the real world many people attach
considerable importance to achieving independent political rights for
their membership group:
(…) ambiguities about membership (do not)
negate the fact that self-government and
autonomy are important to many who consider
themselves members of distinct peoples because
they find such collective autonomy important for
their own freedom and well-being.38
There are two circumstances that in Young’s view call for
self-determination rights to be awarded to a group. The first is
concerned with culture and identity. When a group of people “gain a
particular joy and sense of stability from symbols, practices,
monuments, sites, and texts”39 associated with a particular culture,
“then those people should have the means collectively to decide how to
maintain and promote their flourishing as a people”.40 At the front of
36 Ibid.
37 Ibid, p257.
38 Ibid.
39 Ibid, p256.
40 Ibid. Importantly, she notes that “this does not mean that those
positioned as members of the group all have the same attitude towards
that membership”.
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Young’s mind here is the case of indigenous groups.41 The second
circumstance when it is appropriate to award a group
self-determination rights is when those rights may be instrumental in
protecting the members from harmful relationships which they may
suffer at the hands of other, more powerful or numerous groups:
“institutions of self-government can serve as a means to resist
exclusion, discrimination, exploitation, or minority status”.42 When
minority “historical and cultural groups”43 suffer domination and
exploitation at the hands of other groups with state power behind them,
those minorities may warrant separate governmental institutions as a
means of insulating themselves from further harm. I believe Young
saw the legitimacy of the calls for the self-determination of the
Palestinian people as being grounded on this second set of
circumstances.44
The case of Israel/Palestine served for Young as a clear example of the
need for a shared federal system of governance, with territorially
interspersed groups which should have rights to non-domination rather
than non-interference. The territory shared by the two groups includes
sites of symbolic importance and natural resources which are crucially
signifiant for both; most obviously the city of Jerusalem and the
watershed of the Jordan river respectively. In Young’s view, a
two-state solution to the current situation where both groups have legal
and political autonomy with a right to non-interference would be
unable to accommodate the fact that both groups require and are
entitled to access these sites and resources. Nor would it be equipped to
41 Ibid.
42 Ibid.
43 Ibid, p257.
44 Young (2005a). It is important to note that in neither circumstance
does Young state explicitly that self-determination rights should
include control over the admission of outsiders to social membership or
citizenship.
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accommodate the “spatial togetherness”,45 economic interdependence,
mutual vulnerability to the natural environment, and unequal military
and political power of the Israelis and Palestinians. Young proposes
instead that each group be recognised as being composed of a number
of small and territorially dispersed units, each of which would be
entitled to exercise “political, cultural and local resource autonomy”.46
The members of each unit would have equal civil and political rights
and would be required to participate in negotiation and shared rule with
other units to reach agreement over specific issues with implications
for all, such as the local environment or economy.
So Young substitutes the idea of relational autonomy for autonomy and
the idea of self-determination as non-domination for self-determination
as non-interference in order to derive an account of justice that is more
attuned to the interdependent global context, but which also resists the
move towards a unified world state as the only possible alternative to
the ideal of Westphalian sovereignty. She argues that as long as the
activities of political communities are regulated or interfered with by
supranational or global authorities on grounds that are non-arbitrary,
their status as free and self-determining associations is not thereby
compromised. According to Young, interference in the affairs of
self-governing political communities is not arbitrary if “its purpose is
to minimize domination, and if it is done in a way that takes the
interests and voices of affected parties into account”.47 So the kind of
affect that legitimises interference in the affairs of self-determining
communities is domination.
45 Ibid, p23.
46 Ibid, p8.
47 Young (2000a), p259.
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Young’s vision of self-determination as non-domination is derived
from Philip Petit’s version of republicanism. On Petit’s account,
non-domination understands freedom as the lack of arbitrary
constraints on the ability to achieve one’s projects or goals, but not
necessarily independence or non-interference in the sense of a sphere
of decision-making activity free from external regulation. An agent
interferes with another when they block, restrict or direct their actions
or change their range of options in such a way that impacts negatively
on their choice situation. Domination occurs when an agent interferes
with another in a way that is arbitrary, i.e. without taking into account
the interests or voices of those affected. However interference is not a
necessary condition of domination; an agent dominates another when
they have the power or capacity to interfere with their actions
arbitrarily. Freedom, on this view, implies that agents do not stand in
these relations of domination to one another.48 This entails that
institutional interference in the affairs of both individuals and
self-determining collectives in order to combat domination can be used
to bring about freedom, rather than necessarily compromising freedom,
as the non-interference model would suggest.49
If political communities refuse to recognise their inter-relations and
causal connections with other communities, their self-determined
activities and decisions can end up creating domination and injustice
for individuals who, by virtue of their geographic location and
citizenship status, are not armed with rights to defend their interests.
Self-determination can be a misleading term, then, in so far as it is
coupled with a right to non-interference, as this can result in
domination where the will of one political community is imposed
arbitrarily upon another, or where one political community is able to
48 Ibid, pp. 258-259, citing Pettit (1997).
49 Young (2000a), p260.
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interfere arbitrarily with another. Seen from Young’s republican
perspective, such cases are better described as other-determination.50
According to Young, one important way in which the domination of
the members of one political community over another can be avoided is
through including the voices of affected outsiders in a shared
decision-making structure when a given policy or decision is liable to
have consequences that exceed the jurisdictional boundaries of a
particular self-determining body. Affectedness, for Young, triggers a
legitimate claim to democratic inclusion when it describes a negative
impact; individuals “should have their interests taken into account in so
far as they may be adversely affected”.51 As an example, she discusses
the case of Goshutes v. Utah. In the late 1990’s, the Goshute tribe used
its legal right to self-determination to offer to lease out part of their
reservation land to the federal government, for the purpose of storing
radioactive nuclear waste. Since the decision threatened to impact
negatively on the welfare and safety of those living not just within the
reservation but also in the surrounding federal states, Young argues
that self-determination as non-interference for the Goshute in this case
would give the tribe unjustifiable discretionary power to harm
outsiders, without having any obligation to take their interests or voices
into account and without incurring any legal consequences.52
The all-affected principle as a mode of demarcating the boundary of
those entitled to participate in a democratic process is the direct
antithesis of the all-subjected principle of inclusion and the normative
ideal behind ethical territoriality discussed in relation to Walzer in the
50 I have borrowed the term ‘other-determination’ from Gould (2006),
p54.
51 Young (2000a), p259.
52 Young (2007), pp. 53-56.
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previous chapter. Contra Walzer, Young argues that territorial
presence and subjection to the law cannot in and of itself account for
why we should consider someone a member of a political community
with a right to participate in its decision making procedures, because
the political borders around different states seem arbitrary from a moral
point of view: “How can it be that one day a person is not a member of
the society because he is in Tijuana, but when he has arrived in San
Diego, he is a member? Surely entering the boundaries of a sovereign
state does not itself make one a member of a society”53. Seen from
Young’s perspective, ethical territoriality as a guide to drawing
democratic boundaries can be criticised for being both under and
over-inclusive. It is under-inclusive because it seems to exclude
individuals outside the state who may nevertheless have a genuine
claim in justice to have their voice heard because their interests are
affected by the decisions enacted by the members of that state. It is
over-inclusive in so far as it seems to attribute membership ties
between people within a state who may have little or no politically
relevant connections to one another. For Young, obligations of justice
and rights to democratic participation spring from social, political and
economic connections, and these connections are not confined within
the borders of sovereign states and are not necessarily predicated on
either shared subjection to a system of governance or geographical
proximity: “The social and economic connections between people in
Mexico and Central America and the Southwestern United States are
wide and dense, arguably denser than my connection with either region
as I sit here in Pittsburgh”.54
Since the all-subjected and all-affected principles appeal to potentially
contradictory guidelines to legitimise particular jurisdictional
53 Young (1998), p2.
54 Ibid.
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boundaries, they will often result in drawing radically different
participatory membership boundaries. One can be affected by a law or
a policy without being subject to it, as is the case with the South Pacific
Islanders who bore the main brunt of the environmental impact of the
French nuclear testing but were not subject to French law - because
they did not have French citizenship status - and therefore had no right
to participate in the formulation of French law and policy. Likewise,
one can be subject to a law without being affected by it: for example, I
am subject to the immigration laws of the United Kingdom but they do
not currently have a direct impact on my interests (although that may of
course change, say for example if I met a marriage partner abroad and
sought to secure residency status for her in the UK).55
If Young is correct that affectedness is the criterion of inclusion that
liberal-democrats should endorse to demarcate a constituency for a
given decision, and if she is also correct that self-determination should
be understood as non-domination, then this would imply that
democrats have good reason to jettison their commitment to the
unilateral discretion of political communities to control their
membership policies and should adopt instead a more fluid, negotiable
and issue-responsive approach to demarcating participatory
membership.
However, I will argue in the following section that Young’s
substitution of affectedness for subjection to the law as a jurisdictional
rule raises a number of difficulties, some of which are specific to her
overall project. My first objection is that the principle of democratic
inclusion according to affected interests results in a logical regress of
constitutive decisions. I go on to discuss two possible solutions to this
55 Karlsonn (2006), p23.
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problem - the first being that we can simply invoke the idea of
‘founding fathers’ to settle the matter of the initial constitution of the
demos, the second being the idea that a ‘boundary court’ could be set
up to pass judgement on who is affecting who to the degree sufficient to
trigger a right to inclusion. I argue that this latter proposal should have
been particularly unpalatable for Young, given her earlier critique of
the ideals of impartiality and neutrality. I go on to suggest that Young
could have responded to these difficulties by invoking the idea of
special representation for vulnerable or less powerful units of
self-determining peoples. This response, however, seems to take her
back to the logic of exclusion and the ideal of self-determination as
non-interference. The upshot of this discussion is that affectedness as a
criterion of democratic inclusion raises some dilemmas peculiar to
Young’s work, suggesting that her earlier position on group
representation stands in tension with her later reflections on
self-determination and participatory membership. Lastly, I argue that
non-domination as a jurisdictional rule risks dissolving the capacity of
political communities to make any decisions for themselves at all. This
suggests that there are good reasons to think that - pace Young -
self-determination could be undermined if it does not include a right to
exclude outsiders from participatory membership, even though those
outsiders may be affected by a particular policy or decision.
4.3 The All-Affected Principle and Self-Determination as
Non-Domination
The all-affected principle generates some paradoxical questions when
it is used to draw democratic boundaries. Firstly, a logical difficulty
arises when we try to specify the constitution of those affected by a
decision in terms that are consistent with the all-affected principle itself.
The problem is that for every question concerning the constitution of
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the demos that involves an appeal to those who are affected, we have to
pose the prior question of who is entitled to decide upon the relevantly
affected parties. But, since that decision will also affect individuals,
that question too must be answered by those who are going to be
affected by the decision, and so on, ad infinitum. As Whelan argues:
Before a democratic decision could be made on a
particular issue (by those affected) a prior
decision would have to be made, in each case, as
to who is affected and therefore entitled to vote
on the subject - a decision, that is, on the proper
bounds of the relevant constituency. And how is
this decision, which will be determinative for the
ensuing substantive decision, to be made? It too
should presumably be made democratically - that
is, by those affected - but now we encounter a
regression from which no procedural escape is
possible .… Thus to say that those who will be
affected by a given decision are the ones who
should participate in making it is to … propose
what is a logical as well as a procedural
impossibility.56
Torbjorn Tannsjo and David Held have both suggested ways of
rescuing the all-affected principle from the logical regress noted by
Whelan.57 Tannsjo, with traces of the Walzerian take on the original
constitution of self-determining political communities, suggests that
the “solution to the boundary problem may well be reached in a
democratic manner”58 if we appeal to “some founding mothers and
fathers, to draw up the constitution for us”.59 I have discussed and
rejected a similar proposal when looking at Walzer and the democratic
boundary problem in the previous chapter. I will not dwell on it further
56 Whelan (1983), p19; Baubock (2009), p17.
57 Karlsonn (2006, pp. 10-11) also discusses these responses to
problems with the all-affected principle.
58 Tannsjo (2007), p6.
59 Ibid.
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here, except to note that Walzer and Tannsjo’s ‘response’ to the
boundary problem is no real response at all, if we consider Goodin’s
complaint that one of the reasons that political theorists have not in
general had a great deal to say on the matter of the constitution of a
demos is precisely because they (like Walzer and Tannsjo) simply
“take it for granted that a people has already constituted itself. How a
people accomplishes this mysterious transformation is therefore treated
as a purely hypothetical event that has already occurred in prehistory or
in a state of nature”.60 For the theorist who takes seriously the problem
of how to democratically constitute a demos, historic appeals like this
will be unsatisfactory.
David Held’s more interesting proposal is that “issue-boundary forums
or courts will have to be created to hear cases concerning where and
how ‘significant interest’ in a public question should be explored and
resolved”.61 What Held’s institutional proposal draws attention to is the
fact that deciding upon the constitution of those relevantly affected or
dominated by a particular policy requires a decision on the appropriate
jurisdiction by some external actor or ruling body. We cannot logically
include all actually affected parties in a particular decision. We cannot
know who is actually affected by a decision until it has been made and
carried out, because the making and carrying out of the decision will
affect people, and so all those actually affected by the decision cannot
logically take part in making the decision.62 So it seems that taking the
60 Dahl (1970), p61
61 Held (1995), p237.
62 Goodin (2007), p52. There is a question to be addressed here about
how we should interpret Young’s application of the concept of
‘affectedness’. On the one hand, she states that “a people cannot ignore
the claims and interests of those others when the former’s actions
potentially affect the latter” (Young (2000a), p259 (emphasis added)).
But the very next sentence seems to suggest that in her view all those
who are actually affected by a policy or decision have a claim to
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all-affected principle seriously as a jurisdictional rule would in fact
require there to be in place some kind of external ruling body or
institution to decide upon the relevant constituency for any given
decision. As Jacob Levy points out, self-determination as
non-domination (which, as we have seen, incorporates a principle of
inclusion according to affected interests) requires:
(…) some (crucially) unspecified actors to
decide whether a polity’s decision create
domination over others … in order to decide
whether the decision may be left to the polity or
must be negotiated in shared institutional
settings with those others. In other words, that
outside actor must pass judgement on all
proposed actions taken by the self-determining
polity, in order to decide whether the polity may
act unilaterally.63
Why should this necessarily be an objection to the all-affected principle
of democratic inclusion and self-determination as non-domination?
The real problem is that deciding upon the appropriate constituency for
any given decision according to affectedness cannot it seems be simply
a procedural, neutral or empirical matter. Deciding upon the
appropriate jurisdiction in fact involves making a substantive judgment
on the merits of the issue at hand. Affectedness in itself is a vague
concept; if it is to do any useful work in drawing democratic
boundaries we have to specify what kinds of affect are necessary or
sufficient to trigger a claim to participatory membership. This in itself
will be a matter of controversy.64 In turn, drawing a boundary around
inclusion: “In so far as outsiders are affected by the activities of
self-determining people, those others have a legitimate claim to have
their interests and needs taken into account”. However, as I argue in the
main text, this latter condition for marking the boundaries of a demos is
logically incoherent.
63 Levy (2008a), p70.
64 Karlsonn (2006).
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the relevantly affected parties in any particular case must involve
normative reflection, historic analysis and social-scientific theorising
because otherwise the all-affected principle is vulnerable to what
Nancy Fraser calls the ‘butterfly effect’. The problem is that appealing
solely to empirical evidence of causal connections to set the demos
would seem to lead to the conclusion that virtually everyone, virtually
everywhere is in some sense affected by the actions of virtually
everyone else, virtually everywhere else: “one can adduce empirical
evidence that just about everyone is affected by just about
everything”.65 Relationships of justice and the democratic obligations
they entail would therefore become wildly indeterminate and the
all-affected principle would be impossible to apply. Therefore, in order
to decide who is affected and causally related in a way that is necessary
or sufficient to trigger a right to democratic inclusion, we cannot
simply appeal to objective empirical criteria but must make a
substantive judgment on the merits of the policy, issue or decision at
hand.
This point becomes clearer if we consider as an example the issue of a
state’s immigration legislation and attempt to apply the all-affected
principle to demarcate the boundary of those entitled to have a say in
the matter. If it is decided that only the interests of existing citizens are
relevantly affected, rather than prospective migrants, then we have
actually decided upon the substantive moral and theoretical question of
whether or not immigration should be considered a matter purely of
democratic self-determination or of individual rights to freedom of
movement and equality. Alternatively, we may want to argue that the
interests of family members located abroad are affected more
profoundly by restrictive immigration policies than, say, economic
migrants, so they should be given priority in having a say in
65 Fraser (2005), p27.
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determining the admissions policy of a particular state. But, again, this
requires some agency or ruling body to decide that family
re-unification is a more pressing normative concern than economic
migration. It seems then that no agency or individual could possibly
decide upon the correct constitution of a demos in any particular case
according to criteria of affectedness or non-domination without thereby
making a normative assessment of the issue or policy at hand. Levy
argues on these grounds that the ideal of non-domination that underlies
Young’s commitment to the all-affected principle is an unhelpful mode
of demarcation, because it entails that deciding the merits of the case
has to precede the decision about the appropriate jurisdiction. But the
members of the constituency are supposed to be the agents who
deliberate over the merits of an issue: “Rules about jurisdiction and
self-government concern who gets to decide the merits of a question.
Non-domination as a jurisdictional rule requires getting things
backward: deciding the merits prior to deciding the authority”.66
For Young, it is particularly problematic that the decision about
relevantly affected or dominated parties cannot proceed without
substantive normative judgment. Young claims that decisions made by
outsiders about when and how to intervene in the affairs of political
communities in order to combat domination, or when to sanction and
oversee co-deliberation between federal units, would be illegitimate if
it proceeded “according to their judgement of what way of life is
best”.67 We can understand this as a function of her general concern to
limit the potential for abuses of power and domination and her
scepticism towards allowing authorities to decide upon a unitary
conception of the ‘common good’ (more on this below). But the idea
that decisions about relevantly affected or dominated parties could in
66 Levy (2008a), p70.
67 Young (2000a), p259.
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principle proceed without making a substantive normative assessment
seems to turn on the possibility of the kind of neutrality and
impartiality in deliberative procedures and reasoning that Young spent
much of her earlier career working to discredit as an impossible ideal
which is fundamentally ideological. Since, in her view, individuals
cannot help but reason and deliberate from the perspective of their
particular social background and relational context, it follows that the
attempt to follow ‘neutral’ rules of discussion and adjudication serves
typically as a shield for the dominance of the perspective of more
powerful and privileged groups. In Justice and the Politics of
Difference, she writes that:
(Impartiality) is ... an impossible ideal, because
the particularities of context and affiliation
cannot and should not be removed from moral
reasoning … (T)he ideal of impartiality serves
ideological functions. It masks the ways in which
the particular perspectives of dominant groups
claim universality, and helps justify hierarchical
decision-making structures.68
The decision by an external actor about who is affecting who or
dominating who to the degree required to trigger a right to inclusion
cannot it seems be a neutral or impartial procedure, but must involve a
judgment on the merits of the issue at hand. The worry from Young’s
point of view must therefore be that that judgement will reflect the
perspective of power and privilege from which that external actor
surveys the situation. This problem is compounded by the fact that, as
Saward notes, investing an external actor or governing body with the
authority to decide upon the relevantly affected parties in any given
case would put “enormous powers”69 into the hands of “unelected
68 Young (1990), p97.
69 Saward (2000), pp. 42-43.
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authorities”.70 Young’s discussion of social perspectives and the
necessary partiality of all forms of moral reasoning would suggest that
these ruling authorities will almost inevitably make jurisdictional
decisions that reflect their own position of ‘enormous power’. Young’s
earlier work has provided good reasons to be sceptical that they will be
able to make jurisdictional decisions which would benefit or reflect
adequately the needs and interests of the weaker and less powerful
federal units.
Saward observes in connection with his critique of the principle of
inclusion according to affected interests that “agenda-setting is a
primary means to power”.71 This point is also present in Young’s work.
She argues that, particularly in circumstances of socio-economic
inequality, the common good is likely to be defined in such a way as to
reflect the particular perspective of more powerful and privileged
groups, thus excluding or marginalising the point of view of weaker
minorities
The relative power of some groups often allows them to
dominate the definition of the common good in ways
compatible with their experience, perspective and
priorities. A common consequence of social privilege is
the ability of a group to convert its perspective on some
issues into authoritative knowledge without being
challenged by those who have reason to see things
differently.72
Furthermore, Young’s position on social perspectives, group identity
and relational ontology and her critique of neutrality and impartiality in
deliberative procedures imply that communication and understanding
across both individual and group boundaries will always be difficult
70 Ibid.
71 Ibid, p43.
72 Young (2000a), p108.
219
and fraught with the potential for misunderstanding, distortion and
domination73. The public sphere, for Young, is not a “comfortable place
of conversation among those who share language, assumptions and
ways of looking at things”.74 There is some broad similarity then
between Young’s view of communication and the public sphere and the
view promulgated by the agonistic approach to democratic theory and
collective identity, which I discuss in Chapter 6. The reservations that
she expresses about the difficulty of achieving transparency and
impartiality in deliberation at an intranational level seem hard to
reconcile with her faith that negotiation at a global level will be
effective at combating domination. I think we can argue that Young’s
concerns about the threat of the dominance of the perspective of
privileged and powerful groups will be multiplied when deliberation is
relocated to a transnational, supranational or global context. Arguably,
according to the terms of Young’s position, there will be a greater
threat of powerful and privileged parties dominating weaker parties
because of the lack of face-to-face interaction, the difficulty of
reaching balanced judgements concerning events occurring far away
from the site of deliberation, and the difficulty of taking into account a
sufficiently expansive range of different perspectives to ensure that
domination on a global scale is being minimised. All of these factors
make it more likely that considerations of power and privilege - rather
than balanced reason, argument, and the equal representation of
different social perspectives - will influence the outcome of
deliberative democratic procedures.
Moreover, it seems that stable and long-established democratic states
(or units of self-determining peoples) would have an important
advantage over non-democratic states or units of peoples, or states or
73 Ibid, pp. 136-137.
74 Ibid, p111.
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units in which democracy is fragile or a comparatively recent
accomplishment, when deliberating over affectedness or
non-domination in transnational or global forums, simply because the
members of stable and long-established democratic states will be better
versed in presenting their arguments in a democratic forum.75 This
much should also be evident to Young, given her acknowledgement
that when an individual knows the conventional ‘rules of the game’ in
deliberative procedures and the dominant modes of argumentation and
reasoning, they are more likely to have their perspective heard and
attended to, than those who may argue and reason in more esoteric or
emotional ways.76
Young could have perhaps responded to these charges by falling back
on her earlier position on group representation put forward in Justice
and the Politics of Difference. She might have argued that since in her
view the powerful often dominate the weaker through the medium of
purportedly impartial discursive procedures, those units of
self-determining peoples in her vision of decentralised federalism that
are economically and politically weaker would warrant special,
guaranteed political rights of representation in transnational or
supranational deliberative fora, such as reserved seats or veto rights on
certain issues of particular importance to the members of the group, to
ensure that their perspective is heard and their collective interests are
respected. This was precisely Young’s position in Justice and the
Politics of Difference on the issue of land policy for indigenous North
American tribes, which she put forward as a clear example of a
legitimate “group veto power regarding specific policies that affect a
group directly”.77
75 Enslin (2006), pp. 62-63.
76 Young (2000a), Chapter 2.
77 Ibid, p184; quoted in Levy (2008a), p61.
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However, this response seems to take us back to the logic of
sovereignty as non-interference that Young wanted to avoid by
recommending global democratic fora, relational autonomy and
non-domination in the first place. In order for a group to have special
rights of representation, it seems that there must be a clear distinction
between those who are and those who are not members of that group
with a right to participate in its internal affairs. In Inclusion and
Democracy, Young “brackets”78 the “particularly controversial”79
issue of veto power for minority groups, and partially retracts her
earlier argument for reserving seats for minority groups in
representative bodies on the grounds that “Reserving seats for
particular groups can tend to freeze both the identity of that group and
its relations with other groups in the polity”.80 She goes on to note that
the policy is problematic in that it requires a determinate conception of
who is and who is not a member of the group and thus who has a right
to choose representatives to take up the reserved seats: “If only the
members of the group have a right to choose for the reserved seats,
furthermore, this method generates difficult problems of determining
who has the right to choose those representatives”.81 So Young seems
to face a dilemma. These passages confirm my point that whilst special
representation in deliberative fora - be it regional, national or global -
may be an important method for combating illegitimate exclusion and
domination, it requires the kind of clear and determinate jurisdictional
78 Young (2000a), p144, n27. This is also noted in Levy (2008a), p62.
79 Ibid.
80 Ibid, p149. I say ‘partially’, because although Young recognises
these problems with reserved seats as a mode of special representation,
she acknowledges that it may still be a necessary tool to facilitate
inclusion, but only as a “last resort and temporary option”; Young
(2000a), p150.
81 Ibid, p150.
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boundary around a group that Young’s accounts of relational autonomy
and self-determination as non-domination are designed to overcome.
In contrast to her earlier endorsement of special representation for
minority groups, in her later work on self-determination, Young claims
that “Political principle must be content with a “(…) vague and
ambiguous set of intuitions about when a group of people have
sufficient affinities and cultural projects to warrant distinction”.82
However, the concern is that for oppressed and less powerful groups,
vagueness and ambiguity concerning their participatory membership
boundaries could turn into a shield for their exploitation at the hands of
more powerful and numerous majority groups. In fact, the threat of
minority groups being ‘swamped’ by outsiders and outvoted on matters
of particular political or cultural significance to them, has in the past
been a key normative claim in favour of a politics of difference that
recognises self-government rights for national minorities, that includes
the right to exclude outsiders from their internal decision making
procedures. Will Kymlicka, for example, argues on these grounds that
justice for national minorities requires their recognition as a “political
unit substantially controlled by the members of the national minority
and substantially corresponding to their historical homeland or
territory”.83 In her earlier work on group representation, Young
endorsed a similar claim when she wrote that her version of the politics
of difference accepts “as a basic principle that members of oppressed
groups need separate organizations that exclude others, especially
those from more privileged groups”.84 This kind of claim is difficult to
reconcile with her later attempt to defend “local self-determination …
82 Ibid, p255.
83 Kymlicka (1995), p30.
84 Young (1990), p167 (italics added).
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without sovereign borders”.85 By Young’s own admission, then, the
implementation of her idea of self-determination as non-domination
could undermine the right to self-determination of minority groups.
It seems that if we took the all-affected principle and non-domination
seriously, as jurisdictional rules, there is a risk that they would dissolve
the capacity of the weaker and numerically smaller units in Young’s
federated picture of the global order to make any decisions for
themselves at all. Levy brings out this point in relation to Native
American tribal sovereignty. As a criticism of Young, this argument
extends beyond the example of indigenous groups because she uses
contemporary Native American tribal sovereignty as the initial model
and norm for her overall vision of democratic federalism.86 Levy
argues that if the tribes did not have a right to non-interference, i.e. if
they were unable to exclude outsiders from participatory membership,
then their right to self-determination could be undermined because
virtually no decision could ever be made by the tribes without first
involving protracted negotiation around defining the appropriate
constituency. The greater the amount of negotiation involved in
deciding upon the constitution of the demos in any particular case, the
greater the potential there is for inequalities in power to influence the
outcome. According to Levy, “a conception of self-determination such
as Young’s that lacks ... legal rigidity and clarity, one that emphasizes
negotiation over the question ‘who holds the rights’ … unavoidably
tends to multiply initial power imbalances”.87 Since Native American
tribes are typically surrounded by federal states with greater numbers
and political power, this process of negotiation could result in either
political inertia or the outright suppression of the ability of the tribe to
85 Young (2007), p33.
86 Ibid, p43.
87 Levy (2008a), p72.
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act politically. This suggests that - unlike control over social
membership and citizenship - collective self-determination does
require the exclusion of outsiders from participatory membership:
(…) if every use of reservation land that might
have some effect on non-tribe members - which
is to say almost every use of reservation land,
given the expansive understanding of
interconnectedness suggested in Young’s
discussion of relational autonomy - is subject to
negotiation over who gets to decide, then the
more-populous and more-powerful surrounding
states could negotiate tribal governments to
death88.
At this point, however, there may be an objection to my overall
position. I argued against Miller in section 3.7 of the previous chapter,
that open access to social membership and citizenship would not
compromise democratic self-determination for the reasons he gives,
partly because of the internal diversity in the preferences for state
policy amongst the members of the pre-migration community. So why
should the inclusion of the (similarly diverse) voices of affected
outsiders compromise self-determination? Don’t many of the same
arguments that I made in support of opening up access to social
membership and citizenship also support opening up access to
participatory membership according to affected interests? I do not
think so. The reason is that in the case of open access to social
membership and citizenship, there is still a clear and determinate
constituency that is demarcated according to procedural criteria (i.e the
subject-to-the-law principle). The individuals counted within the
constituency will change due to migration, but the boundary of the
constituency itself is stable, determinate and projected into the future.
This constituency can make democratically self-determined
88 Ibid, p73.
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decisions.89 But if affectedness or non-domination are used as
jurisdictional rules, the making of a decision is postponed until
negotiation over the appropriate constituency has been settled, and it
this negotiating process that threatens to undermine self-determination.
If the boundaries of a constituency are permanently open to being
challenged by outsiders raising a claim to inclusion on the grounds of
affectedness or domination for any given issue (rather than just the
individual members counted within the constituency changing over
time due to open migration), then this could it seems threaten to
undermine the existence of differentiated, territorial self-determining
political communities whose actions and decisions are projected into
the future. As affected outsiders raised their more and less legitimate
claims for inclusion in any given case, territorial political communities
could find themselves unravelled and unable to make any decisions for
themselves. This difficulty is compounded by the problems of
indeterminacy with the all-affected principle noted earlier; because the
principle cannot provide a clear guideline for inclusion, negotiation
around who is affected in any given case could be protracted to the
point where no decision could be made at all. I think Margaret Moore
has a similar point in mind when she argues that territorial
self-governing democratic communities cannot co-exist easily with
issue-specific democratic bodies with different bases of inclusion
because “Non-territorial inclusion threatens the very decision-making
capacity of the kind of political community that most people care
about”.90
Given the objections I have raised with deploying the all-affected
principle as a criterion of democratic inclusion, I think it may be worth
89 Notwithstanding the issue of ‘swamping’ discussed above and in
Chapter 3, section 3.7.
90 Moore (2006), p36. See also Baubock (2009), p18.
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reassessing the merits of the subject-to-the-law principle as a
jurisdictional rule. This is the task of the following section. I begin by
discussing the advantages of the principle in comparison to the
difficulties I have raised with the all-affected principle, and I defend
subjection-to-the-law against the charge that it has the counter-intuitive
implication of awarding membership rights to temporary visitors. A
more thorny problem is that it seems at first glance to be unable to
secure any means of addressing, democratically, the potentially
harmful affects generated by self-determining political communities.
So a risk with endorsing subjection to the law as a jurisdictional rule is
that we forego completely the important normative insights raised by
Young’s critique of the Westphalian conception of sovereignty and
self-determination as non-interference. This leads me to consider
expanding the concept of subjection to encompass subjection to
coercive power. This expanded account, which is put forward in similar
versions by Nancy Fraser, Arash Abizadeh and Linda Bosniak, has
some normative advantages over the narrower subject-to-the-law
principle. However, I will argue that the ‘all-coerced’ principle of
inclusion succumbs to one of the key difficulties I have raised with the
all-affected principle, which is that using the scope of coercive power
to define the boundary of a demos involves judging the merits of an
issue in order to decide upon who gets to ‘decide’ upon the issue. Faced
with this objection, I propose a way of combining the advantages of the
clarity and determinacy of the subject-to-the-law principle with the
normative insight that negative affects, inequalities, coercion and
trans-boundary harms will often need to be addressed through
co-operation, interaction and negotiation between self-determining
political communities. This move requires prising apart the scope of
the demos from the scope of obligations of justice. Finally, I support
my position further by arguing - contra Young - that the
subject-to-the-law principle and self-determination as non-interference
are compatible with transnational and supranational democratic
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activity, as well as a recognition on the part of states of obligations to
outsiders.
4.4 Subjection Re-Visited
Dahl refers to the all-subjected principle as the ‘principle of full
inclusion’, and his formulation runs thus: “The demos must include all
adult members of the association except transients and persons proved
to be mentally defective” where adult members of the association
refers to “all adults subject to the binding collective decisions of the
association”.91 Rubio-Marin provides a similar description when she
writes that “(…) states claiming to be committed to liberal democracy
ought to regard as full members of their organized political community,
all those who reside in their territory on a permanent basis, being
subject to the decisions collectively adopted there (…)”.92 The
democratic credentials of the subject-to-the-law principle consist in the
type of congruence that it describes in the political relationship
between rulers and ruled: namely, that those bound by laws through the
coercive power of the state should have a say in their formulation; or in
Dahl’s similar formulation, “the moral axiom that no person ought to
be governed without his consent”.93 I will defend the principle in the
course of the following section, then suggest a possible way of
combining it with the all-affected principle in a way that avoids some
of the main difficulties I have noted with appealing directly to
affectedness as the criterion for demarcating a democratic
constituency.
91 Dahl (1989), p129.
92 Rubio-Marin (2000), p20.
93 Dahl (1997), pp. 112- 113; quoted in Goodin (2007), p49, nt. 19.
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As a preliminary point for this discussion, it seems that the
subject-to-the-law principle of democratic inclusion complements the
ideal of self-determination as non-interference. Awarding participatory
membership rights to those long-term residents who are subject to the
exercise of a state’s power leads to the kind of clear, stable and
determinate demarcation of jurisdictional boundaries according to
territorial location that sustains a right of political communities to
non-interference from outsiders. Subjection to the law as a guide to
democratic inclusion preserves the clear jurisdictional boundary
between inside and outside that non-interference calls for. Therefore
subjection-to-the-law as a mode of demarcating a demos complements
self-determination as non-interference in the same way that
affectedness as the criterion for inclusion complements
self-determination as non-domination.
I argued in the previous section that when affectedness is used as a
jurisdictional rule, it risks dissolving the stability of the democratic
rights of individuals, because the boundaries of the constituency for
each decision may change depending on who puts forward a claim to
be affected. Some cosmopolitan theorists of global democracy
welcome this radical implication of the principle. Daniele Archibugi,
for example, argues that:
(…) democratic procedures and norms need to be
tailored to the issues concerned: for example,
what are the appropriate constituencies to settle
problems involving two local communities of
separate states but located on opposite sides of
the same river, for problems involving regional
settlements, or for problems of global concern?
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Quite clearly, the forum will be different in each
of these cases.94
Likewise, Ian Shapiro observes that the all-affected principle would
require a dynamic conception of democratic participation and
legitimacy, whereby the demos would be (re)defined “decision by
decision rather than people by people”.95 The arguments of the
previous section suggest that there are good reasons - partly from the
value of self-determination - to resist this perpetual process of
re-casting jurisdictional boundaries according to the set of those who
are affected by the policy or decision at hand. A key normative point in
favour of the subject-to-the-law principle, in contrast, is that it sets out
clear, stable and determinate jurisdictional boundaries, so it is more
easily satisfied and applied than the all-affected principle.96 As
Michael Saward argues, workable democratic politics and rights rest on
secure membership in a clearly demarcated territorial unit whose
constituency is stable:
(...) if the constituency can and must change for
each decision, then the rights of ‘members’ are
not fixed, or immutable, from one decision to the
next … Membership is only secure, because the
grounds of citizenship and rightful political
participation can only be clear, in a territorial
entity.97
Importantly, deciding who is subject to a law is a matter of fact and
does not involve the kind of normative judgement that affectedness or
non-domination require when they are used to draw democratic
boundaries. The all-subjected principle seems to successfully avoid
94 Archibugi (1998), p209.
95 Shapiro (2002), p222; cited in Baubock (2005), p686.
96 Karlsonn (2006), p24.
97 Saward (2000) p38. See also Moore (2001), p298.
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both the difficulty of the burden of substantive normative judgement as
well as the ‘butterfly effect’ noted by Fraser, because we can appeal to
objective, empirical criteria to demarcate the legitimate constituency
for any given decision. Although it is no better than the all-affected
principle at providing a solution to the regress of constitutive decisions
described by the boundary problem,98it has the important advantage of
legal clarity and stability. If my criticisms in the previous section have
force, they suggest that Young in particular should have been
concerned with legal clarity in membership boundaries and stable
jurisdictions for the rule of law because of her concern with protecting
minorities from domination at the hands of more numerous and
privileged groups.
Goodin considers the merits of the all-subjected principle as a possible
response to the boundary problem that may enable democrats to bypass
some of the difficulties with appealing to affectedness as a
jurisdictional rule. He writes that the “thought might be that all and
only those persons who are (legally) obliged or (morally) obligated to
obey a body of laws ought to be entitled to membership in the demos
making those laws”.99 However, he finds the principle normatively
problematic because it seems to be over-inclusive when taken to its
logical conclusion, attributing membership to individuals like
temporary visitors:
(….) there turn out to be all sorts of people who
are legally and morally obligated to obey our
laws but who are not (and rightly not) entitled to
membership in our demos: the captain of a
foreign ship anchored in our harbor; any visitor
to our shores; or indeed any alien illegally living
among us. All are rightly bound by our laws, but
98 Karlsonn (2006), p24.
99 Goodin (2008), pp. 128.
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none is (or ought to be) entitled to a vote in
making them.100
Gustaf Arrhenius raises a similar objection when he argues that the
scope of those legally bound by the laws of a particular state is too
“unclear” for it to constitute a useful jurisdictional rule, and like
Goodin he mentions temporary visitors as an example that flags up the
indeterminacy and counter-intuitive implications of the all-subjected
principle: “I’m in a sense legally bound by the laws of South Africa
since I spend a week there every year. Does that mean that I should
have a right to take part in the South African elections?”101 The
obvious response to the objection raised by Goodin and Arrhenius
would simply be to stipulate - along with Dahl and Rubio-Marin - that
the subject-to-the-law principle does not extend to certain classes of
territorial insiders, including transients. But I think there is a more
interesting retort to be made. In practice, liberal states do award guests
and temporary visitors political rights that are considered sufficient to
protect their basic interests and human rights whilst they are
territorially present (such as rights to due process, rights to private
property, rights to police protection, and so on). Doing so seems
consistent with the logic of the subject-to-the-law principle because,
whilst they are territorially present, guests and temporary visitors are
indeed subject to most of the laws of the state. But temporary visitors
like tourists or the sea captain in Goodin’s example are not subject to
all of the laws of the state they are visiting. They are not required, for
example, to obey whatever laws may be in place concerning taxation,
100 Ibid, pp. 128-129. I will leave aside the issue raised by Goodin
concerning whether or not illegal aliens are entitled to membership on
the grounds of their subjection to the laws of the state whose
jurisdiction they reside within. For an extended discussion of the
normative issues surrounding illegal immigration, see Rubio-Marin
(2000).
101 Arrhenius, p10.
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inheritance, or military service. For that reason alone, it makes sense -
in keeping with the normative logic behind the subject-to-the-law
principle - to attribute them rights that fall short of full citizenship
whilst they are territorially present. What Goodin and Arrhenius
overlook, it seems, is that being subject to laws and being a social
member of a political community need not necessarily be considered an
all-or-nothing situation; there can be and are degrees of subjection and
degrees of social membership. Goodin and Arrhenius’ examples do not
therefore show that there is anything incoherent or normatively suspect
about the subject-to-the-law principle of demarcation.
But wouldn’t endorsing the all-subjected principle as a jurisdictional
rule mean ignoring the arbitrary inequalities generated and perpetuated
by the division of the globe into autonomous and self-determining
political entities? Wouldn’t it also mean that the potentially harmful
trans-boundary spill-over effects of the policies enacted by
self-determining communities could go unchecked? This concern is
what underlies Goodin’s further complaint that the all-subjected
principle is also open to the charge of under-inclusiveness when he
writes:
Imagine a German law that requires polluting
factories there to build chimneys tall enough to
ensure that their emissions fall to ground only in
Scandinavia: legally, that law binds only
manufacturers in Germany; but it clearly affects
Scandinavians, and is indeed designed to do so.
Giving only Germans (the only ones who are
literally “bound” by the law) a vote on the law, as
the principle here in view envisages, would be
adjudged fatally underinclusive in
consequence.102
102 Goodin (2007), p50.
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Would endorsing the subject-to-the-law principle as a mode of
demarcating political boundaries mean simply accepting the
cross-border harms generated by the self-determined activities of
political communities? Not necessarily. If it can be shown that
individuals are subject to laws enacted by transnational or
supranational political institutions, then the subject-to-the-law
principle would dictate that they have a legitimate claim to have their
voice heard and their interests taken into account by those bodies. The
all-subjected principle would, for example, strongly support the
democratisation of the European Union, since the EU is able to enact
laws that are binding for the members of signatory states.103 If other
transnational or global law-making institutions were created and
empowered to address or regulate problems of international concern
such as the environment, nuclear power or global finance, then
individuals would have a legitimate right to be included in the decision
making procedures undertaken by those institutions. This is just to say
that the subject-to-the-law principle in and of itself is silent on the
question of what kind of governing body and at what level of
governance the particular laws, to which individuals are subject, are
issued. Likewise, the subject-to-the-law principle can be agnostic about
the issues being legislated. They need not be issues that are internal to a
particular political community. So the subject-to-the-law principle is
not necessarily inhospitable to the notion of democratic politics taking
place beyond the confines of the nation-state, in order to address issues
that are transnational or global in the scope of those individuals whose
interests may be affected by them.104
However, this response leads to a further objection, which is that the
subject-to-the-law principle seems unable to account for the need to
103 Karlsonn (2006), p25.
104 As Post (2000, p7) points out, “Just as a person can be required to
obey the constraints of domestic law, so can a democratic state be
required to obey the constraints of international law”.
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hold non-governmental and non-statist organisations democratically
accountable. In the international sphere, there are organisations - for
example multinational corporations like Shell and Coca-Cola, NGOs
and global finance institutions such as the World Bank - that do not in
themselves have the authority to enact binding laws but - as I pointed
out in the final section of the previous chapter - still exercise political
and economic power in ways that can impact negatively on the rights
and interests of individuals, particularly in poorer countries, thereby
exacerbating and perpetuating global inequality and inhibiting the
equal self-determination of all political communities. Carol Gould puts
forward this criticism when she claims that the all-subjected principle
cannot address fully the need for transnational or global democratic
accountability because in this context many of the key actors who
exercise political leverage over the lives of individuals are institutions
and organisations that are not law-making and are not bound by
standards of democratic procedural legitimacy or transparency.
Outside of the context of the nation-state, Gould points out:
(…) there are no established polities, or clearly
demarcated demoi or publics for whom
democratic participation and representation are
clearly relevant. Yet, as already suggested, the
effects of decisions by the organizations of
global governance, especially the WTO, the
World Bank, and the International Monetary
Fund, are felt by those at a distance, and their
decisions profoundly affect the conditions of
existence and the life chances of many millions,
if not billions, or people around the globe.105
One way of accommodating this point could be to formulate the idea of
subjection in a broader and more expansive sense than simply
subjection to the laws of a formal governmental or institutional body.
105 Gould (2007), p33.
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Fraser makes this suggestion when she argues that the all-subjected
principle should be interpreted as referring to subjection to governance
structures understood as “encompassing relations to powers of various
types”.106 This idea of subjection goes beyond subjection to the laws of
a state or other legislative body and extends to any organisation or
agency that “generate(s) enforceable rules that structure important
swaths (sic) of social interaction”.107 We can see from this quotation
that a key difference between Fraser’s more expansive understanding
of subjection and the understanding we have been working with so far
is the substitution of ‘rules’ for ‘laws’. “Not restricted to formal
citizenship”, writes Fraser, “or even to the broader condition of falling
within the jurisdiction of a state, this notion also encompasses the
further condition of being subject to the coercive power of nonstate and
trans-state forms of governmentality”.108 As Michael Blake observes,
coercion represents “an intentional action, designed to replace the
chosen option with the choice of another … coercive proposals violate
the autonomy of those against whom they are employed; they act so as
to replace our own agency with the agency of another”.109 This
understanding of subjection covers the potentially economically
exploitative and coercive activities of NGOs, unaccountable global
financial institutions such as the WTO and the IMF, transnational
bodies governing environmental or nuclear power policy, and so on, as
well as formal law making institutions. The all-coerced principle would,
for example, support a right to participatory membership in the
American decisional structure on the part of African farmers who are
subject to the coercive power of trade laws deliberated over and
106 Fraser (2008), p412.
107 Ibid.
108 Ibid (italics added).
109 Blake (2001), p272. Blake bases his interpretation of coercion on
Raz’s (1986) three-pronged account of autonomy, as does Abizadeh
(2008).
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enacted by US Congress.110 Subjection to coercion is therefore the key
criterion of inclusion to participatory membership for Fraser, which is a
more expansive and fluid mode of demarcation than the
subject-to-the-law principle.
Arash Abizadeh advances a similar criterion of democratic inclusion
according to the scope of coercive power, arguing that rights to be
included in the decision-making procedures of a particular demos
should be awarded to all those who are subject to coercion by the state
in question.111 An implication of his argument is that a given state’s
regime of border controls should be jointly negotiated over between
existing citizens and prospective migrants in a transnational or global
deliberative forum. According to Abizadeh, the all-coerced principle
dictates that the justification of a state’s immigration controls is owed
to both insiders and outsiders because border controls subject both
groups to state coercion. In Abizadeh’s view, preventing an individual
from crossing a border amounts to an act of political coercion, no less
than, say, the imposition of taxation laws on citizens. Since the
principle of democratic legitimacy calls for governmental coercion to
be justified to those over whom it is exercised, democratic
considerations themselves call for (porous) borders under joint control
by existing citizens and foreigners.
Lastly, Linda Bosniak appeals to subjection to governmental power in
order to advocate extending participatory membership to those situated
outside a political community when she writes:
110 Seglow (2006a), p25.
111 Abizadeh (2008).
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(…) it is unclear why those noncitizens located
abroad who are subject to the exercise of a
sovereign’s power are not entitled to protection
against that sovereign ... Many states wield
power in ways that affect people outside the
territorial boundaries of their states and yet deny
obligations to them. Arguably, those so affected
should enjoy protections from its exercise
irrespective of their geographical location as
well their citizenship status.112
Although Bosniak and Abizadeh only refer to being subject to the
coercive power of a state, their arguments could easily and consistently
be extended to cover subjection to the coercive power of non-state
organisations: the exercise of coercive power must be justified to all
those over whom it is exercised. For simplicity, I will refer to the
principle advocated by Fraser, Bosniak and Abizadeh as the
‘all-coerced’ principle, and will continue to use the terms
‘all-subjected’ and ‘subject-to-the-law’ to refer to the practice of
attributing democratic rights based on subjection to formal law.
Coercion is a form of affect, as we can see from Bosniak’s
equivocation in the passage cited above, between being subject to
coercive governmental power and being affected. However, the
all-coerced principle is more limited and therefore easier to apply than
the all-affected principle as it signifies more clearly and more narrowly
the type of affective relationship which is of the kind of moral
significance required to generate a right to inclusion in democratic
deliberation. The all-coerced principle therefore seems less vulnerable
to the butterfly objection raised against the all-affected principle.
It could be argued that the all-coerced principle provides a description
of the underlying normative basis for the subject-to-the-law principle
112 Bosniak (2007), pp. 408-409.
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of demarcation. One could argue that it is by virtue of formulating and
then requiring individuals to obey laws that states subject individuals to
coercive power, and therefore individual citizens must be armed with
rights to defend their interests and have their perspective taken into
account. The subject-to-the-law principle is therefore a limited and
state-centric instance of the more general all-coerced principle.
Following this, the proponent of the all-coerced principle could claim
that their preferred mode of demarcation is to be endorsed over the
subject-to-the-law principle, as coercion pays no heed to the arbitrary
division of the globe into independent nation-states with separate
legislative institutions, and the all-coerced principle is equipped to
account for that fact, whilst the subject-to-the-law principle is not.
Moreover, they might add that, unlike the subject-to-the-law principle,
the all-coerced principle recognises the need to hold non-statist
organisations democratically accountable to those whom they subject
to coercion.
The problem with Fraser, Abizadeh and Bosniak’s proposal, in my
view, is that it seems to take us back to the problem of the burden of
substantive normative judgment that was discussed in relation to the
all-affected principle. The problem is that, as with the all-affected
principle, the all-coerced principle as a mode of demarcation seems to
require investing some unspecified actor with the authority to pass
judgement on whom is coercing whom to the degree and in the manner
required to trigger a claim to democratic inclusion. This problem is
exacerbated by the fact that - somewhat paradoxically - coercion is
both enabling of and restricting of individual freedom and autonomy.
Coercive state actions limit the range of choices available to an
individual, but at the same time, some degree of state coercion is
necessary to ensure the stable social and political conditions required
for individuals to autonomously plan and act out their lives. As Blake
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argues, “Without some sort of state coercion, the very ability to pursue
our projects and plans seems impossible. Settled rules of coercive
adjudication seem necessary for the settled expectations without which
autonomy is denied”.113 Moreover, according to Joseph Raz’s
well-known account of autonomy (which Abizadeh appeals to), the
degree to which an agent is coerced is a function partly of the degree to
which the options available to them, after the fact, are sufficient for
them to live an autonomous life.114 For the democratic theorist, both of
these points raise the issue of who decides what degree and what forms
of coercion are necessary for autonomy; and who decides what degree
and what forms of coercion infringe on autonomy?115 The all-coerced
principle as a mode of demarcation therefore seems to bring us back to
the problem of having to decide the merits of a particular issue prior to
deciding wherein lies the jurisdictional authority to ‘decide’ upon the
issue.
A different, more promising suggestion which is responsive to the
usefulness of the subject-to-the-law principle can I think be brought out
by a reading of Levy.116 In responding to Young, Levy points out that
the principle of self-determination as non-interference does not entail
that there could or should be no interaction, negotiation or deliberation
between communities and between communities and non-statist
organisations in order to address issues of mutual concern or
self-determined policies that have trans-boundary or global
implications and effects. On Levy’s reading, Young sets up a false
dichotomy between self-determination as non-domination and
inter-communal interaction on the one hand and self-determination as
non-interference and communal isolationism, chauvinism or autarky
113 Blake, (2001), p280; cited in Valentini (2009), p4, nt. 9.
114 Raz (1986), pp. 154-155, p369; cited in Abizadeh (2008), pp. 39-40.
115 Karlsonn (2008, p80) makes a similar point.
116 Levy (2008a).
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on the other. All that self-determination as non-interference and the
subject-to-the-law-principle entail is that interaction between
communities will take place after the fact of a decision having been
made by one of them, rather than before, as is the case under the
all-affected and all-coerced principles of demarcation: “outsiders can
have their interests taken into account and negotiations can take place,
after the rights have been allocated in the preferred way”.117 So if
community A decides to build a power plant close to the border of
community B, and if doing so is liable to have a negative
environmental impact on community B, the government of community
B will have to bargain, negotiate, ‘log-roll’, offer financial incentives,
etc, if they want to influence the government of community A not to
proceed. The point is that if A and B are self-determining entities with a
right to non-interference, and if the members of A and B respectively
have a stable body of democratic rights that follow from their location
of residency as the ethical territorialist and the subject-to-the-law
principle would have it, then it is clear with which community
negotiation is necessary, in any given case.
What this analysis suggests to me is that we need not regard the
all-subjected on the one hand and the all-affected and all-coerced
principles on the other as mutually exclusive when thinking through the
relationship between self-determination and political membership. The
subject-to-the-law principle and self-determination as non-interference
indicates with which political community negotiation is necessary in
cases where self-determined decisions are likely to impact negatively
on the interests of outsiders, whilst the all-coerced and all-affected
principles and the ideal of non-domination suggest possible standards
or norms to be employed in the course of those negotiations.118 The key
117 Ibid, p73.
118 Saward (2000, p38) suggests that “innovative efforts to
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advantage of this proposal is that it avoids the problem of the burden of
normative judgement that arises when we try to appeal directly to
affectedness or coercion, as the criteria of inclusion, whilst also
acknowledging that the division of the globe into separate
self-determining political communities can generate harmful
inequalities and cross-border effects, which may call for negotiation
and deliberation. The upshot of this discussion, to my mind, is that it
illustrates that whilst it may well make normative sense to appeal to
criteria like affectedness, domination or coercion in order to mark the
relationships of justice that extend beyond the borders of
self-determining political communities (and nothing I have said here
disputes this), that does not necessarily mean that those same criteria
constitute either appropriate or coherent rules for demarcating a
democratic constituency. When states negotiate, they should be bound
by norms of non-coercion and non-domination. Rather than providing a
guideline for drawing the limits of democratic accountability, on my
account these norms substantiate moral obligations on the part of states
and international institutions.
If this argument is valid, it suggests that theorists of transnational or
global democracy who appeal to criteria of inclusion, such as
affectedness or coercion, can be charged with committing something
akin to a category error. That is, they confound the grounds for deriving
transnational obligations of justice with the criteria for allocating
democratic rights. Separating the two may enable the transnational or
global impacts that can emerge from the self-determining activities of
political communities to be addressed democratically in a more
efficient and effective manner because we bypass some of the logical
institutionalize the all-affected principle ... become more attractive
once territorially-based mechanisms are conceded at the primary
level”.
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paradoxes and the risks of power misuse (or indeed abuse) that arise
when we import substantive normative assumptions to demarcate a
democratic constituency. Young begins the chapter on
‘Self-determination and Global Democracy’ in Inclusion and
Democracy by posing the question: “what is the proper scope of
obligations of justice to which political institutions ought to
correspond?”119 What the previous objection suggests is that the scope
of obligations of justice should not necessarily correspond to the scope
of democratic political institutions.120
I think that the interpretation of affectedness as a moral judgement
better captures the kind of harm being caused in cases such as the
French nuclear testing in the South Pacific, than the interpretation of
affectedness as a jurisdictional rule. If the French state had decided to
include the South Pacific Islanders in the policy debate over whether or
not to explode nuclear devices under the Mururoa Atoll, and if the
islanders had subsequently been outvoted by French citizens so that the
testing went ahead as a democratically legitimate decision, I think that
we would still want to condemn that decision on moral grounds.121 If
this is the case, then it seems that the harm being caused in the case of
the French testing is not primarily to do with the democratic exclusion
of a group of affected individuals at all, but rather the scale of the
environmental destruction, the health problems later suffered by the
islanders, and so on. This seems to support the point that affectedness is
best understood as describing a relationship of justice rather than of
democratic accountability.
119 Young (2000a), p238.
120 As such, I do not want to read as putting forward what Young
(2000a, p239) calls ‘the positivist’ account of obligations of justice,
which holds that obligations of justice follow exclusively from shared
subjection to a structure of governance.
121 Karlsonn (2006, pp. 19-20) argues that the all-affected principle
weakens the force of moral claims.
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A problem with Levy’s proposal, however, arises from the distorting
role of the initial imbalances in power, wealth and resources between
different political communities. If we consider Levy’s suggestion that
transnational interaction can and should take the form of
inter-communal negotiation, bargaining, log-rolling and so forth after
and not before the allocation of democratic decision-making rights, it
seems clear that those political communities with greater wealth,
resources and power will be far better placed to influence the
self-determined activities of politically and economically weaker
communities, should they consider themselves relevantly affected or
dominated by its decisions and policies. Conversely, political
communities without much wealth or resources will of course have far
less to offer other communities as incentives to influence their internal
decision-making should they regard their interests as relevantly
implicated. The state of Utah is clearly better placed financially to
influence the internal self-determining activities of the Goshute tribe
than the Goshute are of the state of Utah.122 It is strange that Levy does
not address this problem, given his own criticism of Young’s position
for affording too much leeway for initial imbalances of power and
resources to affect the outcome of deliberation over democratic
rights-claims. If, as Levy claims, the differences in power and
resources between communities are liable to influence the outcome of
protracted negotiation around the allocation of democratic rights,
surely those differences will be at least as influential in the course of
protracted negotiation and bargaining concerning the way in which a
particular community exercises its democratic rights? We might
reasonably suppose that those inequalities between self-determining
communities will be more determining of the outcome of negotiation in
122 See, for example, the account of the impoverished circumstances of
the Goshute in Herr (2008), p52.
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Levy’s sense, as he introduces an economic component123 that is (at
least nominally) absent from the process of deliberation over allocating
rights to democratic participation. So a condition for the normative
feasibility of Levy’s argument is that wealthy states take credible
efforts to combat global inequality.
If we take another look at Walzer - perhaps the pre-eminent ethical
territorialist and proponent of the all-subjected principle - it is clear that
he is by no means opposed to transnational interaction to address issues
of concern that cross political borders. He argues that accepting the
“moral usefulness of the (nation-) state and the solidarity it
generates”124 does not require wholesale acceptance of the “‘drastic
inequalities’ of international societies”.125 What it does mean, however,
is that “the fight against those inequalities begin within existing
political communities”,126 rather than involving the perpetual
re-structuring of boundaries demarcating participatory membership, as
Young and proponents of the all-affected principle would have it.
Aside from the fact that Walzer’s commitment to moral contextualism
would lead him to deny that obligations to combat global inequalities
should be articulated within the language of justice, the passage cited
above sounds remarkably similar to Young’s claim that “while there
may be reason to say that commitments in justice begin in … local and
particularist relationships, that does not imply that they should end
there”.127 When reciting the policies he would be prepared to endorse
for the sake of greater international equality, Walzer lists:
123 Levy (2008a) p72.
124 Walzer (1995), p249.
125 Ibid.
126 Ibid.
127 Young (2000a), p242
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(…) increased foreign aid, economic unification
and co-operation across borders; multilateral
political and, if necessary, military interventions
for humanitarian purposes, extensions of
sovereignty to stateless peoples; experiments in
regional devolution and transnational agency.128
The quotation above makes it clear that whilst Walzer accepts the
legitimacy of nation-state borders, he is by no means opposed to forms
of political engagement that extend across borders and that
compromise the nation-state as the sole site of citizen allegiance and
political and democratic activity. Again, this shows that, contra the
overall thrust of Young’s argument, advocating the subject-to-the-law
principle of democratic inclusion and self-determination as
non-interference need not necessarily entail a commitment to
isolationism or national chauvinism, nor a wholesale rejection of
international obligations, interdependencies or transnational and global
democratic activity.129 Young is incorrect therefore to argue that
self-determination as non-interference implies an “atomized” picture
of identity and individual and collective autonomy where “agents
simply mind their own business and leave each other alone”.130
Likewise, her claim that the non-interference model of
self-determination implies that “each self-determining entity has no
inherent obligations with respect to outsiders”131 is an exaggeration. As
we saw in the final section of the previous chapter when looking at the
‘purchase argument’, even nationalist theorists like Miller who
128 Walzer (1995), p249
129 Post (2000, p9) points out in a similar fashion that
self-determination as non-interference is “not necessarily inconsistent
either with a democratic state’s recognition of the rights of third-parties
or with its participation in international dispute settlement
mechanisms”.
130 Young (2000a), p258.
131 Ibid, p257.
246
strongly advocate the non-interference rights of states concede that
comparatively wealthy countries have an obligation to ensure a
minimum standard of welfare across the globe and to help lay the
foundation for the self-determination of all nations.
4.5 Conclusion
Iris Young argues that individual and collective autonomy and
self-determination should be modelled according to a republican ideal
of freedom as non-domination rather than non-interference, and she
believed that this alternative conception could accommodate the
practice and value of the self-determination of distinct groups without
entailing the illegitimate and harmful exclusions which are in her view
perpetuated by nationalist approaches to group identity and democratic
freedom. According to her understanding of self-determination as
non-domination, when the social, political or economic decisions of
political communities are liable to affect the members of other
communities, those decisions should be made in a shared democratic
forum in which all relevantly affected parties have an equal opportunity
to influence the outcome. I have advanced a number of reasons for
resisting this line of argument and for preserving the subject-to-the-law
principle of democratic inclusion and a corresponding understanding of
self-determination as non-interference. Self-determination as
non-domination and the principle of democratic inclusion according to
affected interests not only encounter logical paradoxes of authorisation,
they risk undermining the capacity of groups to achieve effective
self-determination.
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I have argued that the subject-to-the-law principle of inclusion avoids
some of the key difficulties with the the all-affected principle,
primarily because it offers a way of drawing democratic boundaries
which is empirical and procedural, and which delivers clearly
demarcated, stable and determinate jurisdictional boundaries. Contra
Young, self-determination as non-interference is compatible with
recognising the need for transnational and supra-national democratic
deliberation, accountability and negotiation, but it dictates that such
deliberation and negotiation take place after democratic rights have
been allocated according to the subject-to-the-law principle. Whilst I
have criticised those authors who recommend using affectedness or the
scope of coercive power to define the demos in any given case, I have
argued that these criteria may still be appropriate as moral guidelines
when delineating obligations of justice. An implication of my argument
is that criteria like affectedness or coercion, which may be appropriate
for defining transnational or global moral obligations, may not be
appropriate as criteria for drawing democratic boundaries.
Seyla Benhabib’s cosmopolitan/discourse theory approach to political
membership shares a number of the key features of Young’s republican
position. Like Young, she argues that a principle of affected interests
should be used to draw the boundary around the set of individuals
whose voices and interests should be taken into account by liberal
democracies when formulating their ‘internal’ policies. However, she
reserves a more important role than Young in her theory of
membership for the territorially bounded state and for the right of
political communities to set the terms for admission to membership in
those states. She agrees partially with the line of argument that I have
defended in this chapter; which is that democratic self-determination
calls for clearly demarcated territorial jurisdictions. For Benhabib, the
task of a discourse theory approach to political membership is to
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mediate the tension between the democratic rights to collective
self-determination that are owed to individuals in virtue of their
membership within bounded political communities and the
cosmopolitan rights that are owed to individuals in virtue of their
shared humanity. This may involve drawing the kind of distinction
between moral obligations and democratic rights discussed in the final
section of this chapter. Can these dual commitments be balanced in a
way that delivers a defensible position on political membership if they
are formulated within the terms of a discourse theory approach to moral
reasoning? This question is the focus for the following chapter.
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Chapter 5
Cosmopolitanism and the ‘Paradox of Democratic Legitimacy’
5.1 Introduction
In her recent work on cosmopolitanism and political membership,
Seyla Benhabib argues that there is an “inherently conflictual”1
relationship between the rights of political communities to shape their
domestic circumstances through a process of democratic
self-determination and the universal rights of individuals qua human
beings. She claims that the right of liberal democracies to determine
their membership and admissions policies on the one hand and the
universal right of individuals to have political membership on the other
generates a theoretically and politically urgent tension between
democratic and liberal-cosmopolitan understandings of rights and
political legitimacy. According to Benhabib, we can see this tension at
work quite clearly in the current status of international law concerning
migration; whilst the Universal Declaration of Human Rights
recognises a human right to exit a state, it imposes no reciprocal
obligation on any other state to receive migrants. Thus universal human
rights stand in tension with the rights of political communities to
exercise sovereign authority over a bounded territory, including the
right to regulate admission to social membership and citizenship.2
Benhabib resists the urge to reduce this dilemma to either of its
constituent parts, preferring instead a strategy of mediation. Her
approach relies in part on drawing a distinction between the “principle
of rights”, which accrues to all individuals in recognition of their
1 Benhabib (2004a) p93.
2 Benhabib (2004b), p130.
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humanity as such, and the various different “schedules of rights”,3
which are the product of democratic will-formation and subject to
legitimate variation across different political communities.
For the purposes of this chapter I will use the term ‘cosmopolitanism’
to refer to an orientation towards political morality that takes as its
subject individual human beings rather than individual citizens.
Broadly speaking, a cosmopolitan outlook invites individuals to see
themselves as citizens of the world, rather than of individual states.4 A
cosmopolitan approach to morality denies the Tamir/Walzer/Miller
view that co-nationality provides the basis for obligations of justice.
Cosmopolitan norms are said to be binding on all individuals,
regardless of their group membership.5 Institutionally, cosmopolitans
favour modes of political organisation which are consistent with their
moral universalism. This may imply forms of political membership that
either transcend or are situated above the level of nation-states, as
institutional cosmopolitanism attempts to undermine the normative
basis of membership policies that are grounded exclusively in
nationality, ethnicity or shared culture.
According to Benhabib, political membership should be encompassed
within international human rights regimes. This raises a dilemma of
how to reconcile this right to membership with the necessary and
legitimate existence of bounded, self-determining democratic
communities:
Sovereignty entails the right of a people to
control its borders as well as define the
3 Ibid.
4 Miller (2007), p25.
5 Miklos (2007), p408.
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procedures for admitting “aliens” into its
territory and society; yet in a liberal-democratic
polity, such sovereignty claims must always be
constrained by human rights, which individuals
are entitled to, not by virtue of being citizens or
members of a polity, but insofar as they are
simply human beings … Can claims to sovereign
self-determination be reconciled with the just and
fair treatment of aliens and others in our midst?6
Benhabib agrees with Young that developments in globalisation, the
rise of an international human rights regime, and increased
international migration have frayed nation-state sovereignty, resulting
in the need for new approaches to political membership that do not rest
exclusively on national ties or ethno-cultural identification: “New
modalities of membership have emerged with the result that the
boundaries of the political community, as defined by the nation-state
system, are no longer adequate to regulate membership”.7 However,
Benhabib’s moral and political cosmopolitanism still reserves an
important role for the territorial state in terms of facilitating democratic
representation and accountability. In place of national, ethnic or
cultural criteria for citizenship, Benhabib encourages a citizenship of
residency in liberal democracies that stresses the importance of the
affective bond between the individual and the local, regional and
transnational institutions which should ideally represent their interests.8
One of Benhabib’s core claims is that whilst the tension she identifies
between universal cosmopolitan rights and democratic
self-determination cannot ever be solved or overcome, its impact can be
6 Benhabib (2002), p152.
7 Benhabib (2004a), p1.
8 Benhabib (2004c), p66.
252
progressively mitigated over time.9 If - as she also claims - there are
some forms of membership control that do not necessarily contradict
universal cosmopolitan human rights, then it would seem that
democratic equality predicated on the existence of practices of closure
and exclusion can, in certain circumstances and within the context of
certain moral constraints, be compatible with liberal-cosmopolitan
equality, understood as delineating a class of rights that are owed to
individuals in virtue of their shared humanity. According to Benhabib,
there is a tension but not an outright contradiction between
cosmopolitan universalism and democratic particularism. ‘Democratic
iterations’ and ‘jurisgenerative politics’ are the two key conceptual
innovations that Benhabib employs in order to mediate these
potentially conflicting understandings of rights and legitimacy.
Having outlined the core tenets of Benhabib’s position in section 5.2, I
begin section 5.3 by discussing a problem of interpretation concerning
her position on jurisdictional rules. Whilst Benhabib agrees with
Young that the moral conversation should take into account the
interests and voices of all affected parties regardless of their geographic
location or citizenship status, she maintains that democratic rule and
representation are irreducibly territorial. Democratic closure, for
Benhabib, is unavoidable due to the logic of representation and
territorial jurisdiction. But this conceptual claim seems to run counter
to her normative conviction that decisions and norms are only morally
valid in so far as they are the outcome of deliberation amongst all
affected parties. As such, it seems that Benhabib endorses both
subjection to the law and affectedness to mark a democratic
constituency and rights to participatory membership. I suggest that a
way of rescuing Benhabib from the charge that she endorses
contradictory jurisdictional rules would be to posit a similar distinction
9 Benhabib (2002), pp. 150-151.
253
in her work to that which I introduced and defended in the previous
chapter; between a democratic community and a moral community,
with subjection to the law defining the former and affectedness being
used to demarcate the latter. Whilst this response does draw some
interpretative support from Benhabib’s work, I argue that, ultimately, it
is ambiguous whether she wants to make the democratic community
co-extensive with the community of the affected.
Following on from this interpretative conclusion, I discuss the
coherence of using affectedness as a jurisdictional rule for participatory
membership within Benhabib’s discourse theory approach to moral
reasoning and democratic deliberation. The problem of the normative
basis for judgements of affectedness that was discussed in the previous
chapter is a difficulty for Benhabib as much as it is for Young. If - as
Benhabib states - we cannot know the answer to normative questions in
advance of an inclusive dialogue amongst all affected parties, and if we
cannot decide upon the relevantly affected parties that should be
deliberating without importing normative assumptions, then it follows
that the decision concerning who gets to participate, necessarily lacks
the stamp of normative validity that discourse theory demands.
Having outlined this criticism, in section 5.4, I canvas two possible
responses to this boundary problem that could be brought out of
Benhabib’s work. The first response would be that democratic
iterations and jurisgenerative politics mark the fact that democracy
contains an internal self-correcting logic, so that no matter where or
how we start the process of deliberation and democratic rule, we are
bound to end up with the properly inclusive composition that universal
hospitality demands. This ‘teleological’ or ‘chrono-logical’ response to
the boundary problem would render the logic paradoxes of
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authorisation normatively irrelevant by positing certain features
inherent in the process of democratic self-determination itself.10
Reassuring as this response would be, Benhabib would not be
comfortable with it as it would require faith in a “Hegelian teleology of
reconciliation”11 to which she is (nominally) opposed. Nevertheless, I
use this section as an opportunity to discuss the problems with what I
think is an undeniably teleological strain in Benhabib’s thought, which
is betrayed by her repeated use of a temporal vocabulary and
evolutionary language to describe democratic iterations,
jurisgenerative politics, the spread of cosmopolitan norms and the rise
of an international human rights regimes. These objections - which I
put forward partly from the perspective of Bonnie Honig’s agonistic
democratic theory - suggest that we should be wary of investing too
much faith in democratic iterations and jurisgenerative politics to
soften what Benhabib regards as tensions between cosmopolitan
human rights claims and exclusionary moments in democratic politics.
The second possible response from Benhabib’s perspective to the
logical problem of authorisation involved with using affectedness as a
jurisdictional rule would be to emphasise hypothetical over actual
processes of inclusion and deliberation. In discussing the idea of
practicing an ‘enlarged mentality’, which is a condition of discourse
theory moral reasoning, when individuals reflect imaginatively on the
validity of norms or decisions from the standpoint of others, Benhabib
states that it is not strictly necessary that actual deliberation take place
amongst concrete individuals. It is sufficient, in Benhabib’s view, to
enact a hypothetical conversation and to place oneself in other’s shoes.
This suggests that actually including all actually affected parties in
10 The description of Benhabib’s position as ‘chrono-logical’ is in
Honig (2008).
11 Benhabib (2004a), p143.
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deliberation is unnecessary for reaching morally defensible conclusions
as to how to act. If hypothetical consent is all that is required then we
need not worry about the logical problems involved in including all
actually affected parties. However, I go on to criticise this move from
Young’s perspective on deliberative democracy, arguing that
Benhabib’s faith in the reversibility of perspectives and hypothetical
deliberation risks calcifying existing inequalities in power and status,
and excluding the perspective of marginalised individuals. If valid, this
objection suggests that hypothetical or imaginative reasoning may
result in ‘internal exclusions’, and so the process of collective
self-determination may not honour fully the normative logic behind the
subject-to-the-law principle of democratic inclusion, as some citizens
and social members may find their perspective and voice
under-represented.
These problems with Benhabib’s use of affectedness as a jurisdictional
rule lead me to consider in section 5.5 whether her position on
membership is more persuasive if we emphasise instead her
commitment to the subject-to-the-law principle and a territorially based
citizenship of residency. In supporting this move, I suggest that
proponents of de-nationalised citizenship like Benhabib should
welcome the focus on the local, territorial aspect of social membership
as the basis for attributing citizenship, as this shifts the emphasis away
from nationality and legality of status. However, there are problems too
with Benhabib’s use of the ideal of public autonomy (which is the term
she uses to describe the principle that the authors of the law should also
be its subjects). My first concern is that Benhabib attributes democratic
citizens a degree of control over naturalisation policy that seems to run
counter to the normative logic behind the all-subjected principle and
the idea of a right to political membership. Secondly, Benhabib
introduces a distinction between ascriptive and elective criteria for
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admission to citizenship which is unstable. She states that unchosen
features of individuals such as their age, race, religion, language
community or sex, are morally indefensible criteria for exclusion,
whilst elective features such as their job skills, training, qualifications,
civic competencies, and so forth, are defensible selection criteria.
These are the sorts of admissible variations in the different schedules of
rights enacted within self-determining political communities. Benhabib
thinks that it is particularly important that political communities have a
right to employ economic criteria in their admissions procedures.
However, I argue that economic criteria cannot be divorced neatly from
the ascriptive criteria that Benhabib wants to take off the table, so there
is a risk that Benhabib’s attempt to mediate the tense relationship
between universalism and democratic particularism via democratic
iterations slides into the kind of unilateral, club-based model of
self-determination as exclusion put forward by Walzer, but at the level
of citizenship rather than at the territorial border.
5.2 Cosmopolitanism and Political Membership
For Benhabib, the key aim of a discourse theory of political
membership is to show how communities may legitimately and
democratically shape their own character whilst respecting the
universal human rights of those outside the community who seek social
membership and/or citizenship. The question of the rights of migrants,
refugees and asylum seekers brings to the fore the puzzle of how to
balance respect for the will of self-governing communities with respect
for the rights of individuals. As Rousseau famously articulated, one of
the key problems for democratic theory is the fact that listening to the
will of the demos may lead to policies that are legitimate but unjust. The
difficulty, for Rousseau, is therefore how to ensure that the general will
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(the true interests that all citizens share in common) is coterminous with
the will of all (the aggregation of self-interested voting preferences).12
We can see a similar problematic at work in Benhabib’s approach to
democracy and liberal-cosmopolitanism. From a liberal-cosmopolitan
standpoint, not every decision taken or policy enacted by a democratic
community is morally legitimate, just in so far as it is democratically
sanctioned. From a democratic standpoint, the imposition of a
particular set of norms appears procedurally illegitimate if they are
imposed ‘from above’ and not subject to and therefore the outcome of
democratic debate, contestation and decision. For Benhabib, the
dilemma is this: “How can the will of democratic majorities be
reconciled with norms of cosmopolitan justice? How can legal norms
and standards, which originate outside the will of democratic
legislatures, become binding upon them?”13
Benhabib sets out to mediate the “fraught relationship”14 between
democracy and cosmopolitanism as it pertains to the issue of political
membership via the application of a discourse theory of political
morality. For Benhabib, the constraints on the collective will of
democratic communities that are dictated by a conception of ‘just
membership’ entail:
(…) recognizing the moral claim of refugees and
asylees to first admittance; a regime of porous
borders for immigrants; an injunction against
denationalization and loss of citizenship rights;
and the vindication of the right of every human
bring “to have rights”, that is, to be a legal person,
12 Rousseau (1993), cited in Benhabib (2004a), p44; Benhabib (2004b),
p132.
13 Benhabib (2004b), pp. 116-117.
14 Ibid, p117.
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entitled to certain inalienable rights, regardless of
the status of their political membership.15
Whilst Benhabib is critical of the current status of membership policy
in international law whereby territorial admissions and naturalisation
procedures are considered to be a more or less unchecked sovereign
prerogative, she resists embracing wholesale the federal solution
proposed by Young in which restrictions on movement and access to
citizenship are dissolved altogether in favour of open yet autonomous
jurisdictional units. As such, we can see her position as straddling a
divide between nationalistic defenders of state sovereignty in
admissions and membership procedures like Walzer and Miller and
those theorists like Young and Carens who encourage the removal of
restrictions on international movement altogether.16 However,
Benhabib agrees with Young that the scope of obligations of justice -
and of democratic accountability - extend beyond the confines of
bounded nation-states: “territorial boundaries and state borders are not
coterminous with those of the moral community”.17 As with Young,
Benhabib substantiates this claim by appealing to a principle of
democratic inclusion according to affectedness, and she claims that this
gives rise to the need for issue-responsive and shifting deliberative
bodies: “Discursive communities can emerge whenever and wherever
human beings can affect one another’s actions and well-being, interests
or identity”.18
15 Benhabib (2004a), p3.
16 She characterises her position as steering a “middle course between
the radical universalism of open-borders politics on the one hand and
sociologically antiquated conceptions of thick republican citizenship
on the other”, Benhabib (2002), p153.
17 Ibid, p147.
18 Ibid (emphasis added).
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In contrast to liberal nationalists, identity liberals and communitarians,
Benhabib’s conception of self-determination makes no appeal to
national homogeneity in the form of shared values, beliefs or
characteristics. She stresses instead the conflictual and potentially
antagonistic dimension of deliberative procedures amongst the existing
citizen body. Like Young, Benhabib regards cultural groups as
internally heterogenous and defined relationally. An appropriate
understanding of cultural identity, for Benhabib, “would emphasize
that cultures are formed through complex dialogues and interactions
with other cultures; that the boundaries of cultures are fluid, porous,
and contested”.19 She therefore stands opposed to membership policies
that would seek to draw firm and impermeable boundaries around
individuals or groups on identity-based or cultural criteria.
Benhabib shares with Tamir, Miller and Walzer a suspicious attitude
towards proposals of global governance or the wholesale abandonment
of jurisdictional boundaries20. However, she is more prepared than any
of those theorists to bind the will of self-governing communities
closely to universal moral standards. This is because Benhabib
approaches the question of political membership from the standpoint of
a revised version of Habermasian discourse theory. Her strategy is to
ask what norms governing membership procedures would be
reciprocally acceptable to all affected individuals under special
discursive conditions. Contra Tamir, Miller and Walzer, Benhabib
argues that there is a human right to membership that ultimately trumps
the democratic will of political communities:
(…) to insist that the right to membership - that is,
to naturalization - follows from a
discourse-ethical standpoint seems to bind the
19 Ibid, p184.
20 Benhabib (2004d).
260
will of the sovereign in accordance with a
specific concretization of rights … the “human
right of membership” is more general than the
specific citizenship legislation of this or that
country.21
Institutionally, cosmopolitanism need not necessarily imply world
government or the abolition of nation-state borders.22 Benhabib agrees
with Walzer that territorial borders demarcating political jurisdictions
are a necessary and inherent feature of democratic self-determination.
However, whilst Walzer most commonly appeals to the importance of
cultural distinctiveness and shared values to justify a right to communal
closure, Benhabib emphasises instead the role that territorial and
membership boundaries play in securing democratic legitimacy and
accountability: “the will of the democratic sovereign can extend only
over the territory that is under its jurisdiction”.23 She argues that the
logic of democratic representation calls for borders to separate different
legal jurisdictions. Democracies need boundaries otherwise it would
not be clear where the jurisdiction of different communities began and
finished: “Precisely because democracies enact laws that are binding on
those who authorise them, the scope of democratic legitimacy needs to
be circumscribed by the demos which has bounded itself as a people on
a given territory”.24 Moreover, democratic representatives must be
held accountable to a specific group of people, and this entails a
territorially bounded demos: “democratic rule, unlike imperial
dominion, is exercised in the name of some specific constituency and
binds that constituency alone”.25 This does not mean, however, that
those territorial boundaries are immutable or that they should be fixed
according to nationalist, ethnic or cultural criteria. All individuals have
21 Benhabib (2004a), pp. 140-141.
22 Miller (2007), p67.
23 Benhabib (2004a), p45.
24 Ibid, p219.
25 Benhabib (2004b), p133.
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a right to have political membership, and so those who present
themselves at the borders of other communities must have their interest
in migrating weighed fairly against the right of political communities to
determine the conditions of membership.
Benhabib’s ‘cosmopolitan federalism’ emerges in part through a
re-reading of Kant’s essay ‘On Perpetual Peace’, the third article of
which reads ‘Cosmopolitan Right shall be limited to Conditions of
Universal Hospitality’.26 According to this moral principle, each
individual is possessed of the right to present themselves before others,
to seek out and make contact with other lands and peoples and to be met
without hostility. This, naturally, imposes a reciprocal duty upon the
traveller not to conduct himself in such a way as to be hostile toward his
hosts or to exploit their hospitality. Kant makes it clear that the right to
hospitality is a right that all humans possess simply in virtue of being
human: it is not to be reduced to an act of grace or generosity on the part
of sovereign states. However it is important to note that, for Kant, the
right to hospitality does not automatically guarantee a right to
membership, only temporary resort or visitation. The stranger remains
alienated from the rights, benefits and burdens of citizenship unless and
until the sovereign decides to grant full membership status. In other
words, in Kant’s view political communities are under no moral
obligation and should be under no legal obligation to naturalise resident
aliens. Moreover, Kant considered it unobjectionable to refuse entry
altogether if doing so would not cause the prospective migrant’s
‘destruction’. It seems to me that one way of explaining this
qualification is to assume that Kant is making a similar point to the one
that was discussed in relation to Miller in Chapter 3: that is, he is
suggesting that the right to hospitality must be fulfilled by some
26 Kant (1795), p328, V111: 357 PP; Benhabib (2004a), Chapter 2;
Benhabib (2004b), pp. 119 - 126.
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community but that in and of itself that right cannot secure admission to
and hospitality within any particular community.
Benhabib takes issue with this qualified cosmopolitanism, arguing
instead that states are morally bound to make citizenship available to all
residents. What is required, in her view, is an account of moral
reasoning and discursive rationality that provides constraints on the
acceptable range of criteria that a self-determining community can
employ to control membership and admissions procedures. She asks
“which norms and normative institutional arrangements would be
considered valid by all those who would be affected if they were
participants in special moral argumentations called discourses”.27 For
Benhabib, moral discourse that issues universally valid and binding
injunctions presupposes both universal moral respect and egalitarian
reciprocity:
Universal respect means that we recognise the
rights of all beings capable of speech and action
to be participants in the moral conversation; the
principle of egalitarian reciprocity, interpreted
within the confines of discourse ethics, stipulates
that in discourses each should have the same
rights to various speech acts, to initiate new
topics, and to ask for justification of the
presuppositions of the conversations.28
Accepting the strictures of discourse ethics places significant
limitations on morally permissible practices of political membership.
When formulated under the rubric of universal respect and egalitarian
reciprocity, the human right to membership precludes from
consideration criteria that would exclude others on the grounds of
27 Benhabib (2004a), pp. 131-132.
28 Ibid, p13.
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ascriptive or non-elective characteristics such as “race, gender, religion,
ethnicity, language community or sexuality”.29 The act of excluding
someone from political membership must be justified by reasons that
are, or would be, “reciprocally acceptable”30 to all concerned; any
given citizen offering grounds for exclusion would accept those
grounds if they themselves were in the position of a migrant seeking
admission to a state. The reasons must, in other words, be capable of
generating a moral consensus. On the other hand, factors such as
“length of stay, language competence, a certain proof of civic literacy,
demonstration of material resources, or marketable skills”, as well as
certain “qualifications and competencies”31 can in Benhabib’s view be
stipulated as conditions for membership and can vary legitimately
between democratic communities.
Given the inevitable existence of differentiated democratic
communities, each individual must rely upon a concrete and particular
set of political institutions to recognise and uphold their civil and
political rights. On the other hand, these particular political institutions
are to be judged by the extent to which they recognise and uphold
universal rights that accrue to individuals just insofar as they are
members of the human race. This paradox of democratic legitimacy
calls for an attempt to mediate democratic territorial control with
pre-political universal human rights. The question of who is and who is
not a member of the political community brings to the fore the problem
of the scope of the moral conversation, or in other words, who gets to
participate and on what terms. For the discourse theorist, the paradox
of democratic legitimacy has particular bite because their universalist
commitment to allowing all to speak and be heard seems to run sharply
29 Ibid, pp. 138-139.
30 Ibid, p139.
31 Ibid.
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up against the boundaries of democratic communities. All must have
the right to speak and be heard, and yet speaking and listening take
place within territorially circumscribed communities that seem to
require the exclusion of the voices of some as a condition of including
the voices of others. Particular communities are required to enact and
protect human rights, and yet for the discourse theorist those human
rights can only be formulated legitimately through a moral
conversation that takes all individuals into account: “Since the
discourse theory of ethics articulates a universalist moral standpoint, it
cannot limit the scope of the moral conversation only to those who
reside within nationally recognized boundaries; it views the moral
conversation as potentially including all of humanity”.32 If communal
closure is a necessary feature of democratic practice, part of Benhabib’s
task is to show how her theory of discourse morality, which champions
universal inclusion, can be relevant to formulating a normative account
of membership in differentiated political communities, as opposed to
membership within the community of those entitled to speak and be
heard in the moral conversation, i.e. all of humanity. Part of the
problem for Benhabib is this:
Membership norms impact those who are not
members precisely by distinguishing insiders
from outsiders, citizens from noncitizens. This
then gives rise to a dilemma: either a discourse
theory is simply irrelevant to membership
practices in that it cannot articulate any
justifiable criteria of exclusion, or it simply
accepts existing practices of exclusion as morally
neutral historical contingencies that require no
further validation. But this would suggest that a
discourse theory of democracy is itself
chimerical insofar as democracy would seem to
require a morally justifiable closure which
discourse ethics cannot deliver.33
32 Benhabib (2004b), p118.
33 Ibid, pp. 118-119.
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Benhabib argues that whilst this tension can never be fully overcome, it
can be progressively mediated over time through the twin phenomena
of ‘democratic iterations’ and ‘jurisgenerative politics’. These concepts
are used to describe democratic political processes that mediate the
conflictual relationship between universal norms mandating the
inclusion of all, and practices of democratic self-determination: “The
relationship between cosmopolitan norms and democratic
will-formation can be conceptualized as a process of democratic
iterations, often resulting in jurisgenerative politics”.34 For Benhabib,
these processes show how this relationship can be productive of rather
than fatal to a viable discourse theory approach to political membership.
One of her key conceptual claims is that the dilemma between universal
human rights and democratic particularism can be mitigated through
re-interpreting and re-situating universal human rights principles in
concrete, democratically differentiated scenarios: “the precise
interpretations of human rights and the content of citizen’s rights must
be spelled out in light of the concrete historical traditions and practices
of a given society”.35
Democratic iterations are “complex processes of public argument,
deliberation, and learning through which universalist rights claims are
contested and contextualized, invoked and revoked, throughout legal
and political institutions as well as in the public sphere of liberal
democracies”.36 ‘Jurisgenerative politics’ are political processes
through which “the democratic people shows itself to be not only the
subject but also the author of its laws”.37 These are the concepts that
Benhabib employs to show how bounded communities can respect
34 Ibid, p118.
35 Benhabib (2004a), p123.
36 Ibid, p19.
37 Ibid, pp. 19-20.
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universal personhood and the rights of individuals to hospitality and
political membership without thereby sacrificing their right to
self-determination. Put simply, Benhabib’s response to the dilemmatic
relationship between cosmopolitan universalism and democratic
particularism is to point out that it is possible - through these processes
of iteration and jurisgenerativity - for a democratic people to choose to
respect the universal human right to membership of migrants, asylum
seekers and refugees, thereby bringing cosmopolitan norms into line
with popular sovereignty and democratic self-determination: “it is the
people themselves who, through legislation and discursive
will-formation, must adopt policies and laws consonant with the
cosmopolitan norms of universal hospitality”.38 When a self-governing
demos decides, for example, to expand the franchise by extending
voting rights to resident aliens, or to develop more inclusive procedures
for accessing citizenship, they illustrate the fact that a self-governing
body can voluntarily change its constitution and composition in line
with respect for universal personhood: “the democratic demos can
change its self-definition by altering the criteria for admission to
citizenship”.39 The alteration to the German citizenship laws in 1999,
which permitted all long-term residents the right to naturalise and
introduced birthright citizenship according to a jus soli model (i.e
automatic citizenship for all children born within the jurisdictional
boundaries of the German state), is one of Benhabib’s key examples of
an instance in which democracy served cosmopolitan ends.40 In this
case, the previous ethnic conception of membership, where the German
people were viewed by their state as “a political community of fate”,41
with citizenship being predicated on the ties of blood, shared history
and national identity, was transformed into a democratic conception,
which recognised the legitimacy of the claims of resident migrants and
38 Ibid, p177.
39 Ibid, p206.
40 Benhabib (2004b), pp. 156-157.
41 Ibid, p154.
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their offspring to have a right to citizenship. This transformation in the
German consciousness and public discourse on membership received
clear expression in the city-state of Hamburg, when it criticised the
previous ethnic conception by declaring that:
The Federal Republic of Germany has in fact
become in the last decades a country of
immigration. Those who are affected by the law
that is being attacked here are thus not strangers
but cohabitants, who only lack German
citizenship. This is especially the case for those
foreigners of the second and third generation
born in Germany.42
Benhabib acknowledges that democratic iterations do not always “yield
positive results”.43 Moreover, the validity of norms are not dependent
upon these processes; democratic iterations are not self-validating.
Ideally, what these processes do is re-situate independently valid
cosmopolitan norms in concrete political situations: “productive or
creative jurisgenerative politics results in the augmentation of the
meaning of rights claims and in the growth of the political authorship of
political actors, who make these rights their own by democratically
deploying them”.44 Through these processes of iteration and
jurisgenerativity, the boundaries between inside and outside, between
‘us’ and ‘them’, ‘foreigner’ and ‘native citizen’, are shown to be
permeable, and the supposedly natural and pre-political division of
individuals into cultural groups, and of nations into separate
self-determining states, is revealed as political, contingent, arbitrary,
and therefore permanently susceptible to democratic (re)negotiation:
“The line separating citizens and foreigners can be renegotiated by the
42 BVerfG 83, 60 II, Nr. 4, p68; cited in Benhabib (2004b), p156.
43 Benhabib (2004a), p113.
44 Benhabib (2004b), p140.
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citizens themselves”.45 In other words, self-determination can lead to
inclusion rather than exclusion:
While the demos, as the popular sovereign, must
assert control over a specific territorial domain, it
can also engage in reflexive acts of
self-constitution, whereby the boundaries of the
demos can be readjusted and democratic
sovereignty itself can be disassembled or
reaggregated.46
As I understand her, Benhabib’s point is that international migration
and the fraying of Westphalian sovereignty needn’t necessarily be
thought of as having a negative impact on democratic
self-determination and popular sovereignty. Instead, we should view
these developments as providing an occasion for their reinvigoration,
through the re-interpretation of the meaning of membership in a
particular political community.
Against Carl Schmitt and his contemporary followers like Chantal
Mouffe, Benhabib believes that “the moral equality of individuals qua
human beings and their equality as citizens are imbricated in each
other”.47 According to Benhabib, the democratic understanding of
equality which calls for the extension of the franchise to all adult
members of the political association is parasitic upon the
liberal-cosmopolitan understanding of universal equality:
The modern social contract of the nation-state
bases its legitimacy on the principle that the
45 Ibid, p155.
46 Benhabib (2007), p450.
47 Benhabib (2002), p175. For a discussion of Mouffe’s relationship to
Schmitt in this context, see Chapter 6, section 6.2 & section 6.4 of this
thesis.
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consociates of the nation are entitled to equal
treatment as rights-bearing persons precisely
because they are human beings; citizenship rights
rest on this more fundamental moral equality,
which individuals enjoy as persons.48
Contra Schmitt and Mouffe, for Benhabib the key conceptual difficulty
for liberal-democracy is not that universal human rights and democracy
necessarily belong to different historic traditions with contradictory
conceptions of equality.49 The difficulty is rather that
liberal-cosmopolitanism and democracy have different standards of
procedural legitimacy that may conflict or stand in tension with one
another: the former appealing to universal human rights, the latter
appealing to the will of a democratic legislature. However, Benhabib’s
use of democratic iterations and jurisgenerative politics is designed to
mark the fact that these different standards of legitimacy can in fact be
congruent in their political implications, thus belying the Schmittian
conviction that liberal-democracy is destined to collapse under the
weight of its own internal contradictions.50
It is clear that Benhabib’s use of democratic iterations and
jurisgenerative politics to mediate cosmopolitan universalism and
democratic particularism is ultimately reliant upon the deliberation and
decisions undertaken amongst citizens of territorially bounded political
communities. In Benhabib’s view, the demos should undertake to
expand its own moral and conversational boundaries to encompass the
interests of all affected parties. However, at the same time she
maintains that democratic rule is irreducibly territorial and bounded
due to the logic of representation and democratic jurisdiction: “The
core of democratic self-governance is the ideal of public autonomy,
48 Ibid.
49 Schmitt (1985); Mouffe (2000a).
50 Schmitt (1985).
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namely, the principle that those who are subject to the law should also
be its authors”.51 As such, I think there is an ambiguity here about
whether Benhabib thinks that the moral community and the democratic
community should be demarcated according to affectedness, or
whether territoriality and the subject-to-the-law principle should mark
the former and affectedness the latter.52 This is a distinction that I
introduced and defended in the previous chapter. I begin my discussion
in the following section by arguing that Benhabib - as with Young -
ultimately wants affectedness to demarcate both, so that the moral
community is co-extensive with the democratic community. I then go
on to raise a problem with Benhabib’s use of affectedness as a
jurisdictional rule. I argue that the normative basis for decisions about
who is relevantly affected is problematic for Benhabib because of her
commitment to deliberation to uncover normatively valid principles. In
section 5.4 I outline two possible responses from Benhabib’s
perspective to this boundary problem. The first response situates
democratic iterations within a teleological narrative according to which
democracy contains a self-correcting internal dynamic that leads to
properly inclusive membership boundaries. The second possible
response appeals to hypothetical rather than actual processes of
deliberation, iteration and the discursive validation of norms and
decisions. My critical analysis suggests that neither of these responses
is convincing, which leads me to consider in section 5.5 whether
Benhabib should abandon her commitment to affectedness as a
jurisdictional rule and emphasise instead subjection to the law as a
mode of demarcation, and the territoriality of democracy.
51 Benhabib (2004a), p217.
52 Aleinikoff (2007, p427) gestures briefly towards this ambiguity.
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5.3 Affectedness and Deliberative Exclusion
According to the principle of discourse ethics, all individuals who are
affected by a norm, policy or decision should be involved in its
validation through an inclusive dialogue. If norms, policies or decisions
have an impact that extends beyond the boundaries of a political
association, it follows that the sphere of inclusion must also extend
beyond the confines of bounded political communities.
However, as we have seen, Benhabib also claims that democracy is
irreducibly territorial because democratic law is authorised by a
specific group of people, and because representatives must be held
accountable to their constituencies: “(…) the will of the democratic
sovereign can extend only over the territory that is under its jurisdiction
… democratic rule, unlike imperial dominion, is exercised in the name
of some specific constituency and binds that constituency alone”.53
Thus, she claims that “there is no way to cut (the) Gordian knot linking
territoriality, representation and democratic voice”.54
The first point of criticism I want to raise, then, concerns Benhabib’s
position on jurisdictional rules. Her conceptual conviction that
democratic rule and representation are irreducibly territorial and
inherently bounded seems to run counter to her normative conviction
that decisions and norms are legitimate only in so far as they are the
outcome of free and unconstrained democratic deliberation amongst all
relevantly affected parties. I argued in section 4.3 of the previous
chapter that the value of social membership and citizenship in terms of
facilitating democratic self-determination could be compromised by a
commitment to extending the scope of participatory membership via
53 Benhabib (2004b), p133.
54 Benhabib (2004a), p219.
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the criterion of affectedness. As I have noted before, it seems that
taking the all-affected principle seriously would require the existence
of fluid and issue-responsive demoi that would have to be perpetually
(re)formed and dissolved as a function of the particular issues being
addressed at a given time. Benhabib accepts this when she states that
the group of individuals party to a deliberative process will change
depending on who can claim to be affected by the norm or policy under
consideration:
The moral domain of the conversation involves
all those who are affected by a norm, a law, a
practice … this discourse principle is necessarily
indeterminate in that the circle of its addresses
always needs to be adjusted according to who can
raise the claim of being affected by a norm and its
potential consequences.55
But this seems to entail that - absent the possibility of a state making no
decisions and taking no actions with trans-boundary or global
implications - a demos could not possibly be tied permanently to one
particular territorial jurisdiction under the terms of the all-affected
principle. It seems that the all-affected principle is designed precisely to
be able to account for the problematic implications of conceptualising
democracy in terms of territorially bounded jurisdictions. To
appropriate the terminology that Benhabib uses in the quotation above,
the problem to which the all-affected principle is designed to be
responsive is that the will of the democratic sovereign can and often
does extend over and beyond the territory that is under its jurisdiction.
This is why proponents of the all-affected principle are unhappy with
the practice of demarcating participatory membership according to
whom is bound to what territorial constituency. There seems to be an
ambiguity then about whether Benhabib wants to endorse subjection or
55 Benhabib (2007), pp. 451-452. See also Benhabib (2004a), p218.
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affectedness as the mode of demarcating a constituency.56 Consider the
fact that other advocates of the all-affected principle like Young
welcome the idea that democratic rule can and should be
deterritorialised: “(…) institutions of governance ought not be defined
as exclusive control over territory and what takes place within it. On the
contrary, jurisdictions can be spatially overlapping or shared, or even
lack spatial reference entirely”.57 I therefore find it hard to see how
Benhabib thinks that her commitment to the relationship between
territoriality and democracy on the one hand and her commitment to the
all-affected principle on the other are compatible. Isn’t the whole
normative point of the all-affected principle to cut the ‘Gordian knot
linking territoriality, representation and democratic voice’?
One possible way of defending Benhabib, against the charge that she
endorses potentially incompatible jurisdictional rules, would be to
suggest that she is making a similar distinction to that which I defended
in the previous chapter; between a democratic constituency and a moral
constituency, with territoriality and subjection to the law being used to
demarcate the former and affectedness demarcating the latter. This
response draws some interpretative support from Benhabib’s
discussion in her article ‘Democratic Exclusions and Democratic
Iterations’58 of whether the Iraqi people should have been party to the
debate over the American invasion given how deeply their interests
were implicated by the decision to go to war. Benhabib supports the
view that the Iraqis should have been “part of the moral as well as
policy conversation of the US, though they are not part of the
decisional structure of US institutions”.59 The distinction here would
be between an electoral constituency (comprised of all those formally
56 Baubock (2007), p403; Aleinikoff (2007), p427.
57 Young (2000a), p261.
58 Benhabib (2007).
59 Ibid, p452.
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recognised as US citizens with standing in the decisional structure
given their territorially-based membership rights) and a moral
constituency (comprised of all those affected by the decisions
undertaken by the US citizenry). In the previous chapter, we saw that
Young argues for conflating these two categories: in her view the moral
community consisting of all those affected by a decision ought to be
co-extensive with the formally enfranchised decision-making
community; in other words democratic institutions should correspond
to the scope of moral obligations of justice defined according to causal
relationships and interdependencies. I put forward a number of reasons
for resisting this line of argument and for keeping these two categories
separate. In the case of Benhabib, however, there is an ambiguity about
whether she wants to endorse a similar position to Young’s on this issue.
In the quotation just cited, is she suggesting that by bringing the Iraqis
into the moral and policy debate, they should have also been brought
into the democratic decisional structure, or is she claiming that whilst
they should remain outside of the democratic decisional structure, they
should nevertheless be part of the moral and policy debate?60 The latter
interpretation fits with my distinction, whilst the former suggests with
Young that we should attempt to bridge that distinction. Benhabib
seems committed to the first interpretation, given her claim that the
work of the discourse theorist is to reduce the “hiatus between the
discourse community of all those whose interests are affected by
legislation and the circle of formally recognized democratic citizens”.61
Similarly, she states that “Making the exercise of democratic voice
dependent upon one’s nationality status alone … flies in the face of the
60 See also Benhabib (2007, p455), where she draws a distinction
between a “‘demotic community’, i.e. all those who are formal citizens
and residents of a jurisdictional system, and other more fluid and
unstructured communities of conversation which can involve
international and transnational human rights organizations such as
Amnesty International, various UN representative and monitoring
bodies, and global activist groups such as Medecins San Frontiers”.
61 Ibid, p450.
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complex interdependence of the lives of peoples across borders and
territories”.62 This suggests that the ultimate goal of a discourse theory
of political membership is to make the democratic community
co-extensive with the moral community, comprised of all those whose
interests are affected. Therefore it would seem that affectedness, for
Benhabib as for Young, should ideally be used as a jurisdictional rule
for defining the scope of participatory membership, and not just as a
moral and policy guideline.
This criticism may not be particularly consequential. The link between
territoriality and democracy may not be a key aspect of Benhabib’s
position in comparison to her commitment to the all-affected principle.
This is suggested by the fact that she abandons that link when
discussing the importance of transnational democratic institutions like
the EU, which she cites as evidence that “democratic citizenship can
also be exercised across national boundaries and in transnational
contexts”.63 National boundaries are constituted partly by territorial
boundaries, so the fact that democratic citizenship can be exercised
across them entails that democratic rule can be deterritorialised.
My aim is not to pronounce one interpretation more authentic or
accurate than the other. Rather, I want to consider the implications of
both, in turn. In the remainder of this section and in the section that
follows, I focus on the interpretation that commits Benhabib to the
co-incidence of moral obligations and the scope of democratic
accountability, through her use of affectedness as a jurisdictional rule.
In 5.5, I discuss critically the implications of following the alternative
62 Benhabib (2004a), p215.
63 Benhabib (2002), p183.
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interpretation, which reads her as holding on to the territorial basis for
ascribing membership.
I want to focus now on Benhabib’s commitment to affectedness as a
jurisdictional rule. As I have argued in the previous chapter, using
affectedness to demarcate a constituency seems to require investing
some unspecified actor(s) or governing body with the authority to
decide upon the relevant constituency for any given case. To re-cap:
we cannot just include all those actually affected, since who is affected
by a decision depends on the outcome, and the outcome depends on
who is included, i.e. who is affected. Furthermore, unless we include
virtually everyone in virtually every decision made virtually anywhere,
deciding who is and who is not relevantly affected by a decision cannot
be an objective, empirical or neutral procedure; using affectedness as a
jurisdictional rule requires making a normative judgment on the merits
of the issue at hand. However, as with Young, this normativity is a
problem for Benhabib, though the way in which the problem plays out
is different. Whereas for Young the difficulty arises in part because of
her scepticism of claims to neutrality and impartiality in moral
reasoning and deliberative procedures and her general concern to limit
the potential for abuses of power and privilege, for Benhabib the
problem stems from her commitment to deliberation to uncover
normatively valid principles.
As we have seen, the principle of discourse ethics holds that the correct
answers to normative questions cannot be known in advance of an
inclusive discussion taken amongst all those relevantly affected. But if I
am correct to hold that deciding upon the boundary of those affected
must itself involve normative judgement on the merits of the issue at
hand, then it follows that the decision concerning who is relevantly
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affected in any given case necessarily lacks the stamp of normative
validity that the discourse theorist demands, precisely because the
decision concerning who is relevantly affected cannot logically be
mandated according to the criteria that all those affected have been
party to its articulation. It is ironic, I think, that Benhabib criticises
global egalitarians on the grounds that implementing the necessary
principles of redistribution would “have to rely on coercive
enforcement agencies whose democratic credentials are
questionable”.64 It seems that, on pain of regress, those outside actors,
who would have to be empowered to decide upon the boundary of those
relevantly affected by a given decision, cannot have credentials that are
democratically legitimate according to the terms of the all-affected
principle itself.
I now want to canvass two possible counter-arguments that Benhabib
could make in response to this boundary problem. The first is a
teleological or ‘chrono-logical’ response that appeals to features
inherent in the process of democratic self-determination itself. The
second appeals to a distinction between hypothetical and actual
processes of deliberation and the discursive validation of norms and
decisions. I will argue that neither response rescues the coherence of
using affectedness as a jurisdictional rule within the terms of
Benhabib’s position.
5.4 Two Responses to the Boundary Problem
Benhabib’s discussion of the demos-expanding potential of democratic
iterations and jurisgenerative politics can, I think, be understood as a
64 Benhabib (2004a), p113.
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possible way of avoiding the boundary problem described in the
previous section. If there are deliberative mechanisms in place within
democratic procedures that generate an inevitable (and moreover
morally correct) extension of the franchise, then it may not matter how
and according to what sorts of criteria the demos is initially constituted.
Benhabib’s faith in relying on the will of the demos to soften the
dilemma between cosmopolitan universalism and democratic
particularism seems to fit roughly with Goodin’s speculations on the
implications of there being “some internal dynamic within democratic
decision-making processes that naturally leads the demos to be changed
over time in such a way as to include all those and only those who ought
to be included”.65 If we had sufficient reason to invest faith in the
presence of such an internal dynamic, Goodin claims, we simply would
not need to worry about the source of the legitimacy of border and
membership controls or chicken-and-egg boundary problems, because:
(…) thanks to those internal dynamics of
democratic decision making, you always end up
settling on precisely the right composition of the
demos. Were all that true, we need not worry
about how the demos is initially constituted. We
could constitute that initial demos on any basis
whatsoever, and set democratic process
underway to refine it (…).66
It may be reassuring for those democratic theorists who are animated by
the boundary problem to suppose that democracy does contain this kind
of self-correcting internal dynamic, as it would mean that the logical
paradoxes of authorisation involved in drawing the boundaries of a
democratic regime (whether it be according to affectedness, or some
other criterion) are normatively irrelevant. The thought would be that,
eventually, the gap, between those with a right to participate in the
65 Goodin (2008), p131.
66 Ibid.
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making of political decisions and those receiving the consequences of
those decisions, will be bridged, as cosmopolitan norms of hospitality
and human rights take root more and more firmly in the overall ethos of
liberal-democratic citizens. However, Benhabib claims that her
position does not entail any “Hegelian teleology of reconciliation”,67
by which she presumably means just such an appeal to an inevitable
movement in democracy towards a universal end-state of inclusion. As
we have seen, Benhabib cautions against seeing democratic iterations
and jurisgenerative politics as self-validating. Democratic iterations
don’t always result in the morally and democratically correct outcome
and Benhabib does not want to abandon the moral vantage point outside
of procedures of democratic will-formation that enables the discourse
theorist to point out when and how they have gone wrong.
But this fallibilism sits awkwardly in the context of her repeated use of
a temporal and evolutionary vocabulary. Time and again, Benhabib
uses a temporal register and invokes evolutionary language to describe
the emergence of cosmopolitan norms and universal human rights
principles, the disaggregation of citizenship rights, and the fraying of
Westphalian sovereignty. Consider, for example, her description of the
trial of Adolf Eichmann in Jerusalem as standing at “the beginning of
the evolution of cosmopolitan norms, the full implications of which
have only become clear in our time”,68 and her faith that this new “era
of cosmopolitan norms”69 marks the “end of the unitary model of
citizenship”,70 so that nationalism represents a “vanishing ideology”.71
The use of this language seems to suggest not only that we (‘we’ being
the citizens of liberal-democratic societies) can but that we are in fact
67 Benhabib (2004a), p143.
68 Benhabib (2004b), pp. 119-120; p115.
69 Ibid, p138.
70 Ibid.
71 Ibid, p155.
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moving progressively towards an end-state where all individuals will
be included or excluded according to criteria that are congruent with
universal laws of cosmopolitan hospitality.72
Further evidence of Benhabib’s teleological position on the
development of democratic rights claims can be found in her discussion
of the French headscarves affair. Benhabib applauds the manner in
which the schoolgirls from Criel were able to “talk back to the state”73,
and she suggests that it is likely that one day the girls will embrace
democratic-cosmopolitan citizenship more thoroughly by learning to
‘talk back to Islam’, i.e. by contesting the meaning of traditional
Islamic practices.74 In this way, Benhabib seems to position their
actions within a temporal maturation narrative. According to Honig,
Benhabib evaluates the schoolgirls’ actions from the perspective of
“the backward-looking gaze of a (still) future cosmopolitanism perched
on a normative, linear temporality”.75 Consider again the following
statement, this time in its entirety:
The political philosopher as discourse ethicist is
committed to further the democratic dialogue
such that the hiatus between the discourse
community of all those whose interests are
affected by legislation and the circle of formally
recognised democratic citizens, while it can
never be eliminated, can nonetheless be reduced
through processes of ever more widening public
representation and participation.76
72 Johnston (2007, p18) gestures towards this teleological element of
Benhabib’s position.
73 Benhabib (2006), p67; Benhabib (2004a), p157.
74 Ibid.
75 Honig (2008), p94.
76 Benhabib (2007), p450.
281
This statement provides evidence of the way in which Benhabib
situates what she regards as the constitutive tension between
liberal-cosmopolitan rights and democratic self-determination within a
temporal, evolutionary narrative, whereby she anticipates, and judges
the present from the perspective of, a posited future in which that
tension is overcome. Universal cosmopolitan rights lie ahead and
particularity in the form of Westphalian sovereignty lies in the past.77
How convincing is this teleological or chrono-logical way of
conceptualising the trajectory of democratic inclusion, as a way of
avoiding the logical paradox of demarcation discussed above?
The key problem with positioning democratic rights claims within this
sort of chrono-logical or evolutionary narrative is that this positioning
overlooks the contingent, non-linear and precarious way in which
democratic rights are won, lost, won again in different forms and
contexts or not at all, and so forth. It seems misguided, for example, to
regard, as Benhabib does, contemporary forms of alien suffrage as the
latest development in an evolutionary trajectory of rights expansion,
given the fact that voting rights for resident aliens was widely practiced
and endorsed in pre-First World War America, only to be revoked in
the face of post-war xenophobia.78 Moreover, the EU cannot simply be
seen as ushering in a new era of cosmopolitan hospitality divorced from
national particularism and exclusion/hostility. As I noted above,
Benhabib endorses the way in which the German citizenship laws were
revised in 2000 to introduce birthright citizenship according to a jus soli
model, thereby marking a distinct break with the previous ethnic
conception of citizenship transmission by jus sanguinis. However,
elsewhere in Europe this process has been reversed. The citizens of the
Irish Republic, for example, recently voted to abolish citizenship by
77 Honig (2008), pp. 94-95; Johnston (2007), p18.
78 Honig (2008), p95.
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birth in the territory, in an effort to combat what was seen as ‘birth
tourism’ (i.e. pregnant women entering the territorial jurisdiction of the
state in order to secure citizenship and its attendant benefits for their
expected offspring).79 So we cannot know that cosmopolitan rights and
universal hospitality will win out over democratic particularity and
exclusion in the cut and thrust of actual political life.
Honig takes issue with the chrono-logical element of Benhabib’s
philosophical system; her presupposition of “a certain linear and
progressive temporality”80 which “reassures us that continued
developments along the trajectory of rights will take us to a desirable
democratic outcome”.81 This is one instance of the broader agonistic
critique of rationalism, which I will discuss in more detail in the
following chapter. From Honig’s perspective, the danger of embedding
democratic iterations within a chrono-logical narrative is that the
exclusions which inevitably accompany those iterations may become
insulated from further contest. We risk becoming blind to those
“remainders” which “will always result from every political-legal
settlement, no matter how progressive or expansive”.82 Honig takes
particular exception to the way in which Benhabib champions the EU
as a welcome sign of cosmopolitan-moral progress in the form of the
disaggregation of citizenship rights and the concomitant waning of the
79 Baubock (2006). Other examples of previously inclusive
immigration policies being reversed include the introduction in 1996 of
the US-American Welfare Reform, which denied legal resident aliens
access to means-tested welfare programs, and the introduction in
Australia of lengthy waiting periods before immigrants are eligible for
welfare benefits. In the last decade, Austria, Italy and Denmark have all
voted into power governments whose agenda emphasises the restriction
of immigration as well as the rights of resident aliens. These examples
are cited in Baubock (2002), p5, nt. 4.
80 Honig (2006), p111.
81 Ibid.
82 Honig (2006), p111.
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era of unchecked nation-state sovereignty - as precisely just such a sign
of “ever more widening public representation and participation”. The
disaggregation of citizenship rights, for Benhabib, describes
“institutional developments that unbundle the three constitutive
dimensions of citizenship, namely, collective identity, the privileges of
political membership and the entitlements of social rights and
benefits”.83 In Honig’s view, by focusing on developments that seem to
be congruent with laws of universal hospitality (as Benhabib
characterises them) like “Europe’s newly porous borders, … new
recognition of extracitizen human rights and alien (but still
membership-based) suffrage, and … extrastate fora to which
state-based injustices can be appealed”,84 Benhabib overlooks or
underestimates the way in which these developments themselves not
only harbour new and pernicious forms of exclusion and domination,
but also work to reinforce alternative forms of national sovereignty. For
example, whilst it is true that the borders of many European nations
have in recent years become more porous, freedom of movement is still
ultimately dependent on membership in a signatory state. Moreover,
national membership is a necessary requirement for being able to vote
in European elections and to participate in the ratification of the EU
Constitution Treaty85. Therefore, paradoxically, being a member of
Europe not only enables an individual to transcend the significance of
their nationality for the purposes of migration and participatory
membership, it also reinforces the political salience of their nationality.
This vindicates Honig’s point that the EU both attenuates nation-state
sovereignty whilst also shoring it up in alternative forms; it illustrates
her point that the EU “is a vehicle whereby national belonging is
transcended, but also a way to rescue national belonging …”.86
83 Benhabib (2004b), p136.
84 Honig (2006), p108.
85 Urbinati (2005).
86 Honig (2006), p114. Urbinati (2005) makes a similar point.
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The rhetoric adopted by EU policy makers confirms the point that
Union citizenship is a derivation of, and not a substitution for, national
citizenship in signatory states. For example, the 1997 Amsterdam
Treaty states that “citizenship of the Union shall complement and not
replace national citizenship”87 and that “the Union shall respect the
national identities of its member states”.88 Therefore Benhabib’s
optimistic claim that “nationalism” is a “vanishing ideology”89 and that
the EU represents a “decoupling of national and cultural origin from the
privileges of political membership”90 seems misleading. The
significance of national belonging in the context of the EU is also
bolstered by the increasingly exclusionary treatment of the
undocumented; the greater hospitality shown towards citizens of EU
member states has been accompanied by greater hostility towards
asylum seekers and refugees. For Honig, this provides an apt empirical
illustration of the Derridean thesis that unconditional hospitality always
contains a trace of conditional hospitality which - being conditional -
necessarily involves an element of hostility and exclusion: “The new
porousness of territorial borders among EU countries has been
accompanied in recent years by the erection of new, not at all porous
borders inside the EU. The hosts are not only welcoming; they are also
hostile”.91
We can see a similar double-movement of inclusion/exclusion at work
in decisions to ‘disaggregate’ citizenship by awarding rights to
long-term residents. Whilst it may in one sense be progressive and in
87 The Treaty of Amsterdam (1997), p25 (italics added); cited in
Baubock (2006).
88 The Treaty of Amsterdam (1997), p6; cited in Baubock (2006).
89 Benhabib (2004a) p207.
90 Ibid, p155.
91 Honig (2006), p108; Derrida (2000).
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keeping with norms of cosmopolitan hospitality to award rights and
social benefits to resident aliens, at the same time this can also be read
as a tool for perpetuating their exclusion from full and equal
citizenship.92 If resident immigrants are awarded rights independently
of citizenship status then they are less likely to demand full
incorporation into the polity. Benhabib applauds disaggregation but
does not note the way in which it can simultaneously reduce and shore
up the political salience and exclusive dimension of nationalism. In
Honig’s view, the key advantage of an agonistic over a discourse theory
conception of democracy is that the former is more likely to engender
critical attentiveness towards forms of exclusion and domination which
might otherwise go unnoticed: “If we expect hospitality always to
harbor a trace of its double - hostility - then proponents of hospitality
will always be on the lookout for that trace and its remainders”.93
Conversely, faith in the teleological or chrono-logical expansion of
rights generates a certain myopia; political developments are liable to
be seen as progressively inclusive, regardless of whether they harbor
alternative forms of exclusion. To my mind, the fact that Benhabib does
not see the double-movement of inclusion/exclusion perpetuated by the
disaggregation of citizenship rights, regarding it only as a tool of
inclusion and de-nationalisation, provides a neat illustration of this
point.
The upshot of the previous discussion is that democracy cannot be
relied upon to solve boundary problems for itself. An alternative way
that Benhabib could respond to the difficulty of employing affectedness
to mark the boundaries of the demos would be to emphasise the
importance and feasibility of hypothetical over actual processes of
92 Kymlicka (2001a), pp. 138-139.
93 Benhabib (2006), p111.
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discursive validation.94 The logical paradoxes involved in deploying
affectedness as a jurisdictional rule seem to arise because of the
assumption that the all-affected principle is being used to define the
group of actual individuals who have a right to take part in actual
deliberation. The idea is that real people who are relevantly affected
should be communicating with each other in a real deliberative forum.
But if it were possible for an individual to enact or imagine
hypothetically the conversation that would take place amongst all
relevantly affected parties, and without distorting the interests or voices
of those other parties through importing their own personal preferences,
prejudices, preconceptions, and the like, then it would seem that the
logical paradoxes of demarcation would be avoided. There would be no
need to worry about who gets to decide who is relevantly affected if an
individual was in principle possessed of both the ability to reason from
the standpoint of all relevantly affected parties as well as the capacity to
enact a hypothetical conversation amongst those parties characterised
by universal moral respect and egalitarian reciprocity, thereby leading
to a just and legitimate conclusion as to how to act democratically.
Given the huge numbers of individuals across the globe who may
potentially be affected by a given norm, policy or decision, it may be
that the very coherence of the all-affected principle as a moral and
policy guideline in fact relies crucially upon the ability of individuals to
reason and deliberate imaginatively in this way. Since bringing
all-affected parties together to deliberate face-to-face may often be
impossible, hypothetical deliberation is a necessary second-best
alternative.95
94 A similar distinction is discussed in Abizadeh (2008), p41. He points
out that whilst liberals argue that coercive state acts be justifiable,
democrats argue that they should be justified. Liberals are concerned
with the content of the justification, whilst democrats are concerned
with the process of justification.
95 For a defense of hypothetical deliberation, see Goodin (2008),
Chapter 3.
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This response to the problem of affectedness fits neatly with
Benhabib’s discussion of practicing an ‘enlarged mentality’, i.e. a
capacity to reason from the standpoint of all relevantly affected parties.
Benhabib states that it is not strictly necessary for reaching morally
defensible conclusions that we engage in debate with an actually
existing interlocutor:
I want to suggest that we must think of …
enlarged thought as a condition of actual or
simulated dialogue. To 'think from the standpoint
of everyone else' is to know 'how to listen' to
what the other is saying, or when the voices of
others are absent, to imagine oneself in
conversation with the other as my dialogue
partner.96
It is interesting to note in connection with this point that two of
Benhabib’s key examples of democratic iterations leading to
jurisgenerative politics - the recent expansion of the franchise in
Germany to include all children born within the territory, regardless of
the citizenship status of their parents, and the way in which during the
French ‘headscarves affair’ the Muslim schoolgirls were able to
re-appropriate the symbolic importance of the veil and to thereby “talk
back to the state”97 - are processes of democratic iteration that took
place between existing members of the polity. The voices of those
lacking official citizenship status are notably absent from Benhabib’s
examples, and it is significant in the present context that she does not
seem to consider it important to reflect on ways of including
non-citizens in debates over membership rights or - for example - the
meaning of religious symbols in the public sphere. In the following
chapter, I will discuss the way in which Bonnie Honig encourages the
disenfranchised - those individuals who are “so far outside the circle of
96 Benhabib (1992), p137 (italics added).
97 Benhabib (2004a), p210.
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who ‘counts’ that they cannot make claims within the existing frames
of claim making”98 - to “take rights on (their) own behalf”, in contrast
to the state-centric and ‘top-down’ model of franchise expansion that
provides the framework for Benhabib’s thoughts on membership,
where the migrant is always positioned as - in Honig’s words - “an
object of charity or hospitality”.99
Benhabib’s hope is that democratic citizens will engage in iterative
deliberations that will result in their state extending the privileges of
citizenship to resident aliens, as well as affected outsiders. But, for
Benhabib, the process of deliberation over such policies is always
ultimately a conversation amongst those already enfranchised. To
return to a quotation cited above, notice that although the status of
foreigners and resident aliens is what is at issue, Benhabib’s faith is that
“The line separating citizens and foreigners can be renegotiated by the
citizens themselves”.100 On these grounds, Nadia Urbinati criticises
Benhabib for failing to explain how “migrants can be the protagonists
of democratic negotiations on an issue (immigration) in relation to
which they have no voice, either as individuals or as members of a
recognized community”.101 Similarly, Megan Kime is unsatisfied with
Benhabib’s focus on democratic iterations that take place amongst
individuals who are already located within the territorial boundaries of
a democratic community and already armed with the rights that are
necessary to have their voice heard and their interests represented. This
internal focus, according to Kime, belies the discourse theorists’
commitment to the universal scope of the moral conversation, by
leaving the voices of those located abroad unrepresented:
98 Honig (2001a), p101.
99 Ibid, p61.
100 Benhabib (2004b), p155 (italics added).
101 Urbinati (2005).
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(…)(Benhabib) pays almost no attention to …
the case of individuals who have not crossed
borders and are therefore completely excluded
from wealthy bounded communities. Benhabib
has high hopes for the possibility of resident
aliens being able to transform their own status
using the democratic process, but it is hard to see
how this can help those many more who are
excluded from affluent bounded societies not
only by law but also by geographical distance.102
However, in my view Urbinati and Kime’s criticisms, as they stand, are
misplaced. Benhabib’s silence on including the voices of foreigners
and non-citizens is not so much an oversight on her part but rather a
structural implication of her faith in the reversibility of perspectives
and the capacity for individuals to practice an enlarged mentality. As
we have seen, these normative guidelines make listening to and
deliberating with actual concrete individuals sufficient but not
necessary for discourse theory moral reasoning.
The kind of objection I want to make now can be brought out through
the work of Iris Young.103 Young agrees with Benhabib that a virtue of
citizenship practice is the ability to transcend private, “self-regarding”
political interests and to adopt a “broader, more objective view”.104
However, she disagrees with the idea that seeking out this more
objective viewpoint should involve role-reversing or mutual
identification. According to Young, the assumption that we can
represent the situation and perspectives of others within our own
framework of intelligibility often fails to do adequate justice to the
102 Kime (2008), p226.
103 Hutchings (2005) also looks to Young in order to criticise Benhabib,
though in the context of a different kind of debate and for different
purposes to mine.
104 Young (1996), pp. 126-127; Simpson (2000), p432.
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fundamental alterity of others. This is a consequence of her views on
group-specific experiences and perspectives. As we saw in the previous
chapter, Young maintained that different individuals are structurally
placed in different roles and positions in society, and that this
positioning results in location-specific perspectives on socio-political
issues:
(…) even when they find their relations defined
by similarly socially structured differences of
gender, race, class, nation, or religion,
individuals usually also find many ways that they
are strange to one another. Individuals bring
different life histories, emotional habits and life
plans to a relationship, which makes their
positions irreversible.105
This ontological claim regarding the impossibility of practicing an
enlarged mentality feeds into a normative claim regarding its
undesirability. Young argued that purportedly neutral discursive
procedures often serve to reinforce the dominance of the perspective
and interests of more privileged social groups. Where there is a
pre-existing asymmetrical power-relation, inviting discursive
participants to think from the standpoint of others threatens to result in
the imposition and dominance of the perspective of the powerful and
the privileged:
When members of privileged groups
imaginatively try to represent to themselves the
perspective of members of oppressed groups, too
often those representations carry projections and
fantasies through which the privileged reinforce
a complementary image of themselves.106
105 Young (1997a), p347.
106 Young (1997b), p48.
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Since we cannot ever fully transcend our location-specific perspective
and think from the standpoint of all others, when we attempt to do so
we risk imposing illegitimately our own perspective and interests onto
others. If we approach moral reasoning on the basis of the assumption
that others are sufficiently similar to enable us to see the world from
their point of view, we risk silencing their voices and assimilating them
to the image we have of ourselves and of our political or moral world.
According to Young, this threat of assimilation becomes particularly
acute and dangerous when we are dealing with the case of relatively
powerless and vulnerable groups like newly arrived migrants, asylum
seekers and refugees. When we attempt to do justice to the interests of
the socially marginalised or disempowered through practicing an
enlarged mentality, the concern is that we will simply reproduce
existing inequalities and power-relations. Moreover, when individuals
and groups are engaged in minoritarian struggles, attempting to reverse
perspectives with them could lead to an outright denial or suppression
of their particular problems or interests: “if you think you already know
how the other people feel and judge because you have imaginatively
represented their perspective to yourself, then you may not listen to
their expression of their perspective very openly”.107 To assume that all
different social locations can be read from one particular position is to
assimilate difference to sameness and to do violence to the importance
of attending to the actual voices of those who are differently placed in
society.
If this objection is valid, it turns out that insisting upon the practice of
enlarged mentality as the sine qua non of the practice of citizenship in
liberal democracies risks creating illegitimate exclusions and entails an
unappealing vision of democratic deliberation108. Iris Young refers to
107 Young (1997a), p350.
108 Benhabib (2002), p171.
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this as ‘internal exclusion’, a term which “refers to the way that some
people’s ideas and social perspectives are likely to dominate discussion
and decision making even when a forum has diversity in the room”.109
This means that the internal process of self-determination may not be
equally open to the input of all territorial insiders in the way that is
called for by the subject-to-the-law principle of inclusion to which, as
we have seen, Benhabib is also committed.
Given the difficulties I have discussed with using affectedness as a
principle of democratic inclusion and the inadequacy of both the
teleological and the hypothetical-deliberation responses, in the
following section I consider whether we should abandon that horn of
Benhabib’s position and emphasise instead her commitment to the
territorial basis of democratic inclusion. However, here too we
encounter a number of difficulties. Firstly, Benhabib allows political
communities a degree of unilateral discretion over naturalisation
criteria that seems to stand in tension with the principle of public
autonomy. Secondly, I argue that her policy recommendations on
naturalisation fail to meet her own strictures of universal respect and
egalitarian reciprocity, partly because they apply different membership
procedures to immigrants and birthright citizens. Furthermore, there is
a risk - acknowledged in part by Benhabib - that her position could turn
into an apology for national chauvinism. Finally, I argue that her
distinction between ascriptive and elective criteria for membership is
unstable, and that this instability threatens to collapse her position into
a normatively problematic version of the club-based model of
self-determination as exclusion put forward by Walzer, but at the level
of citizenship rather than social membership.
109 Fung (2004), p49.
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5.5 Benhabib on Naturalisation
Benhabib’s discussion of subjection to the law as a jurisdictional rule is
designed to promote a citizenship of residency over citizenship as
ethno-cultural identification or shared nationality. Her hope is that by
stressing the importance of shared subjection to the law for generating
an entitlement to democratic voice, resident aliens and the
undocumented will be brought within the circle of the addressees of
rights claims, by being offered the opportunity to naturalise. One
advantage of stressing the importance of the territoriality of democracy
is that it offers a non-nationalist conception of membership rights that
takes the emphasis away from the relevance of status for the attribution
of rights and towards the affective ties that are generated by living in a
certain place, participating in its institutions and contributing to its
shared life. This is one way in which legality of status may come to be
seen as irrelevant for structuring attributions of rights and social
benefits. As Aleinikoff points out, “If citizenship is conceived of as a
lived, local practice rather than a formal national category, then the
legality of one’s immigration status may matter little in recognizing
societal membership”.110
However, despite her claim that there is a universal human right to
membership, and despite her criticisms of Kant and Arendt for their
willingness to concede sovereign authority over determining the
conditions of hospitality and statehood to independent nations,
Benhabib herself remains rooted in the democratic tradition of thought,
whereby the terms of access to citizenship fall under the remit of a
political community’s right to self-determination. Unlike Young, who
110 Aleinikoff (2006), pp. 6-7.
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wants to transfer the authority to regulate migration and citizenship
policy away from states and ‘upwards’, to global regulatory bodies,
Benhabib regards the will of the demos as the final and necessary
arbiter in the domain of membership policy. Her hope is that political
communities will be guided by the cosmopolitan norms that are derived
from her version of discourse theory, so that their democratic iterations
will lead to jurisgenerative politics, whereby their self-determined
choices will create a gradual expansion of the franchise. She claims to
have proceeded beyond the Kantian position on naturalisation in the
direction of a more thoroughgoing cosmopolitanism by arguing that, on
her account, “the sovereign discretion of the democratic community is
circumscribed: once admission occurs, the path to membership ought
not to be blocked”.111 But, at the same time, “the terms and conditions
under which long-term membership can be granted remain the
prerogative of the republican sovereign”.112 Presumably then, the real
difference between Benhabib and Kant is that the former insists that
there must be some procedure for naturalisation, whereas in Kant’s
formulation a resident alien could be denied membership in
perpetuity.113
Benhabib resists embracing the full implications of a territorial
conception of membership. The ideal of ‘public autonomy’ (which is
the term that Benhabib uses to describe the principle that the subjects of
the law should be their authors) seems to stand in tension with her
commitment to allowing the citizenry of a community to determine
unilaterally the conditions and criteria to be satisfied by prospective
migrants in order to access citizenship. By permitting the demos to set
unilaterally the conditions to be satisfied in order to naturalise,
111 Benhabib (2004a), p140.
112 Ibid, p42.
113 Ibid, p141.
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Benhabib allows for a class of residents to be subject to the law and yet
still be denied authorship of those laws, should they be unable or
unwilling to satisfy those conditions114. By contrast, a consistent and
thoroughgoing commitment to the all-subjected principle would permit
resident immigrants to have a say in the formulation of citizenship
policy. As Corey Robin observes, “(…) if those who are subject to the
law should be its authors, why shouldn’t immigrants have a say in
formulating those laws? Surely no one is more subject to those laws
than they”.115 Members of the republican sovereign are not the ones
who are subjected to immigration laws: which means that giving
citizens unilateral control seems to contradict the subject-to-the-law
principle, even if that control is framed within certain moral constraints
like ‘no ascriptive or non-elective criteria’.
This point would not be particularly consequential if the conditions set
by the host community were minimal and largely procedural - for
example, if only a certain period of residency was required. That would
entail that the hiatus between those subject to the law and those with
rights to participate in the authorship of those laws would last only as
long as it took for the resident in question to pass the time qualification.
However, the more substantive the requirements for passing
naturalisation procedures, the more significant this objection becomes.
What I now want to argue is that Benhabib awards political
communities more leeway in formulating criteria for naturalisation
than seems congruent with the strictures of universal respect and
egalitarian reciprocity to which her version of discourse theory is
committed.
114 Baubock (2007), p7.
115 Robin (2006).
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What is particularly problematic in my view is Benhabib’s claim that
setting economic criteria for membership and criteria based on the
skills and qualifications of migrants is unobjectionable from a moral
point of view informed by discourse theory. It seems untenable that a
prospective migrant would concede to their exclusion from citizenship
on the grounds of their professional qualifications anymore than they
would concede to their exclusion on the grounds of their ethnic
background or skin colour, because these sorts of criteria as conditions
for accessing membership could reasonably be interpreted as
dehumanising. As Aleinikoff questions, “Is it really true that denying
one a place in the conversation on these grounds (i.e. skills, language
and the like) is any less dehumanizing than denying a place on
ascriptive grounds?”116 Seglow agrees that using purely economic
criteria to evaluate the claims of outsiders to have political membership
betrays a lack of respect for their personhood: “The message sent to
guest-workers is that they are merely economically useful and no more
… Guest workers may not wish to become citizens, but to prohibit them
from becoming so seems to me a signifiant failure of respect”.117
In a reply written to prominent critics of The Rights of Others,
Benhabib rehearses this objection and in responding to it she re-iterates
the claim that economic exclusions and exclusions based on a lack of
skills or resources are justified from her perspective because these are
factors that are chosen, and so are not arbitrary from a moral point of
view.118 However, this response seems to deny a key, further point,
which is that the exclusion of individuals from citizenship on the basis
of economic or professional criteria represents a failure to treat that
116 Aleinikoff (2007), p427.
117 Seglow (2008), p26.
118 Benhabib (2007), pp. 452-453.
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individual as the moral equal of native citizens. As I argued in Chapter
2, it seems that no criteria for naturalisation can be consistent with
showing all individuals equal moral respect in so far as those same
criteria are not applied to members of the host community.119
According to Benhabib’s version of discourse ethics, “freedom can be
restricted only through reciprocal and generally justifiable norms
applying equally to all”.120 Yet nowhere does Benhabib suggest that
existing citizens should should have to prove themselves qualified for
membership through their possession of skills, resources or civic
competence, or that their freedom (to exercise citizenship rights)
should be granted or restricted on such grounds. If, as Benhabib claims,
“the obverse side of the injunction against denaturalization”121 is a right
to citizenship, why is she content to accept that this right is
unconditional for birthright citizens but conditional for migrants? It
seems that Benhabib’s policy recommendations on naturalisation may
not satisfy her own stringent moral guidelines.
Moreover, this view on naturalisation risks becoming fuel for the kind
of national chauvinism according to which immigration policy should
primarily be seen as a way of furthering the interests and values of the
nation; which is precisely one of the cornerstones of the Westphalian
conception of international politics that Benhabib wants to dismantle
by situating political membership within the terms of universal human
rights. We have to note that Benhabib is discussing admission to
citizenship here, rather than admission to territory. At points, Benhabib
suggests that whilst the territorial borders demarcating different
jurisdictional units should be open in a physical sense - (“While
democratic self-governance involves the demarcation of jurisdiction, it
119 This is a central argument running throughout Cole (2000). See
Chapter 2, section 2.6 of this thesis.
120 Benhabib (2004a), p133 (italics added).
121 Ibid, p135.
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ought not to prohibit the flow of peoples across borders in both
directions”122) - acquiring citizenship can be predicated legitimately on
the possession of certain skills or qualifications to be set by the host
community. But we have seen in the discussion of Walzer than the
combination of ‘open borders-but-exclusive-citizenship’ can become a
shield for the social and political exclusion and economic exploitation
of guest workers. A possible implication of Benhabib’s position is to
reinforce the kind of immigration policy adopted in Germany in the
1960s and 70s, where foreign labourers were invited to perform menial,
dangerous or unpleasant work for little pay, and were denied the
political voice to defend their interests (for example a right to family
re-unification), or to press for better wages, better working conditions
or a better job. It also seems congruent with the current UK approach to
immigration that seeks to attract skilled foreign workers to meet gaps or
pressures in the domestic labour market whilst excluding the poor and
unskilled.123 Benhabib acknowledges the point that her position could
“merely leave an extremely unjust and inegalitarian world pretty much
as it is”,124 but does not provide any response to it.
Given her stated commitment to universal respect and egalitarian
reciprocity, Benhabib would not endorse explicitly these forms of
democratic exclusion. But I think that there is a risk of her position
sliding into a version of Walzer’s club-based model of
self-determination-as-exclusion, at the level of citizenship. This is
because her distinction between ascriptive and elective criteria for
admission to citizenship is unstable. Benhabib accepts that political
communities have a right to exercise unilateral control over domestic
122 Benhabib (2007), p448.
123 This is a form of immigration control that I discuss critically in more
detail in Chapter 7, section 7.2, when looking at the recent introduction
of the points-based system in the UK.
124 Benhabib (2004a), p111.
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economic policy and to decide how their economic priorities relate to
their citizenship and immigration policies: “Democratic peoples
themselves must form judgments about economic priorities and
enlighten themselves about how these priorities bear on matters of
social and economic justice in their societies”.125 But if economic
criteria are legitimate grounds for exclusion, why not age, sex, race,
religion or linguistic community? These ascriptive factors cannot be
divorced neatly from considerations of economics. If it is for each
democratic community to decide upon its economic priorities, and
moreover the way in which these priorities stand in relation to other
matters of justice, including migration and citizenship policy, then it
would seem that they should be entitled to, say, offer citizenship to
immigrants with ethnic or racial backgrounds that the members believe
to be hardworking in nature. A liberal-democracy could also decide
justifiably to bar from citizenship those over a certain age, on the
grounds that they have passed the age at which they can make a useful
contribution to the economy, or a contribution at least sufficient to
offset the drain they are likely to exert at some later point on the health
care system and social services. On Benhabib’s account, the citizens of
the UK would be entitled to discriminate against female applicants on
the grounds that women are entitled by UK law to nineteen weeks
pregnancy leave on full pay, which could have a negative impact on
their net fiscal contribution. They could also decide justifiably to bar
entry to members of religious groups, who must take scheduled breaks
from their work in order to pray, on the grounds of the loss of working
hours. Indeed, if a state decided that it was in its best economic interests
to simply close its borders to all immigrants and to bar all long-term
residents from accessing citizenship, there would seem to be little that
Benhabib could say in response, given that the closure here is (at least
125 Ibid.
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nominally) not being predicated on the ascriptive characteristics of
prospective migrants.
My point is not that these sorts of discriminatory criteria or the
reasoning processes behind them are justifiable. Rather, my claim is
that Benhabib’s approach to self-determination and political
membership will have difficulty in explaining what is wrong with them.
Her position risks allowing preconceptions which offend
liberal-democratic and cosmopolitan values to determine admission to
citizenship. Benhabib comes close to recognising this objection when
she states that the threat of her position turning into an apology for
“democratic selfishness is a risk we must be willing to countenance”.126
If the point I am trying to make here has force, then it may be difficult
to prevent Benhabib’s claim that “regulation of immigration for the
sake of indigenous labour markets is inevitable and fair”127 from
sliding into an inadvertent justification for the kind of unilateral
club-based model of self-determination-as-exclusion put forward by
Walzer, but at the level of citizenship, rather than (as with Walzer) at
the level of social membership. It is interesting to note in connection
with this point that Walzer himself has questioned the degree to which
Benhabib’s endorsement of porous borders differs in its political
implications from his own commitment to
self-determination-as-exclusion:
If “porous” means “not open”, then it must be the
case that, at some level of political organization,
there exists a right “to control and sometimes
restrain the flow of immigrants”. But that is my
position, which she quotes in order to illustrate
126 Ibid.
127 Benhabib (2007), p453.
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the “civic republican” position she means to
dispute.128
In fact, there is a key difference between Walzer and Benhabib’s
position on closure. In the former case, exclusion takes place at the
territorial border, as a means of restricting the access of individuals to
social membership, whereas for Benhabib exclusion is permitted within
the territorial boundaries of liberal-democracies, as social members can
find themselves excluded justifiably from citizenship on her account.
Over the course of Chapters 2 through 5, I hope to have established that
neither form of closure can be justified unproblematically by appealing
to the value and practice of self-determination.
5.6 Conclusion
In the introductory chapter I noted that a number of authors claim that
the question of admission to political membership in liberal
democracies generates a tension between the universal liberal
commitment to the rights of individuals qua human beings and the
particularistic democratic commitment to the rights of individuals qua
citizens of differentiated political communities. Benhabib argues that
whilst this tension is a ‘constitutive’ feature of liberal democracy, it can
be mediated over time through democratic iterations leading to
jurisgenerative politics. Her cosmopolitan universalism is reflected in
her argument that the decisions and policies of states are morally valid
only in so far as they are the outcome of deliberation amongst all
affected parties. However, she recognises that democratic legitimacy
calls for bounded territorial jurisdictions which seem to call for the
128 Walzer (2001). See also Urbinati (2005).
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distribution of citizenship rights according to the subject-to-the-law
principle. In this chapter I hope to have shown that neither of these
commitments - to the radically expansive scope of participatory
membership through the criterion of inclusion according to affected
interests, and to the territorial basis for attributing citizenship according
to the subject-to-the-law principle of inclusion - are articulated
convincingly within the terms of Benhabib’s discourse theory approach
to political theory and moral reasoning.
In the following chapter, I look at the relationship between agonistic
theory, democratic self-determination and political membership,
focusing on the work of Chantal Mouffe and Bonnie Honig. Mouffe
shares with Benhabib the idea that liberal-democracy is beset by a
fundamental tension between universalism and particularism. However,
agonistic theorists are heavily critical of the kind of rationalist,
consensual and universalist approach to moral reasoning and
democratic deliberation adopted by discourse theorists like Benhabib,
as well as the claims to national unity promulgated by liberal
nationalists, identity liberals and communitarians. They stress instead
the importance of difference, conflict and disagreement within the
democratic process. Does their focus on the agonal dimension of
citizenship practice contribute to a conception of self-determination
and political membership that avoids the shortcomings with the
nationalist, deliberative democratic and rationalist models which they
set themselves in opposition to? This question is the focus for the
following chapter.
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Chapter 6
A Democracy of Strangers: Agonism and Political Membership
“(…) every single person needs to be reconciled
to a world into which he was born a stranger and
in which, to the extent of his distinct uniqueness,
he always remains a stranger”1
6.1 Introduction
In the introductory chapter, I stated that different concepts of collective
self-determination result in very different prescriptions concerning
both the regulation and porosity of membership boundaries. The
previous four chapters have substantiated that claim. The
Tamir/Walzer idea that self-determination is primarily a matter of the
preservation and status of national identities in the public sphere
supports the conclusion that the members of national groups should
exercise unilateral control over membership, and that they can
justifiably erect firm boundaries that function to exclude those unable
or unwilling to endorse the central tenets of their national culture.
Miller’s claim that self-determination is primarily concerned with the
democratic control of domestic cultural, economic and socio-political
conditions leads to a similar claim about the justifiability of exclusive
nation-state boundaries under the unilateral control of existing citizens.
Young’s contrasting argument that self-determination is achieved via
the condition of non-domination leads to the view that the ‘internal’
decisions of states (including but not limited to their decisions over
membership boundaries) cannot reside justifiably in the hands of their
1 Arendt (1994), p304.
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citizens alone, but must take account of and involve the democratic
participation of affected outsiders. If - as Benhabib argues - acts of
self-determination should be constrained by norms of universal respect
and egalitarian reciprocity, then a great range of possible membership
criteria are morally impermissible, regardless of the social, cultural or
democratic preferences of existing citizens.
What if we abandon all claims to unity amongst the members of the
demos - whether that unity be articulated through the idea of a national
culture, a shared set of democratic preferences or through the idea of a
universal moral perspective that takes into account the voices and
interests of all affected parties? What implications for the porosity and
control of membership boundaries might follow, and how justifiable
are those implications from a normative perspective? In this final
chapter I attempt an answer to these questions by focusing on two
versions of an agonistic approach to democratic theory. I will discuss
the work of Chantal Mouffe and Bonnie Honig in the main, but I will
refer at points to William Connolly.
In classical Greek the term ‘agon’ refers broadly to a public contest,
dispute or struggle between adversaries. There are significant
differences between each of the contemporary authors associated with
the label ‘agonist’, and they each look to different (though at times
overlapping) aspects of historic and modern political thought to
motivate their work, drawing from sources as diverse as Aristotle,
Schmitt, Gramsci, Wittgenstein, Arendt, Nietzsche, Foucault and
Derrida. However, they share in common an emphasis on not only
accepting but making greater room for political conflict and
disagreement between opposing viewpoints in the democratic process.
Agonistic theorists are sceptical of claims to universal reason,
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rationality, and consensus, stressing instead the significance of both
epistemological and political differences across groups and subject
positions. Tied to this view of politics and moral reasoning is a set of
claims about the ultimate futility and dangers inherent in attempts to
devise political procedures that will neutralise or reconcile those
differences into a set of principles acceptable to all ‘reasonable’ or
‘rational’ individuals.
Agonists are also united in opposing what they consider to be the
de-politicising impetus in much contemporary liberal and deliberative
democratic theory. Honig, for example, is sharply critical of Rawls’
search for an overlapping consensus that would reconcile in the public
political sphere the fundamental differences in the various conceptions
of the good held by the citizenry. She regards this device as masking a
desire to remove genuine disagreement and dissent from the political
field, and she claims that it is insufficiently attentive to the exclusions
and ‘remainders’ which are, for her, an inevitable and necessary
corollory of politics.2 Likewise, Chantal Mouffe charges deliberative
democrats like Habermas and Benhabib with imposing a false and
distorting homogeneity on society through the ideals of consensus and
agreement in rational procedures of argumentation and discussion3.
One of Mouffe’s core normative claims in favour of agonistic politics
is that liberal-democratic societies will be more stable, more
democratic and more inclusive towards outsiders to the extent that they
make greater room for the expression of conflict between opposing
political viewpoints.
2 Honig (1993a), Chapter 5.
3 Mouffe (2000a); Mouffe (2000b); Mouffe (2005a); Mouffe (2005b).
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Another basic premise that we find shared across agonistic theorists is
the idea that identity is constructed on the basis of relational
differentiation. In other words, agonists hold that identities - both
individual and collective - are partially constructed on the basis of what
they exclude. On the face of it, this may seem to imply a rather
pessimistic view of the prospects for inclusive democratic politics.
Michael Karlberg argues that the agonistic claim that collective
identities are inherently conflictive and exclusive, runs counter to the
prospects for constructing the kind of genuinely inclusive political
ethos or mentality that is in his view required to address political issues
of global concern:
(…) a global identity is essential if we are to
address the many global challenges that we now
face as a species. As long as we continue to
understand the world in terms of “us” and
“them,” we will be unable to overcome our
narrowly perceived self-interests and work
together to create a peaceful, just, and
sustainable future together.4
However, there are many different ways of interpreting the agonistic
claim that there is no ‘us’ without a ‘them’, and part of my aim in this
chapter is to elucidate a way of reading this claim that serves the
inclusive democratic ends argued for in the previous four chapters,
without overlooking the dimension of exclusion which I have also
argued is justified by the value and practice of self-determination (i.e.
the exclusion of outsiders from participatory membership). This may at
first sight seem a counter-intuitive approach; utilising the theoretical
resources offered by an orientation towards the political that stresses
the permanence of exclusion, contestation and conflict to advance a
politics of democratic inclusion and solidarity with excluded ‘others’.
4 Karlberg (2008), p313.
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However, one of my core claims in this chapter is that the idea of
divided subjectivity, which is a central component of Mouffe, Honig
and Connolly’s writings, contributes to a concept of democratic
self-determination as political action taken in concert with strangers,
which in turn encourages the opening of jurisdictional boundaries that
might otherwise function to exclude. Karlberg’s objection seems to
turn on a narrow, spatial understanding of the ‘us/them’ distinction that
maps onto the existing divisions between nation-states. In contrast, my
argument will turn on conceiving of the ‘us/them’ distinction, and the
general agonistic premise that politics is inherently conflictual and that
democracy is about managing contestation around identity categories,
as referring to the politics internal to both democratic societies and
individual democratic subjects. That will be the purpose of section 6.5.
In keeping with their rejection of rationalism,5 agonists do not attempt
to justify the exclusive moments entailed by democratic
self-determination, but nor do they envisage a form of democratic
politics without exclusions. Like Benhabib, they accept the need for
and permanence of boundaries separating the members of a demos
from non-members, whilst insisting on the interrogation of particular
forms of exclusion in and through the democratic process. However, as
we have seen in the previous chapter, Honig takes issue with what she
regards as Benhabib’s ‘chrono-logical’ approach to the trajectory of
rights claims, whilst Mouffe is critical of the deliberative democratic
emphasis on consensus and rationalism. Although agonistic democrats
resist the Walzer/Miller justification of self-determination as a more or
less unchecked sovereign prerogative, they are also sceptical of
Young’s cosmopolitan claim that the current era of globalisation has
5 Connolly (1991); Honig (1993a); Mouffe (2000a); Mouffe & Laclau
(1985).
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rendered the territorially bounded nation-state a political anachronism.6
Agonistic democrats avoid grounding citizenship rights exclusively in
either universal human rights (as with Benhabib) or strictly delineated
nationality or sovereign nation-statehood (as with Tamir, Walzer and
Miller). They are critical of attempts to anchor citizenship in abstract
personhood, but are also opposed to membership criteria based solely
on nationality, ethnicity or a shared conception of the good. Instead,
agonistic citizenship is primarily characterised as a form of political
action and a particular ethos of critical engagement with others, with
oneself and with political institutions and rules, and as a way of
approaching disagreement and democratic deliberation. As David
Howarth observes, an agonistic ethos:
(…) speaks to the way in which antagonisms
between different groups and coalitions ought to
be played out: that there should be an acceptance
of the common rules of the game, an acceptance
of defeat in the political process and an
expectation that conflict and contestation are an
ongoing and ‘infinite’ prospect (…)7
What is particularly distinctive about Mouffe’s position is her claim
that by acknowledging the necessary moments of exclusion in
democratic politics and collective identity formation, it is possible to
formulate effective strategies for combating the more pernicious,
socially destructive and politically violent forms of exclusion and
oppositional politics: “instead of trying to erase the traces of power and
exclusion, democratic politics requires us to bring them to the fore, to
make them visible, so that they can enter the terrain of contestation”.8
This is achieved in part through fostering relationships of agonistic
respect between competing political actors with potentially conflicting
6 Honig (2001a), pp. 102-103; Mouffe (2005a), pp. 106-107.
7 Howarth (2007), p187.
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goals and identities. Agonists maintain that recognising the relational,
interdependent and fluid character of identity formation opens up new
and potentially more hospitable ways of being with others politically
than we find in conventional rationalist and/or deliberative models of
liberal democracy. For Mouffe, ‘agonistic pluralism’ includes an ethos
of critical engagement that enables us to see those with opposing
viewpoints or identities as legitimate adversaries to be debated with,
rather than as enemies to be destroyed.9 In section 6.2, I outline this
aspect of Mouffe’s position.
In section 6.3, I argue against Mouffe’s claim that her agonistic
democratic community will be more open and inclusive towards
excluded individuals by conceiving of those exclusions as political
decisions as opposed to moral imperatives. I argue that - in so far as she
emphasises the Schmittian rather than the Derridean currents in her
thinking - Mouffe’s agonistic democracy is in fact no more inclusive or
fluid in its membership boundaries than Tamir’s liberal nationalism;
the problematic implications of which I hope to have established in
Chapter 2. This criticism of Mouffe takes her exclusion claim at face
value, and argues that it does not do the work of promoting democratic
inclusion that Mouffe claims for it, at least as far as excluded
individuals are concerned.
If valid, Mouffe’s claim that collective identities inherently rest on the
exclusion of outsiders could pose a serious problem for my objections
in Chapters 2 and 3 to arguments for exclusion from the principle and
value of democratic self-determination. It would mean that my overall
argument that self-determination need not and should not include the
8 Mouffe (2000a), pp. 34-35.
9 Mouffe (2000b). See also Connolly (1993), p381.
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right to exclude outsiders from social membership and citizenship may
be mistaken on an ontological level. I outline the philosophical basis of
Mouffe’s exclusion claim in section 6.4. In section 6.5, I go on to
criticise the exclusion claim itself, arguing that Mouffe’s marriage of
Derrida and Schmitt to establish the necessary relationship between
collective identity and exclusion is unsuccessful. I then go on to argue
that if we re-orientate Mouffe’s position more centrally around her
Derridean rather than Schmittian allegiances, then her concept of
agonistic democratic self-determination should be understood not so
much as a process that necessarily entails a clear division between
empirically identifiable members and non-members of the demos, but
rather as a form of political action taken in concert with strangers. This
conception is informed by the agonistic account of divided subjectivity
that we encounter in the work of Mouffe and Honig, and which draws
centrally on Derrida’s critique of Saussurean structuralist linguistics.
Embracing this perspective would mean abandoning “the dream of a
place called home, a place free of power, conflict and struggle”,10 and
adopting instead the more precarious concept of a democratic
community as an assemblage of subjects not only foreign to one
another but foreign to themselves.
In section 6.6, I argue that Honig’s analysis of the symbolic politics of
foreignness - along with insights offered by Mouffe, Abizadeh and
Derrida - complements this idea of democracy as political action taken
in concert with strangers. Honig advances a form of “democratic
cosmopolitanism” that is “rooted not … in a national ideal but rather in
a democratic ideal, one that seeks out friends and partners even (or
especially) among strangers and foreigners”.11 In this penultimate
10 Honig (1994), p567.
11 Honig (2001a), p13.
311
section, I argue that the idea of a ‘democracy of strangers’ offers a way
of thinking through the relationship between democracy and political
membership that undermines the claim that collective
self-determination should encompass the unilateral right of existing
citizens to shape membership through practices of exclusion. If
‘foreignness’ names the relationship that exists not only between
citizens, but within citizens themselves, the thought that the inclusion
of further foreigners may jeopardise the collective right to
self-determination of the existing citizens loses much of its purchase.
In the final section of this chapter, I discuss Honig’s reflections on the
‘foreign founder’ and the ‘taking immigrant’ as symbols of democratic
activism. This discussion flips the conventional framing of the
relationship between democracy and foreigners on its head. It suggests
that democratic regimes need not feel that the inclusion of foreigners
poses a potential threat to their capacity for self-determination. In fact,
they can draw democratic sustenance from these markers of the
permeability of their territorial and citizenship boundaries; the very
markers which liberal nationalists, identity liberals and liberal
communitarians regard as indicators that genuine self-determination is
at risk of being undermined.
6.2 Liberal-Democracy and Hegemony
Mouffe is one of the most prominent defenders of an agonistic concept
of democracy. She explicitly sets herself in opposition to the
deliberative democratic account found in authors like Habermas and
Benhabib. I canvassed the deliberative democratic/discourse-theory
approach to political membership put forward by Benhabib in the
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previous chapter and suggested that, along with other difficulties, her
position threatens to create internal exclusions through disregarding the
voices of marginalised political actors. This means that the internal
process of self-determination may not be as equally open to the input of
all resident territorial insiders in the way that is called for by the
subject-to-the-law principle, which I have defended as a jurisdictional
rule. Mouffe is heavily critical of the notion of a universal rational
consensus without remainders as it is deployed by deliberative
democrats, arguing instead that any agreement reached in a political
forum will reflect a particular crystallisation of existing power relations
and will necessarily exclude a certain set of claims, identities or
subject-positions. For Mouffe, conflict, disagreement and struggle for
hegemony between contending identities is to be accepted and even
welcomed within democratic politics for giving greater space for the
articulation of genuine and legitimate pluralism. This position stems
from her views on the ontology of power and objectivity first laid out in
Hegemony and Socialist Strategy12 with Enersto Laclau.
The first stage in Mouffe and Laclau’s argument is to follow Derrida
and Lacan in proposing a radically constructivist view of objectivity
and social reality. On this basis, the meaning of words, actions, beliefs -
in sum, the whole field of human activity - is given not by an essential
objectivity but through a location within a specific discourse: “there is
no meaning that is just essentially given to us; there is no essence of the
social, it is always constructed”.13 Their rejection of fixed meanings
leads Mouffe and Laclau to propose that all social objectivity is the
product of particular sets of power relations. Power, they argue, is
constitutive of the social:
12 Mouffe & Laclau (1985).
13 Carpentier & Cammaerts (2006), p4.
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(…) because the social could not exist without
the power relations through which it is given
shape. What is at any given moment considered
as the ‘natural’ order … is the result of
sedimented hegemonic practices; it is never the
manifestation of a deeper objectivity exterior to
the practices that bring it into being.14
Given this view of the constructive and constitutive role of power and
the contingency of all social and political arrangements, it follows for
Mouffe that any agreement or settlement reached in a political forum
should be seen as a temporary stabilisation of the field of possibility.
Any given political arrangement reflects the dominance of one set of
power relations, and should therefore never be considered an
authoritative or final state of affairs beyond further legitimate
questioning or revision: “Every hegemonic order is susceptible of
being challenged by counter-hegemonic practices, i.e. practices which
will attempt to disarticulate the existing order so as to install another
form of hegemony”.15 In the following section, I will argue that whilst
this claim may be plausible for a great range of political or economic
settlements, it is implausible if we are concerned with membership
practices and the inclusion of concrete individuals.
Mouffe uses the term ‘hegemony’ to describe the dominance of one
concept of social objectivity over another (or - potentially - all others).
This view of the ubiquity of power relations and the ultimately
contingent nature of any political settlement explains in part why
Mouffe wants to leave more up to the give and take and everyday
struggle of democratic politics and is (at least rhetorically) far more
reluctant than deliberative democrats or Rawlsians to constrain the
14 Mouffe (2007), pp. 2-3.
15 Ibid, p3.
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collective will of self-governing democratic communities to a universal
principle of human rights. Mouffe suggests that politics cannot be
governed or justified by universally valid moral considerations of the
Kantian, neo-Kantian or Habermasian stripe, since in her view political
arrangements are always the product of power and never the product of
superior moral reasoning or communicative rationality.
To present political decisions as being the result of a universally valid
procedure such as the original position or communicative rationality, is
to mask their ultimately political character and to artificially naturalise
what is in her view a contingent and temporary state of affairs. Given
that power, for Mouffe, rather than rationality or moral superiority, is
what ultimately determines their constitution, it follows that political
and social institutions should be seen as the site of struggle,
contestation and exclusion:
Consensus in a liberal-democratic society is -
and will always be - the expression of a
hegemony and the crystallization of power
relations. The frontier that it establishes between
what is and what is not legitimate is a political
one, and for that reason it should remain
contestable.16
Seeking to ground politics in a higher form of rationality or a universal
dialogic consensus is objectionable to Mouffe because it represents an
act of cloaking what is the contingent success of one particular
hegemonic project in a veil of objectivity and necessity. The kind of
consensus that Habermas and Benhabib seek (or at least endorse as a
regulative ideal) is impossible in Mouffe’s view because there can be
no decision taken, argument made or policy adopted that does not
16 Mouffe (1999), p46.
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create an exclusion. The task of liberal-democratic politics, therefore,
is not to achieve a universal consensus without remainders, but to
preserve spaces for challenging the necessary forms of exclusion that
exist at any time and for re-articulating the hegemonic meaning of
identities and rights.
Mouffe believes that by engaging with the terms of Carl Schmitt’s
critique of liberalism, it is possible to learn useful lessons that can be
pressed into the service of a more pluralistic, inclusive and politically
stable conception of liberal democracy. For Schmitt, the defining
category of the political is the friend/enemy relationship. Mouffe
endorses Schmitt’s claim that antagonism is the ever-present condition
of politics and she also follows him in maintaining that there can be no
‘we’ without a contrasting and competitive ‘them’. By defining the
political as characterised by antagonism, Mouffe concludes that any
attempt to eradicate antagonism (through, for example, establishing an
overlapping consensus or universal agreement through a discursive
procedure) amounts to an attempt to eradicate the political itself.
However, Mouffe takes an important departure from Schmitt with her
faith in the potential for democratic politics to ‘tame’ relations of
hostility between contending identities. Schmitt believed that that the
only way that pluralism could express itself was through antagonism.
So he maintained that political communities must have a sufficient
degree of homogeneity between citizens in order to function without
periodically exploding into violent disorder.17 Mouffe has a more
optimistic view of the matter. In her view, the aim of liberal democratic
politics should be to effect a shift in the manner in which we view and
respond to political adversaries, by regarding them as legitimate
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opponents; i.e. interlocutors who have a right to hold and express
viewpoints that one rejects, rather than as enemies who should be
eradicated or banished from the public sphere. Mouffe describes this
process of domestication as a shift from an antagonistic to an agonistic
relationship. In agonistic modes of confrontation the interlocutors still
acknowledge that each other’s ends are mutually incompatible and the
goal is to ‘convert’ the other to one’s way of thinking through direct
confrontation. However, a precondition for agonistic debate is the
existence of a “common symbolic space”18 - which is supplied through
a shared endorsement of liberal-democratic values - whereas in
antagonistic confrontation there is no common ground at all. The task
of agonistic democracy is to offer democratic channels for the public
articulation of conflict and disagreement. The hope is that this will in
turn facilitate a change in the mode of interaction between contending
identities, from a potentially violent antagonistic relationship of
friend/enemy to a more benign agonistic relationship of us/them: “the
aim of democratic politics is to construct the ‘them’ in such a way that
it is no longer perceived as an enemy to be destroyed, but as an
‘adversary’”.19 I will have more to say about Mouffe’s relationship to
Schmitt, and the alliance she attempts to forge between Schmitt and
Derrida in order to substantiate her idea of the political as being
characterised by ‘us/them’ relationships, in section 6.4.
This view on the necessity of exclusion brings us to Mouffe’s ideal of
inclusion. Mouffe claims that her agonistic model of democracy will be
more open to pluralism, more democratic and more inclusive than
conventional liberal or deliberative democratic approaches because in
her model, exclusions are regarded as explicitly political, which in turn
17 Schmitt (1985).
18 Mouffe (2000a), p13.
19 Ibid, pp. 101-102.
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means that they are reflected upon, discussed and debated, and so
potentially revisable at any point. The relevant contrasting view here
would hold that exclusions are mandated by rationality or morality, and
so definitive and therefore not legitimate objects for potential
re-evaluation. On Mouffe’s agonistic account the goals of democratic
inclusion and emancipation are served through preserving spaces for
contestation over the existing set of political arrangements in place. In
a similar vein, Connolly argues that allowing agonistic competition in
the public political sphere “prevents injuries and injustices … from
becoming too thoroughly naturalized, rationalized, or grounded in a
higher direction in being”.20 Mouffe and Connolly believe that liberal
democracy will be more open and inclusive if a climate of contest and
oppositional politics in the public sphere is preserved because there
will always be scope for publicly challenging hitherto unacknowledged
forms of subordination, inequality and exclusion. This approach also
purports to be more democratic in seeking to empower individuals to
actively engage in self-legislation, both at the individual and communal
level, rather than bow to inherited traditions or institutions.
In Mouffe’s view, the attempt to dissolve or avoid the inherently
confrontational nature of the political is not only ontologically
misguided, it is also politically dangerous. She argues that the
Rawlsian and deliberative democratic search for
harmony/unity-in-difference in the sense of an overlapping consensus
or universal agreement can only proceed by suppressing genuine
differences between political positions, imposing a false homogeneity
on the political field which is at odds with the inescapable facts of
pluralism and antagonism. This act of suppression, in turn, threatens to
channel those differences into the service of pernicious nationalism,
20 Connolly (1991) p93.
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religious fundamentalism or far-right extremism.21 Mouffe’s concern
is that if deep-seated differences of political opinion cannot be aired in
a democratic forum they will only be able to find expression through
these anti-democratic movements. This is why she takes issue with the
consensus-oriented politics of the so-called ‘third way’ in Europe.
According to Mouffe, when political parties traditionally divided to left
and right, start moving towards the centre in an effort to conduct
consensual politics, they deprive citizens of important channels for the
democratic expression of political differences, which are in turn more
likely to manifest themselves in either apathy or, at the other end of the
spectrum, anti-democratic extremism.22 In this way, Mouffe’s appeal
for greater confrontation and disagreement in democratic politics is
motivated by a desire to save liberal-democracy from destroying itself
through embracing too little pluralism in the public sphere (rather than
too much pluralism, which is the concern for political liberals).23
Socio-political stability without the creation of a totalitarian or
authoritarian regime, in Mouffe’s view, comes from inviting conflict
and serious disagreement into the public political sphere, rather than
removing it from the table as in the later-Rawlsian model.
However, despite her attack on consensus-orientated deliberation and
her endorsement of conflict and contestation in the public sphere,
Mouffe concedes that liberal-democratic politics rests on agreement on
the political maxim: ‘liberty and equality for all’. Democracy, in her
view, no matter how radical, cannot allow for the public expression of
viewpoints that would put those core values into question. Whilst she
endorses a model of deliberation in the public sphere that would invite
viewpoints that challenge the existing hegemonic interpretation of
21 Mouffe (2005a), pp. 19-34; pp. 69-72.
22 Ibid.
23 Rawls (1993).
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liberty and equality, she doesn’t actually want to invite into her agon
those who would overturn liberal institutions or those would seek the
“radical negation of the established order”.24 Notice in the following
quotation that it is the nature of liberal-democratic institutions that are
a constitutive part of Mouffe’s agonistic debate, not the desirability of
the institutions themselves:
Some demands are excluded, not because they
are declared to be ‘evil’, but because they
challenge the institutions constitutive of the
democratic political association. To be sure, the
very nature of those institutions is also part of the
agonistic debate but, for such a debate to take
place, the existence of a shared symbolic space is
necessary.25
For Mouffe, agonistic competition is carried out amongst citizens who
“have a shared adhesion to the ethico-political principles of
democracy: liberty and equality”.26 Adversarial debate therefore takes
place within the framework of liberal-democratic institutions; it does
not extend to disagreement over the desirability and the hegemony of
those institutions themselves. As a theorist of liberal democracy, it is
unsurprising that Mouffe refuses to countenance viewpoints that reject
liberal democracy outright. She attempts to avoid falling prey to the
same criticisms concerning the negation of difference and the
suppression of contestation that she levels at Rawlsians and
deliberative democrats by claiming, firstly, that hers is a ‘conflictual
consensus’ in the sense that it permits open disagreement over the
interpretation of the meaning of liberty and equality. Her public sphere
requires “consensus on the ethico-political values of liberty and
24 Mouffe (2005a), p82.
25 Ibid, pp. 120-121.
26 Mouffe (2000b), p15.
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equality for all”27 but welcomes “dissent about their interpretation”.28
Secondly, as we have seen, she emphasises that any agreement reached
through an agonistic democratic debate will be recognised as explicitly
political (i.e. reflecting a particular and contingent, as opposed to
rational or moral, reification of existing power relations) and so
permanently open to further questioning, debate and revision: “(…) I
claim that the drawing of the frontier between the legitimate and the
illegitimate is always a political decision, and that it should therefore
always remain open to contestation”.29 Mouffe claims that by facing up
to the ineliminable dimension of power and exclusion that grounds
every political settlement, policy or decision, and the corresponding
absence of rationality or moral certainty, we preserve a space for the
potential re-organisation of our political society: “Every order is ...
political and based on some form of exclusion. There are always other
possibilities that have been repressed and that can be reactivated”.30
The idea is that by confronting “the contingent character of the
hegemonic politico-economic articulations which determine the
specific configuration of a society at a given moment”,31 agonistic
democracy remains open to this potential ‘reactivation’ of
suppressed/excluded possibilities.
In the following section, I evaluate whether or not this claim is
convincing when it is applied to individuals who find themselves
excluded from social membership and citizenship in
liberal-democracies. Could Mouffe’s agonistic approach to the
political ground a form of democratic politics that promotes the forms
of inclusion argued for in Chapters 2 and 3 of this thesis? I will argue to
27 Mouffe (2005a), p121.
28 Ibid.
29 Ibid.
30 Mouffe (2007), p3.
31 Ibid.
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the contrary that Mouffe’s agonistic public sphere is far less open, to
the radical re-interpretation of its existing political settlements and in
particular to its hegemonic membership practices and modes of
inclusion and exclusion, than she suggests.
6.3 What’s Radical about Radical Democracy?
As we have seen, Mouffe maintains that by registering and facing up to
its necessary moments of exclusion, and by acknowledging them as
political acts rather than rational or moral imperatives,
liberal-democratic communities will be more open to pluralism and
inclusive of difference, because they will preserve a climate of
contestation over the forms of exclusion existing at any time. This may
be a plausible claim to make for a great range of political, social,
cultural or economic policies. If, for example, one refuses to see
capitalism as the one true model of economic organisation for fulfilling
the good of all people at all times, then it seems natural to at least
entertain the possible merits of alternative, ‘excluded’ models of
economic organisation. However, whether or not this kind of openness
extends to membership procedures and excluded individuals, is a
different matter. David Howarth believes that the agonistic idea of
recognising the political dynamics of hegemony and exclusion and
therefore resisting closure for the sake of inclusion does in fact extend
to membership practices and concrete individuals:
(…) even though decisions have to be taken that
exclude some from a democratic space, the
virtue of agonistic respect requires an openness
to those who are excluded; and this ethos is itself
predicated on the idea that such boundaries are
never fixed but contingent and revisable. Indeed
the agonistic ethos requires the conduct of
322
democratic practices which endeavor to
transform and thereby include those that are
deemed enemies or who declare themselves
outsiders, practices that actively seek to
transform enemies into democratic adversaries.32
In what follows, I aim to show that Howarth’s faith in the inclusive
potential of Mouffe’s agonistic ethos is misplaced. As a preliminary
point, notice the tension in the statement just quoted between, on the
one hand, the requirement of an “openness to those who are excluded”
and, on the other hand, the idea that the excluded must be ‘transformed’
as a condition of their inclusion. If it is the excluded who must be
transformed in order to be included, rather than the community and its
membership boundaries, in what sense is there openness towards the
excluded? A community that has to “transform” outsiders before it is
prepared to accept them as members is not particularly ‘open’ at all.
Howarth does not seem to recognise the tension between these
requirements. I argue below that this tension is present in Mouffe’s
work, and that it complicates the idea that her democratic community is
open to the perpetual re-articulation of its membership procedures.
To begin with, notice with Howarth that what Mouffe’s position seems
to entail is that the process of fostering agonistic respect for one’s
enemies is in fact a process of persuading them to argue their case by
appealing to a recognisable interpretation of the values of liberty and
equality, so that existing citizens are able to view them as sharing a
‘common symbolic space’. For agonistic relationships to unfold, the
deliberators have to be co-members of a common democratic
enterprise. The presence of antagonism can therefore be read as
implying an absence of shared membership, because antagonists, for
32 Howarth (2007), p188.
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Mouffe, reject liberal democracy outright, and those who reject liberal
democracy outright “exclude themselves”33 from membership.
However, if Mouffe’s ‘political’ account of exclusion requires a
perpetual openness to those currently deemed enemies and so subject to
exclusion from the community, and a perpetual openness to new forms
of membership and new hegemonic assemblages (because their
exclusion is a political decision rather than a rational or moral
imperative), this would seem to imply that political outsiders are not to
be considered permanently excluded. Instead it seems that, for Mouffe,
they must (in some unspecified sense) remain on the periphery of the
community, until such time as they succeed in presenting their views as
an interpretation of liberty and equality that existing citizens are able to
accept.34
But I find it difficult to understand how those who are excluded in this
way can attain membership whilst still posing a challenge to the
hegemonic political settlements concerning membership already in
place. Mouffe’s understanding of membership in liberal democracies
describes not only “allegiance ... to a set of shared ethico-political
principles”35 but a more substantive commitment to a specific, shared
way of life. Agonistic citizenship, for Mouffe, describes not only
adherence to liberal-democratic principles and institutions but also an
ethos or a certain attitude towards liberal democracy as a ‘form of life’.
Citizenship is not, in her view, primarily a legal status, nor a matter of
national or ethnic belonging, nor the sharing of a substantive
33 Mouffe (2005b), p4.
34 This all sounds very similar to Miller’s claim that his form of
republicanism is radically (and in his view sufficiently) inclusive
because it “places no limits on what sort of demand may be put forward
in the political forum”. Nevertheless, the success of a claim depends on
“how far it can be expressed in terms that are close to, or distant from,
the general political ethos of the community”. Miller (2000), p191.
35 Mouffe (2005a), p122.
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conception of the good life. Instead, Mouffe argues that liberal
democratic citizenship consists partly as a form of identification with
liberal democratic principles:
To be a citizen is to recognise the authority of
such principles and the rules in which they are
embodied, to have them informing our political
judgement and our actions. To be associated in
terms of the recognition of liberal democratic
principles: this is the meaning of citizenship that
I want to put forward. It implies seeing
citizenship not as a legal status but as a form of
identification, a type of political identity:
something to be constructed, not empirically
given.36
Despite her claim here that citizenship is primarily about identifying
with a set of political principles specific to liberal-democracy, Mouffe
also argues on the basis of her Wittgensteinian rejection of rationalism
that individuals cannot be persuaded by appeal to arguments to adopt
liberal principles and so be accepted into the community, because
principles are always grounded on a more substantive ‘form of life’:
“The real issue is not to find arguments to justify the rationality or
universality of liberal democracy ... Liberal democratic principles and
procedures can only be defended as being constitutive of our form of
life …”.37 As such, we are told that becoming a member of a liberal
democracy “is more a sort of conversion than a process of rational
persuasion”.38 The key, notorious passage in Wittgenstein that Mouffe
appeals to in her rejection of rational-universalist, ‘foundationalist’
models of liberal democracy reads thus:
36 Mouffe (2005b), pp. 65-66.
37 Mouffe (2000a), p66.
38 Ibid, p102.
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Giving grounds, however, justifying the
evidence, comes to an end; but the end is not
certain propositions striking us immediately as
true, i.e. it is not a kind of seeing on our part; it is
our acting, which lies at the bottom of the
language game.39
According to Mouffe’s reading of Wittgenstein, in order for there to be
agreement on principles and procedures, there must already be
agreement in ‘forms of life’:
(…) procedures only exist as complex ensembles
of practices. Those practices constitute specific
forms of individuality and identity that make
possible the allegiance to the procedures. It is
because they are inscribed in shared forms of life
and agreements in judgements that procedures
can be accepted and followed (…)40
All of this means that possessing an ethos of agonistic respect and
having an attachment to (a recognisable interpretation of) liberty and
equality are preconditions for membership, rather than qualities that
one achieves in and through participation as a member in the political
life of an agonistic democratic community. Paradoxically, it seems that
what Mouffe characterises as the work of agonistic democracy -
translating relationships of antagonism into agonism, enemies into
adversaries - must be complete in a society before her agon can get
under way. In what sense, then, is Mouffe’s agonistic democracy open
to new and radical challenges to the hegemonic interpretations of the
meaning of liberty and equality in such a way that would enable those
individuals who are currently excluded to attain membership whilst
also challenging and re-articulating the dominant meanings and
39 Wittgenstein (1969), p204; quoted in Mouffe (2000a), p70.
40 Mouffe (2000a), p68.
326
settlements attached to membership? Unfortunately, Mouffe nowhere
provides concrete examples of the kinds of interpretations of liberty
and equality that would be acceptable and welcomed into her radically
pluralist public sphere but would be excluded from, say, the public
sphere of Rawls, Benhabib or Habermas. Presumably, that is because it
will be the responsibility of the existing members to decide. It is
possible to present a great range of claims as being an interpretation of
liberty and equality, unless some limits are placed on the range of
acceptable interpretations. Absent an appeal to rational argument,
morality or some other extra-communal standard, it follows that those
limits must be supplied by the ‘form of life’ of the existing citizens and
the dominant interpretations in place at the time. But then it is hard to
understand how Mouffe can make good on her claim that her agonistic
democracy constitutes a “community without a definite shape ... and in
continuous re-enactment”.41 My core objection is this: how can
excluded individuals be brought “to the fore” and made “visible, so that
they can enter the terrain of contestation”, thereby perpetuating the
“continuous re-enactment” of the community, when the reason for their
exclusion is precisely because existing citizens cannot regard them as
sharing in the common ethos and way of life that makes participating in
the “terrain of contestation”42 possible on agonistic, rather than
antagonistic, terms? Agonistic competitors, Mouffe tells us, “are
adversaries, not enemies. This means that, while in conflict, they see
themselves as belonging to the same political association, as sharing a
common symbolic space within which the conflict takes place”.43 So,
to put the point a slightly different way: how can enemies become
adversaries through the agonistic democratic process when they are
excluded from the political association precisely because they are
41 Mouffe (2000b), p67.
42 Mouffe (2000a), pp. 34-35.
43 Ibid, p20 (emphasis added).
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enemies?44 Yet another way of putting the point is this. If - as Mouffe’s
appropriation of Wittgenstein entails - one has to agree with the
dominant liberal-democratic form of life that is in place in a given
society as a condition of participating as a member in
liberal-democratic procedures, how is it possible to challenge the terms
of that form of life in and through liberal-democratic procedures?
Mouffe’s claim that her agonistic recognition of the permanence and
necessity of exclusion leads to a more inclusive and pluralistic form of
democratic community - one that is “more receptive to the multiplicity
of voices that a pluralist society encompasses”45 - therefore seems
unfounded. In fact, it seems that we are faced with a similar position to
that which we encountered at the beginning of Chapter 2 of this thesis.
Namely, with a state that requires prospective citizens to display a
commitment to liberal-democratic values and principles and which
excludes those who fail to meet the standards set unilaterally by the
existing members. Mouffe’s position on membership seems to coincide
with Tamir’s when the latter states that “Prospective citizens must be
able and willing to be members of this particular historical community,
its past, its future, its forms of life and institutions”.46 I hope to have
already pointed out a number of problems with Tamir’s position, and if
my criticisms were valid, they should be equally damaging to Mouffe.
At this point, it will be useful to recall the three-part distinction
introduced in chapter 2. Whilst Mouffe attempts to defend concept A, it
seems that the thicker cultural commitments described by concept C
inevitably bleed into the supposedly thin, abstract commitments that
44 Richard Rorty would say that Mouffe’s ‘enemies’ are individuals
with whom liberals simply cannot have a fruitful conversation because
there is insufficient overlap between their respective belief-systems.
Rorty (1991), pp. 187-188.
45 Mouffe (2000a), p77.
46 Tamir (1993), p129.
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are supposed to sustain the conceptual space shared by citizens in
Mouffe’s agonistic public sphere.
The idea that Mouffe’s agonistic pluralism implies the kinds of
cultural-nationalist policies of preemptive exclusion that we
encountered in the work of Tamir and Tebble is probably not one that
she would be happy to countenance. But it does seem - at the very least
- that we are faced here with the idea that what matters for the inclusion
of outsiders is that they identify with or have a strong feeling of
emotional attachment towards the dominant values in their host society,
and that their formal political inclusion is conditional upon the
presence of such sentiments. However, as Carens points out, whilst it
may be desirable that all citizens have these sorts of affective ties
towards the liberal polity, whether or not it should be made a condition
of their formal inclusion is a separate matter, and not one that
liberal-democrats should be quick to endorse.47 The emotional,
affective element of identification that is central to Mouffe’s account
should make it particularly unpalatable as a model for membership
procedures from a liberal perspective, as liberals typically regard the
affective or emotional states of individuals as lying outside the
legitimate scope of political scrutiny.48
In this section I have taken Mouffe’s exclusion claim at face value, and
have argued that it fails to do the work of fostering a democratic polity
that is more inclusive towards excluded individuals than - for example -
Tamir’s liberal nationalist position discussed in Chapter 2. However,
the exclusion claim itself has been subjected to vigorous critical
47 Carens (2005), p39.
48 Miller (2008), pp. 384-385.
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scrutiny. In the following section I will discuss in greater detail the
philosophical basis of Mouffe’s exclusion claim. In section 6.5, I will
argue that Mouffe fails to show that acts of concrete exclusion are a
necessarily implication of democratic rule and the formation of
collective identities.
6.4 Mouffe on ‘The Political’
Like Benhabib, Mouffe is interested in exploring what she regards as
tensions between liberal and democratic approaches to liberty and
equality as they pertain to the construction and negotiation of
boundaries, not only between insiders and outsiders of political
communities but between notions of reasonableness and
unreasonableness, between acceptable and unacceptable forms of
pluralism, and between rational and irrational forms of political
argument, persuasion and conviction. However, whilst Benhabib is
committed ultimately to the idea that these tensions can be mediated
successfully through attention to the discursive principles of her
version of discourse theory and through strategies of democratic
iteration leading to jurisgenerative politics, for Mouffe the
contradiction between their respective logics runs deeper and cannot be
reconciled through either theoretical reflection or discursive
procedures: “liberal democracy results from the articulation of two
logics which are incompatible in the last instance and … there is no
way in which they could be perfectly reconciled”.49 Even if
deliberative democrats concede that full reconciliation between liberty
and equality is only a regulative ideal and that consensus in political
discussion will never actually be realised, the obstacles they perceive to
stand in the way of such a consensus are empirical and political,
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whereas for Mouffe the desire for agreement and consensual politics is
not only politically unrealistic and dangerous but also conceptually and
ontologically mistaken.50
Contra Habermas, who argues that there is a “conceptual or internal
relation … between the rule of law and democracy”51, Mouffe argues
that liberalism and democracy belong to two distinct historic schools of
thought and political practice and that any relationship between them is
a purely contingent political achievement. The ‘democratic paradox’,
for Mouffe as for Benhabib, consists in the conflictual relationship
between the liberal emphasis on individual rights, liberty and the rule
of law, and the democratic emphasis on collective self-determination,
popular sovereignty and equality. As I have noted before, political
membership is a particularly salient issue on which liberalism and
democracy are said to collide. Whilst liberalism claims equal liberty
and freedom for all, Mouffe argues that democracy requires a moment
of closure in the sense of a boundary between insiders and outsiders.52
We have seen in the previous chapter that Benhabib’s defence of
democratic closure appeals to the logic of democratic representation
and the drawing of jurisdictional boundaries. Mouffe also appeals to
“democratic logics” to justify her exclusion claim, which she claims
“always entail drawing a frontier between ‘us’ and ‘them’, those who
belong to the ‘demos’ and those who are outside it”.53 What this means
is that democratic equality and rights cannot be based on a general
appeal to humanity, but must be instantiated through the category of
‘we, the people’, in contrast to a ‘them’ that is excluded from the
49 Mouffe (2000a), p5.
50 Ibid, p48.
51 Habermas (1998), p449; quoted in Mouffe (2005a), p84.
52 Mouffe (2000a), p39.
53 Ibid, p4.
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community.54 This is why Mouffe makes the Wittgensteinian claim
that the respective ‘grammars’ of equality deployed in liberal and
democratic theory are in tension with one another and can never be
reconciled perfectly. Democracy needs to be based on a principle of
equality between citizens, but it cannot achieve the ideal of liberal
equality because without a community there could be no democracy,
and - according to Mouffe - without the exclusion (and thus unequal
treatment) of a group of outsiders there could be no community.
Mouffe’s democratic paradox therefore occurs because the condition of
the realisation of a perfectly inclusive liberal-democratic regime is at
the same time the condition of its impossibility.55 Liberal equality
refers to the equality existing between persons qua human beings
whereas democratic equality refers to the equality between persons qua
citizens of particular communities, and so the latter concept requires
the drawing of a distinction between insiders and outsiders: “What
matters is the possibility of tracing a line of demarcation between those
who belong to the demos - and therefore have equal rights - and those
who, in the political domain, cannot have the same rights because they
are not part of the demos”.56
However, as I pointed out in Chapter 3 in my discussion of Walzer,
even if we grant the point - as I have done in this thesis - that
democracy requires the drawing of a jurisdictional boundary, this tells
us nothing about the appropriate regime of boundary control. A
boundary delimiting a jurisdiction and drawing a line between those
inside and those outside can exist, but still be open, closed or
somewhere in between.57 In other words, a jurisdiction can exist
without there being any controls preventing people from freely moving
54 Ibid, p40.
55 Ibid, p16.
56 Mouffe (1999), p41.
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across it and acquiring social membership, thereby putting themselves
on the road towards citizenship. I have argued in the previous two
chapters in favour of the subject-to-the-law principle of democratic
inclusion as against the all-affected and all-coerced principles. But the
subject-to-the-law principle in itself is agnostic about who constitutes
the subjects of the law. It gives a normative explanation for why the
subjects of the law should also be its authors, but it does not offer
guidance as to whether the membership boundaries defined by
law-making should be closed, open or porous. Absent further
conceptual, ontological or normative premises, there is nothing
inherent in the logic of either democratic rule or the all-subjected
principle that means that democratic jurisdictions cannot be open.
Long-term residents would possess rights within that jurisdiction
according to the subject-to-the-law principle of demarcation and would
lose those rights if and when they freely chose to depart. Mouffe’s
more fundamental exclusion claim - the idea that the jurisdictional
boundary dividing members from non-members must necessarily
function to keep some individuals outside of its scope - rests on her
appropriation of Schmitt’s ontological concept of the political as
inherently characterised by potential antagonism, or relationships of
friend/enemy, and the way in which she combines this with Derrida’s
account of ‘the constitutive outside’.58 Whilst Derrida proposed this as
a deconstructive tool with which to challenge Saussure’s structuralist
linguistics, Mouffe argues that it teaches liberal-democrats important
lessons about collective identity formation; namely, that “collective
identities can only be established on the mode of an us/them”.59
57 Abizadeh (2008), p43; Baubock (2007), p400; Baubock (2009), p10.
58 Derrida (1967), Chapter 3, Part 1.
59 Mouffe (2000a), p213.
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According to Saussure, the meaning of a given sign is determined not
by its relationship to an external reality or non-linguistic entity, but by
its location within a linguistic system.60 The meaning of sign a, on this
basis, is determined by its difference from all the other signs in the
linguistic system. Derrida’s critical analysis, however, suggests that
this idea of a linguistic system conceptually entails closure in the sense
of a boundary between the inside and the outside of the system.
However, Derrida argues that closure is not only essential to the
account of meaning proposed by structuralism, but it is (paradoxically)
what makes meaning impossible. If we are to suppose that there is a
firm and determinate boundary between the inside and the outside of a
linguistic structure then meaning within that structure becomes wholly
self-referential. If the meaning of sign a is determined by its difference
from signs b, c, d (etc), and if the meaning of signs b, c, d (etc) are
dependent for their meaning on their difference from the meaning of
sign a, then the meaning of sign a is ultimately determined by the
meaning of sign a. The only way to rescue meaning from this vicious
circularity is to propose the idea of an ‘outside’ to the structure which is
in fact partially constitutive of the meaning of the terms ‘inside’ the
structure. Signs internal to the ‘closed’ structure must refer to
something outside that structure. In this way, the very idea that there is
an ‘inside’ and an ‘outside’ to the linguistic structure is called into
question, since the existence of an ‘outside’ is what enables the
existence of an ‘inside’ by creating a boundary, and yet the ‘outside’
has to penetrate the ‘inside’ to make meaning possible.61
Mouffe transposes the Derrida/Saussure debate from the field of
linguistics to the domain of collective identification, arguing that the
idea of the constitutive outside reveals the “antagonism inherent in all
60 Saussure (1960).
61 Abizadeh (2005), p56.
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objectivity and the centrality of the us/them distinction in the
constitution of collective political identities”.62 According to Mouffe’s
reading of Derrida, he shows us that identities always depend on a set
of differences that they exclude as a condition of their possibility. In
other words, identities - no less than linguistic signs - require an
excluded exterior: “the creation of an identity implies the establishment
of a difference”.63 Mouffe argues that this in turn points to the fact that
both individual and collective identities are relational: what we are is
partially constituted on the basis of what we are not, that which
constitutes our ‘exterior’: “every identity is relational and … the
affirmation of a difference is a precondition for the existence of any
identity … In the field of collective identities, we are always dealing
with the creation of a ‘we’ which can exist only by the demarcation of a
‘they’”.64
Mouffe presents Derrida’s understanding of the constitutive outside as
complementing Schmitt’s characterisation of the necessarily
antagonistic nature of political life and communal identification: “the
notion of the ‘constitutive outside’ forces us to come to terms with the
idea that pluralism implies the permanence of conflict and
antagonism”.65
For Mouffe, the Derridean account of the constitutive outside and the
Schmittian account of the antagonistic nature of the political together
indicate the conceptual and ontological impossibility of a democracy
grounded on universal personhood, or a ‘pure’ form of cosmopolitan
democracy that had transcended the need for differentiated political
62 Mouffe (2000a), p12.
63 Ibid, p15.
64 Ibid.
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communities. As we have seen, Mouffe acknowledges that the
“universalistic rhetoric” of liberalism calls for the creation of a
democracy of mankind, but claims that the logic inscribed in
democracy itself is the condition of the impossibility of ever realizing
such a cosmopolitan world order66. In her view, democracy itself would
perish if the borders between communities were torn down to make
way for a global state inhabited by ‘world citizens’ because those
citizens would no longer be the bearers and the subjects of rights to
self-government that could be actualised within a specific community:
(…) it is through their belonging to the demos
that democratic citizens are granted equal rights,
not because they participate in an abstract idea of
humanity. This is why he (Schmitt) declares that
the central concept of democracy is not
‘humanity’ but the concept of the ‘people’ and
that there can never be a democracy of
mankind.67
I think there is a useful parallel to be drawn here between Mouffe’s
criticism of cosmopolitan rights and Arendt’s discussion of the “right
to have rights”.68 Arendt was moved to postulate the idea of a ‘right to
have rights’ in the face of the situation of refugees left stateless in the
aftermath of the First World War. What Arendt meant to indicate
through this phrase was that citizenship in a particular polity is a
prerequisite for the meaningful exercise and enforcement of human
rights. In other words, without secure membership in a political
community our universal human rights are empty signifiers. In a
similar vein, Mouffe argues that the ‘rights’ of individuals as members
of a global demos would in fact be moral claims rather than political
65 Ibid, pp. 32-33.
66 Ibid, p44.
67 Ibid, pp. 40-41.
68 Arendt (1967), pp. 296-297.
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rights since they could not be actualised within any particular political
community.69 At best, global citizens would be left with the ability to
appeal to transnational courts to challenge global political
arrangements. For Mouffe, this would not constitute effective
democratic self-determination because there would be no scope for
contesting the hegemony of the liberal-universalist terms on which
global democracy would in her view have to be based:
(…) without a demos to which they belong, those
cosmopolitan citizen pilgrims would in fact have
lost the possibility of exercising their democratic
rights of law-making … In all probability, such a
cosmopolitan democracy, if it were ever to be
realized, would be no more than an empty name
disguising the actual disappearance of
democratic forms of government and indicating
the triumph of the liberal form of governmental
rationality (…)70
Mouffe appears quite similar to Walzer then in her normative
evaluation of the prospects for genuinely democratic politics on a
global scale. For the sake of protecting the value and practice of
self-determination, both theorists support the idea that more should be
left up to politics in the sense of preserving spaces for differentiated
communities to pursue different sorts of policies and adopt different
kinds of political principles. Walzer criticises Benhabib for supporting
the imposition of a single universal model for membership policies on
all political communities - a charge that amounts to the claim that her
distinction between the principle of rights and different schedules of
rights is illusory.71 Mouffe argues on similar grounds that
cosmopolitan theorists fail to take pluralism seriously in their desire to
69 Mouffe (2005a), p101
70 Mouffe (1999), p42. See also Mouffe (2005a), pp. 106-107.
71 Walzer (2001).
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“impose one single model on the whole world”.72 Her key objection to
cosmopolitan political rights (i.e. rights that are not anchored in a
particular political community) is that they stand in direct opposition to
collective rights to self-determination:
(…) they may be used to undermine existing
democratic rights of self-government as when
civil society institutions challenge national
sovereignty in the name of ‘global concern’. By
justifying the right for international institutions
to undermine sovereignty in order to uphold
cosmopolitan law, (the cosmopolitan approach)
denies the democratic rights of self-government
for the citizens of many countries.73
We can see then that on a global level, both Walzer and Mouffe support
self-determination as-non-interference and the outcome of popular
sovereignty over and above the universal validity of any particular set
of political principles. What is crucial to Mouffe’s opposition to global
democracy is the normative legitimacy of democratic
self-determination and, in turn, the conceptual claim that democratic
self-determination necessarily requires the creation of a boundary and
acts of exclusion: “if the people are to rule, it is necessary to determine
who belongs to the people. Without any criterion to determine who are
the bearers of democratic rights, the will of the people could never take
shape”.74 However - once again - we can accept the point that
democratic self-determination calls for a clearly demarcated space - a
jurisdiction - in which the will of the people is sovereign, without
insisting that that space has to be closed to outsiders seeking social
membership and citizenship. In the following section, I argue that
Mouffe’s ontological claim that democratic jurisdictional boundaries
72 Mouffe (2005a), p115.
73 Ibid, p101.
74 Mouffe (2000a), p43.
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must necessarily function to exclude concrete outsiders from
membership is unfounded. However, I conclude this discussion of
Mouffe’s work by arguing that if we downplay her allegiance to
Schmitt and emphasise instead the Derridean aspects of her thought,
then the agonistic frontier between ‘us’ and ‘them’ shifts from
describing an exclusive territorial boundary separating the members of
a demos from the non-members, to describing boundaries both between
and within the members themselves. We arrive at the idea that an
agonistic democratic community is a democracy of strangers.
6.5 Us/Them?
The most forceful critique of the ‘particularist thesis’ advanced by
Mouffe - the idea that democratic communities must necessarily
commit acts of exclusion understood as barring concrete individuals
from membership - has been put forward by Arash Abizadeh.
Abizadeh’s main target in his paper ‘Does Collective Identity
Presuppose an Other?’75 is the idea that collective identification
necessarily rests on the exclusion of concrete, actually existing and
empirically identifiable outsiders, who are excluded from full
membership. Abizadeh wants to rescue the prospects for a genuinely
global democratic community, i.e. “a democratically legitimated
cosmopolitan political order buttressed by a sense of identification or
solidarity with humanity as a whole”.76 For Mouffe, as we have seen,
this goal is conceptually and ontologically impossible since
‘personhood’ is in her view not a political category and so cannot be
used to anchor genuine democratic rights. It is not a political category
in Mouffe’s view since it is not formulated in opposition to an enemy or
75 Abizadeh (2005).
76 Ibid, p45.
339
adversary and so cannot capture the dimension of antagonism and the
necessary exclusions which accompany the constitution of collective
identities. It is this position that Abizadeh aims to undermine. In so
doing, the thesis that there is a necessary, ontological relationship
between democratic self-determination and exclusion is brought into
question.
What Abizadeh takes exception to in the presentation of Mouffe’s
argument is the claim that “every collective identity simultaneously
and necessarily excludes some individuals from its constitution”.77
According to Abizadeh, there are two ways of reading this premise.
The first is to interpret Mouffe as claiming that communities
necessarily exclude some concrete individuals from membership: A)
that there is no ‘us’ without a ‘them’, where ‘they’ consist of ‘actually
existing individuals or groups who are denied membership’.78
Abizadeh points out that this argument is belied by the fact that the
subject of exclusionary forces could in fact be an insider or a full
member of the community in question:
(…) exclusion need not consist in the denial of
membership to particular individuals … The
exclusionary violence to which Mouffe refers …
might, for example, take the form of including
the targeted individuals as members by forcibly
excluding … characteristics that fail to fit the
mould.79
The second, more expansive way of reading Mouffe’s exclusion claim
is: B) communal identities are based on excluding some actually
existing individual or groups from membership, whether inside or
77 Ibid, p54.
78 Ibid.
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outside the community.80 Abizadeh moves on to attack the idea that the
formation of collective identity requires excluding any actually
existing individuals or groups of individuals from membership. He
does so via a critical re-appraisal of Mouffe’s deployment of the
Derridean notion of the ‘constitutive outside’. As we have seen,
Mouffe presents Derrida and Schmitt as complementing each other in
the sense that they mutually support the conclusion that identity is
relational and that therefore the constitution of every identity involves
an act of exclusion. For Mouffe, Derrida shows us that “difference is
the condition of the possibility of constituting unity and totality at the
same time that it provides their essential limits”.81 What Abizadeh
attempts to show is that Derrida’s views cannot be pressed into the
service of a simple binary consisting of us/them, where ‘they’ are
excluded from membership by ‘us’. In fact, according to Abizadeh’s
reading of Derrida, a proper understanding of the constitutive outside
confounds Mouffe’s assertion of the particularist thesis.
As mentioned above, Derrida’s argument is directed at Saussurean
structuralist linguistics. For Saussure, the meaning of a sign is
determined by the relationship between a concept and an acoustic
image within a closed linguistic structure. Signs therefore derive their
meaning not from their relation or correspondence to nonlinguistic
entities but from their differential relationship to all the other signs
within the linguistic structure. As we have seen, Derrida argues that
this idea of a closed linguistic system succumbs to a vicious circularity
that renders meaning impossible. He argues that the only way to escape
the self-referential character of meaning within a closed linguistic
system is to postulate an ‘outside’ to the system that penetrates the
79 Ibid, p55.
80 Ibid.
81 Mouffe (2000a), p33.
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inside. For Derrida, this interpenetration actually calls into question the
clarity of the distinction between the inside and the outside of a
linguistic structure that structuralist linguistics proposes as an account
of the meaning of signs. For Abizadeh, this interpenetration is no less
fatal to the Schmitt/Mouffe claim that all collective identities rest on
the exclusion from membership of actually existing, empirically
identifiable outsiders. If the outside (the ‘enemy’) is partly constitutive
of the inside (the ‘friends’), then the distinction between the outside
and the inside of a collective identity cannot be transposed neatly onto
a clear, empirical distinction between those individuals who are friends
(and included) and those who are enemies (and excluded). Rather, it
follows from Derrida’s critique that there are enemies within the circle
of friends, just as the outside of a linguistic system is constitutive of the
meaning of the terms within the system:
(…) if the ‘constitutive outside’ is constitutive of
what is inside … then the (impure) conceptual
distinction between friend and enemy … cannot
map onto existing, empirically identifiable
bounded groups of individuals … This is because
any act of identifying the ‘friend’ will inevitably
find within its members characteristics that
supposedly belong to the category of the ‘enemy’
… the enemy is within one’s own self.82
Finally, Abizadeh points out that the idea that politics always involves
relations of ‘us/them’ underdetermines the construction of any
particular boundary between ‘us’ and ‘them’, as well as any particular
way of filling in the content of ‘us’ and ‘them’. Even if it is conceded
that collective identity requires an ‘other’, and that democracies require
the drawing of a boundary, why should that ‘other’ be thought of as a
geographically external human or group of humans, and why should
the boundary be conceived of in spatial or physical terms? A
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community could quite coherently define its identity and draw its
boundaries in opposition to some community that existed in the past, or
a set of imaginary values, or a set of non-human properties or
characteristics83. The particularist thesis; the claim that ‘they’ must
consist of actually existing, empirically identifiable individuals who
are excluded from membership, does not therefore follow logically
from the premise that collective identities require an ‘other’.
Abizadeh has in my view shown convincingly that Mouffe’s
neo-Schmittian ontological exclusion claim cannot be supported on
Derridean grounds.84 However, for my purposes it is important to note
that Mouffe’s relationship to Schmitt is more ambiguous than a simple
affirmation of his reductive account of the political as characterised by
‘friend/enemy’ relationships, understood as describing a relationship
whereby ‘we’ exclude ‘them’ from membership. In her more Derridean
and less Schmittian moments, Mouffe acknowledges that the outside of
a political community is partially constitutive of the inside, and that
there cannot therefore be any ‘pure’ ‘we’, or a community free from
internal differences, that sets itself in contrast to, and so excludes, a
concrete, empirically identifiable ‘them’:
In order to avoid any misunderstanding, let me
point out that the ‘constitutive outside’ cannot be
reduced to a dialectical negation … what is
‘outside’ is not simply the outside of a concrete
content but something which puts into question
‘concreteness’ as such … the ‘them’ is not the
constitutive opposite of a concrete ‘us’, but the
symbol of what makes any ‘us’ impossible.85
82 Abizadeh (2005), p57.
83 Ibid, p58.
84 Honig (2001a, p144, nt. 16) also disagrees with what she calls the
‘metaphysical’ exclusion claim.
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Similarly, she observes that:
“(…) every object has within its very being
something other than itself ... Since the
constitutive outside is always present within the
inside, every identity becomes purely contingent.
This implies that we should not conceptualize
power as an external relation taking place
between two pre-constituted identities (…)86
Abizadeh does concede that Mouffe makes these claims, but he states
that she fails to see how they are incompatible with her endorsement of
the Schmittean exclusion claim.87 I think it is coherent - although more
charitable in light of Abizadeh’s critique - to read them instead as
marking Mouffe’s difference from Schmitt, or at least her ambiguous
relationship to his philosophical legacy; an ambiguity fostered in my
view by her simultaneous allegiance to Derrida.
Mouffe does sometimes appear to endorse an uncritically reductive
account of the political in terms of the Schmittian distinction between
friend and enemy - for example, when she claims that “it is useful to
remember with Carl Schmitt that the defining feature of politics is
struggle and that ‘There always are concrete human groupings which
fight other concrete human groups’”88. However, at other points she
acknowledges the fact of multiple, fractured identities and the way in
which this understanding of divided subjectivity disrupts the
Schmittian binary; for example, when she calls for multiplying
relations of ‘us/them’ as a means of defusing the antagonism that
Schmitt believed was a necessary aspect of the political:
85 Mouffe (2000a), pp. 12-13. See also p21.
86 Ibid, p21.
87 Abizadeh (2005), p57, nt. 38.
88 Mouffe (2005b), p113, quoting Schmitt (1985), p67.
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(…) the most likely condition for the emergence
of antagonism … is when there is a very strong
separation between ‘us’ and ‘them’ … If on the
other hand, the us/them is multiplied, so that for
instance you and I constitute an ‘us’ with respect
to ‘them’, but then a different you and I
constitute a different ‘us’, then it is less likely
that there will be antagonism.89
The idea that a single subject can occupy multiple positions of
identification, so that they can be both friends with another subject in
one context and the agonistic opponent of that same subject in a
different context, contradicts a bifurcated conception of the political in
terms of a simple relationship of us/them. This understanding of
political subjectivity turns on the idea that we have encountered above
in Abizadeh’s reading of Derrida; that “the construction of a political
frontier is … something that can cut across each individual”.90
In the following section I will argue in connection with my discussion
of Honig that this idea of divided subjectivity suggests a way of
thinking through the relationship between democratic
self-determination and political membership which speaks to a number
of the key concerns I have raised in relation to the theories canvassed in
the previous four chapters. If the collective identity of the ‘self’ that is
self-determining is composed of subjects who are not only foreign to
one another, but also contain traces of foreignness within themselves,
then the concern seems to lose purchase, that the introduction of further
foreigners into that political association might compromise the practice
of self-determination for the existing members.
89 Mouffe and Laclau, (2001), p26.
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In the final section of this chapter, I go on to argue that Honig’s work,
on democracy and the symbolic politics of foreignness, opens up a
distinctive way of approaching the relationship between democratic
self-determination and political membership. It encourages the
following ‘switching’ of the conventional problematic: what if certain
key aspects of democracy rest not on the right to exclude outsiders from
social membership and citizenship, but instead on the symbolism
implied in the act of including them? This reversal of the conventional
way of framing the relationship between self-determination and
political membership is motivated by Honig’s argument in Democracy
and the Foreigner91 that democratic regimes often rely on those
energies, qualities or virtues that come from the introduction of
foreigners into the political association. Although Honig does not apply
her arguments directly to the question of self-determination and
democratic membership, my reflections here take inspiration from the
way in which she switches the normative/investigative framework
within which immigration is traditionally situated. Rather than asking
whether or not foreignness poses a problem for democracy, Honig asks
whether foreignness solves certain intractable problems for democracy.
6.6 No place like home; Bonnie Honig, Democracy and
Foreignness
Agonism, for Honig, names a certain attentiveness to those elements of
society that are left out of or alienated by “ideal or systematic”92
approaches to justice. Her agonism calls for “a commitment to a certain
90 Mouffe (1996), p25.
91 Honig (2001a).
92 Browning (2008), p438.
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fidelity to the remainders of politics … those undone oughts that haunt
political life and to those parts of all persons that are ill fitted to
dominant norms and forms of subjectivity and kinship”.93 In Honig’s
view, both the traditional liberal commitment to a universal politics of
rights, as well as the communitarian emphasis on the unity of political
community, represent ‘virtue’ theories.94 They seek to contain conflict
and to subsume potentially disruptive moments in democratic politics
within a stable system of rights or according to a unitary concept of
communal values and identity respectively. By contrast, agonistic
‘virtu’ theorists - for example Nietzsche and Arendt - celebrate the
unexpected and the unconventional in politics, and they aim to harness
these disruptive and destabilising energies to bring new political
worlds and possibilities into being.95
Like Mouffe, Honig is critical of rational and universalist approaches
to moral reasoning and political organisation. In her view, they seek a
form of closure and unity which can only be preserved through a denial
of difference, dissonance and pluralism. Her agonism promotes politics
as “a disruptive practice that resists the consolidations and closures of
administrative and juridical settlement for the perpetuity of political
contest”.96 She calls on the subjects of modern liberal societies to resist
seeing their state as either the final and authoritative arbiter in matters
of justice or as the sole avenue for political allegiance and democratic
activity, and to develop and participate instead in multiple channels for
the expression of democratic energies below, across and beyond state
boundaries.97 This is in part because she agrees with the doctrine of
divided subjectivity that we have encountered in the previous section.
93 Ibid, p436.
94 Honig (1993a).
95 Ibid, Chapter 3, Chapter 4; Honig (1994), pp. 586-589; Honig (2006),
p110, p117.
96 Honig (1993a), p2.
97 Honig (2001a), p103.
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She claims that individuals “are constituted by multiple and often
incommensurable identities and differences”.98 I will discuss further
the connection between this account of divided subjectivity and
Honig’s emphasis on resisting the state as the sole avenue for
democratic activism at the end of this section.
The idea of a shared collective democratic will - for example the
tradition of jurisprudential thought that conceives of the state as a
“corporate ‘person’ having a sovereign ‘will’ and interests that it may
rightly pursue, with territorial sovereignty understood as analogous to
private property”99 - would seem to be a clear example of an idea of
democratic politics that denies the existence of what Honig calls
remainders, i.e. those conflicting voices and competing interests within
the demos itself, or the strangers within the ‘self’ that is democratically
self-determining. Following Jacques Ranciere’s concept of democracy
as an “abstract assemblage of ordinary people, who have no individual
title to govern”,100 Honig argues that “democracy is always about
living with strangers under a law that is therefore alien (because it is the
mongrel product of political action - often gone awry - taken with and
among strangers)”.101 In contrast to Walzer’s use of familial analogies
to help explicate the moral basis of his liberal-communitarian position
on membership, Honig encourages us to “rethink democracy in
non-kinship terms, as a politics among strangers”.102 Instead of
regarding the fundamental opacity between democratic citizens as
being a problem to be overcome, or as an obstacle to collective
self-determination,103 Honig sees the potential for a re-invigoration of
98 Honig (1994), p565.
99 Whelan (1988b), p24.
100 Ranciere, (2000) p19; quoted in Honig (2009).
101 Honig (2001a), p39.
102 Ibid, p72.
103 cf. Taylor (2002).
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democratic energies, particularly on behalf of the disenfranchised and
the stateless: “Even at its very best, or especially so, democracy is
about being mobilized into action periodically with and on behalf of
people who are surely opaque to us and often unknown to us”.104
Honig’s understanding of democracy as political action taken in
concert with strangers suggests that the ideal of a unified collective
democratic will articulated through popular sovereignty is illusory, or
at best a regulative fiction that can never be realised. On the agonistic
account of divided subjectivity, we are alien to aspects of ourselves, we
are alien to aspects of others, and so at least partly alien before the law
that we democratically participate in formulating in concert with those
others. As John Heilbron points out, one of the key messages of
Honig’s work is that “ (…) no political order, not even democracy, can
be fully transparent and honest about itself … the real foreigner among
us is the law itself”.105 In other words, the state is never wholly
authorised to act in the name of a ‘people’; the marriage between “a
people and its law, a state and its institutions”106 is never a perfectly
harmonious relationship. For Honig, this permanent legitimacy gap is
something to be welcomed:
Which is the better course for democracies? To
see such perhaps necessary moments of
alienation in life under law as welcome gaps that
remind us of the insufficiencies of juridical
efforts to institute justice or legitimacy without
remainder? Or to seek, as Kant and Rousseau did,
as Habermas often does, to overcome the
moment of alienation?107
104 Honig (2001a), p39.
105 Heilbron (2004), p247.
106 Honig (2001a), p109.
107 Honig (2001b), p794.
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On Honig’s account, facing up to the “moments of alienation” under
the rule of law in a democratic society opens up channels for
democratic experimentation. In particular, recognising that democratic
energies never rely on fully or correspond to a shared collective will of
the people helps to displace the territorial nation-state’s claim to be the
sole site of democratic allegiance and activity:
(…) the felt strangeness of the institutions that
aim to define the terms of the democratic contest
… might … stand as markers of the fact that
democracy’s energies and origins always point
beyond the (national) borders and commonalities
that have heretofore presented themselves as
democracy’s necessary conditions.108
Honig’s understanding of democracy as a form of political action taken
with, and on behalf of, strangers, issues a distinct understanding of the
relationship between self-determination and political membership. If
the law is always partly alien to us, then membership controls (as much
as and no less than any other policy or decision) do not issue
straightforwardly from a shared will of the people articulated through
popular sovereignty. If, as the work of Honig (and Mouffe, in her more
Derridean and less Schmittian moments) suggests, democratic
self-determination is ultimately about political action taken in concert
with strangers, then the worry that a community will lack meaningful
self-determination if it is deprived of the unilateral right to control
membership, becomes considerably less pressing. If a democratic
community is composed of strangers, this dissolves the concern that
foreigners may pose a threat to the internal social unity, the shared
values, identity, or the common will, and therefore to the collective
democratic projects, that are often said to both express themselves and
108 Honig (2001a), p40.
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be preserved by the unilateral right of existing citizens to shape the
sphere of membership. Following Honig and promoting democratic
politics “without presupposing a unified demos stabilized by a
metaphorics of national kinship”109 renders control over political
membership a far less urgent feature of self-determination, because
shared membership in this agonistic demos is something that is always
already riven by internal differences, conflicts and disharmonies; those
“incommensurabilities and differences that cut across and through
traditional, ethnic, local, or national group identities”.110
In what ways does the idea of a democracy of strangers have normative
merit in comparison to the theories of self-determination canvassed in
the previous four chapters? I have argued in Chapters 2 and 3 that
appeals to social or cultural unity, to substantiate the normative link
between control over membership and self-determination, are both
problematic in themselves and have unappealing implications for
democracy. The idea of a democracy of strangers avoids the objections
to the claims of cultural unity that underly Tamir and Tebble’s claim,
that political communities have a right grounded in the significance of
shared culture to autonomy to exclude those who cannot affirm the
dominant shared values of the host community. The idea of the
democratic community being composed of individuals who are
ultimately strange to one another is the direct antithesis of the
Tamir/Walzer view of national groups as “communities of character”
united in a collective project of self-determination, the internal unity of
which legitimates the kind of discretionary ‘club’ based model of
unilateral membership controls. I argued in Chapter 3 that Miller’s
democratic argument for membership controls is undermined by the
fact of heterogenous preferences for state policy amongst the citizen
109 Ibid.
110 Honig (1994), pp. 565-566.
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body. This is an objection that the idea of a democracy of strangers
avoids, as it makes no appeal to a shared collective will of the ‘demos’
that could be ‘hollowed out’ by the entrance of outsiders with different
preferences. Furthermore, it is opposed to the discourse-theory
approach to moral reasoning as the practice of ‘enlarged mentality’
advanced by Benhabib. The idea that we can reason from the
standpoint of all relevantly affected others, and so act on the basis of
decisions that are universally justifiable, turns on a level of
transparency and mutual understanding between subjects which denies
their strangeness to one another. I argued against Benhabib that her
assumption of the reversibility of perspectives between democratic
subjects threatens to create internal exclusions, which in turn
compromises the normative logic behind the subject-to-the-law
principle of democratic inclusion, which I have argued in favour of as a
jurisdictional rule. The contrary assumption of the irreversibility of
perspectives, on the other hand, is quite clearly sustained by the
assumption of the fundamental alterity of other democratic subjects.
A democracy of strangers would be a democratic community mindful
of Iris Young’s warning that “politics should not succumb to a longing
for comfort and unity”.111 Instead, she argues with Honig that “(…)
politics must be conceived as a relationship of strangers who do not
understand one another in a subjective and immediate sense”.112 Young
maintains that contemporary urban spaces offer guidance for
re-conceptualising the idea of political community in ways that are
attentive of difference but which do not “succumb” to the kind of
longing for unity in the demos which is characteristic of nationalist
approaches to democracy and group identity. “City life”, she writes,
exemplifies “a form of social relations which I define as the being
111 Young (2005b), p146.
112 Young (1990), p234.
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together of strangers”.113 Cities display a form of unity in so far as their
inhabitants operate with a sense of belonging, but this does not entail
the kind of homogeneity or unity said to be characteristic of national
identities: “In the city persons and groups interact within spaces and
institutions they all experience themselves as belonging to, but without
those interactions dissolving into unity or commonness”.114 As I noted
in Chapter 2 in connection with my critique of Walzer’s communitarian
defense of membership controls, city life illustrates the fact that
political belonging, group differences and collective self-determination
do not necessarily require closure in the form of social membership or
citizenship controls.
As Young suggests, there may well be something reassuring about the
ideal of national unity; for example, in Miller’s description of national
communities as being “held together not merely by physical necessity,
but by a dense web of customs, practices, implicit understandings, and
so forth”.115 However, in a discussion of the politics of ‘home’ - which
can be counterpoised to the idea of a democracy of strangers - Honig
argues that this ideal is often politically dangerous in its threat to
pluralism and inclusion:
(…) it animates and exacerbates the inability of
constituted subjects - or nations - to accept their
own internal divisions, and it engenders zealotry,
the will to bring the dream of unitariness of home
into being. It leads the subject to project its
internal differences onto external Others and
then to rage against them for standing in the way
of its dream (…)116
113 Ibid, p237.
114 Ibid.
115 Miller (1995), p41.
116 Honig (1994), p585. A similar message runs throughout Connolly
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If we understand the ‘subject’ in this quotation to mean ‘democratic
community’, and if we understand “(…) rage against them” to mean
“(…) exclude them from membership”, then we have an apt summary
of the point I am trying to make in this section, as well as the normative
and political shift that is effected by substituting for the ideal of home
the far more precarious conception of a democracy of strangers. Diana
Brydon points out in similar fashion to Honig, that “When ideologies
of home get channelled through theorizations of community they often
lead toward a governmental emphasis on ‘social cohesion’ that seeks to
promote homogeneity, limiting dissent and alternative imaginings”.117
Honig cautions her readers not to assume that the philosophical
doctrine of divided subjectivity is sufficient in and of itself to usher in a
more pluralistic and inclusive redefinition of political identity and
democratic community. Acknowledging the internal differences within
ourselves and within our community may have the reverse effect; it
may lead democratic subjects to pursue unity and homogeneity with
even greater vigour, with a correspondingly graver cost to those who
resemble or reflect internal ‘others’:
The mere awareness of our own internal
divisions may make us more tolerant of others
(who may personify those divisions for us). But
it may just as well engender and feed a
determination to extinguish or contain that
strangeness, to scapegoat it, in order to
(re)establish the unity … we crave118.
(1991).
117 Brydon (2007).
118 Honig (2001a), pp, 57-58. There are, of course, dangers inherent in
the agonistic concept of politics, rationality and morality. Perhaps the
most pressing objection is that it seems grist to the mill for hard-core
political realists. If we abandon all appeals to morality and rationality
in politics, do we not thereby give licence to the view that ‘might is
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At this point, the contextual nature of Honig’s analysis becomes
particularly salient, and limits the extent to which her conclusions can
be generalised. The argument that open immigration can re-vitalise the
democratic process seems unobjectionable in the contemporary
American context. But it is far more tenuous when applied to, say, the
case of Israel/Palestine, where the potential for violent hostility
between the two national groups is an unavoidable fact and where the
danger of one group being subject to domination at the hands of the
other is very real. In situations like this, where two or more mutually
antagonistic groups live in close proximity, and where civil, political
and human rights are precarious, the thought that the free entrance of
outsiders might re-invigorate the democratic procedure seems naively
optimistic.
But my point is not so much about the kinds of psychological or
political dispositions that might be engendered by attending to
foreignness within the political association, and which may lead
established citizens to regard foreignness as either good or bad for the
self-determining political community. My argument is rather a
conceptual one with normative implications. A democracy of strangers
cannot claim justifiably that the right to exclude foreigners from social
membership or citizenship is necessary for safeguarding its right to
collective self-determination, given that the collective ‘self’ that is
‘self-determining’ is composed not only of subjects who are foreign to
right’? Whether or not agonists can come up with a convincing
response to this sort of critique is beyond the scope of this thesis. But
the utility of the agonistic concept of democracy for thinking through
the relationship between self-determination and political membership
does not turn upon that concept being ethically or conceptually
flawless.
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one another, and so foreign before the law that they jointly legitimise in
concert with others, but also in an important sense foreign to
themselves. The idea of a democracy of strangers therefore provides a
riposte to Whelan’s claim that if democratic communities are denied
the right to exclude then “(…) the democracy that existed would be
seriously attenuated; it would not amount to self-determination”.119
A final point that arises from the idea of divided subjectivity in relation
to the politics of membership is that it highlights the importance of
encouraging multiple sites for democratic activism. If we have multiple,
internally divided selves, it follows that our autonomy may be best
served by participating in multiple forms of community and having
multiple forms of political membership.120 Honig attempts to loosen
the state’s monopoly over the legitimacy of modes of inclusion and
exclusion and the regulation of sites for democratic activism by
reflecting on the potential for political voice and democratic
citizenship-activity to be expressed and carried out through informal,
non-statist organisations and social movements. The aim of her
“democratic cosmopolitanism” is to “widen the resources and energies
of an emerging international civil society to contest or support the
states actions in matters of transnational and local interest such as
environmental, economic, military, cultural and immigration
policies”.121 Carol Gould supports this emphasis on multiplying the
sites for democratic membership and participation by suggesting that
such multiplication can help to alleviate the harm of being excluded
from any particular community: “multiple memberships can ...
contribute to minimizing the exclusiveness and unfairness that besets
many cases of national citizenship, and can permit addressing more
119 Whelan (1988a), pp. 28-29.
120 Honig (1994), p566.
121 Honig (2001a), p103.
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squarely the requirements of global justice”.122 In a similar fashion,
Honig argues that “highly politicized institutions that shift and
proliferate the sites of politics are the best way to diminish the violence
and the resentment that invariably haunt political arrangements”.123
The kind of democratic activism promoted by Honig and Gould
encourages the exercise of democratic agency outside formal state
channels. In Chapter 4 I argued against Young that self-determination
calls for the exclusion of territorial outsiders from participatory
membership. The multiplication of forms of political membership may
help to ‘minimise’ the potential harm to individuals of being excluded
from participation in those ‘internal’ decisions of other political
communities which may affect their interests. For example, following
Honig and Gould’s line of thought would encourage the participation
of South Pacific islanders in informal, non-statist organisations like
Greenpeace, in order to put pressure on the French state not to test
nuclear devices in their vicinity in the future. Their exclusion from
participatory membership in the formal French decision making
structure would not thereby render the islanders wholly devoid of a
political voice and democratic agency. In the following section, I
discuss the way in which Honig encourages the stateless and
disenfranchised to ‘take rights’, with a view to disrupting further the
exclusivity of nation-state membership.
122 Gould (2006), p51.
123 Honig (1993a), p159.
357
6.7 The ‘Taking Immigrant’ and the ‘Foreign-Founder’
All of the authors I have discussed so far approach the issue of political
membership from a more or less state-centric or institutional
perspective. They share the thought that rights to democratic voice,
entry to territory or access to citizenship are the responsibility of states
or other formal political institutions to grant or withhold. Even theorists
of post-national democracy like Benhabib and Young, who attempt to
de-couple the privileges of democratic participation from citizenship
status distributed according to nationality or territorial location, still
ultimately rely on formal political institutions to sanction the inclusion
of outsiders in democratic decision-making procedures.
In contrast to these ‘top-down’, institutional approaches to
enfranchisement, Honig focuses on strategies by which the
disenfranchised can be empowered to speak for themselves and to take
the rights and privileges associated with citizenship, rather than waiting
for them to be granted or withheld at the whim of a particular demos,
state or other institutional body. Honig encourages those who are
disenfranchised to not only demand the rights of citizenship but to act
as if they already had them; in other words, to take rights for
themselves, and in so doing, to expose the grounds for distinguishing
between insiders and outsiders as contestable: “empowering aliens to
act as citizens, even when they lack that juridical status ... attenuates
the lines between aliens and citizens”.124 The founding of American
democracy itself proceeded without any external sovereign
authorisation, and Honig argues on the basis of this example that
democracy is often at its most vibrant when it is animated by those who
seek to join or create a community, and who seize rights for themselves
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that had not been previously sanctioned by any formally recognised
political authority: “the practice of taking rights and privileges rather
than waiting for them to be granted by a sovereign power is, I would
argue, a quintessentially democratic practice”.125 The practice of taking
rights is exemplified in efforts to expand forms of alien suffrage. Such
taking is, for example, captured successfully in the practice already
prevalent in a number of American cities of including noncitizen
residents in local or municipal elections.126 Informal political advocacy
groups such as the international ‘No Borders’ movement help to
empower resident aliens to take rights for themselves by providing
immigrants, refugees and asylum seekers with free legal advice and
representation and by generating local and national awareness of
humanitarian and legal complications in the status and treatment of
aliens at the hands of the state. As I noted in the previous chapter,
linking membership rights to the fact of territorial residence in the way
that is called for by the subject-to-the-law principle of democratic
inclusion helps to de-nationalise citizenship status, and in turn lends
democratic legitimacy to the taking of rights endorsed by Honig.
The idea of taking rights without formal authorisation seems to tail
with Arendt’s discussion of statelessness and ‘the right to have rights’,
in as much as it is concerned with empowering and enfranchising those
who lie outside of the structure of state membership and have no formal
legal standing.127 The difference between Benhabib and Honig’s
reading of ‘the right to have rights’ is revealing in the present context.
Benhabib points out that the two uses of the term ‘right’ are
non-equivalent:
124 Honig (2001a), p164, nt. 82.
125 Ibid, p99.
126 Ibid, p102.
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The first use of the term “right” is addressed to
humanity as such and enjoins us to recognize
membership in some human group ... The second
use of the term “rights” is built upon this prior
claim of membership … Such rights, which
generate reciprocal obligations among
consociates … are usually referred to as “civil
and political” rights or as citizens rights.128
In this sense, the first use of the term ‘right’ sets the ground for
legitimising the claim of individuals to possess ‘rights’ in the second
sense of the term, i.e. the rights that already exist within a specific
political community: “the right of humanity entitles us to become a
member of civil society such that we can then be entitled to
juridico-civil rights”.129 On Honig’s contrasting interpretation,
however, the ‘right to have rights’ does not legitimise the incorporation
of migrants into a pre-existing system of juridico-civil rights. Instead,
she argues that the legitimising grounds follow from the making of a
new rights claim - not the other way around, as suggested by Benhabib:
(…) the right to have rights could be seen as an
authorizing ground for the claims made by those
without proper standing to make them … But I
don’t pursue this point further because in general
I think such authorizing grounds tend to follow,
post hoc, from the making of new claims rather
than grounding them in advance.130
The difference between Benhabib and Honig here is that the former
regards the migrant as “an object of charity or hospitality”.131 The
‘right to have rights’, for Benhabib, creates an obligation on the part of
127 Ibid, p61.
128 Benhabib (2004a), pp. 56-57.
129 Ibid, p59.
130 Honig (2001a), p149, nt. 53.
131 Ibid, p61.
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established political regimes to bestow rights upon aliens, whereas
Honig wants to position “the immigrant as a full agent empowered to
make (always contestable) claims or take rights on her own behalf”.132
For Honig, ‘the right to have rights’ is backward looking, describing
instead of legitimising the grounds upon which migrants take rights for
themselves. This exemplifies the point that Benhabib is concerned with
incorporating immigrants into an already existing polity, whereas
Honig is interested in how migrants might bring new political rights
and possibilities into being.
I have drawn attention to and discussed critically the boundary problem
in democratic theory at a number of different points in the previous
three chapters. Although I have endorsed subjection to the law over
affectedness as a principle of democratic inclusion, in Chapters 2 and 3
I have conceded that, ultimately, this way of demarcating a demos is
still vulnerable to the logical problem of initial authorisation. To return
to a previously cited quotation, the problem is that simply stating - with
Walzer - that the self-determining body of people who initially
constitute the subjects of the law are those people who choose to
recognise one another as such is “in fact ridiculous because the people
cannot decide until someone decides who are the people”.133 The
subject-to-the-law principle of demarcation cannot bring this logical
regress to a halt, because it presupposes the existence of a bounded
territorial unit, and cannot in itself explain why the laws of that territory
- including its membership policies - are legitimate expressions of the
democratic will of that particular demos.134 In Chapter 2, I argued that
the boundary problem reveals the fact that the demos has no legitimate
right grounded on purely democratic considerations to grant or
132 Ibid, p62.
133 Jennings (1956), p56.
134 Karlsonn (2006), p24.
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withhold membership to outsiders, because there is no democratic way
of answering the question, ‘what gives this group of people, bound by
these territorial boundaries, the right to shape membership through
policies of inclusion and exclusion?’, without entering into a logical
regress. What the boundary problem suggests in turn is that whilst the
‘taking’ immigrant acts without prior sovereign authorisation, their act
of taking rights is no more and no less illegitimate on democratic
grounds than any membership decision or boundary policy enacted by
established citizens. The idea of the ‘taking’ immigrant as a symbol of
democratic activism is crucial for Honig, because it illustrates that,
rather than simply being recuperated for nationalist concepts of
democracy, the symbolic politics of foreignness can be pressed into
service of democracy outside of the nation-state, in terms of civil
society, and beyond the nation-state, in terms of transnational civil
networks135.
Alongside her analysis of the ‘taking immigrant’, Honig finds dotted
throughout the history of Western political thought and contemporary
popular culture the recurring figure of the “foreign-founder”. These are
individuals who come from outside the established citizenry to provide
an important quality or testimony that is lacking in or inaccessible to
the current members: ““the figure of the foreigner serves as a device
that allows regimes to import from outside … some specific and
much-needed but also potentially dangerous virtue, talent, perspective,
practice, gift or quality that they cannot provide for themselves …”.136
An important insight of Honig’s reflections on the ‘foreign founder’
myths that she encounters in Biblical tales, popular culture and
contemporary American immigration politics is that they confront
squarely the necessary lack of authorisation in the founding of
135 Honig (1998) p19.
136 Honig (2001a), p3.
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democratic regimes, whilst suggesting ways in which this permanent
legitimacy gap can be used to appropriate democratic energies on
behalf of the disenfranchised.
But aren’t democracies threatened by the figure of the foreign-founder,
given the prevalent belief that democracy requires social or cultural
unity in order to function successfully?137 Not necessarily. In fact,
foreigners who seek to join a political community often bolster the
democratic character of the association. By naturalising, foreigners
provide evidence of ‘consent-worthiness’ of the political regime, and
so provide an important supplement to the political community.
Birthright citizens, whose political autonomy is supposed to be
protected in part through their secure membership in a self-determining
state, are never offered directly the opportunity to voice their consent to
membership within that regime. This is an uncomfortable fact for
liberal regimes, which are supposed to derive their legitimacy in part
from the consent of the governed.138 Only the foreigner who has chosen
to become a naturalised citizen is in a position to fill this legitimacy
gap:
The liberal consenting immigrant addresses the
need of a disaffected citizenry to experience its
regime as choice worthy, to see it through the
eyes of still enchanted newcomers whose choice
to come here also just happens to reenact
liberalism’s fictive foundation in an act of
individual consent. Simultaneously, the
immigrant’s decision to come here is seen as
living proof of the supposed universality of
America’s liberal democratic principles.139
137 Ibid, p10.
138 Ibid, p92.
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Therefore, not only is the inclusion of foreigners to social membership
and citizenship compatible with democratic self-determination, it can
in fact be seen to reinvigorate democracy, by providing evidence that
the regime they seek to join embodies desirable principles of
governance: “The American need for periodic testimony to the true
universality of its principles and the choiceworthiness of its democracy
is met by new immigrant foreigners”.140 As we have seen, liberal
nationalist and liberal communitarian theorists worry that the
differences that foreigners bring with them may dissolve the shared
internal unity which is in their view crucial for the self-determination
of the host community. Honig once again reverses this framing of the
relationship between nationalism and foreignness. She argues that the
more foreign the prospective citizen, the greater democratic
supplement they represent to the nation when they choose to pursue
membership within it, precisely because the desirability of that
membership presumably spans whatever ethnic, religious, cultural or
linguistic differences might be thought to stand between them and
native-born citizens: “… the more foreign the new consenter, the more
powerful the impact of her consent as testimony to the universal’s
universal attractiveness”.141
The idea that democratic regimes often draw sustenance from the
inclusion of foreigners precisely because of their alterity marks a
notable exception to the more conventional way of framing foreignness
as a threat to the internal unity of the nation and its capacity for
self-determination. Charles Taylor has argued that the impulse towards
exclusion in contemporary nation-states follows from a political
dynamic internal to the functional logic of democracy; which is that
139 Honig (1998). p2.
140 Honig (2001a), p94.
141 Ibid.
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democracies typically operate better when there is a strong sense of
collective identity amongst the citizenry. Taylor argues that a
democratic community has to resemble something more than a mere
aggregation of strangers; citizens must be “bonded more powerfully
than (by) chance grouping”.142 In order for citizens to accept that they
are free and that the rule of law is legitimate even in cases where they
are in an outvoted minority, they have to be able to see themselves as
part of a political association that is being ruled by laws which are in
some sense expressive and protective of an identity or a set of interests
that they share in common with their fellow citizens:
(…) the modern democratic state has generally
accepted common purposes, or reference points,
the features whereby it can lay claim to being the
bulwark of freedom and locus of expression of
its citizens. Whether or not these claims are
actually founded, the state must be so imagined
by its citizens if it is to legitimate.143
Nationalism provides a source for this unity in the idea of a shared
culture: “What is defended and realised in the national state is not just
your freedom as a human being, but this state also guarantees the
expression of a common cultural identity”.144 Democratic exclusion is
therefore motivated by the threat of the dilution of this common
identity.
As an historic account of the drive towards unity and exclusion in
democratic societies, Taylor’s analysis may well be correct. But might
it be possible to encourage citizens to regard their liberal-democratic
association as legitimate precisely because of its lack of membership
142 Taylor (2002).
143 Ibid.
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controls? Could the “common allegiance to the political community”145
which Taylor sees as a pre-requisite for the “stability of (the)
legitimacy”146 of states come partly from the recognition amongst their
citizens that the exclusion of outsiders from social membership and
citizenship is unjustifiable on both liberal and democratic grounds, so
long as those outsiders pose no threat to the structure of their
self-determining association? Given the “peculiar significance” of
membership controls to national sovereignty in contemporary politics,
it may be unlikely that we will see such a change in either popular
consciousness or international law in the foreseeable future - if ever.
But if this thesis has offered convincing arguments, such a shift will be
a step in the normatively correct direction.
6.8 Conclusion
In this final chapter I hope to have illustrated some of the advantages of
thinking through the relationship between democratic
self-determination and political membership from the perspective of a
(suitably qualified) reading of the agonistic positions of Mouffe and
Honig. I began by discussing critically Mouffe’s claim that democratic
communities will be more open and inclusive to outsiders to the extent
that they conceive their policies and settlements (including those
concerning their membership boundaries) as political acts rather than
rational or moral imperatives. In my response I argued to the contrary
that Mouffe’s agon implies similarly restrictive membership policies to
those endorsed by liberal nationalists like Tamir. I then went on to
discuss Mouffe’s claim that collective identities necessarily rest on the
144 Ibid.
145 Ibid.
146 Ibid.
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exclusion of concrete individuals from membership. I illustrated how
she tries to ground this claim by forging an alliance between Schmitt’s
reflections on the antagonistic nature of ‘the political’ and Derrida’s
idea of the ‘constitutive outside’. I argued that this marriage is
unsuccessful, and that Derrida’s position in fact undermines the
Schmitt/Mouffe exclusion claim. In drawing my discussion of Mouffe
to a close, I argued that if we downplay her allegiance to Schmitt and
bring to the fore instead the Derridean elements of her thinking, then
we effect a shift in both the nature and the location of the agonistic
frontier between ‘us’ and ‘them’; a shift that has important implications
for how we should understand the inclusivity of an agonistic
democratic community. No longer bound uneasily to the reductive
Schmittean account that positions this frontier between the (included)
insiders and the (excluded) outsiders of a (national) political
community, the Derridean voice in Mouffe locates this frontier not
only within the boundaries of a democratic collective but within the
very identities of the members of the collective themselves.
‘Foreignness’, on this revised account of the agonistic frontier, does not
simply describe a relationship that exists between the members and
non-members of a demos, but amongst and within the members
themselves. A democratic community viewed from the perspective of
this (suitably qualified) agonistic understanding of individual and
collective identity represents therefore a ‘democracy of strangers’.
In the second half of this chapter I asked what normative light the idea
of a democracy of strangers might shed on the relationship between
collective self-determination and political membership, through a
discussion of Bonnie Honig’s work on the symbolic politics of
foreignness. I argued that the sorts of reasons that motivate the
exclusion claims that we have encountered in liberal nationalist,
identity liberal and liberal communitarian theories of
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self-determination (reasons which I hope to have exposed as at least
contestable in Chapters 2 and 3) simply do not arise if we view both
individual democratic subjects and the collective demos from the
agonistic perspective of divided subjectivity. In the final section, I
argued that Honig’s reflections on the ‘taking immigrant’ and the
‘foreign founder’ offer a further way of ‘switching’ the conventional
framing of the relationship between democratic self-determination and
control over membership. In contrast to the prevalent viewpoint which
sees the entrance of outsiders as a potential obstacle to the effective
self-determination and political autonomy of the state and its members,
the conclusion I advanced here is that the democratic vitality of
regimes - and therefore, to an extent, the autonomy of the existing
citizens themselves - can draw sustenance from the admission of
foreigners to social membership and citizenship.
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Chapter 7: Conclusion
7.1: Summarising the Thesis
This thesis has explored the question of whether and to what extent the
right to collective self-determination justifies or entails a right on the
part of liberal-democracies to control admission to membership. As I
noted in the introductory chapter, it is often said that the question of the
admission of outsiders to membership brings into relief a tension
between two of the core commitments of liberal-democracies. On the
one hand, the liberal commitment to universal freedom and equality
seems to generate a strong presumption in favour of open borders and
the inclusion of resident aliens as citizens. Joseph Carens and Philip
Cole, amongst others, have put forward robust arguments to this
conclusion.1 Liberals have commonly advanced arguments against the
exclusion of outsiders from bounded nation-states, from the value of
freedom of movement and from the value of social justice and equality
of opportunity. On the other hand, the democratic commitment to
self-determination seems to generate a strong presumption in favour of
allowing states to control admission to membership and to exclude
outsiders from participating in their ‘internal’ decisions and
deliberations. Theorists who stress the normative significance of
shared national identity like Yael Tamir, Michael Walzer and David
Miller, amongst others, have put forward strong arguments to this
conclusion. Arguments in support of self-determination rights for
distinct political communities commonly appeal to the value of
individual and collective autonomy. However, this picture is
complicated by the fact that a number of democratic theorists - such as
1 Carens (1992); Carens (1995); Cole (2000). See also Dummett
(2002) & Kymlicka (2001a).
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Iris Young and Arash Abizadeh - have argued for limiting the ability of
self-determining political communities to exclude outsiders from their
‘internal’ decisions on democratic grounds; often by appealing to a
principle of democratic inclusion according to affected interests or
subjection to coercion. These tensions are the background motivation
for my project. Does the question of admission to and exclusion from
membership entail that liberal-democracy is in some sense a
paradoxical marriage of contradictory political values and principles? I
will return to this question in the final section of this chapter, when I
discuss the broader theoretical implications of my argument.
In the introductory chapter I identified three forms of democratic
exclusion: exclusion from social membership (i.e. exclusion from
entering and settling in the territory as a permanent resident), from
citizenship (i.e. full and formal membership in the polity) and from
participatory membership (a right to have a democratic voice in the
‘internal’ decisions of other political communities). I then identified
six different accounts of the value and practice of self-determination
that would provide the framework for the ensuing argument: liberal
nationalist, identity liberal, liberal communitarian,
multicultural/republican, cosmopolitan/discourse theory and agonistic.
Chapters 2 and 3 have discussed principally arguments from
self-determination for controlling admission to social membership and
citizenship, whilst Chapters 4 and 5 have discussed principally
arguments from self-determination for extending participatory
membership to affected outsiders. Chapter 6 has discussed the possible
merits of thinking through the relationship between self-determination
and political membership from the perspective of agonistic democratic
theory.
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I began Chapter 2 by addressing the cultural account of
self-determination put forward by the liberal nationalist Yael Tamir.
For Tamir, the value of national identity to individual autonomy
grounds a right on the part of self-determining national communities to
exclude those outsiders deemed unable or unwilling to endorse and
participate in the central tenets of that identity, which is said to include
shared values, beliefs and practices. In my critical discussion I
identified a number of tensions and inconsistencies in Tamir’s
argument, which in turn cast doubt on her defence of exclusion from
the value of national self-determination. For example, whilst national
identities are characterised by Tamir as being ‘pluralistic’ and capable
of accommodating normative diversity, her argument for excluding
outsiders on the grounds of their cultural identity and/or value
commitments would seem to be predicated on the idea that national
identities are homogenous and that the host community is united in its
values and beliefs. This objection, with others, suggests that the
tension that Tamir identifies between freedom of movement and
national self-determination is exaggerated within the terms of her own
theory.
I then looked briefly at the discussion of immigration and national
identity put forward by Will Kymlicka. He argues that restricting
admission to social membership may be justified as a means of
protecting the interest that the current members have in the
preservation of their ‘societal culture’, which encompasses a shared
language and common participation in shared political institutions, but
not shared values or beliefs in any thick sense. In response, I argued
that Kymlicka’s concern with protecting societal culture can be met by
internal measures designed to encourage the socio-political integration
and naturalisation of immigrants.
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In the final section of Chapter 2, I focused on the identity liberal
position on democracy and exclusion. Identity liberals argue that high
levels of immigration combined with multicultural policies that are
permissive towards non-liberal or anti-democratic values and cultural
practices can result in the corruption of the democratic system from
within. On the identity liberal view, the potential threat that
immigration and multiculturalism pose to democracy grounds a right
on the part of host communities to impose culturally assimilationist
admissions policies and to exercise powers of deportation. I argued
against this position firstly on the grounds of consistency. A political
community nominally committed to universal equality should be
prepared to apply the same social membership and citizenship
practices to both resident aliens and prospective migrants that are
applied to birthright citizens. I then put forward a series of arguments
designed to show that the identity liberal position on membership
contributes to a politically unappealing concept of identity and of
democratic discourse, critique and participation.
In Chapter 3, I discussed critically the arguments for membership
control from the value of self-determination put forward by Walzer and
Miller. Walzer defends exclusionary powers for nation-states at their
territorial borders but argues for a right to inclusion to citizenship for
all settled residents. His argument here turns partly on the
subject-to-the-law principle of democratic inclusion. This position on
citizenship contrasts favourably with the account of the discretionary
powers of political communities over admission to citizenship put
forward by liberal nationalists and identity liberals. The reasons for my
endorsement of Walzer’s position on citizenship were developed more
thoroughly in Chapter 4, when discussing Young’s position on
participatory membership. On the subject of admission to social
membership, Walzer puts forward communitarian and democratic
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arguments for excluding outsiders. In my critique I offered objections
to both. The communitarian argument for closure from the value of
diversity can be objected to on the grounds that regional political
diversity is preserved without restrictions on movement or on
membership within institutional arrangements like the federal states in
the US. The democratic argument for membership control from the
value of self-determination succumbs to a logical paradox, which is
that it seems impossible to use democratic criteria to demarcate the
political unit that has subsequent powers of exclusion.
In the second half of Chapter 3 I looked at David Miller’s account of
territorial rights, collective national responsibility and democratic
self-determination. Miller argues that a proper understanding of the
relationship between these three features of national political life
sustains a right on the part of liberal-democracies to exclude outsiders
from social membership. In my response, I tried to show that Miller’s
account of national responsibility and self-determination fails to
overcome considerations from equality that weigh in favour of open
borders. I then outlined the possible response that considerations of
equality are more relevant to arguments for the international
redistribution of wealth and resources than for opening up access to
membership in wealthier countries, and that liberal-democracies can
therefore ‘purchase’ the right to exclude. I put forward four arguments
against this view, suggesting that considerations of social justice in
favour of open borders cannot be assuaged straightforwardly by
redistributive efforts.
In keeping with the line of argument developed in Chapters 2 and 3,
Iris Young argues that the jurisdictional boundaries around
self-determining political communities should be open to allow the
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free movement and re-settlement of peoples. However, she also argues
that those jurisdictional boundaries should be set by and (re)negotiated
according to the all-affected principle of inclusion, which is an
important feature of her idea of self-determination as non-domination.
The primary focus of the first half of Chapter 4 was on Young’s
argument for re-conceptualising self-determination in terms of
non-domination rather than non-interference, and for extending rights
to participatory membership to affected outsiders. I argued against this
position, partly on the grounds that it seems logically impossible to
demarcate those who are affected by a decision or policy in terms that
are consistent with the all-affected principle itself. I also argued that
the self-determination of political communities could be undermined if
they do not have a right to exclude affected or dominated outsiders,
because affectedness or domination as jurisdictional rules threaten to
undermine the existence of stable, territorially bounded democratic
jurisdictions.
In the second half of Chapter 4 I continued my discussion of the merits
of the subject-to-the-law principle of demarcation. I began by arguing
against extending the concept of subjection to encompass subjection to
coercion. I then put forward a way of combining the subject-to-the-law
principle with the all-affected and all-coerced principles in a way that
is designed to reap the benefits of the clarity and determinacy of the
former without foregoing the normative insights afforded by the latter
two. Finally, I pointed out that - contra Young - advocating
self-determination as non-interference and the subject-to-the-law
principle of demarcation does not entail abandoning all forms of
inter-communal negotiation around issues that transcend the borders of
political communities. All it entails is that interaction and negotiation
will occur after a decision has been made.
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In Chapter 5 I discussed critically the cosmopolitan/discourse theory
approach to political membership put forward by Seyla Benhabib.
Benhabib argues that there is an ineliminable tension at the heart of
liberal-democracies between democratic self-determination and
cosmopolitan human rights, but that this can be mediated over time
through ‘democratic iterations’ and ‘jurisgenerative politics’. Like
Young, Benhabib supports the extension of participatory membership
to affected outsiders. I continued my critique of this position by
arguing that affectedness as a jurisdictional rule is problematic for
deliberative democrats like Benhabib because of their commitment to
deliberation to discover normatively valid principles and policies. If -
as I argued in Chapter 4 - affectedness as a jurisdictional rule requires
judging the merits of an issue prior to deciding the appropriate
constituency, it would seem to follow that the jurisdictional decision
lacks the kind of normative validity that discourse theory demands,
because the jurisdictional decision cannot logically be the outcome of
deliberation amongst all affected parties. I then outlined and rejected
two possible responses to this boundary problem that can be brought
out of Benhabib’s work. In the final section I criticised Benhabib’s
position on naturalisation, partly by arguing that her defence of the
right of political communities to employ economic criteria in their
naturalisation procedures is difficult to reconcile with her commitment
to universal respect and egalitarian reciprocity.
Chapter 6 focused on the agonistic approaches to democratic
self-determination and political membership put forward by Chantal
Mouffe and Bonnie Honig. Mouffe argues that democracy always
involves relationships of ‘us/them’ and that collective identities rest
upon exclusion. However, at the same time, Mouffe believes that
liberal-democracies will be more open to the re-interpretation of their
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existing political settlements if they face up to the political nature of
the necessary moments of exclusion entailed by democratic rule and
collective identity. In my critical response I argued that neither the
‘inclusion’ nor the ‘exclusion’ claim stands to reason. Mouffe’s
agonistic public sphere seems to require the assimilation of outsiders
into the dominant liberal ‘form of life’ as a condition of membership,
and so it seems to imply similar acts of exclusion as Tamir’s liberal
nationalism. As for the latter argument, the idea that collective identity
rests on exclusion does not ground the further claim that exclusion
must necessarily consist in the denial of membership to concrete,
actually existing individuals. A more accurate description of agonistic
self-determination is that of a ‘democracy of strangers’.
In the second half of Chapter 6 I developed further the idea of a
democracy of strangers through an interpretation of Bonnie Honig’s
recent work on the symbolic politics of foreignness. This reading of her
work led to the suggestion that democratic communities are often
revitalised by the entrance of foreigners. For example, by consenting to
their host regime through naturalising they provide evidence of the
‘choice-worthiness’ of the community they seek to join. Rather than
representing a challenge to or problem for liberal-democracy, in
Honig’s view immigration and foreignness often solve certain key
problems for liberal-democracies. This analysis complements my
critique of arguments from self-determination for the exclusion of
outsiders from social membership and citizenship, by pointing to ways
in which the inclusion of foreigners can be a tool for re-invigorating
democratic regimes.
My conclusion has not been that there are no circumstances under
which there may exist a collective right to exclude outsiders from
social membership or from citizenship. It is important to re-iterate the
point that, when it comes to the justifiability of exclusive membership
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practices, numbers do count. I have acknowledged that arguments for
membership control have greater purchase in cases where political
communities are at risk of being subject to cultural or political
domination at the hands of outsiders. Nonetheless, whether or not a
particular community is at risk of being overwhelmed in this way is
essentially an empirical matter, and so the threat of submergence
cannot ground a general right on the part of states to control
membership. So my claim is instead the more limited one that the
theorists I have discussed have difficulty in justifying a general right to
control membership on the basis of the value of self-determination. It is
unclear that the functions that self-determination is designed to
perform (for example the protection of cultural and political diversity)
and the values it is designed to further (for example the individual and
collective autonomy of existing citizens) would be compromised if
control over social membership and citizenship were removed from the
self-determining powers of liberal-democracies.
However, if the arguments of Chapters 4 and 5 have force, they suggest
that the right of states to non-interference - and so the exclusion of
outsiders from participatory membership - can be supported by the
value and practice of self-determination. I have argued that Young’s
attempt to construct a model of self-determination, without involving
exclusive jurisdictional boundaries, is problematic. Alongside a
number of other difficulties, the principle of democratic inclusion
according to affected interests - which is a key component of Young’s
concept of self-determination as non-domination – risks undermining
the existence of stable, territorially bounded political communities. If
the question: “who has a legitimate claim to membership because their
interests are affected?” has to precede any given decision on the part of
states about how to act, then the risk is that states could be prevented
from making any decisions at all. Negotiations around affected
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interests could be protracted indefinitely. This problem is compounded
by the logical indeterminacy involved in using the projected outcome
of a political decision (i.e. the range of individuals who will be affected
or coerced by a decision) to determine the group of individuals that get
to make the decision. Self-determination does therefore seem to call
for the distribution of democratic membership according to neutral and
procedural criteria, and the corresponding exclusion of non-resident,
non-citizens. This form of exclusion is required to preserve the
stability of the jurisdictional boundary within which laws are binding
upon those who authorise them.
I have argued that a similar logical conundrum undermines Benhabib’s
attempt to use the all-affected principle as a jurisdictional rule (a
critical discussion that applies to the reading of her work that interprets
her as being committed to the co-incidence of the moral and the
democratic community). Neither the teleological nor the
hypothetical-deliberation responses to this problem, which I canvassed
in turn, are satisfactory. The former argument is vulnerable to the
agonistic critique that holds that purportedly inclusive membership
procedures seem to inevitably embody alternative forms of exclusivity.
The latter argument is vulnerable to the objection that imaginative
deliberative procedures often work to reinforce the perspective of the
powerful and privileged, whilst marginalising those whose voice and
experiences are under-represented.
If valid, the upshot of my argument is that liberal-democrats should
support the right to self-determination as non-interference for distinct
political communities, but not the self-determination of their social
membership and citizenship policies. This would involve prising apart
self-determination from the ideal of sovereignty over border controls,
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but would still entail the exclusion of outsiders from the internal
decision-making procedures of distinct democratic communities.
A possible objection to my overall conclusion is that it is insufficiently
attentive of the ethnic, historic and cultural differences between
nation-states. As Walzer points out, “All the world is not America”.2 Is
it really the case that the self-determination of, say, the Danes, the
French or the British would not be compromised if they lacked control
over social membership and citizenship? These are nations that are said
to be based upon a distinctive shared historic and cultural background,
and the protection of that cultural background may, in turn, be said to
legitimate membership controls in order to preserve their collective
right to self-determination. In response, I should note that my overall
argument is compatible with recognising the justifiability of
naturalisation procedures that are designed to ensure integration into
this particular nation (whichever it may be), with its particular public
and political culture, history, customs and language. Learning about
the history of one’s host country, its language and its political
procedures and institutions seem to be reasonable requirements for
accessing citizenship in countries where there is said to be a strong
collective identity based on these sorts of cultural factors. But for
specifically liberal democracies, these measures are only justifiable in
so far as they are also applied to natives, otherwise the universalist and
egalitarian principles upon which their mode of governance is based
turn out to be chimerical.3 As I point out in the following section, the
UK policy of mandatory citizenship education for native-born citizens
as well as immigrants is to be commended for at least moving in a
direction which is congruent with this normative logic.
2 Walzer (2001).
3 See Chapter 2, section 2.6 & Chapter 5, section 5.5 of this thesis.
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7.2: Policy Implications
This thesis has dealt primarily with arguments and theories at a certain
level of abstraction from real-world politics. What difference might
these arguments make to actual practice? I want to focus now on the
policy implications of my theoretical analysis by discussing two recent
documents outlining UK policy on citizenship and immigration: the
2002 White Paper ‘Secure Borders, Safe Haven’4 (which I also
referred to briefly in the introduction to Chapter 2), and the 2006 Home
Office document ‘A Points-Based System: Making Migration Work
For Britain’5. I will also refer at points to other UK policy
developments as well as statements made by senior UK politicians.
The White Paper ‘Secure Borders …’ was designed to mark a clear
break in the restrictive immigration policies of previous UK
governments, promising “a new modern approach to immigration
which recognised its contribution to British economic and social life”.6
Introduced as part of New Labour’s focus on social inclusion and
inter-communal cohesion in the aftermath of racial tensions and civil
disturbances in Bradford, Oldham and Burnley in the spring and early
summer of 2001, the paper stresses the need to encourage the
integration of immigrants through ‘education for citizenship’ and
‘citizenship ceremonies’, with an emphasis on the need for immigrants
to adhere to what are said to be core British values.7 Despite the new
focus in the paper on promoting the inclusion to citizenship of settled
migrants and the promotion of economic migration, according to
Rosemary Sales the document is congruent with Labour policy on
4 Home Office (2002).
5 Home Office (2006).
6 Sales (2005), p459.
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immigration since the 1960s in so far as it stresses the need for the
control and secure management of migration into the country.8
William Walters agrees that “the White Paper continues a relatively
well-established convention that sees immigration as a threat to
domestic order that calls for careful management”.9 In Walter’s
analysis, the rhetoric of securitisation put forward in the document
reflects the idea of ‘domopolitics’:
Domopolitics implies a reconfiguring of the
relations between citizenship, state and territory.
At its heart is a fateful conjunction of home, land
and security. It rationalizes a series of security
measures in the name of a particular conception
of home … the home as hearth, a refuge or
sanctuary in a heartless world; the home as our
place, where we belong naturally, and where, by
definition, others do not … We may invite guests
into our home, but they come at our invitation;
they don’t stay indefinitely … Home as a place
to be secured because its contents (our property)
are valuable and envied by others. Home as a
safe, reassuring place, a place of intimacy,
togetherness and even unity, trust and
familiarity.10
From this passage, it is clear that domopolitics is the direct antithesis of
a democracy of strangers. In Walter’s view, ‘Secure Borders ...’
reinforces the idea that ‘our’ nation is ‘our’ home which must be
protected from outsiders. Should ‘we’ wish to invite outsiders in, ‘we’
may do so, but - as we saw in the discussion of Benhabib on Kant -
such acts of hospitality are entirely at the discretion of the existing
members, and there is no expectation that guests will “stay
indefinitely”. In Chapters 2 and 3, I argued that Tamir, Tebble,
7 Ibid, p455.
8 Ibid, p449.
9 Walters (2004), p239.
10 Ibid, p241
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Kymlicka, Walzer and Miller all fail to provide a defensible normative
account of self-determination that might sustain the validity of this
kind of domopolitics. The ideal of kinship underlying this concept of
home fails to do justice to the internal heterogeneity of
liberal-democracies. We have seen that whilst Tamir acknowledges the
internal diversity within national identities, she wants to protect one
particular interpretation of national identity from being corroded
through the entrance of outsiders. But if - as she herself states - national
identities can accommodate “extreme normative disagreement”11
amongst the existing members without threatening their autonomy,
there seems to be little basis within her theory of national
self-determination for the defence of immigration restrictions which
are designed to prevent the entrance of further diversity. Kymlicka, for
his part, has shown through his analysis of immigration politics in
Canada and the United States that harmonious socio-political
integration can be achieved through internal measures designed to
encourage naturalisation, language training and political participation.
This analysis undermines the rhetoric of securitisation at the border
which is promulgated by the idea of domopolitics behind ‘Secure
Borders ...’.
Walzer’s communitarian account of political community suffers from
a similarly indefensible idealisation of home life. It suggests that “we
belong naturally” in ‘our’ own political community. In so doing, it
overlooks the point that the identity of the ‘we’ is fractured, internally
divided and heterogenous. As we have seen, agonistic democrats argue
that home is never simply “a place of intimacy, togetherness ... unity,
trust and familiarity”. Honig’s analysis of the symbolic politics of
foreignness suggests, in contrast to the rhetoric of ‘Secure Borders …’,
11 Tamir (1993), p90.
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that immigrants should not be seen as a threat to the democratic vitality
of the nations they seek to join. Her account of the role of
‘foreign-founders’ and ‘consenting immigrants’ suggests that the very
alterity of newcomers is often the key to the way in which they
reinvigorate democratic regimes, by providing evidence of their
choice-worthiness.
Miller’s discussion of collective national responsibility, democratic
self-determination and political membership is grist to the mill for
proponents of domopolitics. It is designed to show that ‘our’ home is
‘our’ collective property, and that ‘we’ should both shoulder the
burdens and enjoy the benefits of our self-determined decisions to the
exclusion of outsiders. I argued against this position, in part by
disputing the closeness of the ‘fit’ between the actions of states and the
collective will of nations. Miller’s position is also supportive of the
more explicitly economic approach to membership controls outlined
initially in ‘Secure Borders …’ and developed more thoroughly in the
recent UK policy document ‘A Points-Based System … ’. In contrast to
the language of shared British values which is prevalent in ‘Secure
Borders ... ’, this document places greater emphasis on the importance
of the skills and resources that migrants possess and the possible
contribution they could make to the domestic economy. As we saw in
the introductory chapter, the core message of the document is that
citizens will be able to exercise unilateral control over immigration
according to their self-defined economic needs and goals:
(…) this new points-based system will allow
employers and those in educational institutions
to take ownership of migration to this country.
They, rather than just the Home Office alone,
will be able to vet who comes into the UK
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according to the skills and talents of individuals
they feel they need to enhance their sector.12
It seems that Miller’s discussion of self-determination is designed
explicitly to support this kind of approach to immigration. The idea of
a points-based system of migration control with highly skilled
labourers set on the quickest path to social membership and citizenship
also fits neatly with Benhabib’s defence of economic criteria for
citizenship. However, I have argued that neither theorist has shown
convincingly that liberal-democracies should regard economic criteria
for admission to membership as a normatively unproblematic
manifestation of their right to self-determination. In Miller’s case, his
argument that self-determination would be ‘hollowed out’ if the host
community were unable to set restrictive border controls because free
movement could make the community’s self-defined goals harder to
fulfill (which includes the way in which migration might “change …
the mix of skills available in the workforce”)13 is undermined by the
evidence of heterogenous preferences for state policy in both the
existing body of citizens as well as migrants. As for Benhabib, I have
argued that her defence of economic criteria in the selection of new
immigrants is difficult to reconcile with her commitment to universal
respect and egalitarian reciprocity. I also noted that Walzer’s
discussion of the exclusion from citizenship of Turkish guest workers
in Germany illustrates the potentially illiberal and undemocratic
implications of the kind of ‘open-borders-but-exclusive-citizenship’
policy that Benhabib’s position seems to permit. The points-based
approach introduced in ‘Secure Borders ….’ makes access to residency
status, social rights and citizenship much harder for those migrants in
low skilled jobs.14 The Highly Skilled Migrant Programme outlined in
12 Home Office (2006), Foreword.
13 Miller (2007), p222.
14 Sales (2005), pp. 454-455.
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the document offers residency status in Britain to “those at the top of
their chosen profession”,15 whilst those without the skills required are
offered short-term stay, are denied the right to bring in dependents and
their access to social rights is restricted. From the Walzerian
perspective on citizenship which I have argued in defence of, the clear
distinction drawn in ‘Secure Borders …’ between skilled and unskilled
migrants and the differential rights accorded on that basis is
problematic, because it contradicts the subject-to-the-law principle of
demarcation. More broadly, the whole notion of ‘earned citizenship’
for migrants - emphasised by Gordon Brown in a 2008 speech to
members of the third sector and local government representatives in
North London,16 and also reflected in David Blunkett’s introduction to
‘Secure Borders …’ where he welcomes only “those who have a
contribution to make to our country (i.e. skilled migrants)”17 - seems
hard to reconcile with the automatic acquisition of citizenship for some
individuals at birth in a society nominally committed to universal
equality.18
However, as I noted above my argument is compatible with a formal
period of residency as a requirement of naturalisation, as well as forms
of citizenship education and language training, but only in so far as
these measures are also applied to those born within the territory or
born to citizen parents. From this perspective, the introduction in 2002
of mandatory citizenship education in UK schools is to be commended
for its even-handedness. The implied message is that simply being a
native-born citizen is insufficient in itself to guarantee the possession
15 Home Office (2002), p43.
16 Brown (2008).
17 Home Office, (2002).
18 Sales (2005, p459) also questions the compatibility of the system of
immigration control outlined in ‘Secure Borders’ with the liberal
“universalist commitment to the moral equality of humanity”, quoting
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and exercise of the virtues of citizenship, so that both foreigners and
natives are required to undertake some kind of training in preparation
for the exercise of their democratic voice. This seems a particularly
valid message that should guide UK policy thinking with regard to
questions of social cohesion and political stability, given that the
majority of the individuals of Muslim faith who were involved in the
civil unrest in the north of England in 2001 were not immigrants, but in
fact British born-citizens.19 Citizenship education for native born
citizens helps to dispel the idea - promulgated by identity liberalism -
that migrants alone pose a threat to the competent and responsible
native citizen body. In a similarly even-handed manner, ‘Secure
Borders …. ’ stresses that the goal of encouraging social and political
inclusion needs to be applied to native citizens as well as immigrants.
In particular, it expresses concerns about “white working-class
communities whose alienation from the political process, along with
their physical living conditions and standards of living, leave them
socially excluded”.20 The recognition that native citizens as well as
immigrants can suffer from social and political alienation provides a
corrective to Walter’s characterisation of ‘Secure Borders …’ as an
instance of domopolitics exclusively. It also provides a corrective to
the concerns that identity liberals place exclusively on the potentially
disruptive consequences of the social and political alienation of
immigrant communities. In their application of broadly similar
procedures, values and standards to natives and newly arrived migrants
alike, these two aspects of UK policy and governmental rhetoric seem
to me impeccably liberal in principle.
Cole (2000), p2. See also Wilcox (2004), p580-581.
19 FAIR (2002), p2.
20 Home Office, (2002), p10.
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As we have seen, both Young and Benhabib dispute the claim that
subjection to the law should be the criterion of inclusion in liberal
democracies. They argue instead that participatory membership should
be extended to affected or dominated outsiders. Institutionally, this
would lead to the creation of either supra-national or global democratic
fora, or else a federated system of interlinking and overlapping
jurisdictions with access to regional or global governing bodies. If my
arguments in Chapters 4 and 5 have force, they suggest that arguments
from self-determination provide robust grounds for resisting these
moves towards transnational or global democracy on the grounds of
affectedness of coercion. Instead, more effort should be made to
strengthen existing forms of transnational or international legislation
dealing with political issues of transnational or global scope. Naturally,
my argument would hold that the individuals who would be bound by
these laws should have a say in their formulation. So the
subject-to-the-law principle would strongly support the
democratisation of transnational law-making institutions like the
European Union. In Chapter 4, I pointed out that my argument for
self-determination as non-interference (and the corresponding right of
liberal democracies to exclude outsiders from participatory
membership) is compatible with recognising the need for interaction
and negotiation between political communities on issues that may
impact jointly on their respective interests. But I have suggested that
for this to be a logically coherent and politically feasible enterprise
which is compatible with democratic self-determination, rights to
participatory membership must first be awarded according to the
subject-to-the-law principle. However, I have recognised that a further
condition for the normative feasibility of my argument is that
comparatively wealthy states take credible efforts to fight global
distributive inequality. Otherwise the outcome of negotiation,
log-rolling, etc, is liable to serve only the interests of the more
powerful and prosperous liberal democracies.
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7.3: Theoretical Implications
What broader theoretical implications might be gleaned from the
argument of this thesis? What kind of light do the theories, arguments
and counter-arguments discussed here shed on the idea that liberalism
and democracy collide fatally on the subject of membership
controls?Abizadeh observes that:
The tendency in the received literature is to
frame debates in the ethics of borders in terms of
a conflict between the individual “liberal” right
to freedom of movement and the collective
“democratic” right to self-determination - and
then to weigh the liberal and democratic reasons
for and against open borders.21
If - as I have argued - democratic self-determination should not and
need not encompass the right to exclude outsiders from social
membership and citizenship, then the liberal presumption in favour of
freedom of international movement defended by authors like Carens
and Cole need not be thought of as running up sharply against the
democratic commitment to the preservation of the territorial and
jurisdictional boundaries of political communities. According to my
argument, those boundaries are still required to protect the right of
liberal democracies to non-interference, but this thesis suggests that
self-determination is compatible with those boundaries being open to
allow the free passage and (re)settlement of individuals. In contrast to
what has become a prevalent line of thinking with regard to the politics
of membership in liberal-democracies, I argue that the value of free
movement championed by liberalism is compatible with the value of
self-determination championed by democrats. Democrats can join
21 Abizadeh (2008), p54.
389
liberals in campaigning for greater porosity in borders without
sacrificing what is arguably their most cherished ideal. What Benhabib
and Mouffe identify as the ‘constitutive tension’ at the heart of
liberal-democracies, between liberty and equality, may not be as
intractable as they suggest, at least as far as the topic of membership is
concerned. Whelan has argued that whilst liberalism calls for “the
reduction if not the abolition of the sovereign power of states …
especially those connected with borders and the citizen-alien
distinction”, democracy “practically requires the division of humanity
into distinct, civically bounded groups that function as more or less
independent political units”.22 According to the argument of this thesis,
Whelan is incorrect in so far as we understand his claim to be that
democracy calls for differentiated jurisdictions that function to exclude
outsiders from the territory and from citizenship, and that this
commitment sets democracy in opposition to liberalism. But if we
understand his claim to be simply that democracy calls for
differentiated jurisdictions, then this is not incompatible with my
argument that those jurisdictions are required for the
self-determination of distinct political communities, but that they can
nevertheless be open to allow the free movement and re-settlement of
individuals without compromising self-determination.
As we saw in Chapter 4, Abizadeh has argued that as far as political
membership is concerned, both liberal and democratic considerations
point to the need for border controls to be jointly negotiated between
territorial insiders and outsiders: “(…) a state’s regime of border
control could only acquire legitimacy if there were cosmopolitan
democratic institutions in which borders received actual justifications
addressed to both citizens and foreigners”.23 An implication of my
22 Whelan (1988a), p16-17, p28.
23 Abizadeh (2008), p48.
390
argument in this thesis is that if such democratic cosmopolitan
institutions were organised in this way, appeals to self-determination in
order to justify a regime of border controls should be rejected. But I
have also argued against the all-coerced principle of demarcation
which Abizadeh appeals to in order to substantiate his argument for
shared decision-making authority over borders in the first place. In my
view, the construction of cosmopolitan democratic institutions cannot
be supported on the grounds of coercion; but part of the potential sting
is removed from this conclusion because self-determination does not in
my view support exclusive border controls in the first place.
My conclusion regarding the compatibility of democracy and
liberalism on the subject of social membership and citizenship may at
first sight seem radical. It may seem to have implications about the
desirability of greater porosity in borders which are utopian given the
“peculiar significance” of membership controls in the current status of
contemporary international law and nation-state sovereignty. However,
it is worth bearing in mind that the current bureaucratic approach of
liberal-democracies towards the restriction, control and/or
management of immigration is a relatively new phenomenon, and that
extensive freedom of movement for individuals has existed in the
past24. Bernard Porter observes that “For the best part of the 19th
century the British government deliberately denied itself any control
over immigration, and appeared indeed for the most part to take no
interest in it”.25 In the US, federal regulation of immigration dates from
the 1880s26 and the practice of keeping federal records of immigrants
dates from the 1820s.27 As Walters points out:
24 Cole (2000), p30.
25 Porter (1979), p4; quoted in Walters (2004), p250. See also Seglow
(2006a), p3.
26 Castles and Miller (1993), p45; quoted in Walters (2004), p250.
27 Bernard (1998), p55.
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It is tempting to assume that … border controls
are a natural and eternal feature of political life.
Indeed, the case for ‘upgrading’ border control is
frequently made in terms of ‘protecting’ and
‘preserving’ the ‘sovereignty’ of the state, as
though sovereignty were inconceivable without
border control. Yet … it seems that
administrative barriers to migration between
nations in nineteenth century Europe were quite
minimal.28
As I noted in the introduction, liberal political theory has largely been
silent on the question of membership controls. A rare counter-example
can be found in Henry Sidgwick’s The Elements of Politics, written in
1897, where he argues that:
A State must obviously have the right to admit
aliens on its own terms, imposing any conditions
on entrance or tolls on transit, and subjecting
them to any legal restrictions or disabilities that
it may deem expedient. It ought not, indeed,
once having admitted them, to apply to them
suddenly, and without warning, a harsh
differential treatment, but as it may legitimately
exclude them altogether, it must have a right to
treat them in any way it thinks fit, after due
warning given and due time allowed for
withdrawal.29
However, in the last thirty years or so theorists of both liberal and
democratic persuasion have become increasingly concerned about the
justification of practices of membership control from the perspective of
a philosophy of universal freedom and equality, in a way that contrasts
strikingly with Sidgwick’s relatively straightforward analysis. Liberal
28 Walters (2004), p250.
29 Sidgwick (1897), p248.
392
nationalists, identity liberals, democrats and communitarians have
responded to these concerns by appealing primarily to the value of
self-determination. If my arguments in this thesis have force, their
responses should be rejected; suggesting in turn that liberalism and
democracy coincide on the subject of social membership and
citizenship controls. However, this thesis maintains that democratic
self-determination does require a stable and determinate jurisdictional
container, which today is supplied, and in all likelihood will continue
to be supplied, by a nation-state. But it need not necessarily be so.
Other forms of democratic organisation and participation are feasible
and desirable, given that the self-determined decisions of democratic
associations can and often do have consequences that can impact
negatively on the rights and interests of individuals who are
disenfranchised, either because they are situated outside the
jurisdiction of the state making the decisions in question or because
they lack citizenship status. But whether democratic deliberation and
decision-making is carried out nationally, sub-nationally,
transnationally or globally, according to the argument of this thesis
those who should be accorded participatory membership in those
deliberations and decisions should be defined according to those who
will be bound by the laws issued by the governing body in question.
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